Crime prevention series

Trains, Trams and underground systems

Published in:
Preventing crime on transport
Patricia Weiser Easteal and Paul R Wilson
Canberra : Australian Institute of Criminology, 1991
ISBN 0 642 16609 9 ; ISSN 1031-5330
(Crime prevention series) ; pp. 3-22

The scope of the problem

Fare dodging, vandalism and assault are major problems in rail transit around the world. The distribution varies: for example, in London the main crime in 1985 was theft from the person (Department of Transport 1986a); in Moscow and Tokyo vandalism and graffiti are rare (Wilson 1987); and in New York, where anti-graffiti programs have been successful, theft and assault continue to be a problem.

The first task of any crime prevention program must therefore be to analyse existing data to establish incidence patterns including type of crime, location, time and other relevant environmental variables. Unfortunately, since these offences are both under-reported and/or not collected in a systematic fashion, a preliminary step may be necessary: the implementation of a data collection system and research analysing the data to detect the patterns and highest risk areas to target in prevention. However, transit authorities often fail to conduct victimisation or pattern analysis studies to determine the exact scope of their problems before they implement remedial measures (Strauchs 1972). Due to the lack of such research or ongoing statistical collection, it is difficult to define precisely the scope of the problem. The following summary of several major offences in rail transport is therefore limited by the paucity of information available.

Fare evasion

Since many rail companies are experimenting with measures to combat this crime, it can be assumed to be a fairly common offence. However, the very nature of fare dodging makes its measurement problematic. Aside from periodic inspection by rail staff who can calculate for that day how many individuals are fare dodging, by counting how many 'slugs' have been fed into machines or turnstiles, the determination of the magnitude of these offences can only be speculative.

Vandalism and graffiti

Whilst many American cities have successfully cleaned up the graffiti on their trains, the late 1980s have witnessed its growth in Paris, Hamburg, London, some Australian cities and Scandinavia. There are similarities across cultures in the kind of harm inflicted, the age of offenders (youth) and the greater incidence of these offences in off-peak hours (Wilson 1987).

A surburban Melbourne station prior to the Victoria's Ministry of Transport massive cleanup program.

Photo: Australian Institute of Criminology

A Melbourne station's passage way. Mirrors to aid passengers' view around corners have been defaced. Cleanup program should revamp all stations.

Photo: Australian Institute of Criminology

The costs are both direct and indirect. In the United Kingdom it was estimated that in 1986 alone, graffiti cleaning would cost £410,000 which does not include monies for repairing other consequences of vandalism, for example slashed seats (Department of Transport 1986a). The cost of graffiti and vandalism on New South Wales trains for the year 1984-85 was estimated at $4.76 million (Wilson 1987). In 1989-90, Victoria spent $17 million repairing this type of damage and the Public Transport Corporation (PTC) estimated that $23.7 million would be spent in repairs and implementation of prevention measures in 1990-9 1. But the price that rail companies pay is greater than costs incurred in repair. The presence of graffiti and vandals' wreckage increases passengers' feelings of insecurity which can translate into decreased revenue if alternative forms of transport are used (see for example, Shellow et al. 1974; Wilson 1987). Delays in travel and deaths of graffitists (four in New South Wales in 1986) are other losses that can result (Wilson 1987). The latter increases as the vandals become more adventurous and seek the more inaccessible areas of the train system. Thus in 1990, there was one recorded death of a graffitist in Victoria and one recorded loss of limb. Additional costs, according to the PTC in Victoria, include critical media coverage, lack of public ownership, potential safety issues such as broken lights, telephones and signs, loss of staff time and the cost of police investigations.

Crimes against passengers

One study In an unnamed American city which conducted systematic analysis of transit crime revealed that robbery was the most frequent crime with over two-thirds taking place between 6 p.m. and midnight. Physical assaults peaked when the passenger density was highest - during the evening rush hour. The vast proportion of offences occurred in the stations, particularly on the platforms, and not on the trains. The highest risk stations were located in areas with both high unemployment and high crime rates in general (Shellow et al. 1974). Felson et al. (1990) reporting crime in the Newark, New Jersey subway system concur that most transit crime occurs in the stations.

The mid to late 1970s witnessed a number of studies that emphasised the rising risk of assault in American subways, particularly New York; during the first 10 months of 1977, a murder a month took place and there were 13 reported rapes (Mazza 1978). In 1975, a Carnegie-Mellon University report states that 'subways are much less safe than the streets' and a Transportation Research Forum adds that 'the risk of a crime on a subway system is ten times greater than on bus systems' (Kiersh 1980, p. 37). Rape and other sex crimes appear to proliferate in an underground setting. Between January 1977 and June 1978, New York City Transit Police recorded 2,529 sex crime complaints (Beller et al. 1980). 'Low level' sexual offences took place primarily when trains and station platforms were crowded.

In London, crimes against the person also appear to be on the upswing. However, analysis shows that of 274 underground stations, 50 per cent of robberies occur at 25 stations with 129 having no reported cases (Department of Transport 1986a). These offences, plus violent assaults, peak in rush hours and late evening. Both the peak hours for theft and the primary locations differ from robbery and assault which exemplifies the need for the detailed environmental analysis mentioned earlier. Rail crime targets cannot be defined unless it is clear where and when the primary targets occur. Swain (1988), also looking at London underground offences a couple of years later, concludes that one-third of the crimes take place on the train and one-third on platforms with the risk increasing as the day progresses. Men are three times more vulnerable to robbery and assault than are women. In addition, user level is not necessarily an indicator of risk although, generally, robbery and theft do tend to occur more frequently in stations with the denser passenger traffic (Burrows 1980).

Australia appears to share in the problem of attacks against travellers on its cities' trains, trams and underground systems. Lack of safety in rail travel has been particularly highlighted in the last two years with a number of kidnap/murders commencing in railway station car parks. The latter emphasises that prevention strategies must not only target the vehicles and stations but must also include nearby areas where commuters park their cars. It should be noted, however, that a New South Wales Rail spokesperson believes that much of the dangerous rail image is due to poor media coverage. A newspaper headlined a story about an assault. 'Rail Commuter Savagely Bashed and Raped', when, in fact, the crime took place 2 km from the station. The Victorian Public Transport Commission is also concerned with media bias in reporting such offences: the Program Planning Office points out that of 34,000 reported assaults in that state in 1990, only 688 occurred on the transit system.

Prevention strategies

Aside from the obvious costs of crime to rail revenue, the indirect consequence is reduced passenger numbers. Graffiti and vandalism, as mentioned earlier, reduce the image of safety that retains customers. Further, and not surprisingly, those who have experienced train crime have lower levels of satisfaction with train safety and consequently are more prone to avoid this type of travel (Parolin 1987). There are both direct and potential revenue losses in rail crime which are generating the crime prevention programs described below. It must be stressed that such programs need to be built upon a solid base of empirical knowledge and should be holistic in their perspective. Individual remedies to specific problems, such as high-tech ticketing to combat fare evasion are effective but insufficient. '... only a balanced approach that weighs specific conditions and contributing crime patterns can produce long-lasting and meaningful results' (Stratichs 1972, p. 73).

Fare evasion

Automatic fare collection system: The London Underground implemented the Underground Ticketing System which removed the need for ticket collectors at suburban stations. As well, inner city stations were equipped with fully automatic gates to check tickets. The plan included fewer ticket office staff with most tickets being purchased from machines with a nonrr,enu format. The passenger merely pushes the button that identifies the required destination; puts in the money which is displayed and receives the ticket. The Washington, DC, Metro system is more complex giving tickets to the value of money inserted (Isaacson 1990). Hong Kong's Mass Transit Railway (MTR) electronic ticketing works only with exact fares and their validity expires 90 minutes after issue to discourage loitering. If a passenger attempts to use a ticket for a longer journey than purchased, the ticket is rejected at the exit gate and an illuminated message directs the individual to the appropriate office to pay the additional monies (Gaylord & Galliher 1991).

New South Wales is planning to implement machines similar to those in London (and Tokyo) which read magnetically encoded tickets both at the beginning and the end of the journey and activate the barrier which rises only if the ticket is valid. The cost of full implementation will be $140 million but well worth the ultimate revenue savings according to a New South Wales Rail representative. With older rail systems, the costs are enlarged by architectural modifications required to install the gates.

Security officers: In the mid-1980s the Netherlands Minister of Traffic and Public Transport introduced 1,300 Security Information Control officers (VIC in Dutch) on trams and the undergrounds in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague to minimise fare dodging, vandalism and assault (Van Dijk & Junger-Tas 1988). These officers have had a great impact on reducing fare evasion, particularly during the weekday rush hours. The Security Information Control officers were recruited primarily from unemployed youth (aged 19-28) who received two to three months training with courses in criminal law, and pragmatic experience in ticket inspection. Their role and powers vary depending on the city. In Amsterdam, working in units of two to four, the Security Information Control officers randomly check trams and trains and are authorised to impose fines which they may also do in Rotterdam. In the latter city, however, they permanently work at the metro stations providing information and only check tickets on the trams. The Hague's officers cannot administer fines and each pair stays on the same tram for its entire route. In all three cities they can get additional support from police within minutes (Van Andel 1989).

In New South Wales in 1990, CityRail added 200 uniform officers to stand at some barriers, collect and examine tickets and give out penalty notices. These 'Revenue Protection' officers work in groups, carrying portable two-way radios that enable them to contact the central radio centre. They have the authority to ask pass holders for further identification and can verify the address and the validity of the pass with the despatcher.

Vandalism and graffiti

Design and materials modification: Using materials which are vandal resistant is one way to reduce the opportunities of would-be vandals. Hauber (1989) believes that materials which are not easily broken but still have an expensive appearance, such as unbreakable glass, are ideal. Newer stations and trains are using plastic laminates which facilitate cleaning. In Paris seats are covered in Texoid in a colour that inhibits writing; in Chicago fibreglass seats and melamine interior walls are used; in the Tyne and Wear Metro in England solid aluminium coated seats are used (International Railway Journal 1979). Surfaces that are either of an exposed rock-cement mixture, slanted cedar sidings and deeply grooved surfaces reduce 'design' opportunities for graffitists (Wilson 1988, p. 32).

New double-decker Sydney trains are made with graffiti-resistant surfaces and large windows which increase visibility from the outside to deter interior vandals. Sydney's CityRail is testing a new wallpaper on interior walls already in use in Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium and Denmark (Timmins 1991). Graffiti-proof, marks can be easily erased due to a special graffiti-resistant surface. CityRail also employs a process that involves applying liquid vinyl over any train seat graffiti.

Aside from changing the materials, the design and/or general ambience of trains and stations can be improved with more lighting and shorter repainting cycles, for example, New York City stations are now painted every three years instead of the previous 20 (Vuchic & Bata 1989).

The Washington Metro designed its stations with recessed platform walls and put a brass rail in passages to separate the walls from the public (Swain 1988). Wilson and Healy (1986) add that the environment can be upgraded by murals produced by graffitists, thus channelling their acts into legitimate enterprises. Victoria has picked up on this idea and such paintings by 'would-be vandals' will soon be displayed at one station as part of a $1 million clean-up project (Burke 1990b).

Quick cleaning and repair: New York city has successfully combated graffiti; within four years of mounting their cleaning program, 94 per cent of railway carriages were clean; reputedly 100 per cent a year later. What was their strategy? They started with a small unit, completely cleaned it and, from that point on, ensured that every scribble was removed within two hours. These clean cars were never put with vandalised ones in the same train. If cars were not cleaned within the two hours, they were taken out of service (Vuchic & Bata 1989; Sloan-Howitt & Keeling 1990). Crews worked at both ends of the line; police rode trains full-time while they were in operation and clean trains were kept in high security yards when not in use. As more terminals were equipped with cleaners, the numbers of clean cars increased. Concurrently, New York has targeted its stations; those that are part of the program have any graffiti removed within 72 hours. These efforts have been enhanced by new technology which enables paint to be removed from cement surfaces with high pressure, hot water jets. Interestingly, one possible by-product of the opportunity reduction for vandalism on subways in New York has been displacement with an increase of graffiti on white rubbish trucks.

SEPTA, the Philadelphia transportation authority, also reduced its rate of vandalism and graffiti by 75 per cent in little more than one year. by employing the same principle: remove it quickly (Scott 1989). The French city Lille's VAL, the first unmanned metro in the world, maintains clean stations and trains with a similar program of removing graffiti daily from walls; in addition, trains are taken off active service as soon as any graffiti is located (Daulmerie 1988).

New South Wales Rail has made major inroads on cleaning up its carriages with a $25 million annual cleaning program. The New York City model has been implemented with a specialist team of cleaners ensuring that 'clean' cars are kept in that condition within 24 hours of vandalism. By late 1990, a security spokesperson reported that 90 per cent of the carriages were graffiti-free. Efforts have been aided by a team of 'graffiti spotters' whose job involves locating the graffiti and feeding the identification numbers of the vandalised train into a computerised system which immediately alerts the cleaners (Burke 1990a).

Clean Sydney Train
Photos: Australian Institute of Criminology

According to descriptive material on its clean-up program, one feature of the Victorian PTC anti-graffiti strategy is the ongoing quick removal of graffiti from trains. Each carriage is currently cleaned at least once every three days. In addition, all suburban stations are having all graffiti removed by either transport staff or community groups. Once thoroughly clean, the PTC is committed to removing any graffiti at that station within one day.

Increased security: Cleaning and new design must also be accompanied by increased security at the stations, on the trains, and in the yards or depots. New York City, for example, added more depot lighting, used 24-hour cleaners (some undercover police), and repaired and maintained fences on a daily basis (Sloan-Howitt & Kelling 1990). Philadelphia assessed the stations that were most damaged, assigned plain clothes officers to them and installed closed circuit television cameras (CCTV) which the management believes cut down on graffiti in the stations (Hackney 1978). In London, one depot has a system which surrounds the train with an infra-red beam. If the beam is broken, an alarm automatically turns on a television camera and notifies rail personnel. Graffiti at this location has dropped to zero (Swain 1988).

The VAL metro supplements its quick cleaning with its own transit security force that patrols the stations on a 24-hour basis. And, in the Netherlands, the Security Information Control officers discussed previously, are reported to have impacted on vandalism with a 30 per cent reduction on internal metro station walls in Rotterdam (Van Andel 1989). Passengers' and staffs' subjective impressions were that vandalism in general had decreased with the officers presence.

Sydney, as is the case with many other cities, has been hampered by inadequate collection of data from stations reporting on vandalism damage. Appropriate application of security is thus problematic. However, a staff member states that data gathering is being improved with information soon to come from all stations. Then, the Transit Police service, currently a part of the New South Wales Police Department, (previously CityRail employees) can be more effectively deployed. In the 'stables' where trains go after service peak hours, increased surveillance with guards and dogs has reputedly brought graffiti down to almost nil in what formerly were primary locations for this type of vandalism. Victoria is currently applying a new technology at its train stabling sites - an electronic surveillance robot that watches a display screen and emits an alarm if certain areas of the video camera picture change.

Technology has contributed to the dramatic reduction of vandalism and graffiti throughout the Sydney rail network with 13 stations housing CCTV surveillance devices and more to come (James 1990). Costing about $50,000 each, a CityRail spokesperson believes these television cameras act both as a deterrent and as evidence in court proceedings. Melbourne's railway clean-up project also plans to include more closed circuit cameras and patrol staff (Burke 1990b). The former have been installed at selected stations and on particular trains. Large signs indicate to the public that the station is under CCTV surveillance.

Security of trains and stations can integrate community involvement with a Rail Watch program (Wilson & Healy 1986; Wilson 1987). In this scheme, rail staff would have a clear role in reporting and receiving public reports of incidents. Passengers would require a quick and confidential means of reporting with their assistance promoted through flyers and poster ads.

Other avenues of prevention: Designing the rail system in a way that discourages loitering reduces the opportunity for vandalism and graffiti (and other crimes). Hong Kong's MTR has employed a variety of measures that deter such lingering. These include the limited 'life' of the tickets, and the lack of chairs, public toilets, fast-food facilities and luggage lockers (Gaylord & Galliher 1991).

The Victorian clean-up campaign includes legislation that empowers magistrates to sentence vandals to remove their work. Hauber (1989) proposes a similar program for The Netherlands in which youthful culprits could avoid judicial proceedings by spending a day cleaning and repairing trams.

Community education can be an important prong of prevention, although it is important to remember that publicity about graffiti can glorify the behaviour and actually generate more vandalism. Thus a careful balance must be struck between educating school children about the dangers and unacceptableness of such behaviour whilst not indirectly encouraging the activity. In Victoria, school curriculum materials are being developed for dissemination and members of the Transit Patrol Department regularly visit schools to lecture on these subjects. The Public Transport Commission is encouraging the community to recognise that transit offences are community problems. An example of the community acting in this framework is the Croydon Entertainment Train which, on Saturday evenings, hosts a live band or other such entertainment to provide transport to and from the city for young people.

All of the measures outlined above must be evaluated after implementation to assess their impact. Reliable evaluation is dependent upon accurate and comprehensive data collection and systematic analysis of the variables in order to ascertain what has worked, where and what has not (Wilson 1988).

Crimes against passengers

Design of station: Many rail systems are renovating their stations to create a brighter, less run-down appearance and to eliminate or reduce recesses and dead-end hallways that are conducive to assaults against passengers. London has been engaged in such a program, closing off certain passageways during off-peak times to ensure that there are no dark corners (Department of Transport 1986a). New South Wales Rail is removing nooks and crannies and closing down toilets in high crime areas. In addition, the older stations have been given a limited life and will be reconstructed with safety as a primary feature. Victoria is currently upgrading the lighting at stations using the Australian Standard as the minimum acceptable level.

An excellent example of new station design is the Metro in Washington. Before building the system, architects examined rail operations worldwide to see how safety could be enhanced. As a result, columns were eliminated with vaulted arches used instead. Public lavatories were excluded (Crosby 1978). When Vancouver built its automated subway/elevated transit system, advertising hoardings over the tracks were eliminated permitting people on opposite platforms to see each other. Further, advertising on exterior walls was cut back to allow some surveillance of the station's interior by people outside (Brantingham & Brantingham 1988). Hong Kong also designed its MTR stations with few 'alcoves, dog-leg passage-ways and columns, thus denying would-be criminals hiding-places and points of ambush' (Gaylord & Galliher 199 1, p. 19).

An up-graded Sydney station

Photos: Australian Institute of Criminology

Reducing the waiting area on platforms can be implemented with movable barriers or gates increasing passenger density which reduces the risk of robbery or physical assault. It also creates a smaller area to focus security measures upon. For these reasons, Sydney has constructed blue light safety zones on most platforms. The area is well lit for about the length of two cars and is opposite the guard on each train. There is a blue light outside the guard's compartment.

A blue light safety zone is clearly indicated with white stripes.

Photo: by CityRail 1990

A blue light carriage, with employee, stops in the safety zone.

Photo: by CityRail 1990

Other suggestions have been made for improving security where the station is located below the street level (Felson et al. 1990). These include closing down redundant stairways thus creating a passenger flow over the least potential routes; placing platforms for both directions directly across from each other; and off-hour waiting areas above ground requiring the driver to wait for travellers to descend.

Improved lighting in station car parks and proximity to station may reduce assault risk.

Photo: Australian Institute of Criminology

Design of station car parks needs to be appropriately modified, emphasising good lighting and proximity to the station.

Design of trains: Washington, Hong Kong and Hamburg trains include an intercom in each carriage that allows passengers to speak to the driver or to police (Kiersh 1980). These are available on some Sydney trains. The London Underground, afraid that this type of device would be abused, have experimented with a modified version, an emergency alarm that stops the train and then allows for intercom capability.

One-way vision glazing on the train guard's compartment can act as a deterrent since would-be perpetrators are unable to detect whether the cubicle is staffed. However, other psychological deterrents in design, such as 'colour, texture and spatial relationships' that could affect motivation, have been ignored (Strauches 1982, p.74)

Alarms: Some rail companies have installed alarms in stations for passengers' safety. The London Underground, through analysis of crime data, has tried to place these in the highest risk areas (Swain 1988). These devices do not appear to be used extensively worldwide due to potential, problems with vandalism and/or false alarms.

Closed circuit television (CCTV): A more common prevention strategy throughout the world has been the installation of CCTV in rail stations. A large part of the Washington Metro's annual budget is spent on electronic surveillance with a minimum of eight cameras on every platform, which monitor entrances, exits and waiting areas (Kiersh 1980; Crosby 1978).

Burrows (1980) evaluated the effectiveness of cameras in the mid-1970s in use on the London Underground and found that their installation in four high-crime stations significantly reduced the incidence of theft and robbery. Deterrent value may have been enhanced by the cameras' conspicuous locations plus posters notifying the public about the observation equipment. Careful monitoring is an essential contributor to efficacy. Monitors should be placed where a staff person will watch the screen; for example, in Washington the station attendant's kiosk. In the Atlanta Georgia, MARTA network, pictures are received at the closest police precinct (Department of Transport 1986a). The most effective deployment of CCTVs is fixed cameras with one console operator responsible for monitoring at each location with access to speedy communication and response (Strauchs 1972).

CityRail in New South Wales currently has about 23 to 25 of its stations 'covered' by cameras, coupled with signs announcing their existence. These have been targeted at the highest risk stations with 54 cameras at Redfern and over 40 at North Sydney station. Rail staff believe that the high-tech system has reduced both assault and graffiti through their ability to see 98 per cent of the station, and constant monitoring by a station assistant (James 1990). However, since other prevention methods, for example, increased security guards, have been introduced concurrently, without a control-type study, it is impossible to isolate the preventative value of the cameras.

Human surveillance: Rail transit companies either employ their own security force, private security guards, train their staff in security and/or rely upon the police. In some cities, the Guardian Angels, a civilian para-police type of group, voluntarily guard passengers on trains and in stations. The Guardian Angels began in New York City in 1979. Initially only 13 in number, their aims were to deter subway crime and make citizen arrests. Their numbers increased exponentially in correlation with large scale media attention; by 1985, there were approximately 5,000 members, including 1,000 in New York City. Kenney (1986; 1987) measured their effectiveness through a controlled experiment (the Angels cooperated by conducting normal, none or intensive patrols at certain times and areas). The study concluded, quite surprisingly, that victimisation was so low that it was impossible to ascertain whether the Angels had any impact. The presence of Guardian Angels appears to have a temporary effect on fear reduction but they may contribute to evoking an image of potential danger.

The Washington Metro system employs their own security officers who are trained for six months. The surveillance force includes undercover officers - the 'power squad' (Kiersh 1980). Other cities appear to be opting for a higher proportion of plain-clothes security people since experiments such as 'Operation Decoy' in New York have illustrated their value in increasing felony arrests.

One major problem in any kind of patrolling is the need for adequate radio communication, particularly if unarmed staff are engaged in these duties. Radio blind spots in underground areas need to be located and remedied with 'leaky feeder radio antennae' (Swain 1988).

Sydney relies primarily upon security guards hired from private companies who are deployed at 42 metropolitan stations from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m. Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays. Train services cease at midnight, but the guards are present at the station until 4 a.m. CityRail also has a nine person Aboriginal security team, trained and licensed as security guards who work out of Redfern Station, a locality with a high concentration of Aborigines. They liaise with the New South Wales Police who are the primary law enforcement branch responsible for rail safety. In Victoria, the PTC has an internal security force which is responsible for the security of customers, staff and material property. However, the Victoria police are ultimately responsible for crime detection, investigation and, prevention on public transport. In addition, according to the PTC, a Train Monitoring Exercise has been implemented whereby deskbound managers walk through trains at the highest risk times and/or on the highest risk lines. This has reputedly reduced the frequency of incidents and has improved managers' comprehension of the operational facets of the train system.

Queensland has recently placed private security guards on some night-time Brisbane trains (7 p.m. to I a.m.). Called 'Nightwatch' the guards are trained but not armed and work in pairs. Their employment, additional to regular police patrols, was precipitated by 'brutal attacks on nurses time and -time again ... even schoolgirls have fallen victim to bashings and gang-style attacks' (Church 1990, p.1).

Other prevention methods: Since the incidence of certain crimes peak at low traveller density times, such as late at night, a primary way of reducing opportunities for criminal acts is to close stations and cease running night-time trains. Thus, Washington's Metro only runs until midnight. In Sydney, 'nightrider' buses are replacing trains after midnight with many stations closing between 10-11 p.m.

Training of staff and clear delineation of their responsibilities vis-a-vis passenger safety needs to be conveyed. The assault of a 16-year-old teenager on a Victorian train in which a conductor allegedly played no preventive role, dramatically exemplifies these needs (Herald-Sun, 2 January 1991). Victoria is responding to the need for increased safety measures in numerous ways. One is the implementation of a safety audit program, an idea developed in Toronto, Canada. It involves community groups working alongside the police, local government and the Public Transport Corporation. Inspections of suburban stations are carried out both in daylight and at night to identify potential hazards to safety, such as poor lighting or overhanging bushes in car parks.

Summary

If a city is constructing a new rail system, it is obviously easier to design an effective preventative model. Hong Kong did this with great success. First, other cities' systems were thoroughly examined and their successes and failures were integrated into the planning of the MTR. Aside from other measures outlined in this chapter, the Hong Kong design includes: stations with few entrances so that a station could quite easily be closed down to capture an offender; escalators that place passengers at the ends of platforms which encourages a wider distribution of people instead of a dense clustering; trains with a 'straightthrough' format that allows a view of the entire interior of all cars; and a high-tech communications system of walkie-talkies, CCTVs and alarm intercoms in each car (Gaylord & Galliher). The benefit of both analysis prior to construction and the model of situational prevention has been illustrated by the resulting, almost crime-free, environment.

If the train or subway stations are already in place, implementation of preventative strategies are more difficult but not impossible as shown overseas and in the two Australian examples cited-New South Wales and Victoria. By employing a variety of situational measures that reduce the opportunities for criminal behaviour, and through education, fare evasion, vandalism and crimes against passengers can be reduced.