Crime prevention series

Buses and bus shelters

Published in:
Preventing crime on transport
Patricia Weiser Easteal and Paul R Wilson
Canberra : Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991
ISBN 0 642 16609 9 ; ISSN 1031-5330
(Crime prevention series) ; pp. 23-35

The Scope of the Problem

Crime prevention programs dealing with bus travel target both offences and locations. The former includes fare evasion, vandalism, graffiti, and assaults against employees and passengers. Buses, depots and shelters must all be considered as potential locations for some or all of these crimes. As the range of the problem is broad, the prevention program must therefore be appropriately targeted.

Fare evasion

A spokesperson for New South Wales State Transit estimates that $A8 million a year is lost in that state alone through fare evasion. An ACTION (Australian Capital Territory) bus administrator states that although this crime is not specifically monitored, it probably reduces revenue by 10 to 25 per cent. Fare evasion encompasses a range of activities from over-riding beyond the paid distance to lying about age; using outdated or forged tickets or passes, to refusal to pay the fare. Fare evasion appears to be fairly commonplace throughout the world although the last 10 years have witnessed the implementation of various preventive strategies, discussed later, that it is hoped will reduce its incidence.

Vandalism and graffiti

Broken windows, ripped seats and graffiti (in that order) are the three primary bus vandalism costs. For one bus company in northern England with 700 buses, vandalism repairs (prior to a prevention program discussed later) were costing about £250,000 a year (Poyner 1988). Children were the primary culprits smashing windows, slashing seats, spraying paint and throwing various objects. Seats on the upper floor of double decker buses, those on buses without conductors and back seats are more likely to be damaged since surveillance of them is lessened (Sturman 1980). Every year each French bus loses three or four seats due to vandalism contributing to an annual cost of FF20 million (Quidort 1989). A New South Wales State Transit maintenance supervisor believes that much of the graffiti on their buses is done in depots with 'kids and spray cans of paint'; however, his impression is that such activity peaked in 1983 and has been reduced considerably, with better security in the garages.

A Canberra bus shelter covered in graffiti.

Photo: Australian Institute of Criminology

Vandalism is not restricted to windows, seats and graffiti. One transit company's chief engineer reports that holes in the ceilings of buses have had to be repaired; these were caused by persons swinging on the hand rails and actually kicking their feet through the ceiling.

Assaults on staff

Assaults on bus drivers appear to be quite commonplace throughout the world. For example, in Great Britain in the five-year period 1979-83, there were almost 10,000 attacks reported. These assaults were widespread, not restricted to large urban areas and there was a trend toward more serious attacks occurring (Department of Transport 1986b). Another British study found that the major causes of aggression towards bus staff are disputes over fares, hooliganism and traffic incidents (Oxley 1987). Alcohol appears to play a major causative role with a peak in aggressive behaviour taking place in the late evening when pubs close. Another peak occurs in late afternoon when children are en route from school to home.

Crimes against passengers

Bus drivers are not the only potential victims of assault or robbery; attacks on passengers, particularly at stops or shelters, may be much higher than official police figures indicate, and they may be increasing. In France crimes against passengers were rising at a significantly higher rate than the increase in passengers (Quidort 1989). A low rate of reporting is shown by Levine and Wachs (1986) who conducted a telephone survey in Los Angeles and found that only 42 per cent of 'victims had reported crimes. Victimisation was correlated with frequency of bus use; overcrowded conditions (on the bus and at the sh6iter); the rear section of the bus; late afternoon and early evening. Certain types of bus stops were more conducive to higher crime rates; those with heavy pedestrian traffic, proximity to secondary school(s) and, at one location, a possible drug trade. Bus stops are the more frequent location of victimisation towards bus travellers; 57 per cent of crimes in one study occurred outside of the bus (Levine & Wachs 1985).

Crime prevention

The financial costs of fare evasions, vandalism and lost staffing time are indeed significant, but they are not the only costs. As with trains, fear of crime can cut down on passenger travel which translates into reduced revenue for the bus company. As a result, many companies have adopted crime prevention programs in part based on a situational model.

Prior to devising specific strategies, environmental correlates must be ascertained. The capability of isolating significant variables is restricted by the existing crime data collection and analysis. Since police statistics often do not differentiate assaults in buses from other locations, the targeting of high-crime routes or shelters is problematic. Further, if the transport authority or company does not maintain records of vandalism for example which part(s) of the vehicle, which routes-once again the implementation of an effective prevention program is difficult. In fact, if incidents are not recorded, bus systems are not able to determine if they have a vandalism problem. New South Wales State Transit used to monitor such destructive activities, however a divisional maintenance supervisor indicated that since the Authority was split into Divisions in July 1988, records are no longer kept.

Thus, it is important to stress that the success of any of the models described below is directly proportionate to the amount of research and data available that reveal the geographical and other environmental factors that correlate most significantly with criminal acts. It is suggested that the first line of prevention should be standardised forms for each state's transit system on which all criminal incidents are recorded.

Fare evasion

The deployment of inspectors, at least on a periodic basis, is one means of ensuring that tickets or passes are valid and genuine. In mid-November 1990, New South Wales State Transit ran a 'Be Fare Aware Week' which included uniformed revenue inspectors riding the buses (and ferries) and checking one in 25 passengers.

The New South Wales program included a public education component with the theme 'Pay the fare, the right fare, or pay the price'. The latter refers to the $50 penalty for fare evasion.

Other cities' buses, such as Minneapolis-St Paul in the United States, rely upon a two-way radio system with a silent alarm (Harris 19721. If a rider refuses to pay or appears to be using a forged pass, the driver relays a request for assistance to the police and to transit street supervisors via a central control centre. The latter patrol by car which enables them to respond quickly.

The ultimate response to these offences may lie in high-tech innovations. New South Wales State Transit has called for tenders for an on-board bus ticketing system which would presumably be sophisticated enough to be less vulnerable to misuse than the existing technology. ACTION buses in the ACT are looking at advanced technology as a long-term solution. Experience in the Netherlands with automatic on-bus machines showed, however, that fare-dodging increased (Van Andel 1989). As a result, the ticketing system was removed and replaced by a system in which all passengers must enter by the door near the driver either showing their ticket or purchasing a new one (Van Dijk & Junger-Tas 1988).

1991 and 1992 are witnessing the implementation of pass and ticket modifications in the ACT aimed at drastically reducing the current fraudulent misuse. FAREGO passes (concession cards) had not changed in appearance for a number of years and were visually the same for all types of concession. ACTION is introducing four different cards aimed at levels of driver recognition, for example colour to designate type of card. The new passes contain devices in their printing that render them unable to be photocopied unlike the former type which could be duplicated. Quarterly tickets will also be markedly transformed in appearance with the important information, for example month/year, much more visible to the driver. In addition, passes will have to be removed from wallets, preventing another fraudulent practice-the placement of cards in such a way as to obscure dates or type of pass.

ACTION is aware of fare evasion practices that originate with their employees. Currently, FAREGO tickets, which come in packets of 10 and are supposed to be detached in front of the driver, are resold by some personnel. The passenger either pretends to tear a ticket out of a used booklet or enters the bus with just a ticket. To prevent this misuse, the new tickets will be serrated and the passenger will have to rip one on entering to preclude reselling.

An analysis of passenger flow with the appropriate usage of buses would act to minimise offences since bus drivers are better able to monitor the proffering of fares if the buses are not overly crowded. In the latter situation, inspectors could be deployed.

Vandalism and graffiti

Buses: are vulnerable to vandalism both while on the road and in the garage or depot. The opportunity for crime against garaged buses can be reduced by employing security officers, a closed circuit televising (CCTV) system or some alarm mechanism. In both the garage or whilst working, vandal resistant materials in buses are one method of reducing opportunity and can be used in both windows and seats. Windows can be made of safety glass and be glued, instead of being held by rubber, to reduce the ability to break or kick them in. Since most seat damage is caused by cutting or ripping, 'hard' seats, made of fibreglass, may be a solution (Schnell et al. 1973). Slash-resistant fabrics are also available. Thus in France, during a two-year trial on two routes, a 'vandal-proof seat' was employed which was not damaged. These seats have a covering reinforced with slash-resistant trellis work (Quidort 1989). Some companies such as ACTION in the ACT have targeted the two rear seats, putting stainless steel backing on them. They are hoping to change the entire seat design using a plastic frame, formed plywood and fabric stapled to the wood. Thus, no stitching would be required for repairs.

Since most buses lack conductors, supervision of passengers is more limited. There are three ways of compensating and enhancing the surveillance of activities on buses: design of vehicle, inspectors, and video cameras. Los Angeles has used special undercover agents on their buses to monitor passenger behaviour. Other cities have inspectors but the people hours required limit the efficacy of this method.

Poyner (1988) describes the experimentation with video cameras by one northern England company in which 24 buses were actually equipped with the remainder having dummy cameras installed to save financial input. Coupled with publicity and a 'Bus Watch' program described below, a significant reduction in vandalism resulted. It should be noted that displacement does not appear to have resulted; in fact offences have been reduced on all the buses.

Opportunities for vandalism and graffiti can be reduced by: ordinances prohibiting eating and drinking on the vehicle; flat surfaces which are coloured in such a way that felt-tip markers will not show up; the use of non-flammable materials; and by affixing fixtures and fittings in a way that decreases the possibility of removal (Sturman 1980). In addition, restrictions on the sale of spray paint have been implemented in a number of states in America.

Some companies point to speed in repairing and cleaning the vehicles as a primary prevention method. As described in the chapter Trains, trams and underground systems, maintaining a clean vehicle is a primary deterrent to further graffiti; the same is true for other destructive activities.

In addition, community involvement can play a major role in combating vandalism. Most campaigns have been aimed at youth, striving to have the children feel that the buses are a part of their world. In France, the 'cool bus' project outfitted some buses, externally and internally, as more suited to schoolchildren. The latter submitted designs for the exteriors and music facilities, coloured seats and platforms were installed (Quidort 1989). After two years, these buses were reported as damage-free.

American cities have tried to improve students' attitudes about their bus system with inclusion of football players in public relations campaigns; visits of children to transit repair garages to get a better idea of what is involved in bus maintenance; competitions for anti-graffiti posters; and in some urban systems, an employee who acts as liaison with schools (Thrasher & Schnell 1974).

The Bus Watch program in northern England, mentioned above, brings a video equipped bus to a school. After a formal talk, the children go for a ride on the top deck to the depot and through the bus wash. The camera is turned on for part of the time so that, after returning to the school, the children watch the video and are able to see how future misbehaviour could be detected. The Victorian Public Transport Company is launching a similar program - 'Travel Safe Bus'. The bus contains dynamic audio-visual displays and other material; content can be adjusted to different age groups.

Another English transit company has hoped to combat both vandalism and driver assault with an 'Adopt a Bus' plan in which a school 'adopts' a particular bus. A photo is received along with the vehicle's biographical details encouraging the children to think of it as their bus. The program has been successful in reducing vandalism (Department of Transport 1986b).

Bus shelters: are popular sites for graffiti. Canberra's ACTION buses (and other Australian transit authorities), working with local schools and the community, have implemented a creative anti-graffiti program.

Canberra bus shelters painted by school students

Photo: Australian Institute of Criminology

In an annual painting competition, primary and secondary schools compete for $1,000 from a paint company and $300 worth of bus hire by painting murals in a bus shelter close to the school. Designs prove to be very creative, ranging from Aboriginal motifs to bush scenes. ACTION is hoping to develop this program further and have schools, companies and government offices 'Adopt a Shelter', undertaking to maintain it in pristine condition throughout the year. Future plans also extend to implementing 'Adopt an Interchange' with a college or other nearby institution assuming responsibility for the walls and platforms of a station.

Assaults on staff

Early experience in London has shown that the installation of a screen around the driver results in a 30 per cent decrease in assaults (Oxley 1987). In France, the seat is not often enclosed since it is neither believed to be effective nor perceived positively by passengers (Quidort 1989). New South Wales State Transit experimented with partitions at night on 20 buses but these partitions were not employed during peak hours when they proved to be 'in the way'. As the deterrent value did not outweigh other variables, it was decided to discard them. One British evaluation presented the various pros and cons of the polycarbonate screens fitted above the door into the driver's section (Department of Transport 1986b). Negative driver responses included glare and reflections at night, separation from passengers with consequent difficulties in communication and feelings of claustrophobia. However, these protective partitions, along with a new fare system that reduced passenger/driver conflict, significantly reduced assaults on the drivers (Poyner & Warne 1988).

Instead of partitions, New South Wales State Transit relies on a two-way radio, emergency buttons that are activated either by foot or by removing the cash tray, and a hidden microphone linked to the bus office. An interviewed employee felt the latter was particularly effective because the driver could verbally (in a covert way) give the location of the bus. A radio may not decrease the number of assaults significantly but does appear to increase the proportion of those apprehended. Radios can be connected with police and/or with bus employees/street supervisors. Los Angeles buses are equipped with the above plus four-way flashing lights which, when illuminated, indicate an emergency. Vehicles have their numbers painted on the roofs for easy identification by police helicopters (Hebert 1978).

Radios, silent alarms, flashing lights and cameras are morale boosters for the drivers; however, in preventing assault, their potential value is delineated and limited by both the drivers' ability to reach the apparatus and the speed of response by the police. A surprise attack and/or the assailant's knowledge of the alarm may preclude its use. Further, police may not prioritise bus alarms highly if there has been a precedent of false alarms (Fhrasher & Schnell 1974). Some buses that display electronic digital destinations on the front and/or side are equipped (by silent alarm) to flash messages such as 'send police' (Pearlstein & Wachs 1982). The primary value of closed circuit cameras (CCTV) lies in deterrence and eventual apprehension of the perpetrator. One problem in the effective utilisation of cameras on buses is the difficulty in providing sufficient lighting to enable quality photos yet not enough to make night driving problematic.

Suggestions about the design and procedures in buses have been generated. Centre exit doors may reduce assaults since some attacks on staff occur when the passenger disembarks. If (s)he leaves by a centre, or rear door, opportunity is obviously reduced. Other ideas include the careful placement of mirrors so that would-be assailants would actually see themselves; cutout mechanisms on bells, for example a sign 'bus stopping' which turns off the bell after it is rung once, since continuous ringing can cause tempers to rise; and pay systems whereby the driver has a minimum amount of money, for example, exact fare, passes, tickets, since robbery is often an aspect of assaults. As conflicts about fares are the most common source of assaults, a fare system based on zones and passes reduces the frequency of attacks on drivers (Oxley 1987). Another secondary prevention method, advocated by an ACTION bus executive, is gearing numbers of vehicles to passenger volume. A lengthy wait can exacerbate negative attitudes whilst a quick response rate to travel needs improves the general relationship between the transit authority and the public.

Many companies are including a component in their drivers' training that illustrates in what ways the employees can defuse potentially aggressive interactions. In Paris, this involves discussion of types of passengers, the use of roleplaying and transactional analysis (Quidort 1989). Some British firms include assertiveness training and stress management (Department of Transport 1986b).

Increased liaison with the police and the community can also act to prevent assaults. The British Department of Transport study found that some police departments have helped to design and implement the training programs while in London, the 'hop-on-a-bus' program involves all uniformed officers travelling on a bus a minimum of one time during each shift and visiting bus depots in order to become acquainted with staff. The public can play a role through publicity campaigns and rewards. Publicity is a two-edged sword, however, since fear of violence may reduce ridership.

Crimes against passengers

As stated above, American studies on crime at bus stops and on buses isolated certain environmental factors that correlate with risk of robbery or assault. Any city or town targeting these offences would need to precede such an endeavour with detailed collection of data aimed at isolating high risk shelters and then analysing the particular physical and/or cultural variables that seem conducive to passenger assault. The construction and maintenance of such a database is an essential element of crime prevention.

Buses: Levine and Wachs' (1985) random survey of households in Los Angeles revealed a number of suggestions for improving passenger safety while on the bus. These included better scheduling to minimise overcrowding, designing the rear of the vehicle in a manner that would permit improved passenger flow, and increased employment of the drivers in a security role. Specifically, ideas included: seats in the back that could be set no in a circular fashion to reduce isolation and lack of visibility by other passengers and/or the driver; rear or central doors to generate a passenger traffic flow that could interrupt a criminal offence; and better mirrors to facilitate drivers' view of that section. However, the latter implies a security role by drivers who may be reluctant to add another duty to their job requirements. Since such a role of employee surveillance is one of the cornerstones of situational prevention, staff on buses and other transport need to be encouraged to provide this service to their employers.

Bus shelters: If it is known which stops have higher incidence of robberies and/or assaults, police patrols in those areas can be increased. Another alternative is to relocate the stop, moving it away from the pub or school which appears to affect the crime rate. Levine and Wachs (1985) note that such action may not help since the offences might just move with it. Further, passengers may become confused and older people may be hampered by additional walking distances.

Bus stops or shelters should be well lit and crowding reduced by both appropriate vehicle flow (particularly at school closing times) and by separating bus passengers from pedestrians. The latter is possible by a number of arrangements including peninsulas that either extend into the street or are the consequence of erecting physical objects, for example stone pillars in a circular fashion that make a speedy escape by culprits more difficult (Levine & Wachs 1985).

Community involvement through local merchants' surveillance and school programs ('Adopt a Bus Stop') are other prevention strategies.

Summary

All crimes committed on buses and appropriate prevention methods have not been mentioned. For example, companies may experience robbery of fare monies if some type of locked money box and/or exact fare system is not employed. Installing safes on New York City buses (along with flat fares) resulted in the almost total elimination of robberies of bus drivers in that city (see Clarke & McGrath 1990 for discussion).

This is another example of how to reduce the opportunity for committing a crime. As discussed in this chapter, there are many possible measures that can be used to 'harden the targets'. When implementation is both preceded and followed by careful consideration of the specific patterns and factors involved in the particular situation, the prevention methods are likely to be effective and cost efficient.