



Australian Government

Australian Institute of Criminology

Review of anti-corruption strategies

Rob McCusker

Technical and Background Paper

No. 23

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Executive summary

The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) was asked to review the literature concerning anti-corruption strategies, and particularly to identify the common elements deemed to underpin and/or undermine their effectiveness.

A bibliography covering the period from 2000 to 2006 was compiled as part of this report and endeavoured to provide details of indicative sources on the context and operation of anti-corruption programs. The bibliography was not intended to be a comprehensive review of corruption literature per se but rather to provide a specific overview of sources which contained details and analysis of anti-corruption strategies. It also sought to examine those sources which concerned themselves largely with the Asia-Pacific region.

From the 231 sources located in the initial literature search, a subset which emphasised practical rather than purely theoretical approaches taken, was evaluated.

Corruption continues to manifest itself in a number of ways. It ranges from petty to grand in nature, from political to bureaucratic in focus and from incidental to systemic in scope. Emanating essentially from the exploitation of public office for private gain, corruption radiates from governments through agencies and impacts upon the individuals and/or organisations required to liaise with those agencies in order to obtain basic services. Given the range and impact of corrupt behaviour, any anti-corruption strategy must be cognisant of the causes of corruption, the political and socio-economic environment in which corruption thrives and the broader links between corruption, organised crime and international illicit capital flows.

A key factor underpinning anti-corruption efforts is the requirement for a holistic approach to be taken. This is best epitomised by the National Integrity System (NIS) proposed by Transparency International (2001), comprising a set of objectives, supported by key strategies and delivered through institutions, sectors or specific activities known as pillars. The NIS is not dependent upon each pillar functioning or functioning in unison with other pillars. Indeed, the NIS structure permits weakness in one pillar to be mitigated by strength in another.

Although perhaps self-evident, it is important to recognise that the errant behaviour of individuals lies at the heart of corruption. Any successful anti-corruption strategy therefore should endeavour to understand the often complex interactions that exist between the initiator of the corrupt act, the person who passively or actively participates in corruption and the wider society which meets the costs, directly or indirectly, of that corruption. Issues to be decided in the first instance include a determination of the focus of the strategy, for example, upon the office or the office holder, whether efforts should protect state revenues (through enhancing agency integrity) or seek to prosecute those abusing such revenues and whether a cost benefit analysis of vulnerable departments can assist in determining the prioritisation of anti-corruption efforts.

In terms of the design of anti-corruption strategies it is important to construct a set of incentives to encourage rule-abiding, and discourage rule-averse, behaviour by individuals engaged in corrupt practices. Thus, for example, strategies which reduce the scope for corruption via policy changes, increase the costs of corruption via monitoring and punishment of errant behaviour and induce self-restraint within government are important first principles.

It is clear from the literature that attempting to provide and implement a one size fits all anti-corruption strategy is unlikely to be successful. Even where the strategy comprises a number of discrete parts, which are designed to be implemented in an incremental fashion, it is imperative that an assessment of the logic and potential adverse consequences of the implementation sequence is made. Thus, for example, establishing an anti-corruption agency without ensuring that an honest judiciary is also present may undermine the efforts of the former. Similarly, if police corruption remains rife and the judiciary honest, the former will prevent cases of interest coming before the courts and thus negate the impact of the judiciary.

Implementation of the strategy is key to its ultimate success and relies upon the successful coordination of a number of disparate agencies and varied approaches. It is important that a focal point be established with sole responsibility for marshalling such efforts. This might be in the form of an independent anti-corruption body such as Hong Kong SAR's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) which combines investigation, prevention and public support, or in the form of inter-agency coordinating bodies such as those that exist in Venezuela to facilitate coordination between police, prosecutors and the Supreme Court.

Anti-corruption strategies cannot operate successfully within a vacuum but should rely upon the engagement of a wide range of participants. Transparency International advocates the utilisation of civil society in terms of raising awareness, obtaining access to information and supporting and enforcing business ethics. It is essential the business sector in particular plays a major role in anti-corruption efforts since it is this sector which provides both the incentive and the financial wherewithal for much of the corruption to exist and continue.

The economic determination behind most anti-corruption efforts and aid sponsorship programs has been challenged and it would be wise perhaps to be aware of such criticisms when creating a strategy. It can be argued that in some cases, corruption is a driver of economic change rather than a forestaller of it. One attempt to embrace economic drivers in the fight against corruption is the creation of Special Governance Zones (SGZs) which are modelled on Free Enterprise Zones, common in developing nations. The SGZ is a city or region within a country in which major reforms can be undertaken but which are localised and reversible and thus minimise the political fallout that might occur in countrywide endeavours.

The anti-corruption agency, preferably independent from any government or departments, is cited as a key aspect of any anti-corruption strategy. The model example of such an agency is Hong Kong SAR's ICAC which adopts a three pronged holistic approach to corruption, namely, investigation, prevention and education. It has been successful also because of political support at the highest levels of government, the creation of appropriately strong anti-corruption legislation, simultaneous strengthening of law enforcement agencies and widespread public support and assistance.

Addressing deficits within the public sector is key in the fight against corruption. Providing adequate pay scales for public servants is a first step. However, it is also desirable for allied benefits such as pension schemes and allowances to be withdrawn in the face of discovered corrupt behaviour as is removing the opportunities from public servants to engage in corruption, for example through removing the authority of the state to restrict exports or license businesses. Finally, rotating staff within departments to prevent individuals from establishing elaborate corrupt arrangements with others or ensuring that staff are not political appointments in the first instance should be considered.

Determining the impact of anti-corruption strategies is integral to the overall success of the venture. It should be noted that determining whether corruption has in fact occurred is notoriously difficult, since the notion of corruption, of honesty and what a reasonable person might consider corruption are in many ways culturally defined. Transparency International provides a benchmark (via the NIS) against which countries can evaluate their success or otherwise. Based on country self-assessments, a recent evaluation of the Asia-Pacific region (ADB/OECD 2004) noted that countries in the region had successfully undertaken a range of preventive measures such as ensuring the transparency of public administration. Also, a number of initiatives aimed at improving the relationship between government and civil society were undertaken, such as awareness raising and input into the legal drafting processes. Equally, weaknesses were noted in areas such as criminal provisions, a weak regulatory environment and the lack of criminalisation of certain forms of corruption.

Anti-corruption strategies are deemed to have a number of intrinsic weaknesses including over-reliance on the judiciary, police and financial sector without appreciating that, in many countries, such institutions

are weak and corrupt themselves. Anti-corruption efforts often attempt to create an ethical standard by which individuals are supposed to abide, ignoring the fact that if such officials were moral beings, the corruption would not occur in the first instance.

There are no clearly delineated solutions to corruption but there are a sufficient number of ways in which the effects of corruption might be mitigated. In essence, political will is recognised as a key driver of systematic change in the corruption environment within any given country. Many governments have yet to recognise corruption as a serious issue, let alone place it on their political agendas. The disparity between attempts to create anti-corruption reforms and the delivery of those reforms has continued. Reforms which have actually been enacted have met with obstruction at the implementation stage. It is, in short, imperative for governments to recognise and prioritise anti-corruption and for those governments to receive all necessary assistance in developing and delivering appropriate policy vehicles.

The nature and extent of corruption

The AIC compiled a bibliography for the period 2000 to 2006 listing a range of sources concerned with the implementation and evaluation of anti-corruption strategies in general and those pertaining to the Asia-Pacific region in particular. Given the focus of this report, the bibliography was not intended to provide a comprehensive review of corruption literature per se. Of the 231 sources located, 53 percent (116) described anti-corruption strategies and 45 percent (99) discussed the evaluation of particular anti-corruption efforts. This review is based upon an assessment of a subset of 72 sources which were selected largely on the basis of their apparent focus upon the practical, rather than purely theoretical, approaches to the issue. In the context of developing a whole of government strategy to corruption, a pragmatic approach which sought to identify characteristics which underpinned and undermined anti-corruption efforts, seemed a useful one to pursue.

Definitions of corruption abound, but the most commonly used one refers to the abuse of a public position for private gain. Corruption is facilitated by bribery, embezzlement and theft but also by nepotism and cronyism. Corruption affects both the private and public sectors and is often subdivided into grand and petty corruption which ranges from the provision of small 'gifts' in the former to the misappropriation of public assets at the highest levels in the latter. Further classifications distinguish between incidental, institutional and systemic corruption and between political and bureaucratic corruption.

The size and incidence of corruption might be attributed to four key factors:

- the level of public benefits available
- the discretionary power of officials
- the level of risk associated with corrupt deals
- the relative bargaining power of the corruptor and corruptee (Rose-Ackerman 1997).

In terms of the causes of corruption, experts representing higher and lower income countries are unanimous on the three most important causes of corruption and in general agreement on the importance of a number of other factors (see Table 1). These are:

- norms and values of politicians and public servants
- lack of control, supervision, auditing
- interrelationships – business, politics, state.


It is argued that corruption is in fact largely self sustaining as a result of the action and reaction of certain elements within a given society (see Figure 1). Key elements include payments to political parties and control over appointments which can increase the number of civil servants on lower salaries.

Table 1: Importance of causes of public corruption and fraud

Factors	Important cause			
	Higher income country		Lower income country	
	%	rank	%	rank
Norms and values of politicians and public servants	88.4	1	98.4	1
Lack of control, supervision, auditing	87.2	2	93.3	2
Interrelationships – business, politics, state	86.6	3	92.9	3
Values and norms concerning government/state	84.6	4	79.7	11
Public sector culture (values/norms)	83.3	5	76.8	12
Lack of commitment of leadership	82.2	6	90.2	5
Misorganisation and mismanagement	80.7	7	91.9	4
Increasing strength of organised crime	79.3	8	90.0	7
Norms and values [in] private and public [life]	78.0	9	73.7	14
Increasing significance of lobbying	76.5	10	72.9	15
Interrelationships – politics and administration	67.0	11	86.4	9
Social inequality	66.7	12	90.2	6
Low salaries in the public sector	56.9	16	87.1	8
Economic problems (inflation/recession)	62.2	14	85.2	10
(n)	(190)		(67)	

Source: Huberts 1998: 7


Figure 1: Corruption as a system of interlocking vicious cycles



Source: Cobb & Gonzalez 2005: 6

Transparency International's *Global corruption barometer 2005* leaves little room to doubt the wide ranging influence of corruption within and upon a number of sectors and institutions. A questionnaire sought opinions from some 55,000 people in 69 low, middle and high income countries on a number of issues relating to the prevalence and impact of corruption including their assessment of the levels of corruption within a number of sectors and institutions (Figure 2). Political parties were perceived as the most corrupt, followed by parliament/legislature, police, and legal system/judiciary.

Figure 2: Global corruption barometer



Source: Adapted from Transparency International 2005

The definition of corruption and an appreciation of its nature and extent are crucial to understanding whether and if so, how, an anti-corruption strategy might be formulated, implemented and assessed. An important starting point is to address two key questions:

- what types of corruption are the most damaging and in which institutions or countries?
- what are the relationships between corruption and poverty and how can a state reduce corruption?

Within those two framing questions, three broad levels of assessment should occur:

- causes and impact of corruption – for example, how far the causes of corruption are influenced by geographical, political, economic and cultural factors, and by the relationships between political and administrative processes, and between public and private sector
- the political, economic, institutional and social environment – for example, whether the corruption is country or institution specific and whether different political, administrative and economic configurations give rise to differing levels or types of corruption and thus to differing impacts on different groups in society

-
- the global economy and the links between corruption, fraud, organised crime and international illicit capital flows – for example, how crime is organised and to what extent corruption is a necessary or sufficient condition for particular forms of criminal behaviour, i.e. what the shape of crime would be if there were more or less corruption, organised crime and money laundering? (Doig 1998).

A further indication of the propensity for corruption within a given society might be provided by an application of the corruption formula, $C = M + D - A$, that is, corruption (C) equals monopoly power (M) plus discretion by officials (D) minus accountability (A) (Klitgaard 1998).

Basic approaches to anti-corruption

In designing an anti-corruption strategy it is imperative to be cognisant of the fundamental characteristics and nature of corruption itself. Essentially, it must be recognised and appreciated that theories of corruption causation have to be interpreted in the context of actual and/or likely human behaviour, drivers and interaction. It should also be noted that some commentators have suggested that economic progress may in fact be dependent upon, rather than impeded by corrupt practices. A useful analogy for understanding the impact of, and solutions to, corruption is to compare its nature with that of a pandemic. Above all, a determination to consider corruption as an issue best mitigated by a holistic as opposed to a sectoral approach is integral to a well designed anti-corruption strategy. These issues are dealt with in more detail below.

There are (at least) three key schools of thought on corruption reduction and prevention. First, **interventionism**, in which the relevant authorities wait for the corrupt action to occur and then intervene to capture and punish the offender. This school stimulates retribution, rehabilitation and deterrence but there remain a number of obstructive variables including:

- the harm has already occurred and cannot be undone
- the majority of crimes remain unreported
- the demand on finite resources will inevitably be infinite given the degree of supervision necessary to ensure that the deterrence effect operates.

If the dark figure of crime prevents most crimes being detected, reported and responded to, what reasonable measure of deterrence can pertain?

Second, **managerialism**, in which those individuals or agencies seeking to engage in corrupt behaviour can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by establishing appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. In essence, managerialism advocates the reduction or elimination of opportunities such that those who generally benefit from them cease to be able to do so. There are limitations with this school of thought also, key amongst which are the fact that individuals do not necessarily operate according to the predetermined principles of managerialism. Organisations contain three broad categories of people who will react differently to corrupt influences:

- category I: people who want to do the right thing and require guidance on how to achieve this
- category II: people who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside set rules
- category III: people who are corrupt and will operate outside of the rules entirely.

A rule may exist which restricts the amount of money an official can receive as a gift to \$50. People in category I know this rule exists and simply obey it. People in category III will simply not declare the gift and thus flout the rule. People in category II who wish to receive a bribe of \$100 simply register two gifts of \$50 each. The letter, but not the spirit, of the rule has been adhered to and yet clearly such people have engaged in corruption.

All rules can be subverted. Managerialism attempts to provide one set of rules to deter a number of differently motivated individuals. The consequences of this approach are that the success of the anti-corruption effort is fragmented, intercepting the less scheming corruptee but not the more damaging highly planned exploits of others. Equally, managerialist control of corruption ignores market forces. If, for example, public officials are approached to provide confidential information in exchange for money, some may deem the risk too great and refuse. Those who are willing to engage in the activity however, will be able to raise the price of that information which will increase the attractiveness of corruption and sustain its existence.

Finally, **organisational integrity** which involves the integration of an organisation's operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards so that a norm of ethical behaviour is created. This school of thought presupposes that deviance stems from the organisation rather than the individuals of which it is comprised, as if the breach of ethics involved in corrupt practices occurs almost by osmosis from the malfeasant organisation to the innocent individual within it. Arguably, targeting individuals in anti-corruption efforts is likely to be less successful than targeting the organisational context in which individuals operate. Equivalent examples of individual malfeasance within an organisational dynamic can be seen in corporate crime cases such as Enron, Xerox, WorldCom and Union Carbide.

It has been suggested that the organisation must provide a structural framework that removes the possibility of corrupt practices. In short, the ability of the individual to interpret the rules or to decide whether to apply a particular protocol should be circumvented by a system which cannot be manipulated (Larmour & Wolanin 2001).

Economic development

Arguably, economic solutions to poor governance will not succeed in promoting growth or improving government performance. As Rose-Ackerman (2004: 14) notes '[m]acro-economic policy prescriptions presuppose a well-functioning government which is just what is lacking in corrupt countries'. Equally, 'proposals to improve governance by concentrating on economic growth, trade openness, and reductions in inequality beg the question of how weak states could accomplish such fundamental change'.

Driven by evidence that corruption reduces growth and investment in developing countries, the World Bank developed a four dimensional strategy:

- preventing fraud and corruption in Bank projects
- helping countries which request Bank assistance for fighting corruption
- mainstreaming the concern with corruption in all of the Bank's work
- lending active support to international efforts in fighting corruption.

Criticisms have been levelled at the World Bank for framing its activities in economic terms. First, it is suggested that the Bank's anti-corruption strategy is based on a perception of economic development where success is driven by efficient markets supported by non-interventionist states. Second, the empirical data showing a strong relationship between corruption and poor development is, it is suggested, flawed. While corruption has a number of negative effects, it is suggested that in countries such as China and South Korea, for example, corruption was in fact rife at the crucial stages of capitalist development (Khan 2002).

Other commentators have argued that corruption may actually be advantageous, noting that corruption may facilitate the participation and representation of marginalised groups including businessmen and entrepreneurs, who would otherwise have no formal avenue through which to encourage government action in the facilitation of their economic activity.

Corruption may produce efficient outcomes where excessive government regulation is detrimental to growth-enhancing activity. Thus bribing officials to cut through red tape may act like a form of deregulation enabling people to operate more efficiently. This so-called speed money helps to encourage underpaid and unmotivated government officials to perform their job properly (Hobbs 2005). As another commentator wryly observes, '...in terms of economic growth, the only thing worse that a society with a rigid, over-centralised, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over centralised and honest bureaucracy' (Huntington 1968: 10).

The 'disease' analogy

It has been suggested that corruption might be regarded as a pandemic that impacts upon every country to varying degrees. Once public consciousness about the existence of that pandemic is raised (stage 1) it will then be possible to create an appropriate set of responses utilising the same medical analogy (Klitgaard 2000) (see Table 2).


Table 2: Responses to corruption		
Key metaphor	Stage two: fighting ordinary corruption	Stage three: fighting systematic corruption
	Controlling corruption	Subverting corruption
Medical analogy	Strengthen the body to prevent the disease from taking hold Examples: exercise, nutrition, lifestyle	Attack the disease itself Examples: antibiotics, chemotherapy, surgery
Use analysts to find out	Where healthy systems are vulnerable and how to strengthen them	Where organized corruption is itself vulnerable and how to weaken it
Some key analytical questions	How are agents selected? How is the principal-agent relationship structured? What are the incentives? How can discretion be clarified and circumscribed? How can accountability be enhanced? How can the moral costs of corruption be increased?	How are corrupt deals made and kept secret? How are corrupt goods and services delivered? How are members recruited and disciplined? What footprints are there from corrupt activities? How can risks and penalties be created or enhanced? How can corrupt activities be carried out with impunity, and where are they vulnerable?
Draw inspiration from	Best practices in business management; public health programs	Best practices in fighting organized crime; pathology and medicine
Key functions in the fight against corruption	Audit, systems design, incentive and personnel systems, control, citizen oversight	All of these, plus undercover agents, infiltrators, turncoats and key witnesses, dirty tricks
Key actors in the fight against corruption	People who run the system. The 'principal' (metaphorically, the people; in practice, the people in charge)	People who can influence and, if necessary, subvert the corrupt system. Citizens, professional associations, the press, business groups, some government agencies or levels of government

Source: Klitgaard 2000: 3

Holistic approach

The most visible proponent of the multi-layered and holistic approach to anti-corruption is Transparency International which operates from 'the conviction that all of the issues of contemporary concern in the area of governance....need to be addressed in a holistic fashion' (Pope 2000: 34). Recognising the often significant differences between the willingness and capacity of countries to create, design and administer an effective anti-corruption strategy, Transparency International suggests a National Integrity System (NIS). Figure 3 shows the NIS, comprised a set of objectives which, supported by key strategies or approaches (or elements), are delivered by or through key institutions, sectors or specific activities (the pillars).

Figure 3: The national integrity system



Source: Pope 2000: 35

The broad aim of the NIS is to combat corruption as part of a wider battle against misconduct and misappropriation and to create an efficient and effective government which regards its *raison d'être* as working in, and for, the public interest. The ultimate goal is to promote good governance, regarded by some commentators as an essential component in anti-corruption endeavours. Transparency International is grounded in terms of its overall expectations, noting that '...the aim is not complete rectitude or a one-time cure or remedy, but an increase in the honesty or integrity of government as a whole...' Meeting that goal of overall integrity requires the provision of public services that are efficient and effective and assist with maintaining sustainable development, a fully functioning government cognisant of, and able to protect, the rights of its citizens, and strategies to ensure that development of the society applies to all of its members rather than sections or factions within it.

Importantly, given the complexity and entrenchment of corruption, Transparency International's NIS is not a passive tool, neither is it necessarily dependent on existing pillars or on a specific combination of pillars. The pillars identified above must be integrated as far as possible. As Pope (2000) notes, '[w]hat is the benefit of a sound and "clean" Judiciary ready to uphold the Rule of Law, if there is corruption in the police, investigators, prosecutors or the legal profession? The Judges would simply not receive the cases they should hear; they would then sit in splendid isolation – honest, capable, yet able to achieve little.'

The pillars may need to be 'corruption proofed', that is, steps might need to be taken to ensure that weakness in one pillar (for example poor or nonexistent investigative journalism) can be mitigated by strength in another (for example an anti-corruption agency). Thus, the impact of the pillars combined provides the strength of the overall anti-corruption strategy. The combined strength of the pillars is then further enhanced by the application of generic core values and/or practices attached to each individual pillar (Table 3).

Table 3: The rules and practices pillars

Pillar	Corresponding core rules/practices
Executive	Conflict of interest rules
Legislature/Parliament	Fair elections
Parliamentary public accounts committee	Power to question senior officials
Auditor General	Public reporting
Public service	Public service ethics
Judiciary	Independence
Media	Access to information
Civil society	Freedom of speech
Ombudsman	Records management
Anti-corruption/watchdog agencies	Enforceable and enforced laws
Private sector	Competition policy including public procurement rules
International	Effective mutual legal/judicial assistance

Source: Pope 2000: 37

Any attempt to combat public corruption needs first and foremost to create commitment and awareness among leading politicians and public officials since they possess the ability to promote or defeat anti-corruption efforts. The net effect of that positive engagement should be increased transparency in party politics and radical organisational change within the public service, the perceived and/or actual centre for corrupt practices. Equally, a recognition needs to occur of unfettered corruption in business–state relationships and within the symbiotic relationship between organised crime, business, law enforcement, the judiciary and government circles, lest enhanced government and public service-led efforts become redundant. Finally, particularly in lower income countries, a galvanised development process, in which economic and social infrastructure are improved, can only serve to enhance the anti-corruption frameworks created (Huberts 1998).

Cross-sectoral strategies

Sound anti-corruption strategies recognise the level and degree of formal and informal interaction between agencies, organisations and individuals. It is imperative that such strategies incorporate changes in the practices of the public and private sectors. In addition, efforts should be made to increase public awareness of corrupt practices and to garner support from the public in the detection and reporting of corrupt behaviour. These issues are discussed in greater detail below.

Public sector

It has been suggested that strategies that reduce the benefits of paying and/or receiving bribes can only result in positive results for the anti-corruption effort. Reform of the civil (public) service is an essential initial policy. The provision of adequate pay is a useful first step because, if the service pays lower salaries than can be obtained by similarly qualified personnel elsewhere, then there is, arguably, a temptation for civil servants to engage in bribery. However, it is possible that higher pay may simply increase the level of bribe sought by the official concerned. Thus, it might be essential to remove other benefits (such as a pension scheme) from those civil servants who, despite receiving pay increases, continue to engage in corrupt behaviour. Equally, the selection of civil servants needs to be transparent, to avoid the potential for bribery of officials in exchange for a government post.

A further level of civil service control, which relates both to the briber and bribee, could also be instituted whereby the civil servant who accepts a bribe could be fined a multiple of bribes received, as well as losing his/her post, pension and allied benefits. The briber could be penalised in terms of the profits made from the bribe (if, for example, the bribe facilitated the obtaining of a lucrative contract) rather than in relation to the level of the bribe itself. Similarly, it might be possible to include a debarment procedure which would prevent a briber from contracting with the government on any project for a specified and economically debilitating period.

Other reforms such as those of the judiciary and the provision of independent review and investigative bodies are essential if the civil service reforms are to have full resonance. More broadly, corruption within the public service might be mitigated by reducing the benefits under the control of officials. First, it might be possible to eliminate programs identified with corrupt practices. Thus, for example, if a state department has no direct authority to restrict exports or to license businesses (both activities facilitating the demand for corrupt payments), with that decision being taken by an independent body, there will be no point in bribes being sought or proffered. Secondly, if policies increase privatisation then competition may control contracts rather than bribery of a monopolising state.

If the privatisation process is not managed in a systematic and holistic manner there remains a possibility of corruption displacement. For example, a USAID project successfully reduced the number of bribe-extraction points along a transport route for onions in Niger. Unfortunately, as the onions neared the Abidjan food markets, bribes were sought and paid at those points instead. Where government involvement in financial exchanges is essential, such as in the case of tax revenue collection, the issue becomes one of process reform in streamlining administrative processes to reduce the ability of officials to request payment. Other efforts might include rewarding those who report the malfeasance of other public servants and the rotation of staff to prevent entrenched corruption from forming. However, this needs to be approached cautiously, given that if the department in question is corrupt to the core, then rotation will be of limited effect and honest employees may be assigned unpleasant duties for failing to engage in corrupt behaviour (Rose-Ackerman 1997).

Civil service reform or the creation of professional and well-motivated civil service is integral to the anti-corruption process. Political appointments destabilise the civil service, undermine continuity and hamper development of institutional values and standards. There is a need for merit based recruitment and promotion mechanisms that restrain political patronage and create an impartial civil service, combined with credible monitoring and law enforcement. Increasing salary reform for the civil service is often

portrayed as key, but salary reform alone will not eliminate incentives for bureaucratic corruption where high level civil servants retain control of resources.

The success of civil service reform also hinges upon the independence and integrity of the judicial system. Judicial reform aims to put mechanisms in place that provide for job stability, career paths and adequate salaries. It also requires strengthening the prosecutors' and defenders' offices and establishing internal controls to prevent corruption within the judicial system through such entities as professional ethics codes and inspection systems (Tay & Seda 2003).

Private sector

The business sector must also be included in any anti-corruption approach. This cooperation should be orchestrated through the creation of self-regulatory practices in the form of codes of conduct subject to external and objective monitoring. The aim should be placed realistically at setting and adhering to minimum standards. However, this model has attracted criticism from commentators on the activities of corporations in developed economies and has largely given way to the Sarbanes Oxley legislation and related regulatory framework (Carr 2006).

The business sector has historically been seen as part of the corruption problem rather than central to its mitigation, given that the business sector has long recognised the competitive advantage to be achieved through selective acts of bribery, whether in a blatant pay off situation or the more common (and corporately more excusable) payment of 'speed' money to oil, rather than start, the wheels of bureaucracy.

The introduction of the *Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions* (OECD 1997) has, arguably, put pressure upon the business sector to develop integrity management systems. It is suggested that such systems need to reflect both the corporate culture and the culture of the country in which they operate.

Another issue is the interface between the public and private sectors which, in an increasing industrialised environment, has facilitated a high degree of mutually beneficial, yet corrupt, practices. This is said to be particularly acute in smaller countries in which citizens may be influenced by kinship loyalties that may subsume a broader anti-corruption effort. The impact of this discontinuity may be exacerbated if the level of knowledge and understanding of the broader impacts of sustained corruption upon a society is at a low level. The OECD has developed guidelines for managing conflict of interest in the public service which seek to raise awareness of the issue and lay down instances of prohibited conduct, the occurrence of which would result in corrupt practices (OECD 2003).

Given their financial power, businesses need to play a leading role in framing and implementing corporate ethics, strategies and approaches. A key element of transparency is the availability of and free access to information. However, in many countries '...there are bureaucratic practices that are at odds with disclosure systems or mechanisms that would allow the public to appraise the performance of public sector officials or to evaluate the impact of government progress or projects' (Tay & Seda 2003). A catalyst for change in the fight against corruption, NGOs can bring to the mainstream a concern for corruption and break down the long tradition of vertical decision making in the management of public affairs which undermines transparency and accountability processes. While of value, it is important not to overstate the importance of investigative journalism. In Singapore, for example, the media plays a supportive and shaming role, not an investigative one (Tay & Seda 2003).


Public support

It has long been maintained that anti-corruption campaigns cannot succeed without attaining and maintaining public support. Two broad and complementary strategies can increase that support and impact upon the success of anti-corruption strategies. First, there are public awareness programs

which focus upon the harm done by corruption, the misuse of public money, the denial of access to public services and the public duty to complain when public officials act corruptly. Second, there is the empowerment of civil organisations to the extent necessary for them to be able to monitor, detect and reverse the activities of the public officials in their midst. This strategy involves drawing on and utilising the expertise of accountants, lawyers, academics, nongovernment organisations, the private sector, religious leaders and ordinary citizens (Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998).

Increasing the levels of public awareness and thereby increasing the level of successful engagement with the anti-corruption strategy can be achieved through social marketing. This process can raise awareness of the costs of corruption to a country, its organisations and its citizens. It can ensure that corruption becomes a key concern for national institutions (which will in turn be able to provide a more visible level of concern about corrupt practices and a higher level of engagement with anti-corruption efforts and thereby provide continuing succour for that strategy). It can raise the level of understanding in the public domain of the causal factors of corruption and demonstrate the sheer variety of corruption manifestations and typologies. It can ultimately positively influence the behaviour of corrupt and potentially corrupt individuals (Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998) (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Social marketing strategies to fight corruption



Source: Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998: 12

Assessment and design

It has been suggested that any anti-corruption effort should have a plan to alter the behaviour of people who misuse power for private gain as its primary driver. It is suggested that in any act of corruption there are three actors: the person initiating the corrupt act, the person who participates actively or passively, and the individual or larger group of people who may pay the costs of that corruption, even if they are not aware of it.

To be successful, an anti-corruption strategy should consider each actor, understand their motivation and alter the factors underpinning that motivation by engaging in the process of cost benefit analysis that the actors undertake. Understanding the interaction of each actor in a number of corruption scenarios can assist in the designing of an anti-corruption strategy (Table 4).

Table 4: Corruption winners and losers			
	Corrupter (A)	Corruptee (B)	Third Actor (C)
1	Win	Win	Win
2	Win	Win	Lose
3	Win	Lose	Win
4	Win	Lose	Lose
5	Lose	Win	Win (anti-corruption goal)
6	Lose	Lose	Win (anti-corruption goal)
7	Lose	Win	Lose
8	Lose	Lose	Lose

Source: Karklins 2005: 150

In Table 4, A and B can be either a citizen or an official. C can be another citizen, competitor, supervisor, or the public at large. Examples include:

1. Cut red tape
2. A bribes B to jump queue
3. A and C conduct sting operation against B
4. A extorts bribe from B by over-regulation
5. A tries to extort B, B refuses and reports to C, who penalises A
6. A and B collude in procurement fraud, C penalises A and B
7. A tries to extort B, who refuses and blackmails A
8. A bribes B to ignore sanitation law, epidemic results. (Karklins 2005).

Working from the premise that individuals in a position of authority routinely engage in a risk analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of corrupt behaviour, it becomes imperative to establish focal points for anti-corruption efforts and to determine the possible consequences of not ensuring that those focal points are selected in a logical manner.

Thus, a number of preparatory issues need to be addressed prior to any anti-corruption strategy being created and implemented.

It should be decided whether the focus should be placed upon the office or the officeholder. For example, providing training to officials to allow them to manage resources in legitimate and effective manner may simply provide them with transferable skills for a lucrative post outside the corrupt government department. Equally, a trained official in an unresponsive and inherently corrupt department may have little opportunity to apply that training in a systematic anti-corruption effort.

It is necessary to establish whether the focus of the anti-corruption strategy should be placed upon protecting state revenue through the enhancement of the integrity of, for example, the tax and customs agencies or upon investigating evidence of criminal activity such as corrupt contract negotiations. The former will assist in creating financial stability and the latter demonstrate the capacity and commitment of the anti-corruption efforts.

It must be ascertained whether the aim of the anti-corruption strategy is to seek retribution against malfeasance, or restitution. Aside from the moral case for and against each in the corruption context there remains an issue of practicality. The former requires an effective criminal justice system and the latter would require effective asset tracing and confiscation systems.

An assessment should be undertaken of the relative benefits of targeting vulnerable departments or anti-corruption agencies in terms of achieving systematic anti-corruption reform. Risk assessments of departments and their procedures may identify important corruption vulnerabilities and thereby direct and enhance anti-corruption efforts.

An assessment should be made of donor coordination given that, although virtually all donors have policies on corruption, there is not necessarily an overarching process of coordination between donors. The lack of a strategy may result in a number of donors operating in a single country with wholly different aims and objectives, modes of operation and conceptions of corruption.

It has been suggested that the targeting of the public sector through processes such as the redrafting and updating of legislation, enhancing the judiciary and ensuring the accountability of public service departments is, while both logical and laudable, time consuming, expensive and prone to relapse. Similarly, authorising externally appointed and funded agencies to engage with countries on corruption issues may have negative impacts, given that such agencies will, without significant host country government support, possibly be doomed to short-term success and run the risk of creating an atmosphere of resentment (and subsequent non-cooperation) among the targeted sectors in that host country (Doig & Riley 1998).

Other models advocate a comparison of the incidence of corruption and the quality of governance in order to determine the priorities any anti-corruption strategy should possess. The model in Table 5 assumes that countries with high corruption have a low quality of governance, those with medium corruption have fair governance and those with low corruption have good governance.

Table 5: One size does not fit all		
Incidence of corruption	Quality of governance	Priorities of anticorruption efforts
High	Poor	Establish rule of law; strengthen institutions of participation and accountability; establish citizens' charter; limit government intervention; implement economic policy reforms
Medium	Fair	Decentralize and reform economic policies and public management and introduce accountability for results
Low	Good	Establish anticorruption agencies; strengthen financial accountability; raise public and official awareness; anti-bribery pledges; conduct high-profile prosecutions

Source: Shah 2006: 14

This model suggests that, if corruption is symptom of governance failure, any anti-corruption strategy should target the failures of governance which facilitate the corrupt action rather than the corrupt behaviours (Shah 2006).

Rather than simply then creating an anti-corruption strategy and seeking to apply it, an evaluation should be carried out of which types of anti-corruption strategy are likely to be most effective in the short and long term. In essence, this evaluation effectively creates a framework within which the prospective impact of anti-corruption measures can be viewed prior to implementation. This pre-implementation profiling should recognise the diversity of transitional or developing economies and enhance the likely impact of any anti-corruption strategy applied to them. A final component of the pre-design stage could consider strategy issues at individual, organisational and national levels. This could include assessments at the level of:

- the citizen, of sustainable, independent and coordinated strategies for controlling or minimising small scale corruption
- major contracts and senior political institutions and administration, of strategies for controlling or minimising corruption
- the state, of procedures and training within state or public sector institutions in general for promoting a public service culture (Doig 1998).

The variation in the likely impact of anti-corruption strategies due to different governance conditions and patterns of corruption across countries should also be noted. A possible framework to facilitate an understanding of such variance would:

- assess a country's governance and operating environment
- review the range of anti-corruption measures that are in use internationally and the conditions and prerequisites for measures that have achieved success
- link the analysis of the country governance environment and patterns of corruption with the global menu of anti-corruption measures
- seek and build key anti-corruption champions in the country; without broad-based coalitions behind anti-corruption efforts the agenda can be undermined by resistance to reforms
- ensure authoritative and actionable leadership and management structures of anti-corruption are relevant to a country's governance and operating environment
- develop and strengthen processes and mechanisms for regularly monitoring and reporting feedback on anti-corruption policies and programs.

Anti-corruption instruments need to pursue a set of policies and programs that go beyond relying on government leadership and regulation because state institutions are generally weak and agencies and officials more likely to be part of the problem than instrumental in the provision of solutions. Engaging external participation in anti-corruption processes involves forging broad based coalitions to increase pressure for anti-corruption actions, following policy reforms that eliminate administrative opportunities for corruption, reinforcing media independence and citizenship participation, enhancing the effectiveness and accountability of independent oversight institutions and building the capacity and independence of prosecutorial agencies and the judiciary with appropriate checks and balances for holding them accountable to the public (Bhargava & Bolongaita 2004).

Design

In essence, anti-corruption strategies are usually framed in terms of a relationship between a principal and an agent. Corruptive practices exist in this context because the public (the principal) is unable to control the actions of its political, and, by extension, bureaucratic agents.

Sound anti-corruption strategies must involve the construction of a set of incentives to encourage rule-abiding, and discourage rule-averse, behaviour by agents who are predisposed to be opportunistic and driven by self-interest within their currently corrupt working environment. Broadly, strategies which might assist in achieving this outcome include:

- reducing the scope for corruption through policy change
- increasing the costs of corruption through external monitoring and sanctioning
- devising systems to induce self-restraint within government including rewards for non-corrupt behaviour or the reporting of corrupt behaviour (Hamilton-Hart 2001).

A generic but important point concerning the creation of anti-corruption strategies is that '[t]he design and practical delivery of anti-corruption programmes should not be over-influenced by definitional and desk perspectives which offer an indiscriminate, broad-brush approach which belies in-country realities or cross-country differences and neglects the sequential linkages between hypothesised goals and the building blocks to achieve them' (Doig 1998).

This one-size fits all approach to anti-corruption strategies is no longer acceptable or practicable, if it ever was, given that the focus of anti-corruption reform will be unique to every country. It has been suggested that the instigators of anti-corruption reforms should query whether adverse consequences, anticipated or otherwise, might result from the introduction of a particular reform or as a result of its interrelationship with other reforms. Equally, proponents of anti-corruption reforms should ascertain whether the reform in question requires long term support by the recipients rather than externally driven efforts alone. Proponents need to be aware of the correct and most effective sequence of reforms to ensure long term sustainability and eventual weaning off of external aid.

Anti-corruption strategies should be designed with longevity in mind. To meet this long-term goal, a number of assessments need to have been made if the anti-corruption strategy is to be successful. Certain reforms (especially those of a radical nature) should be assessed for potentially adverse and/or disproportionate consequences. Awareness of the importance of the sequential nature of reform, noted above, would note, for example, that an anti-corruption agency's success may depend upon an honest judiciary and that the latter may take longer to establish than the former. Attempting to create the equivalent of the Hong Kong SAR's ICAC without the requisite reform of the judiciary would be costly and broadly ineffective, especially in the longer term. Related to this point is the importance of determining whether police corruption is a greater threat than judicial corruption and if so, how that might impact upon the anti-corruption strategy as a whole.

The importance of recognising the interrelationship of certain anti-corruption reforms and, moreover, the consequences of failing to recognise the often subtle nuances of such relationships should also be noted. Thus, for example, promoting an independent press to investigate and report on corrupt activity is of reduced utility if a literacy campaign to ensure that the public can actually read those accounts is not introduced simultaneously. Recognising what is actually achievable through an anti-corruption strategy is as important as creating the strategy in the first instance. It might be possible, for example, to create an environment in which political parties are funded sufficiently well to be able to realistically challenge in state elections but it might be more difficult to actually ensure that an effective opposition is created in the first instance to utilise that funding.

Specific methods and measures

In order to be holistic in approach, anti-corruption strategies need to incorporate policies in relation to a number of sectors vulnerable to corruption and amenable to change. Underpinning dedicated efforts in relation to those sectors are a number of guiding principles which influence the nature and direction of the anti-corruption strategy. There are tried and tested mechanisms for the mitigation of corruption such as anti-corruption commissions. Equally, a number of pragmatic and innovative mechanisms have been mooted. What is clear in terms of corruption is that lower and higher income countries share a common view as to the major causes of corruption and of the value of anti-corruption efforts designed to undermine those causes. Although there is a degree of disparity between the desire to eradicate corruption and the actual delivery of anti-corruption efforts, there is nevertheless room for optimism. These issues are discussed in more detail below.

Huberts (1998) has distinguished six strategies:

- economic – emphasises the need for the economic stimuli for corruption to be reduced and suggests that such might be achieved by, inter alia, paying higher civil service salaries
- educational – aims at altering the attitudes and values of the populace and civil servants alike via training and education campaigns and engagement of the media
- cultural – ensuring that the behaviour and attitudes of those in power are subject to stringent codes of conduct and their behaviour filters down to civil servants
- organisational or bureaucratic – strengthening internal control systems such as auditing to detect corrupt activity, and staff rotation to reduce the propensity for individuals to establish themselves in entrenched corruption
- political – increasing in transparency in terms, for example, of the monitoring of party finances and more broadly, a clearer and more definite separation of powers in terms of the judiciary and the state
- judicial or repressive measures – advocates harsher penalties for corrupt practices but also the creation of independent anti-corruption agencies.

It has been suggested that there are four broad themes forming the basis of most anti-corruption strategies. The first seeks to utilise regulation as a counter to corruption. The second seeks to provide financial aid with conditions of non-corrupt behaviour attached. The third seeks to employ the media as a means of investigating corruption and publicising its effects. The fourth seeks to engage the NGO and allied sectors in pricking the consciences of governments and international organisations which can in turn bring pressure to bear upon corrupt countries (Carr 2006).

A combination of these generic strategies can be seen in Transparency International's *Anti-corruption handbook* (2004) which provides a number of measures including strategies to provide anti-corruption education, establish anti-corruption agencies, render party political funding more transparent and facilitate and encourage the involvement of nongovernmental actors such as the media and the private sector in anti-corruption efforts. Of these, an oft cited and successful component of anti-corruption strategies is the independent, well-resourced and politically supported anti-corruption agency. Less well known, but of potentially significant value, is the proposed special governance zone concept (based in principle upon free trade zones). These two aspects of anti-corruption strategies are considered below.

Anti-corruption agencies

An examination was undertaken of three patterns of corruption control operating within Hong Kong SAR, India, Mongolia, Philippines and Singapore. The first pattern involved the introduction of anti-corruption legislation with no independent anti-corruption agency. Mongolia has the *Law on Anti-Corruption* and

three provisions restricting bribery in the *Criminal Code*. However, the task of curbing corruption is divided among police, the General Prosecutor's Office and the courts. The second pattern involved the introduction of anti-corruption legislation with several agencies. In India the *Prevention of Corruption Act* is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation, the Central Vigilance Commission, the state anti-corruption bureaux and the state vigilance commissions. The third pattern involved the creation of anti-corruption legislation with one independent agency. In Singapore the *Prevention of Corruption Act* is implemented by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau. The third pattern was deemed the most effective given that Singapore and Hong Kong SAR had been determined by Transparency International to be more successful than the other countries in minimising corruption. A number of lessons were said to have been learned in relation to the anti-corruption experiences of the five countries examined:

- commitment of the political leadership is crucial
- a comprehensive strategy is more effective than incremental measures
- the anti-corruption agency must be incorruptible
- the anti-corruption agency must be removed from police control
- opportunities for corruption in vulnerable agencies must be reduced
- corruption must be reduced by raising salaries if a country can afford to do so (Quah 1999).

Hong Kong SAR's ICAC has always adopted a three pronged approach of investigation, prevention and education. The Operations Department is charged with investigating alleged corruption cases. It has wide-ranging powers including the use of informants and undercover agents.

The Corruption Prevention Department examines practices and procedures of government departments and public bodies with a view to identifying and eliminating opportunities. Through its Advisory Services Group the department also advises private organisations on ways to prevent corruption. Since 1998, the department has produced best practice packages containing advice on ways of minimising corruption opportunities in areas such as procurement, tendering and information security.

The Community Relations Department is charged with educating the public against corruption with the use of the media as a major educative strategy. The department also organised educational programs for new arrivals to Hong Kong SAR from China (following the handover in 1997) to raise awareness of anti-corruption laws.

Within the private sector, ICAC has focused on issues such as building management. It offers its services to all newly formed owners' corporations and building management organisations whose buildings have undergone repair or maintenance work. ICAC also published practical web guides such as the *Corruption prevention guidance on building management* and a checklist to assist building management organisations to enhance transparency and prevent corruption when undertaking renovation and repair projects.

In relation to the financial and insurance industries there has been an emphasis on corporate governance and this has contributed to the installation of effective internal checks and balances. ICAC maintains close links with the Hong Kong SAR Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission.

In relation to corruption within government, the police force formed the Anti-Corruption Strategy Steering Committee with ICAC assistance to fight against graft, formulate strategies and monitor progress of implementation plans. A Working Group on the Internal Reporting of Malpractice and Corruption was established in 1998 to examine a mechanism for reporting serious breaches of duty and supporting officers who made reports.

In relation to public housing construction projects the Corruption Prevention Department reviewed the Housing Department's site supervision system and identified a number of issues that had led to quality and corruption problems. In 2000, the Housing Department set up an Anti-Corruption Strategy Committee similar to the one established by the Hong Kong SAR Police.

The low incidence of corruption in the Hong Kong SAR is not due solely to the establishment and effectiveness of ICAC. A supportive public has made it possible to tackle corruption on all fronts in the community and the rule of law in general within Hong Kong SAR is respected. Consequently, the often difficult task of apprising the public of the existence, nature and consequences of corruption was made all the more easier for the relevant authorities. Straddling all such efforts has been an overwhelming government commitment particularly in terms of the provision of sufficient resources and adequate legal powers to tackle corruption (Lai 2002). In addition, there was a simultaneous strengthening of law enforcement agencies in both Hong Kong SAR and Singapore. In Singapore, civil servants' pay increased substantially relative to the private sector. Public officials were routinely rotated to make it harder for corrupt officials to develop strong ties to certain clients. Rewards were given to those who refused bribes and turned in a client. Rules and procedures were simplified and published often, permits and approvals were scrapped and fees (including import duties) were lowered or removed. In both Hong Kong SAR and Singapore, political support was forthcoming, something which cannot be guaranteed in other, poorer jurisdictions.

In Thailand new institutions including the Constitutional Court and the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) are expected to serve as key pillars in the battle against corruption and misuse of power by politicians and public officials. The NCCC has been empowered to investigate allegations of corruption among politicians and government officials and has power to prosecute wrongdoers. Politicians and public officials must submit reports on assets and liabilities and the NCCC can investigate whether those reports are true (Bunbongkarn 2003).

Consideration has been given to the true impact of anti-corruption commissions upon the long term eradication or control of corruption in countries other than Hong Kong SAR or Singapore where a unique conflation of cultural, political and legislative issues occurred. It has been argued that if the legal framework is not present or lacks essential components such as the ability of the commission concerned to enforce the law then the power of that commission would be effectively usurped. Second, if the commission is not truly independent from the state that create it a similar disjuncture may occur. Finally, the lack of effective oversight of even the most advanced commission undermines the perception of its actual or prospective impact upon corruption (Heilbrunn 2004).

For others, such agencies constitute a potential danger in the sense that they might become reactive rather than proactive and may target the wrong areas for the wrong reasons and with concomitantly wrong results if they lack specific intelligence on corrupt practices. It is suggested that the archetypal anti-corruption commission epitomised by the Hong Kong SAR ICAC may not be of universal application given its expense and requirement of wholesale political support. However, a donor supported agency whose remit was predetermined by internal and external consultation may in fact provide a generic foundation for more enhanced anti-corruption reform (Doig & Riley 1998).

Special governance zones

One important anti-corruption suggestion which seeks to exploit economic drivers has been the creation of a special governance zone (SGZ) which is essentially a city or region within a country in which radical and comprehensive reforms such as the payment of higher civil service salaries can be implemented. These zones minimise the political risk to the leaders of the city/region in question, given that it is localised and reversible if it fails and exportable if it does not. Such zones could actually recoup the financial outlay required at their inception given that, in theory at least, as incidences of corruption fall economic growth should increase and tax revenue from the newly legitimised business activities rise. More importantly, public support and respect for the government's anti-corruption stance should likewise increase.

There are a number of potential advantages to the SGZ concept. First, a successful SGZ can provide a working model for application to the rest of the country. Secondly, the cultural or traditional rationale for avoiding systematic change in governance issues often advanced by bureaucrats can be challenged in by the success of an SGZ in which similar cultural concerns exist. Thirdly, any brain drain of talented individuals from outside to within an SGZ may increase the pressure of non-SGZ regions to increase their capacity and anti-corruption efforts in turn. Finally, a successful SGZ would permit national or state governments to apply the concept to other areas with the proof that such a concept will resonate. There are indications that approaches allied to the SGZ concept have met with a high degree of success, notably in Campo Elias (Venezuela) and Obninsk (Russia) in which cities have developed anti-corruption programs without the assistance of state authorities and have nevertheless achieved a good deal of positive change (Wei 2001).

Finally, consideration might be given to market strategies to increase the competitiveness of the economy through less government regulation. This requires, for example, economic reforms such as lowering tariffs and other barriers to international trade, unifying market-determined exchange and interest rates, eliminating subsidies and simplifying licensing requirements, permits and other barriers for new firms and investors (Tay & Seda 2003).

Effective measures in poor or transitional countries

Transparency International (2002) provides examples of successful approaches undertaken including anti-corruption radio spots in Brazil, workshops on public procurement in Paraguay, monitoring election coverage in Chile, a construction permit manual in Lebanon, monitoring the Senate in Argentina, a comprehensive ethics programme for small to medium business enterprises in Colombia and an urban bribery index in Kenya. It is possible to produce examples of similar and successful (relative to the context in which they are applied) anti-corruption efforts. However, individual in-country efforts do not necessarily make a national anti-corruption program, laudable as they certainly may be.

Crucially, Transparency International recognises that states in transition may experience unique difficulties in the creation and/or application of a NIS. In essence, such states, aside from being inherently weak, may also have inherited bureaucracies that lack many of the regulatory institutions necessary for a modern state and economy to function and also the mechanisms required to ensure that accountability can operate. Thus, there may be an ineffective judiciary, infrastructure reform processes integral to the movement from transition to effective economic status may naturally deflect attention from anti-corruption efforts, the economic transition processes may actually subject players to corrupting practices, the generally weak civil society in transition states will be unable to support any anti-corruption processes attempted and the private sector (eager to embrace the rewards stemming from economic development by possibly corrupt business practices) is unlikely to actively support anti-corruption measures (Transparency International 2001).

A survey of 257 experts from 49 countries asked them to rate the effectiveness of 24 anti-corruption methods. In Table 6 the percentages refer to the percentage of respondents who considered the strategy in question to be 'very effective'.

Table 6: Expert panel views on the effectiveness of 21 anti-corruption methods (percent)			
Strategy	Higher income country	Lower income country	World panel
Economic			
Reasonable standard of living	50.0	85.2	58.8
Higher salaries politicians/public servants	34.4	73.0	44.2
Less government/privatising	27.9	62.5	36.2
Making banking and finance more transparent	69.9	78.7	71.9
Educational			
Information campaigns (public)	71.6	85.0	74.9
More public exposure	76.6	82.0	78.0
Changing family attitudes population	37.1	68.9	45.2
Influencing attitude of public servants	76.8	82.3	78.1
Public culture			
Example given by management at the top	80.0	85.0	81.2
Code of ethics for politicians and civil servants	73.1	76.2	73.9
Better protection for whistle blowers	74.2	78.7	75.3
Organisational/bureaucratic			
Rotation of personnel	51.6	55.0	52.4
Internal control and supervision	86.5	96.9	89.2
Stronger selection of public personnel	73.2	91.9	78.0
Political			
More commitment by politicians	86.9	88.5	87.3
Transparent party finances	80.3	96.8	84.5
Example given by management at the top	80.0	85.0	81.2
More rigorous separation of public powers	48.4	74.6	55.1
Less government/privatising	27.9	62.5	36.2
Repressive/judicial			
More severe penal sanctions	64.2	82.8	68.9
Extension of police and judiciary	57.1	72.1	60.9
Creating independent institutions	75.1	87.1	78.1
Combating organised crime	77.3	86.9	79.8
Making banking and finance more transparent	69.6	78.7	71.9
(n)	(190)	(67)	(257)

Source: Huberts 1998: 217

It is noteworthy that all 24 methods were considered more effective by experts from lower income countries than by those from higher income countries. This consistent pattern is thought to be because all types of initiatives are deemed useful in the mitigation of corruption in countries where corruption is both rife and problematic. This points clearly to the need to ensure that any anti-corruption strategy targets the range of economic, educational, cultural and political drivers of concern. In addition, it was found that there was close agreement between experts from lower and higher income countries about the importance of particular political and organisational strategies, altering the attitudes of public servants and combating organised crime (see Table 7). This bodes well for the success of anti-corruption strategies.

Table 7: Most effective strategies against public corruption and fraud (rank)		
Methods	Effectiveness	
	Higher income country	Lower income country
More commitment by politicians	1	4
Internal control and supervision	2	1
Transparent party finances	3	2
Example given by management at the top	4	8
Influencing attitude of public servants	5	11
Combating organised crime	6	6
More public exposure	7	8
Creating independent institutions	8	5
Stronger selection of public personnel	10	3
Reasonable standard of living	17	7
(n)	(190)	(67)

Source: Huberts 1998: 219

Implementation and impact assessment

The implementation of anti-corruption strategies is perhaps more important than their conception. The key issue for success in this regard lies in the coordination of the efforts of a number of disparate agencies and approaches. A focal point needs to be established which is assigned overall responsibility for ensuring and broadcasting success. It is argued that two key possibilities for such a focal point exist. First, there are agencies such as Hong Kong SAR's ICAC which combines investigation, prevention and public participation and support. Secondly, there are interagency coordinating bodies such as those that exist in Venezuela at the Ministerial and civil servant levels, to facilitate coordination between the police, prosecutors and the Supreme Court.

Anti-corruption efforts can be undermined by a lack of conviction behind clean up campaigns and the consequent failure to have the required impact. As well as attempting to curb corruption, anti-corruption campaigns serve a crucial purpose in raising public awareness and creating a climate in which anti-corruption laws and solutions can be introduced. The perception of corruption by the public may also vary and other socioeconomic issues may be more important to it than anti-corruption efforts. The consequence of this relative lack of importance in the public mind is a further diminution in the importance of tackling the issue of corruption itself.

Even developed western nations the importance of culture in terms of the recognition of the issue of corruption is as recognised as it is in developing nations. One of the difficulties with anti-corruption legislation is the test against which a corrupt individual's actions are measured. It is not simply a question of what constitutes honesty or indeed what a reasonable person in the position of the corruptee would do. Both concepts are in large part culturally defined.

It has been suggested that Transparency International's National Integrity System is an ideal, providing countries with a benchmark against which to evaluate their current corruption situation. Although the NIS provides best practice guidelines it also underlines a number of crucial points:

- attempting to address individual behaviour and responsibility is as important as pursuing the more visible structural targets of government and its associated agencies
- laws should not simply attempt to restrict behaviour but also act as a vehicle by which the fundamental importance of moral and ethical behaviour as an end in itself should be reinforced
- to enhance both of these aims, additional emphasis should be placed on achieving radical cultural reform via systematic education of the dangers and costs of corruption at whatever level of society (Bull & Newell 2003).

A recent evaluation of the ADB/OECD implementation of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for the Asia-Pacific (ADB/OECD 2004) noted that laudable efforts were being made by a majority of countries at legal and institutional levels. Preventive measures in the region were found to focus on human resources management, public officials' conduct, and the transparency and scrutiny of public administration. In terms of enforcement, many governments elected to complement existing law enforcement institutions with anti-corruption agencies or coordinating units and increased the fight against money laundering. In terms of relations between government and civil society a number of activities were undertaken including awareness raising, education campaigns, institutionalised public scrutiny of selected public administration procedures or input to legal drafting processes. It is important to note however, that the evaluation was based upon self-evaluations (see http://www1.oecd.org/daf/Asiacom/pdf/str_indonesia.pdf by way of example) rather than more objective mutual evaluations by the countries concerned. Moreover, the evaluations tended to focus on structural issues such as the regulatory or legal framework, the institutions in charge of implementation and recent or planned reforms for the area under consideration, for example the public service. While establishing such frameworks is important there is little indication within those reports as to how successful such measures had been or were likely to be, in mitigating corruption.

The review noted a number of weaknesses in anti-corruption measures including inequalities and insufficiencies in penal and criminal provisions and a lack of criminalisation of certain forms of corruption. Equally, the involvement and utilisation of the public in the fight against corruption had not been acknowledged sufficiently in most countries. A weak regulatory environment was also seen to lead to discouragement of the private sector in enhancing transparency and accountability in business transactions with public officials.

In the area of procurement, deemed to constitute a central point of abuse, it has been suggested that it may be necessary to create third party oversight processes, given the unlikelihood of either party in the procurement process reporting each other's activity. These could include evaluation and risk profiling of procurement activities and procedures, monitoring of the awarded contract at the site of the project for which a tender was successful and performing post-project evaluations to ensure that the money provided for its completion can be fully accounted for.

It is recognised that locating evidence of corruption is difficult and might arguably impact upon the actual or perceived success of anti-corruption efforts, especially in those environments where corrupt practices are so endemic as to constitute normal behaviour. The provision for safe and objective whistleblowing procedures might provide the crucial link between corruption, evidence and subsequent law enforcement action.

The other evidentiary issue lies in locating and then extracting the pertinent information from the banal. The use of forensic accounting procedures to facilitate this is becoming increasingly important. However, in those countries in which such a facility would be beneficial there is currently neither the expertise nor the capacity to provide such coverage. The final issue of note in the overview is mutual legal assistance which is becoming more important in tracing both the corrupt activities and the money secreted around the globe as a result of those activities (ADB/OECD 2004).

An additional area concerns technical strategies in which improvements are made to improve the efficiency of monitoring and accountability mechanisms in the political, administrative and private sectors. Such measures include procurement laws, sound accounting procedures and transparent financial management systems, regulations on financial disclosure and receipt of gifts by state officials. It also requires the establishment or strengthening of supreme auditing institutions and the establishment of special commissions of inquiry or special prosecutors to investigate individuals and groups accused of corruption (Tay & Seda 2003).

Conclusion

It has been argued that most anti-corruption programs rely on legal and financial institutions such as the judiciary, police and financial auditors to enforce and strengthen accountability in the public sector. The assumption here is that more and better enforcement of rules and regulations will reduce corruption. The problem with such an approach is that in many poor countries the legal and financial institutions are weak and often corrupt themselves (Svensson 2005).

A more fundamental cause for the relative failure of anti-corruption strategies is that they are 'more often limited to rhetoric, and are only rarely sustained' (Wei 2001: 6). Wei suggests that this is because some political leaders fear the political risks associated with radical and entrenched reform of corrupt processes/practices and that the cost of creating significant reforms and achieving essential progress is often prohibitive.

There remain a number of difficulties with tackling corruption. First, anti-corruption efforts that seek to establish and appeal to a moral or ethical high ground via education of the corruptors and corruptees are, some argue, unlikely to succeed. The very mechanisms of government create overriding incentives for corrupt rather than anti-corrupt activities. Second, this also reduces the deterrence component of anti-corruption penalties within the criminal law or code of the country concerned. The corrupt individual arguably considers the prospect of being caught rather than the punishment they might incur in the unlikely event of interception. Third, it is not unusual to discover corruption and incompetence within government occupying the same space and this may be exacerbated by systems of allocating influential government positions on the basis of patronage rather than ability. A corrupt appointment process simply facilitates further corruption by the post-holders (Cobb & Gonzalez 2005).

Others have expressed doubt about the argument that corruption can be fought through a series of anti-corruption agencies, the creation of all-encompassing laws and the establishment of codes of ethical conduct. In many cases it is suggested that these are constituents of a perception of successful anti-corruption efforts which disguise the lack of real progress on the ground (Kaufmann 2005).

It is suggested that a broad based approach must be adopted in relation to anti-corruption strategies if systematic corruption is to be mitigated. Successful campaigns against corruption have included measures to reduce the opportunities for and benefits of corruption, to increase the likelihood that it will be detected and to make it far more likely that a transgressor will be punished. Conversely, difficulties with anti-corruption strategies have included limits being placed upon power or commitment at senior, and therefore influential, political and social levels, overly ambitious anti-corruption promises leading to unrealistic and unachievable expectations and subsequent loss of public confidence, piecemeal and uncoordinated reforms, failure to establish institutional mechanisms that outlive the reformers, failure of the government to include and utilise private sector opinion leaders and failure to devise effective communications programs (Kindra & Stapenhurst 1998).

There are no simple solutions to the problem of corruption but it is important to recognise the fundamental role that political will and support for reforms at the highest levels of government can play in bringing about practical results and in raising the credibility of, and public support for, anti-corruption progress. It has been argued that numerous studies '...show that a common sense of corruption is an absence of strong government institutions, such as the judiciary, the legislature, the office of the auditor-general, the police, the office of the ombudsman and watchdog agencies. The important role that the media, civil society organisations, and the private sector...can play in the fight against corruption is also vitally important, and should not be underestimated' (Aziz 2003).

There are three possible arenas for anti-corruption reforms:

- agenda-setting – many governments have yet to recognise corruption as a serious problem, much less place it on their national agenda
- decision-making – attempts to get anti-corruption reforms approved yet alone implemented have been mixed
- implementation – many reforms that have succeeded in being enacted have encountered obstacles in execution, often preventing the effective resolution of the problem of corruption (Tay & Seda 2003).

Thus, anti-corruption efforts overall need to ensure that governments recognise and prioritise the issue of corruption, that those governments receive assistance with the development of appropriate policy recommendations and finally that governments are provided with the assistance needed to ensure that policy reforms are implemented.

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Anti-corruption bibliography 2000–06

Compiled by Janine Chandler and Karen Collier

90 percent of works in the bibliography are relevant to the Pacific, South East Asia and East Asia

Table 8: Anti corruption bibliography country breakdown

Country	Number of articles
Australia	14
Bangladesh	4
Burma/Myanmar	2
Cambodia	6
China	11
Cook Islands	3
East Timor	1
Fiji	4
Hong Kong SAR	12
India	18
Indonesia	20
Japan	8
Kazakhstan	2
Kiribati	2
Republic of Korea	10
Lao PDR/Laos	4
Malaysia	8
Marshall Islands	1
Micronesia	2
Mongolia	2
Nauru	3
Nepal	5
New Zealand	3
Niue	2
Pakistan	5
Pacific Islands	12
Republic of Palau	3
Papua New Guinea	10
Philippines	13
Samoa	4
Singapore	13
Solomon Islands	2
Sri Lanka	3
Thailand	4
Tonga	4
Tuvalu	2
Vanuatu	6
Vietnam	8
(Total)	(236)

**Table 9: Focus of articles in anti-corruption bibliography as at 13 June 2006
(excludes ADB/OECD country reports)**

Year	Total articles	Describes strategies	Evaluates results
2006	32	19	17
2005	67	31	28
2004	40	27	26
2003	23	10	9
2002	23	10	2
2001	27	19	13
2000	19	14	10
Total	231	130	105
(% of total)	(100)	(56)	(45)

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All URLs correct at 17 November 2006

2006

Asian Development Bank & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2006.

Anti-corruption policies in Asia and the Pacific: progress in legal and institutional reform in 25 countries.
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/31/36832820.pdf>

This report provides a picture of the legal and institutional frameworks that are in place in the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific's member countries. The report follows these countries' progress in establishing safeguards against corruption through the implementation over time of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia-Pacific. Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, P.R. China, Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Thailand, Vanuatu, and Vietnam are included.

Australian Agency for International Development 2006. *Australian aid, promoting growth and stability: a white paper on the Australian Government's overseas aid program.* Canberra: AusAID

This paper provides the strategic framework which will guide the direction and delivery of Australia's overseas aid program over the next ten years.

Blake CH & Martin CG. 2006 The dynamics of political corruption: re-examining the influence of democracy. *Democratization* 13(1): 1–14

This paper develops some conceptual and methodological modifications to the study of democracy's influence on the probability of corruption. These changes demonstrate that the consolidation of a vital democracy maintained over time exercises a more powerful influence over corruption than past research had indicated.

Bubandt N 2006. Sorcery, corruption, and the dangers of democracy in Indonesia. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 12(2): 413–431

This paper examines how sorcery plays an integral part in the new politics of democratisation in Indonesia. It argues that political sorcery thrives in a complex moral economy that mixes local ideas of sociality, political practices of patrimonialism, and global discourses of democracy. Sorcery and corruption are part of the same political imagination, because both speak ambivalently to the problems of power in times of change. Rather than being anathema to democracy, as the new global discourse on transparency would have it, the occult politics of corruption and sorcery are among the means through which a contested form of democracy is conceptualised and implemented in Indonesia.

Bukovansky M 2006. The hollowness of anti-corruption discourse. *Review of international political economy* 13(2): 181–209

This paper notes that a survey of the anti-corruption consensus reveals omissions and oversights which cause analysts to evade and obscure, rather than directly engage, core problems of politics and ethics; this may have practical consequences for anti-corruption efforts. Republican political thought, though not without its own risks and flaws, may balance and correct some of the omissions and oversights of liberal and rationalist discourse on corruption.

Campos JE & Syquia JL 2006. Managing the politics of reform overhauling the legal infrastructure of public procurement in the Philippines. *World Bank working paper no. 70*

This paper concerns procurement reform and notes that tackling problems in procurement is essentially about confronting corruption. Because of the complexity and enormity of the task involved, many developing countries have found it daunting to address the problem of corruption.

Carr I 2006. Strategic improvements in the fight against corruption in international business transactions. *Journal of business law* June: 375–395

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of initiatives aimed at combating corruption in international business practices. It discusses the potential causes of such corruption, its various manifestations and key anti-corruption strategies involving: (1) regulatory intervention, including the Convention on Combating Bribery in Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997; (2) the imposition of loan conditions by international agencies; (3) media cooperation in publicising the effects of corruption; and (4) the participation of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Finally, it considers how the incidence of such corruption may be reduced by encouraging the participation of the business sector in anti-corruption drives and by introducing codes of conduct.

Chang ECC & Chu Y 2006. Corruption and trust: exceptionalism in Asian democracies? *Journal of politics* 68(2): 259–271

This paper utilises data from the East Asia Barometer and notes that there is a strong trust-eroding effect of political corruption in Asian democracies. It also finds no evidence that contextual factors lessen the corruption–trust link in Asia. The trust-eroding effect holds uniformly across all countries examined in this study and remains robust even after taking into account the endogenous relationship between corruption and trust.

Cirillo S 2006. *Australia's governance aid: evaluating evolving norms and objectives*. Canberra: Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government

This paper aims to deconstruct the Australian approach to promoting 'good governance' with a view to answering four key questions: (1) What does the elusive concept of 'good governance' mean in the context of development theory and practice? (2) How did this concept evolve and become institutionalised as a core objective of AusAID's work? (3) How does Australia's conception of 'good governance' facilitate the pursuit of national interest? (4) To what extent does AusAID's foreign policy-focused conception of governance conflict with a more developmentally-focused conception of governance?

Connell J 2006. Nauru: the first failed Pacific State? *Round table* 95(383): 47–63

This paper argues that in recent years supposedly ‘failed states’ have been recognised in the Pacific. Nauru, once rich, has acquired most of the characteristics of a failed state, in large part because of the consequences of an extreme ‘resource curse’ scenario, where other economic sectors fail. Mining of phosphate is now almost over. Wasteful expenditure, especially on a national airline and the panoply of a ‘welfare state’, and inadequate health services and education systems created budget deficits but not the skills required to develop an alternative economy to mining. The collapse of a corrupt offshore banking and passport system emphasised this failure. Political systems have been too inexperienced, short-term and divided to stabilise the political economy. Regional external intervention has occurred and may lead to extensive emigration from Nauru and to a new political status.

Dreher A & Schneider F 2006. Corruption and the shadow economy: an empirical analysis. *Institute for the Study of Labor discussion paper series*

This paper analyses the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. It is hypothesised that corruption and shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses are tested for a cross-section of 120 countries and a panel of 70 countries for the period 1994–2002. The results show that the shadow economy reduces corruption in high income countries, but increases corruption in low income countries. The paper also finds that stricter regulations increase both corruption and the shadow economy.

Everett J, Neu D & Rahaman A 2006. The global fight against corruption: a Foucaultian, virtues–ethics framing. *Journal of business ethics* 65(1): 1–12

This paper extends the discussion of business ethics by examining the issue of corruption, its definition, the solutions being proposed for dealing with it, and the ethical perspectives underpinning these proposals. The paper’s findings are based on a review of association, think-tank, and academic reports, books, and papers dealing with the topic of corruption, as well as the pronouncements, websites, and position papers of a number of important global organisations active in the fight. The paper’s discussion departs from prior analyses by adopting a Foucaultian theoretical framing and by incorporating insights found in the virtue ethics literature. Implications are provided for international business organisations.

Fritzen S 2006. Discipline and democratize: patterns of bureaucratic accountability in Southeast Asia. *International journal of public administration* (forthcoming) http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp06_03.pdf

This paper presents an analytical framework that unpacks the idioms used in common accountability reforms applied in Southeast Asian countries into four categories – rules, watchdogs, culture and re-engineering – and relates reform selection and implementation to country governance characteristics. The framework is used to identify reform opportunities, constraints and likely trajectories in the diverse Southeast Asian context.

Hughes C 2006. Cambodia. *IDS bulletin* 37(2): 67–78

This paper examines the extent to which Cambodia has ‘turned around’ with respect to economic performance, conflict resolution and human development. Cambodia’s economic performance since the UN-sponsored peace process of 1991–93 has superficially appeared creditable, but reflects the combined effect of a peace dividend and contingent factors, salient in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Unresolved structural issues emerging from the legacies of the Cambodian war represent a longer-term constraint on economic performance and human development. A legacy that continues to pose particular problems is the power of the military which has become entrenched as a key player within the government structure, in the interests of a peace conceptualised as public order. The paper documents how this strategy has posed continuing problems for the structural reform of key aspects of governance such as the judicial sector and the promotion of an anti-corruption regime.

James E 2006. *Clean or corrupt: tsunami aid in Aceh*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government

This paper examines the problems that are likely to be encountered in meeting the public undertakings given by the Indonesian Government and donors that the funds donated to Indonesia following the 2004 tsunami would not end up in the wrong hands.

Kasper W 2006. Make poverty history: tackle corruption. *Issue analysis* (Centre for Independent Studies) no. 67

This paper contends that foreign aid tends to facilitate corruption. It notes that attempts to improve accountability in foreign aid, though costly, are becoming more common, because simply disbursing aid to kleptocratic regimes has debased the institutions essential for economic growth and has entrenched corrupt elites.

Kaufmann D, Kraay A & Mastruzzi M 2006. *Governance matters V: governance indicators for 1996–2005* Washington, DC: World Bank. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govmatters5>

This paper reports on the latest update of the World Bank's governance indicators, covering 213 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.

Khatri N, Tsang EWK & Begley TM 2006. Cronyism: a cross-cultural analysis. *Journal of international business studies* 37(1): 61–75

This paper analyses the concept of cronyism and argues that it comes in various guises arising from different motivational bases and power dependence relations. The paper distinguishes cronyism from related constructs and posits that it is a form of corruption with different dynamics from other forms. The paper considers the likelihood of cronyism occurring across cultures.

Larmour P 2006. *Culture and corruption in the Pacific Islands: some conceptual issues and findings from studies of National Integrity Systems*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government

This paper finds differences between elite and popular opinion about corruption, and links between suspicions of corruption and ethnic divisions. It concludes with consideration of the impact of different understandings to anti-corruption practice.

Larmour P & Barcham M 2006. National integrity systems in small Pacific Island states. *Public administration and development* 26(2): 173–184

This paper compares the conclusions reached by Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor in their study of 18 countries (Public Administration and Development 2003) with an overview of a subsequent study of 12 small island states in the South Pacific using the same method. Though the sample was not chosen with scale in mind, smallness might explain some of the similarities between the Pacific Island cases, particularly the risks associated with offshore financial centres, trust funds and investments. Their relative size and weakness has also made them targets for direct intervention by Australian police and officials to rebuild anti-corruption institutions. The paper goes on to show how the evidence from the Pacific Island cases raises questions about some of the standard proposals for anti-corruption reform: stronger parties, an ICAC, civil society coalitions and greater accountability and transparency.

Lo SSH 2006. Ethical governance and anti-corruption in Greater China: a comparison of mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao. *CPSA/ACSP papers*. <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2006/Lo.pdf>

This paper aims to compare anti-corruption and ethical governance in the regional governments of Hong Kong and Macao with that in the national government of the People's Republic of China.

Man-wai TK 2006. Formulating an effective anti-corruption strategy: the experience of the Hong Kong ICAC. *Resource material series* 69: 196–201

This article discusses how the Hong Kong ICAC developed its anti-corruption strategy, included steps taken. It then sets out the strategy that is in place.

Man-wai TK 2006. Investigating corruption. *Resource material series* 69: 191–195

This article discusses the Hong Kong Independent Commission Against Corruption and how it deals with the difficulties of investigating corruption, the prerequisites for an effective investigation and methods of investigation.

Murray JT 2006. *The minnows of Triton: policing, politics and corruption in the South Pacific islands*. Canberra: the author

This book recounts the author's experiences in the ten years when he was responsible for the Australian Federal Police's South Pacific Islands desk. The author discusses the issues relating to opportunism by white-collar fraudsters and widespread domestic corruption which is destroying the fiscal and political integrity of Pacific Island countries as well as the natural resources.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development 2006. *Australia: phase 2: report on the application of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign public Officials in International Business Transactions and the 1997 recommendation on combating bribery in international business transactions*. Paris: OECD

This report evaluates and makes recommendations on Australia's implementation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions and related instruments. The Australian authorities demonstrated a strong commitment to combating foreign bribery.

Pritchard J 2006. Introduction to the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption. *Resource material series* 69: 201–230

This article provides a history of the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption; discusses the Commission's current status; assesses the effectiveness of the Commission; and gives an overview of the functions and powers of the Commission. The second part of the article provides case studies of corruption investigations carried out by the Commission.

Quah J 2006. Curbing Asian corruption: an impossible dream? *Current history* 105(690): 176–179.
http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/21128/Corruption_article_in_CH.pdf

This paper examines the difficulties of curbing corruption in Asia and notes and discusses the impact of the lack of political will upon the success of anti-corruption campaigns.

Quinn BJM 2006. Vietnam's last call for bribes. *Far Eastern economic review* 169(5): 52–54

This paper examines weaknesses in anti-corruption laws in Vietnam, the lack of an independent agency, more recent shifts in government and the role of the media.

Rose-Ackerman S (ed) 2006. *International handbook on the economics of corruption*. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar

This book deals with a number of pertinent issues ranging from an economic analysis of corruption, to the causes and consequences of corruption, measuring governance using cross-country perceptions data and determinants of corruption in developing countries.

Sampford C et al. 2006. *Measuring corruption*. Aldershot: Ashgate

This book contains a variety of expert contributions which deal with the complexity and difficulty of, and potential for, measuring corruption.

Shah A 2006. *Corruption and decentralized public governance*. Policy research working paper series 3824. Washington DC: World Bank

This paper examines the conceptual and empirical basis of corruption and governance and concludes that decentralised local governance is conducive to reduced corruption in the long term.

Stuart-Fox M 2006. The political culture of corruption in the Lao PDR. *Asian studies review*, 30(1): 59–76

This article focuses not on the effects of corruption in Laos, on the Lao economy or the lives of individuals, but rather on what sustains it and makes it difficult to control, much less eradicate. In particular, it examines the political culture of corruption that has developed in the Lao PDR since its inauguration in 1975. It outlines the various forms of corruption that have arisen within the context of Lao political culture broadly conceived, discusses how and why corruption has become so deeply ingrained, and examines why legal measures have been ineffective in dealing with corruption. The conclusion takes account of the internal political and international strategic contexts to suggest why pressures for reform are not more efficacious.

Transparency International 2006. *Global corruption report*. London: Pluto Press.

http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr

This paper focuses on corruption and health. It includes expert reports on; the risks of corruption in different health care systems; the scale of the problem; health care fraud in the US; costs of corruption in hospital administration & the problem of informal payments for health care; impacts of corruption on the pharmaceutical chain; anti-corruption challenges posed by the fight against HIV/AIDS.

UNDP Regional Centre in Bangkok 2006. *Institutional arrangements to combat corruption: a comparative study*. http://regionalcentrebangkok.undp.or.th/practices/governance/documents/Corruption_Comparative_Study-200601.pdf

This paper compares institutional arrangements to combat corruption in 14 countries and is aimed at providing an overview of the various options available in this regard, as well as discussing the advantages and disadvantages of these. Thus the paper offers a menu of options and solutions for countries in the region and beyond to be adapted to the local political, social and economic situation.

Wilsher D 2006. Inexplicable wealth and illicit enrichment of public officials: a model draft that respects human rights in corruption cases. *Crime, law & social change* 45(1): 27–53

This paper seeks to evaluate the drafting of crimes of illicit enrichment from human rights and criminal justice perspectives. The paper considers the jurisprudence from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom and South Africa, as well as the European Court of Human Rights. The paper also evaluates the Hong Kong inexplicable wealth offence and subjects it to criticism in terms of the rights of defendants and the lack of clarity in drafting. It is concluded that there is no need for a specific crime of inexplicable wealth – crime of corruption is perfectly adequate.

2005

Asian Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia 2005. *Controlling corruption in Asia and the Pacific*: proceedings of the 4th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in December 2003. Manila: Asian Development Bank. http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/pub_4th-ac-conf.htm

This paper offers an insight into anti-corruption strategies of Asian and Pacific countries, as well as an overview of preventive and enforcement policies and practices developed in the region, with special focus on the management of conflict of interest, measures aimed at curbing corruption in public procurement, corporate ethics, whistleblower protection, forensic accounting and mutual legal assistance.

Asian Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Transparency International 2005. *Curbing corruption in tsunami relief operations*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Curbing-Corruption-Tsunami-Relief/curbing-corruption-tsunami-relief.pdf>

This paper outlines lessons relevant to humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts concluded at the Expert Meeting on Corruption Prevention in Tsunami Relief (April 2005, Jakarta) jointly convened by the Asian Development Bank / Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific, and Transparency International.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 2005. *APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Symposium, 1-2 September 2005*

This paper details the nature of the aforementioned symposium and notes that it produced a number of relevant strategy papers including ones concerned with eliminating bribery and corruption in business transactions and ensuring integrity in the public sector.

Australian Agency for International Development 2005. *Ring the church bell: the role of churches in governance and public performances in Papua New Guinea*. Canberra: AusAID

This paper discusses a case study which examines the role of the Christian churches as institutional actors within Papua New Guinea's governance and service delivery landscape.

Babb J 2005. Corruption and governance in Japan, in Hook G (ed), *Contested governance in Japan: sites and issues*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon: 174-191

This chapter suggests that it is best to try to look at the manner in which the Japanese themselves have constructed their political understanding of and attempts to cope with corruption. In doing so, the political must be highlighted as a contrast to fixed notions of culture and/or 'good governance'. In the end, it is possible that the changing nature of political corruption may be as much a part of Japanese governance as the attempts to eliminate it.

Brown AJ 2005. *Chaos or coherence? Strengths, opportunities and challenges for Australia's integrity systems: final report*. Brisbane: Griffith University and Transparency International

This paper deals with a range of new methodological issues in developing a new approach to integrity system assessment for Australia and potential application elsewhere. These include: how integrity should be defined; how relevant integrity institutions should be identified (including as 'core' or primary institutions; 'distributed' or dispersed strategies); and how the many institutional and non-institutional elements of an integrity system should be described. The assessment resulted in a useful new, natural metaphor – a bird's nest, in which a multiplicity of small elements make up the system, often individually weak, but clearly interdependent and stronger as a whole.

Brown AJ & Head B 2005. Institutional capacity and choice in Australia's integrity systems. *Australian journal of public administration* 64(2): 84-95

This paper examines recent debate over core or 'independent' integrity institutions in the Victorian and Commonwealth governments to highlight some of the need, and potential, for more careful deliberation over options for building the capacity of integrity systems – the second of the analytical themes used in Australia's national assessment. The first part compares the resourcing of major integrity institutions by Australian governments over the past 15 years. Staffing and finances are seen as a useful basic measure of capacity, helping lift attention away from the assumption that creation of new bodies necessarily increases capacity. The data also show that some jurisdictions – including Victoria – may yet have some way to go if they wish to match other governments. The second part of the analysis identifies eight further issues for consideration in deliberations on institutional design. The paper concludes that by working through such issues more systematically, it may be possible to identify new or different institutional options for configuring integrity resources. This could help avoid inappropriate choices – whether unnecessary new bodies,

overloads on existing ones or the import of frameworks that do not necessarily ‘fit’ local conditions – of particular relevance to current proposals for a new Commonwealth anti-corruption agency.

Cameron L et al. 2005. *Do attitudes towards corruption differ across cultures? Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore*. Department of Economics working papers series no. 943. <http://www.economics.unimelb.edu.au/research/workingpapers/wp05/943.pdf>

This paper examines cultural differences in attitudes towards corruption by analysing individual decision making in a corrupt experimental environment. The paper uses experiments which differentiate between the incentives to engage in corrupt behaviour and the incentives to punish corrupt behaviour and allow further exploration as to whether, in environments characterised by lower levels of corruption, there is both a lower propensity to engage in corrupt behaviour and a higher propensity to punish corrupt behaviour. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, the paper finds that there is more variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behaviour than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behaviour across cultures. The results reveal that the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance towards corruption than the subjects in Australia while the subjects in Indonesia behave similarly to those in Australia. The subjects in Singapore have a higher propensity to engage in corruption than the subjects in Australia. The paper also varied its experimental design to examine the impact of a more effective punishment system and the effect of the perceived cost of bribery.

Case W 2005. Political mistrust in Southeast Asia. *Comparative sociology* 4(1–2); 81–100

This paper focuses on a number of contemporary leaderships in Southeast Asia that have produced variable amounts of mass-level mistrust, including those of Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore.

Choon-Yin S 2005. Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption and the growth of the underground economy. *Sojourn* 20(1): 39–66

This paper suggests, firstly, that an extensive underground economy (UGE) is undesirable because it brings forth more harm than benefit to the economies and, secondly, that curbing corruption is a useful measure to contain the growth of the UGE. The key to curbing corruption is the enactment of appropriate rules as well as having in place good men – men who are incorruptible – to enact and enforce the rules. The article uses Singapore as a case study.

Dreher A, Kotsogiannis C & McCorriston S 2005. *How do institutions affect corruption and the shadow economy*. Econpapers <http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0502/0502012.pdf>

This paper analyses a simple model that captures the relationship between institutional quality, the shadow economy and corruption. It shows that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy and affects the corruption market. The exact relationship between corruption and institutional quality is, however, ambiguous and depends on the relative effectiveness of the institutional quality in the shadow and corruption markets. The predictions of the model are empirically tested – by means of Structural Equation Modelling that treats the shadow economy and the corruption market as latent variables – using data from OECD countries. The results show that an improvement in institutional quality reduces the shadow economy directly and corruption both directly and indirectly (through its effect on the shadow market).

Dusek L, Ortmann A & Lizal L 2005. Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments. *Prague economic papers* 14(2); 147–62

This paper reviews a particular mode of investigation of corruption and corruptibility: experiments. The paper assesses their strengths and weaknesses, and identifies areas where they could be particularly useful in guiding policy choices – namely in designing incentive-compatible and effective anti-corruption measures in public procurement.

de Sousa L 2005. *Transparency International in search of a constituency: the franchising of the global anticorruption movement*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government

This paper assesses the process of franchising Transparency International, the implications it had upon its internal governance and the variations that can be found across its constituent parts, the National Chapters.

Fell D 2005. Political and media liberalization and political corruption in Taiwan. *China quarterly* 184: 875–893

This paper analyses the relationship between democratic and media reforms and political corruption in Taiwan.

Gloster-Coates P & Quest L 2005. Kleptocracy: curse of development. *International social science review* 80(1–2): 3–19

This paper examines the role of kleptocracy rather than good government following the reconstruction of Europe and Japan post-World War II.

Golden MA & Picci L 2005. Proposal for a new measure of corruption: illustrated with Italian data. *Economics and politics* 17(1): 37–75

This paper discusses a measure of corruption that consists of the difference between a measure of the physical quantities of public infrastructure and the cumulative price government pays for public capital stocks. The measure is created for Italy's 95 provinces and 20 regions and is controlled for at the regional level for possible differences in the costs of public construction.

Goldsmith M 2005. Theories of governance and Pacific microstates: the cautionary tale of Tuvalu. *Asia Pacific viewpoint* 46(2): 105–114

This paper questions the popularity of governance frameworks in explaining development failures and proposing new models of development for Pacific states. A brief analysis is provided of how the dominant Protestant church fits into traditional and modern systems of administration illustrates the complexity of local issues and the paper concludes with a discussion of how the neo-liberal governance orthodoxy lacks the critical insight into power and agency afforded by Foucault's concept of 'governmentality'.

Government of India. Central Vigilance Commission 2005. *Vigilance manual 6th ed.* <http://www.cvc.nic.in/man04.pdf>

This manual sets out the role and function of the anti-corruption agencies in the Indian central government. Requirements for reporting preventive and punitive vigilance are outlined.

Haller D & Cris S 2005. *Corruption: anthropological perspectives*. London: Pluto Press

This book examines how anthropology can throw light on aspects of corruption. Taking a more grounded, empirical and holistic perspective, this book reveals how corruption operates through informal rules, personal connections and the wider social contexts that govern everyday practices. It looks at corruption in transitional societies such as post-Soviet Russia, and also explores efforts to reform or regulate institutions that are perceived to have a potential for corruption, such as the European Commission. The book also covers the Enron and WorldCom scandals.

Hindess B 2005. Investigating international anti-corruption. *Third world quarterly* 26(8): 1389–1398

The paper examines the proposals of the TI source book on anti-corruption strategies.

Huffe E 2005. Governance, corruption and ethics in the Pacific. *Contemporary pacific* 17(1): 118–140

This paper examines the governance agenda that arrived in the Pacific in the 1990s and considers the region's ills in terms of a lack of sustained economic development, rising political instability and the increasingly visible mismanagement of public funds in many countries. The paper consider the recipe put forward to cure these ills including the promotion of liberal democracy, the rule of law, government workforce reduction (right-sizing) and increasing the number of more open markets.

Hutchinson F 2005. *A review of donor agency approaches to anti-corruption*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government. http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP05-3.pdf

This paper examines donor approaches to anti-corruption using available policy, project, and academic material. This first entails a discussion of the main conceptual issues such as the definitions of, and theoretical approaches to, corruption. This is then complemented by a discussion of implementation issues – through the comparison of different bilateral and multilateral donor approaches to corruption and an analysis of lessons learned from past experience. The paper concludes by highlighting areas for further work.

Johnston M 2005. *Syndromes of corruption: wealth, power, and democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

This paper examines four major syndromes of corruption: influence markets, elite cartels, oligarchs and clans, and official moguls. The paper uses statistical measures to identify societies in each group, and case studies to show that the expected syndromes do arise.

Justice Initiative 2005. *Legal remedies for the resource curse: a digest of experience in using law to combat natural resource corruption*. New York: Justice Initiative. http://www.justiceinitiative.org/db/resource2/fs/?file_id=16376

This paper reviews some of the main legal instruments used to date to combat natural resource corruption—as well as new, untested legal remedies that appear promising. Focusing on resource spoliation in Africa, it provides case studies to demonstrate what has and has not worked. The report treats the home countries of resource extraction companies separately from the host countries where they operate. It looks at both criminal and civil means of redress. Although corruption in transnational resource extraction is generally subject to inadequate legal safeguards, the report identifies opportunities for civil society action.

Kalnins V 2005. Assessing trends in corruption and impact of anti-corruption measures. Paper to Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies 6th General Meeting, Turkey, 30–31 May, 2005. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/50/37330934.pdf>

This paper aims to grasp the state of the art in measuring corruption and assessing government performance against corruption. This document is not an in-depth study and it does not provide any definite answers about which approach is best. Instead it intends to spark discussions on this complex subject. It is also the intention to facilitate discussion on the role of various actors (governmental and nongovernmental, national and international) in measuring corruption and assessing anti-corruption activities.

Karklins R 2005. *The system made me do it: corruption in post-communist societies*. Armonk NY: ME Sharpe

This book is the first comprehensive study of the origin, nature, and consequences of corruption in post-communist societies. The book suggests innovative and practical institutional strategies for containing corruption.

Kaufmann D & Bellver A 2005. *Transparenting transparency: initial empirics and policy applications*. Washington DC: World Bank. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/Transparenting_Transparency171005.pdf

This paper is a contribution attempting to partly fill empirical and policy-related gaps in relation to the implementation of transparency-related reforms, the extent of the conceptual contributions in the transparency field and the progress on its measurement and empirical analysis.

Kaufmann D, Kraay A & Mastruzzi M 2005. Back to basics: 10 myths about governance and corruption. *Finance & development* 42(3). <http://www.imf.org/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/09/basics.htm>

This paper highlights some of the main issues in the debates surrounding the measuring of corruption and the monitoring of progress in reducing it. It does so by examining six myths and their associated realities.

Kaufmann D, Kraay A & Mastruzzi M 2005. *Governance matters IV: governance indicators for 1996–2004*. Washington DC: World Bank. <http://worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html>

This paper presents the latest update of our estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 209 countries and territories for five time periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004. These indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 37 separate data sources constructed by 31 different organisations. The paper assigns these individual measures of governance to categories capturing key dimensions of governance, and use an unobserved component model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each of the four periods. The paper presents the point estimates of the dimensions of governance as well as the margins of error for each country for the four periods. These margins of error are not unique to perceptions-based measures of governance, but are an important feature of all efforts to measure governance, including objective indicators. In fact, the paper provides examples of how individual objective measures provide an incomplete picture of even the quite particular dimensions of governance that they are intended to measure.

Kunicove J & Rose-Ackerman S 2005. Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. *British journal of political science* 35(4): 573–606

This paper shows that proportional representation (PR) systems are more susceptible to corrupt political rent-seeking than plurality systems. The paper argues that this result depends on the different loci of rents in PR and plurality systems, and on the monitoring difficulties faced by both voters and opposition parties under PR. The paper also examines the interaction between electoral rules and presidentialism. The paper tests predictions and interaction effects on a cross-section of up to ninety-four democracies. The empirical findings strongly support the hypothesis that PR systems, especially together with presidentialism, are associated with higher levels of corrupt political rent-seeking.

Lambsdorff JG, Taube M & Schramm M (eds) 2005. *The new institutional economics of corruption*. London: New York: Routledge

This book provides a new perspective towards the analysis of corrupt behaviour as well as the design of anti-corruption policies. It does so by identifying institutions that may facilitate corruption, such as particularistic trust, social norms that foster reciprocity, intermediaries, hierarchies and network-type organisations.

Larmour P 2005. *Civilizing techniques: Transparency International and the spread of anti-corruption*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government. http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP05-11.pdf

This paper looks at TI both as an agent and critic of market civilisation, paying particular attention to some of the techniques has developed including: networking; the franchising of national chapters; the publication of an annual Corruption Perceptions Index; the publication of a Source Book on the web; and the development of Business Principles for Countering Bribery. Civilisation may be a coercive process, and the paper is particularly concerned with the kinds of power deployed in these techniques. It analyses them as examples of policy transfer and as the results of processes of mimicry and professionalisation that lead to ‘institutional isomorphism’, and draws some conclusions about the spread of civilisation.

Larmour P 2005. *Corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands*. Canberra: Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government.

http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP05-10.pdf

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and accountability in the Pacific Islands, using evidence from surveys of 'national integrity systems' in 14 states. It identifies and assesses four international initiatives to improve accountability and reduce corruption: public sector reform; peer review of accountability systems; cleaning up offshore financial centres, and the intervention of Australian officials on the ground. The paper finds that the relationship between increased accountability and reduced corruption is not straightforward. Moves to improve financial accountability may increase the chances of corruption being detected, but greater political accountability may increase the incidence, or suspicion, of corruption. Comparison between the 14 suggests that accountability and levels of corruption vary independently of each other.

Larmour P 2005. *Foreign flowers: institutional transfer and good governance in the Pacific Islands*.

Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press

This book attempts to answer several key questions: Where do the governing institutions originate and why are so many of them based on Western models? Why have some transfers succeeded while others have not? What are the effects of transfers? What has been the fate of a particular institution, the state? How does culture affect the transfer of (and resistance to) institutions? Early chapters identify institutional transfer as a persistent theme in the study of the Pacific, reflected in ideas like cargo cults, home-grown constitutions, invented traditions, and weak states. The book analyses about forty cases of institutional transfer, beginning with Tonga's borrowing of foreign institutions in the nineteenth century and ending with current attempts to induce island states to regulate their offshore financial centres. It goes on to distinguish factors that determine whether transfer took place, including timing, social conditions, and sympathy with local values. It looks at the kinds of power and coercion being deployed in transfer and at how transfers have been evaluated by their sponsors: domestic reformers, aid donors, international financial institutions, and their consultants and academic advisers.

Larmour P & Barcham M 2005. *National integrity systems in small Pacific island states*. Canberra:

Australian National University, Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government.

http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/degrees/pogo/discussion_papers/PDP05-9.pdf

This paper compares the conclusions of Alan Doig and Stephanie McIvor (in their coordinated studies of 18 countries, and reflected on their method in *Public Administration and Development* 2003) with an overview of a subsequent study of 12 small island states in the South Pacific using the same method. Though the sample was not chosen with scale in mind, smallness may explain some of the similarities between the Pacific island cases, particularly the risks associated with offshore financial centres, trust funds and investments. Their relative size and weakness has also made them targets for direct intervention by Australian police and officials to rebuild anti-corruption institutions. The paper goes on to show how the evidence from the Pacific island cases raises questions about some of the standard proposals for anti-corruption reform: stronger parties, an ICAC, civil society coalitions and greater accountability and transparency.

The mess that the army has made 2005. *The economist* 21 July: 26–28

This paper argues that brutality and neglect by Myanmar's military regime have created a pariah state with a wretched and desperate people.

Michael B & Kasemets A 2005. *The role of incentive design in parliamentary anti-corruption*

programmes. Microeconomics 0511009, EconWPA. <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~scat1663/Publications/Papers/Redesigning%20Parliamentarian%20Anti2.pdf>

This paper discusses incentives within parliamentary anti-corruption programs and the ways these programs should and can help build political capital by managing voter demands, political competition, patronage, and enforcement. The paper also reviews some basic theories from formal political economy which may be of interest to practitioners interested in bridging the theory–practice gap.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005. Fighting corruption and promoting integrity in public procurement. *Source OCDE gouvernance* 35: i-302

This paper captures the main points of the discussions at the Global Forum on Governance event on 'Fighting Corruption and Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement' in 2004 and presents expert analysis of the main issues and case studies from the varied experiences of countries and specialised bodies, mainly in Europe, Asia and Latin America, that contributed to the event.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005. *Measuring the impact of policies to promote integrity and prevent corruption*.

<http://www.ivforumglobal.org.br/biblioteca/docsfg/expo/measuringcorruption/elodiebeth.pdf>

This paper comprises a presentation given to the IV Global Forum on Fighting Corruption, June 7–10, 2005 in Brasilia.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2005. *Thematic review on provisions and practices to curb corruption in public procurement: country self-assessment reports*.

http://www1.oecd.org/daf/ASIAcom/pdf/trpp_indonesia.pdf

This paper compiles countries' self-assessment reports about public procurement legislation, institutions and proceedings that are in place and about measures to ensure and enhance transparency and to curb corruption in this field.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and Transparency International 2005. Public service ethics and trust in government. Paper presented at: 6th Global forum on reinventing government towards participatory and transparent governance, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 24–27 May 2005.

<http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UN/UNPAN020630.pdf>

This paper details a workshop which involved an examination of global and regional trends in public service ethics and anti-corruption initiatives, political and technical challenges in implementing national and sub-national ethics infrastructures and in building trust in government to meet basic needs such as the Millennium Development Goals, good practices and latest tools in managing conflicts of interest, assessing the impact of public sector ethics programmes, and training public servants in ethical decision-making and journalists in investigative journalism and emerging issues.

Olken BA 2005. *Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University and NBER

This paper examines the fact that despite the importance of the problem, the inherent difficulty of directly measuring corrupt activity has meant that there is relatively little evidence, and therefore relatively little consensus, on how to best reduce corruption.

Quah JS (ed) 2005. *Corruption and accountability in selected countries*. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish

This book looks at key issues in governmental responses to both political and administrative corruption. The countries studied include Western democracies, Lithuania, New Zealand, Thailand, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries.

Queensland. Crime and Misconduct Commission 2005. *Fraud and corruption control: guidelines for best practice*. Brisbane: The Commission

This paper outlines fraud and corruption control guidelines which are intended to help public sector agencies plan effectively to control fraud and corruption. They are designed around a best practice control model comprising ten key elements, which builds on earlier models developed by the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission. The guidelines present an integrated approach that includes proactive measures designed to enhance system integrity (prevention measures) and reactive responses (reporting, detecting and investigating activities).

Sandgren C 2005. Combating corruption: the misunderstood role of law. *International lawyer* 39(3): 717–731

This paper examines the notion that the prospects of fighting corruption have improved, notes the factors contributing to this development and considers strategies for fighting corruption.

Sapio F 2005. *Implementing anticorruption in the PRC: patterns of selectivity*. Centre for East and South East Asian Studies working paper no. 10. http://www.ace.lu.se/images/Syd_och_sydstasienstudier/working_papers/Sapio.pdf

This paper addresses why anti-corruption is enforced in a selective way. It notes that unless the concept of anti-corruption campaign is discarded in favour of that of anti-corruption policy, the reasoning utilised in trying to address this question will remain somewhat circular. The paper examines three patterns of selective implementation. First, punishment of most crimes takes place inside the disciplinary system by means of organisational measures (zuzhi cuoshi), means themselves different from either disciplinary or criminal sanctions (chufen). Second, laws proscribing graft (tanwu) and passive bribery (shouhui) are more likely to be implemented than laws punishing other crimes of corruption, as active bribery (xinghui), misappropriation of public funds (nuoyong gongkuan), possession of property in excess of legitimate income (yu'e caichan lai yuan buming), dividing state assets (sifen guoyou zichan), fines and confiscated goods (sifen famo caiwu). Third, courts are sentencing offenders in ways that are often inconsistent with the graduation mechanism of the criminal law.

Spector B (ed) 2005. *Fighting corruption in developing countries: strategies and analysis*. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press

This book presents a sector-by-sector analysis of the problems that stunt economic growth, distort governance, limit civic and democratic participation, and infuriate the populace. The book argues that examining the issue through the lens of nine key development sectors – education, agriculture, energy, environment, health, justice, private business, political parties and public finance – will help us to understand the problem realistically and identify concrete initiatives that are likely to have an impact. The book concludes with practical and policy-oriented suggestions for corruption control that minimise the risk of recorrupting forces that often threaten to reverse gains.

Stokirch K 2005. The region in review: international issues and events, 2004. *Contemporary Pacific* 17(2): 416–433

This paper reports on developments in the Pacific region including in the context of corruption, the imposition of a legal obligation to implement designated anti-corruption measures by the United Nations.

Sun Y 2005. Corruption, growth, and reform: the Chinese enigma. *Current history* 104(683): 257–263

This paper argues that the cumulative unfolding of corruption's many paradoxes in China has, above all, built up momentum and public support to improve state capacities, rather than further weaken them. It suggests that Beijing does not suffer a legitimacy deficit despite corruption's staying power as a top public concern.

Sung H-E 2005. Between demand and supply: bribery in international trade. *Crime, law and social change* 44(1): 111–131

This paper examines how two hypotheses on the dynamics of transnational bribery (namely 'demand–pull' and 'supply–push') are formulated and tested.

Svensson J 2005. Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of economic perspectives* 19(3): 19–42

This paper discusses eight frequently asked questions about public corruption: (1) What is corruption? (2) Which countries are the most corrupt? (3) What are the common characteristics of countries with high corruption? (4) What is the magnitude of corruption? (5) Do higher wages for bureaucrats reduce corruption? (6) Can competition reduce corruption? (7) Why have there been so few (recent) successful attempts to fight corruption? (8) Does corruption adversely affect growth?

Tarling N (ed) 2005. *Corruption and good governance in Asia*. New York NY: Routledge.

This book explores the concept of corruption, now and in the past, recent experiences of Asian countries at the macro- and micro-levels and practical local and international measures to constrain corruption. It outlines key principles of good governance and the policies and practices essential for their application.

Transparency International 2005. *Global corruption report 2005*. London Pluto Press.

This paper shows how the corrupt exploit the vast sums that are poured into the building sector and what can be done to stop them.

Transparency International 2005. *India Corruption Study, 2005*.

<http://www.transparency.org/content/download/637/3856>

This paper covered 151 cities and 306 villages. It was based on a combination of research methodologies, including exit polls at the public offices covered and household studies. The study indicates that a third to a half of the factors causing corruption can be addressed and removed with simple initiatives, including the use of technology. It finds that using technology such as computerised railway reservations at the front-end of offices is likely to bring down corruption while enhancing transparency.

Uhr J 2005. How do we know if it's working? *Australian journal of public administration* 64(2) June: 69–76

This paper examines the introduction of the first of three crosscutting themes used to assess Australian integrity systems – evaluation of their consequences – evidence-based approach to assessing the overall impact of integrity and corruption – prevention measures are possible.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005. *Compendium of international legal instruments on corruption*, 2nd ed. New York, United Nations http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_compendium_e.pdf

This paper contains all the major relevant international and regional treaties, agreements, resolutions and other instruments. These include both legally binding obligations and some 'soft-law' or normative instruments intended to serve as non-binding standards.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005. Report of the fourth meeting of the Judicial Integrity Group, Vienna, 27–28 October 2005 http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publication_jig4.pdf

This paper documents the fourth meeting of the Judicial Integrity Group of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The purpose of the meeting was to review and discuss materials prepared to provide further support to Member States in strengthening judicial integrity and capacity.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2005. Workshop on measuring and monitoring corruption and anti-Corruption, Sofia, Bulgaria, June 2005. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publication_sofia_workshop.pdf

This paper documents a workshop on measuring and monitoring corruption and anti-corruption which examined existing approaches and methods used to assess the levels, nature, location and impact of corruption. The workshop also reviewed the role of monitoring within international anti-corruption policies including an appraisal of existing corruption monitoring methodologies and instruments.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Asia Development Bank 2005 *Proceedings of the seventh interagency anti-corruption coordination meeting*, Bangkok, Thailand, April 2005. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/7th_interagency_meeting.pdf

This paper documents the Seventh Meeting of the International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination. The meeting discussed ways and means of preventing and detecting fraud and corruption in disaster and emergency relief operations. The meeting explored recurrent patterns of alleged corruption, mechanisms for its prevention and control and discussed methods of implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption.

Uprooting graft 2005. *The economist* 28 April: 26

This article notes the first verdict handed down by Indonesia's new anti-corruption court in relation to the conviction of the governor of Aceh province, Abdullah Puteh, of taking 3.6 billion rupiah (\$380,000) of 12.6 billion rupiah that had been allocated to buy a helicopter. Mr Puteh was imprisoned for ten years—two more than the prosecutors had demanded—and fined 500m rupiah.

Villaroman N 2005. *Laws and jurisprudence on graft and corruption: a compendium*. Quezon City: Central Books

This book contains a range of pertinent anti-corruption legislation including the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and the Forfeiture Law.

Webb P 2005. The United Nations convention against corruption. *Journal of international economic law* 8(1): 191–229

This paper sets the context for the UN Convention against Corruption by considering the first wave of anti-corruption initiatives that occurred at the regional level. It then assesses the significance of this new international convention by examining the negotiating process and the strategic positions of different countries. In particular, it analyses the four areas that generated the most controversy during the negotiations: asset recovery, private sector corruption, political corruption, and monitoring. Although the Convention contains many innovative provisions, the paper suggests that it also suffers from some basic weaknesses that may prevent it from having a real impact on corrupt behaviour.

Wedeman A 2005. Anticorruption campaigns and the intensification of corruption in China. *Journal of contemporary China* 14(42): 93–116

This paper analyses the efficacy of China's campaign-style anti-corruption strategy using a combination of formal modelling and empirical data. The analysis suggests that while this sort of strategy may succeed in keeping corruption under control, it is likely to do so by deterring low-level corruption, but not high-level, high stakes corruption, and may encourage inflation of the size of bribes. The article thus concludes that campaign-style enforcement may have actually contributed to the intensification of corruption.

Wu X 2005. Corporate governance and corruption: a cross-country analysis. *Governance* 18(2): 151–170

This paper argues that corporate governance is among the important factors determining the level of corruption. Using a cross-country data set, hypotheses that explicitly link various measures of corporate governance to the level of corruption are tested. The results show that corporate governance standards can have profound impacts on the effectiveness of the global anti-corruption campaign.

Yang D 2005. *Integrity for hire: an analysis of a widespread program for combating customs corruption*.

Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy and Department of Economics, University of Michigan.

http://www.umich.edu/%7Edeanyang/papers/yang_psi.pdf

Leadership data used in paper available at http://www.umich.edu/%7Edeanyang/papers/psi_leaderdata/psi_leaderdata.html

This paper examines the impact of hiring private firms to collect information for government anti-corruption efforts. In the past two decades, a number of developing countries have hired private firms to conduct pre-shipment inspections of imports, generating data that governments can use to fight corruption in customs agencies. The paper notes that countries implementing such inspection programs subsequently experience large increases in import duty collections. By contrast, the growth rate of other tax revenues does not change appreciably. Additional evidence suggests that declines in customs corruption are behind the import duty improvements: the programs also lead to declines in undervaluation and in misreporting of goods classifications.

You J-S & Khagram S 2005. A comparative study of inequality and corruption. *American sociological review* 70(1): 136–157

This paper argues that income inequality increases the level of corruption through material and normative mechanisms. The wealthy have both greater motivation and more opportunity to engage in corruption, whereas the poor are more vulnerable to extortion and less able to monitor and hold the rich and powerful accountable as inequality increases. Inequality also adversely affects social norms about corruption and people's beliefs about the legitimacy of rules and institutions, thereby making it easier for them to tolerate corruption as acceptable behaviour. This comparative analysis of 129 countries using two-stage least squares methods with a variety of instrumental variables supports the paper's contention using different measures of corruption. The explanatory power of inequality is at least as important as conventionally accepted causes of corruption such as economic development. The paper found a significant interaction effect between inequality and democracy, as well as evidence that inequality affects norms and perceptions about corruption using the World Values Surveys data. Because corruption also contributes to income inequality, societies often fall into vicious circles of inequality and corruption.

2004

Acquaah-Gaisie G 2004. Combating third world corruption. Presented at the Quest for Good Global Governance workshop in August 2004. <http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/mgt/research/governance/pdf-downloads/g-acquaah-wshop.pdf>

This paper explores the nature and causes of corruption in the developing world, and looks at global ways of taking action against it. The paper includes a number of brief case studies of corruption in selected countries in Africa, Asia and South America.

Ahmad N & Brookins OT. 2004. On corruption and countervailing actions in three South Asian nations *Journal of policy reform* 7(1): 21–30

This paper argues that readily available data and information in newspaper stories enable one to discern the nature and patterns of corruption and to understand actions taken to combat corruption. It analyses and compares numerous newspaper reports of corruption in India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. Using analysis derived from existing theory of corruption, the paper demonstrates how information in news accounts improves understanding of corruption. Bangladesh had more coercive corruption, with countervailing actions dominated by direct actions of victims. In India and Sri Lanka, corruption was generally collusive, with countervailing actions on behalf of victims frequently leading to legal actions and investigative reports.

Asian Development Bank 2004. *Anti-corruption policies in Asia and the Pacific: the legal and institutional frameworks for fighting corruption in twenty-one Asian and Pacific countries*. Manila: ADB. <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Anti-Corruption-Policies/default.asp>

This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the legal and institutional frameworks for combating corruption in 21 Asian and Pacific countries and territories. It provides experts and policy makers with a tool to analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms, disseminates good practices and tested instruments, and allows the public to measure progress achieved in the implementation of the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific. The report covers Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cook Islands, Fiji Islands, Hong Kong, China, India; Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, and Vanuatu.

Asian Development Bank & Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004. *Implementing the Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia-Pacific strategy and 2004–2006 work plan*. <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/Asiacom/pdf/strategy20042006.pdf>

Since the adoption of the UN Convention against Corruption, the ADB/OECD Action Plan with its established implementation and review mechanisms is deemed as the key instrument to assist the Asia-Pacific countries in implementing the Convention. This report tracks the results and progress made by the 21 Asia-Pacific region countries that endorsed the Plan: Australia; Bangladesh; Cambodia; Cook Islands; Fiji Islands; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Kazakhstan; Korea (Republic of); Kyrgyz Republic; Malaysia; Mongolia; Nepal; Pakistan; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Samoa; Singapore; and Vanuatu.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 2004. APEC course of action on fighting corruption and ensuring transparency: submitted by Chile, Korea and United States. http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/som_special_task_groups/anti-corruption.MedialibDownload.v1.html?url=/etc/medialib/apec_media_library/downloads/ministerial/annual/2004.Par.0034.File.v1.1

This paper reports on the 14th APEC Ministerial meeting held in Santiago, Chile and in particular the Anti-corruption and Transparency (ACT) Capacity-Building Program which will include technical assistance targeted at helping APEC economies address key areas outlined in the Santiago Commitment and the APEC Anti-corruption Course of Action.

Bhargava V & Bolongaita E 2004. *Challenging corruption in Asia: case studies and a framework for action*. Washington DC: World Bank

This book provides an analytical framework to explore and attempt to answer questions such as why some policies and programs work in some countries and fail in others, what accounts for their success or failure and how policy makers can develop and deliver anti-corruption strategies that work.

Brown AJ & Uhr J 2004. Integrity systems: conceiving, describing, assessing. Presentation given to the Australasian Political Studies Association Conference at the University of Adelaide, 29 September – 1 October 2004. http://www.gu.edu.au/centre/kceljag/nisa/brown_uhr04.pdf

This paper introduces the emerging results of the National Integrity System Assessment project which seeking to map and assess Australia's national integrity systems – the sum total of institutions, processes and people dedicated to ensuring accountability and inhibiting corruption.

Brown E & Cloke J 2004. Neoliberal reform, governance and corruption in the south: assessing the international anti-corruption crusade. *Antipode* 36(2): 272–294

This paper presents a critique of current thinking on the causes and impacts of corruption and the measures designed to combat it. It begins by exploring the evolution of the current preoccupation with corruption and traces the growth in international initiatives designed to tackle the issue. It then moves on to consider the assumptions underlying the dominant schools of thought on corruption and alternative definitions of the phenomenon. The limitations of the dominant neo-liberal perspective are explored in detail, focusing particularly on its blindness to the complex interplay between economic liberalisation, political power and institutional reform. An alternative framework that locates corruption at the systemic level is proposed. The paper concludes with some thoughts on potential directions for future geographical research on the topic.

Camerer M (ed) 2004. *Global integrity report*. Washington DC: Centre for Public Integrity. Available at <http://www.publicintegrity.org>

This paper provides in-depth reports on the state of public integrity and corruption in 25 countries. These reports, written and reviewed primarily by in-country experts, provide a probing look at national anti-corruption efforts. Each Country report includes: Country facts (key data on that country), corruption timeline (media coverage of recent corruption-related events), corruption notebook (a ground-level view

by a leading investigative journalist), integrity assessment (an analysis of the state of public integrity by a leading social scientist) and integrity scorecard (peer-reviewed scores, commentary and references on the 80 Integrity Indicators).

Cave S 2004. Fighting corruption in the Pacific. *New Zealand international review* 29(6): 15–19

This paper explores the role of Transparency International New Zealand and the part it has played in the anti-corruption movement.

Cox J & Morrison J 2004. *Solomon Islands: provincial governance information paper*. AusAID.

http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pubout.cfm?ID=6293_9778_8034_6569_6741

This paper analyses the structure, functions and current operational capacity of provincial governments in Solomon Islands.

Davis J 2004. Corruption in public service delivery: experience from South Asia's water and sanitation sector. *World development* 32(1): 53–71.

http://www.siwi.org/downloads/WWW-Symp/Davis_Presentation_Aug2005.pdf

This paper presents empirical information regarding the types and magnitude of corrupt behaviours documented in water supply and sanitation service provision in several South Asian localities. It also examines the strengths and weaknesses of current strategies to reduce corruption among several public water and sanitation bureaucracies in South Asia, drawing on interviews and focus group discussions with more than 1,400 staff, customers, and key informants. Where corruption has been reduced, two concomitant drivers are observed: a shift in the accountability networks of service providers, and a change in the work environment that increases the moral cost of misconduct.

Gay D 2004. The emperor's tailor: an assessment of Vanuatu's Comprehensive Reform Program. *Pacific economic bulletin* 19(3): 22–39. Available at http://peb.anu.edu.au/issues/latest_issue_new.php?peb_id=34

This paper assesses the Asian Development Bank-sponsored CRP from two angles, situating it beside World Bank and IMF structural adjustment programs and also evaluating the impact on the economy. The adjustment of economic structure in Vanuatu was necessary. Public spending was under control but financial management problems were emerging by 1998. Governance left a lot to be desired, the political system was unstable and corruption was growing. The government had little option other than to seek outside support. But it is argued here that it was a mistake to enact a governance-heavy package of reforms rather than attack the macroeconomic problems. GDP per capita declined, exports and incoming investment slumped and the trade balance remained in deficit. The worst failing of the CRP is perhaps not that it worsened economic performance but that failed to exploit missed opportunities. Vanuatu has taken on the garb of economic restructuring but little of the substance.

Gray CW, Hellman J & Ryterman R 2004. *Anticorruption in transition 2: corruption in enterprise–state interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999–2002*. Washington DC: World Bank

This paper analyses patterns and trends in corruption in business–government interactions in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. It points to some encouraging signs that the magnitude and negative impact that corruption exerts on businesses may be declining in many countries in the region. It also shows how some types of firms – most notably small private ones – encounter more corruption than others, and it underscores the importance of policy and institutional reforms in achieving long-term success in the fight against corruption. The longer-term sustainability of recent improvements is not certain, however, and the challenges ahead remain formidable.

Haarhuis CMK & Leeuw FL 2004. Fighting governmental corruption: the new World Bank programme evaluated. *Journal of international development* 16: 547–561

This paper reconstructs and assesses the most recent version of this World Bank's training programme is. Several core approaches in the programme, such as the strengthening of civil society and the privatisation of parastatals, turn out to have unintended consequences. The empirical support is largely case-specific and turns out to be highly conditional. It is concluded that indicators need to be developed to assess the relevance of national anti-corruption policies to country-specific governance and anti-corruption conditions.

Heilbrunn J 2004. *Anti-corruption commissions: panacea or real medicine to fight corruption?* World Bank Institute working paper 33028. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf>

This paper argues that anti-corruption commissions fail to reduce public sector venality in all but a few special circumstances. It notes that those governments that have established successful anti-corruption commissions have done so in response to demands for reform from a broad base of domestic constituents. Demands for reform generally occur after a precipitating crisis has caused deep economic hardship and a national consensus exists that reforms must be implemented. Anti-corruption commissions are effective when they respond to that national consensus and a broad domestic coalition supports reform. Without the precipitating crisis, building such domestic coalitions is a challenge for even the most popular leaders. When support is more tenuous, policy makers have an incentive to weaken reforms and avoid any threat to powerful constituents who profit from official inattention to expenditures, access to governments contracts, and other manifestations of public sector inefficiency.

Hosen N 2004. The Habibie Government and anti-corruption reform in Indonesia. *Asia Pacific law review* 12(1): 53–68

This paper provides an analysis of the relevant law and why it failed in achieving its objective of maintaining adequate standards to promote good governance and the rule of law.

The importance of going straight. *The economist* 11 Dec: 6–8 supplement.
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=3444283

This paper features Indonesia Corruption Watch, a local nongovernmental organisation, which has uncovered no fewer than 67 suspect budgetary manoeuvres in other local assemblies.

Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission 2004. *Progress Report on the first half of 2004*.
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/pdf/indonesia_progressreport_0104.pdf

This paper outlines the nature and role of the Commission for the Eradication of Corruption (Indonesia) and provides details of the accomplishments of the Commission during its first six months of operation and explores what the Commission plans to achieve in the future.

Johnson DT 2004. The prosecution of corruption in South Korea: achievements, problems and prospects, in Ginsburg T (ed), *Legal reform in Korea*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon: 47–70

This paper examines the role that prosecutors played in South Korea's anti-corruption efforts and explores problems which existed in relation to prosecutions by examining the tensions and trade-offs made in order to rectify those problems.

Kaufmann D 2004. *Corruption, governance and security: challenges for the rich countries and the world*. Washington DC: World Bank. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/Kaufmann_GCR_101904_B.pdf

This paper adopts an empirical approach based on the analysis of the 2004 survey of enterprises by the World Economic Forum. It challenges traditional notions of governance and corruption challenges and suggests that the undue emphasis on narrow legalism has obscured more subtle yet costly manifestations of misgovernance, which afflict rich countries as well. Emphasis is also given in the paper

to measurement and analysis of misgovernance when the rules of the game have been captured by the elite through undue influence. The paper constructs a new set of ethics indices, encompassing forms of (legal) corruption not subject to measurement in conventional (illegal) corruption indicators. It is found that manifestations of legal corruption may be more prevalent than illegal forms, such as outright bribery, and particularly so in richer countries. Further, the paper finds that governance constraints, and corruption in particular, is a key determinant of a country's global competitiveness. These findings challenge traditional notions of what constitutes the country's investment climate, and who shapes it. It is also found that illegal forms of corruption continue to be prevalent in the interaction between transnationals of the rich world and the public sectors in many emerging countries. Finally, the paper suggests an empirical link between governance and security issues.

Kumar CR 2004. Human rights approaches of corruption control mechanisms – enhancing the Hong Kong experience of corruption prevention strategies. *San Diego international law journal* 5: 323

This paper considers corruption in Hong Kong and includes analysis of the nature and impact of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the role of the media and civil society in combating corruption and the relationship between corruption and human rights.

Lindsey T 2004. Legal infrastructure and governance reform in post-crisis Asia: the case of Indonesia. *Asian-Pacific economic literature* 18: 12–40

This paper reflects on problems encountered in implementing legal infrastructure reform in the light of current theory and recent, post-crisis experience in East Asia. Indonesia's experience of radical legal infrastructure reform in the six years since the crisis began has been both extensive and troubled. It is therefore a compelling case study of whether the new paradigm of Post-Washington Consensus Governance reform has delivered the kind of legal institutional changes that its proponents believe might have prevented the crisis. The paper begins with an examination of the Governance paradigm rationale for legal infrastructure reform before surveying the Indonesian experience. It concludes with a critique of Governance reform practices and suggests some lessons learned for future legal infrastructure reform, drawn from the Indonesia case study. It argues that the Governance paradigm promotes overly simplistic approaches to the complex and political project of legal infrastructure reform in developing states.

Mahmood R 2004. Can information and communication technology help reduce corruption? How so and why not: two case studies from South Asia. *Perspectives on global development and technology* 3(3): 347–373

This paper explores the linkages between electronic governance and corruption deterrence, and by doing so, fills a crucial void in the current literature. After reviewing successful ICT-led government reform efforts in the West from public administration literature, a simple model is proposed to determine how these technologies may come to be utilised for reform. The model is then applied to the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh and the neighbouring government of Bangladesh to test the salience of the variables, and to determine why the former may be more successful than the latter.

Manion M 2004. Lessons for mainland China from anti-corruption reform in Hong Kong. *China review* 4(2): 81–97

This article presents Hong Kong an excellent example of successful anti-corruption reforms. It sets out four general lessons that Hong Kong's experience offers for ongoing anti-corruption efforts in mainland China. The article then presents flaws in anti-corruption reform in mainland China that are illuminated by the contrast with the Hong Kong experience.

Maor M 2004. Feeling the heat? Anticorruption mechanisms in comparative perspective. *Governance* 17(1): 55–80

This paper addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anti-corruption mechanisms (e.g. commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the

ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate. Against this background, two hypotheses are investigated: (1) the striking outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anti-corruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation; and (2) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both institutions and media accessibility: the more centralised and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five anti-corruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales.)

Marquette H & Doig A 2004. Drilling down to the detail: a case study into anti-corruption project records and record-keeping. *Crime, law and social change* 41(1): 1–14

This paper addresses the importance of records and record-keeping in developing countries as a means of combating corruption and promoting participation and considers the value of donors coordinating and cooperating over donor funding (by institution and country) and the identification of particular expertise of specific donors to diversify the range of complementary strengths (the comparative advantage approach).

McAdam P & Rummel O 2004. Corruption: a non-parametric analysis. *Journal of economic studies* 31(5–6): 509–23

This paper considers the distributional dynamics of a well-known corruption index. Specifically, it seeks to evaluate whether corruption is best characterised as multi-modal (i.e. pointing to clusters of countries with persistently different levels of corruption) and whether there have been significant changes (i.e. convergence or divergence) in the distribution of the perception of corruption across countries and over time. Using nonparametric kernel density methods, the paper's findings lend support to concerns expressed in the theoretical literature, namely, that corruption can be highly persistent, and characterised by multiple equilibria. This highlights and corroborates the conclusion that anti-corruption campaigns must be sustained to be effective.

McCusker R 2004. Issues of corruption and crime: transnational crime syndicates and trafficking. *Development bulletin* 66: 48–52

This paper explores the link between corruption, people trafficking and transnational crime; the opportunities for corruption which exist at different stages of the trafficking chain; findings from the US Trafficking in Persons Report (2004) on evidence of trafficking corruption in different countries; and ways of preventing corruption from gaining or maintaining a foothold.

Meagher P 2004. Anti-corruption agencies: a review of experience. *IRIS Project report paper No. 04/02*

This paper reviews experiences of a wide range of agencies from around the world, in both industrialised and developing countries. It analyses existing documentation on anti-corruption agencies and presents three new, original case studies. It aims to provide practical guidance in this area to policy makers and donor agencies such as the World Bank, and also to identify promising strategies for developing a more rigorous assessment framework.

Mellor T & Jabes J 2004. *Governance in the Pacific: focus for action 2005–2009*. Manila: Asian Development Bank

This paper examines the ways in which attitudes towards governance have changed in recent years including consideration of how public officials and elected representatives have begun to realise its importance and have incorporated principles of good governance into public sector reform programs.

Michael B 2004. Explaining organizational change in international development: the role of complexity in anti-corruption work. *Journal of international development* 16(8): 1067–1088

This paper explains the rapid expansion of programmes undertaken by donor agencies in the 1990s and considers four schools of anti-corruption project practice: universalistic, state-centric, society-centric, and critical schools of practice. The paper argues that a complexity perspective offers a new framework for looking at such growth.

Mocan N 2004. What determines corruption? International evidence from micro data. *NBER working paper no. 10460*

This paper utilises a micro-level data set from 49 countries to address three issues: What determines corruption at the individual level? What determines the perception of the extent of corruption in the country? Does corruption have a direct impact on growth when the quality of the institutions are controlled for? In addition, the paper creates a direct measure of corruption which portrays the extent of corruption as revealed by individuals who live in those countries. The second part of the paper shows that controlling for endogeneity of corruption and institutional quality, actual corruption in the country and the proportion of the bribes asked by various government agencies have no direct impact on corruption perception. On the other hand, an improvement in the quality of institutions lowers the perception of corruption. The final section of the paper shows that controlling for the quality of the institutions, corruption does not have a direct impact on growth.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2004. *Review on assessing effectiveness of integrity and anti-corruption measures in the public service: the Korean experience*. Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate. Public Governance Committee

This paper comprises a case study which compares key components and phases of assessment methodologies implemented by the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption and the Seoul Metropolitan Government.

Rock MT & Bonnett H 2004. The comparative politics of corruption: accounting for the East Asian paradox in empirical studies of corruption, growth and investment. *World development* 32(6): 999–1017.

This paper reports on the notion that corruption reduces investment and/or slows growth. The paper considers the conducting of a series of cross-country regression tests using four different corruption datasets. It notes that corruption slows growth and/or reduces investment in most developing countries, particularly small developing countries, but increases growth in the large East Asian newly industrialising economies. The latter finding provides solid empirical support to a country case literature that explains the East Asian paradox—the combination of high corruption and high growth—in terms of stable and mutually beneficial exchanges of government promotional privileges for bribes and kickbacks.

Rose-Ackerman S 2004. *The challenge of poor governance and corruption*. Copenhagen Consensus Challenge papers. http://osp.stanford.edu/files/challenge_poor_gov.pdf

This book notes that the World Bank estimates that \$1 trillion is spent on bribes annually, some 3 percent of global GDP but that the impact on economic growth and world income could well be much higher than this. It suggests that corruption is one symptom of a failure to achieve an appropriate balance between private wealth and public power and that global solutions to this challenge are difficult to find because corruption and poor governance have a variety of causes. Solutions are not easy to implement because they disadvantage powerful vested interests that can block reforms. Despite these caveats, carefully tailored policies – carried out with the personal commitment of those on the ground – can have large benefits and very low costs.

Saldanha C 2004. Strategies for good governance in the Pacific. *Asian Pacific economic literature* 18(2): 30–43

This paper examines the fact that governance problems in the Pacific find their roots in deeply embedded political and social issues such as the structures of government, the quality of leadership, and the capacity of civil society to hold government accountable. These root causes are not easily addressed by outsiders, such as donors. Yet, governance is so fundamental to the development process that development agencies have a responsibility to assist. The options available to them are relatively limited, however, given that sustained change can only occur if driven from within. But there are courses of action available to development agencies and this paper has outlined a few. They do not necessarily need substantial amounts of funding. But they do need persistent and continuing effort and support and a substantial change of strategy by donors.

Tat YK 2004. Corruption and the effect of regime type: the case of Taiwan. *New political economy* 9(3): 341–364

This article shows how the anomalous features of Taiwan may be explained by variations of regime type. Although they are usually grouped together for the purpose of contrast with other regions, Korea and Taiwan exhibited different regime types, the bureaucratic authoritarian and quasi-monolithic types respectively. Reference to Korea as a comparator will highlight the effects of those variations between two political economies commonly thought to be very similar. Using the analytical framework of regime type will enable us to distinguish between strong developmentalist regimes: in how they control corruption; and in how their legacies shape subsequent patterns of corruption under conditions of dual transition (democratisation and economic liberalisation). As such, it will introduce a complementary dimension to the existing political economy analyses of corruption.

Transparency International 2004. *Global corruption report 2004*. London: Pluto Press.

http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2004#download

This paper focuses on corruption in the political process and in the insidious impact of corrupt politics on public life in societies across the globe.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2004. *Strengthening judicial integrity and capacity in Indonesia, Palembang, October 11–12 2004*. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/publications_palembang.pdf

This paper documents a UNODC assessment of integrity and capacity of the justice sector in two Indonesian provinces, South East Sulawesi and South Sumatra within the framework of a project on strengthening judicial integrity and capacity.

Ying S 2004. Regime and curbing corruption. *China review* 4(2): 99–128

This paper contributes to an understanding of corruption control by putting forth a causal explanation for successes and failures in curbing corruption in non-democratic countries. The main argument is that regime type shapes the anti-corruption strategies employed, and leads to different results. In addition, this study uses a threefold method of comparing corruption across countries and across time, proposes a general categorisation of strategies and a new typology of regimes that govern non-democratic countries.

2003

Arvis J & Berenbeim RE 2003. *Fighting corruption in East Asia: solutions from the private sector*. Washington DC: World Bank

This book looks at the content of the business program against corruption and at issues pertaining implementation and effectiveness such as the role of the business culture. It analyses the incentives, internal and external, that drive the adoption and implementation of those techniques. Many examples of actual mechanisms and alliance to disseminate good practices are presented, often involving partnerships with the public sector or the civil society.

Bull M & Newell JL (eds) 2003. *Corruption in contemporary politics*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

This book presents a series of case studies of political corruption in the liberal democracies of Europe—Spain, Italy, Greece, Germany, France, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, the Netherlands, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—as well as Japan and the United States. Each of the chapters contains discussions of the newness, scale, and corruption; the causes and dynamics of corruption; anti-corruption measures; and the impact and exposure of corruption.

Daniel WE 2003. Corporate governance in Indonesian listed companies: a problem of legal transplant. *Bond law review* 15(1): 345–375

This paper examines the impact of the South East Asian financial crisis upon Indonesia by eliciting the factors that can be blamed as reasons for the financial crisis.

Doig A & McIvor S 2003. The National Integrity System: assessing corruption and reform. *Public administration and development* 23(4): 317–332

This paper builds on a Transparency International – sponsored research study funded by the Dutch Government into the National Integrity System in practice. The study involved 18 countries, using in-country researchers and an overview report. This paper assesses the findings of the study to consider how the approach can work in practice, and what the approach can reveal about the causes and nature of corruption as well as the implications for reform.

Effective prosecution of corruption: report on the master training seminar Ghaziabad, India, 11–13 February 2003. http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Effective_Prosecution_of_Corruption/default.asp

This paper assembles the background papers and case studies, and the experts' and participants' views on the key topics that formed the basis for discussion at a master training seminar on effective prosecution of corruption held in India in February 2003. The seminar aimed to build capacity and strengthen practical knowledge in investigating of high profile cases, ensuring cooperation between law enforcement agencies, reporting corruption within public administration, and obtaining international legal assistance.

Gainsborough M 2003. Corruption and the politics of economic decentralisation in Vietnam. *Journal of contemporary Asia* 33(1): 69–84

This paper focuses on the increase in corruption cases in China and Vietnam during the 1990s and deals with the involvement of party and state officials, bankers and businessmen in court trials on charges of alleged corruption and illustrates an alternative way in which one can understand the phenomenon of corruption cases.

Gatti R, Paternostro S & Rigolini J 2003. *Individual attitudes toward corruption: do social effects matter?* World Bank policy research working paper 3122. Washington DC: World Bank

This paper uses individual-level data for 35 countries and investigates the microeconomic determinants of attitudes towards corruption. It finds that women, employed, less wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. The paper also provides evidence that social effects play an important role in determining individual attitudes towards corruption, as these are robustly and significantly associated

with the average level of tolerance of corruption in the region. This finding lends empirical support to theoretical models where corruption emerges in multiple equilibria and suggests that big-push policies might be particularly effective in combating corruption.

Getting to grips with graft. *The economist* 18 Mar. http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TGQGQTD

This paper reports on the work of the UN in producing what was to become the Convention against Corruption.

Kidd J & Richter F (eds) 2003. *Corruption and governance in Asia*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan

This book delves into the nature of governance in Asia both at government and corporate level. It reviews the history and suggests potential solutions for years of underperformance due to the corrupt practices that have developed because of a poor understanding of corporate governance.

Kumar CR 2003. Corruption and human rights: promoting transparency in governance and the fundamental right to corruption-free service in India. *Columbia journal of Asian law* 17(1): 31–72

This article argues that the problem of corruption in India needs to be analysed in the context of its potential implications for human rights.

Lee N & Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption 2003. Korea's anti-corruption strategies and the role of private sector

This paper comprises a speech on the aforementioned topic presented at a UN Roundtable on Corruption.

Little P 2003. Corporate governance standards: AS 8001, AS 8003 and AS 8004. *Inhouse counsel* 7(1): 7–9

This paper deals with Standards Australia's five new corporate governance standards, with discussion focusing on AS 8001, Fraud and corruption control, AS 8003, Corporate social responsibility and AS 8004, Whistleblower protection programs for entities.

Marquette H 2003. *Corruption, politics and development: the role of the World Bank*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

This paper argues that the Bank should focus on its strengths and avoid the more controversial components of its anti-corruption program, which threaten its credibility.

Nielsen RP 2003. Corruption networks and implications for ethical corruption reform. *Journal of business ethics* 42(2): 125–149

This paper focuses on the systematic, pervasive sub-system of corruption that can and has existed across historical periods, geographic areas, and political-economic systems. It is important to first understand how corrupt and unethical subsystems operate, particularly their network nature, in order to reform and change them while not becoming what we are trying to change. Twelve key system elements are considered that include case examples from Asia, Latin America, the Mediterranean, and North America. A key operating feature of corruption sub-systems is that they are relatively stable networks rather than exceptional, independent, individual events. Drawing on social network, social movement, and action-learning theories, six theory building propositions concerning ethical corruption reform are developed.

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2003. *Fighting corruption: what role for civil society? The experience of the OECD*. Paris: OECD

This paper provides an analysis of civil society's role in the process which led to the adoption of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. It also shows how the anti-corruption initiatives developed with non-member countries contribute to strengthen the role played by civil society actors.

Quah J 2003. *Curbing corruption in Asia: a comparative study of six countries*, 2nd ed. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press

This book deals with the nature of the corruption and counter-measures in Mongolia, India, the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and South Korea, respectively. It notes in particular three patterns of corruption control in Asian countries: Pattern 1 is demonstrated by Mongolia, which has anti-corruption laws but no independent agency. Pattern 2 is illustrated by India and the Philippines as they have many anti-corruption laws and anti-corruption agencies. Pattern 3 refers to the implementation of anti-corruption legislation by an independent anti-corruption agency and is best exemplified by Singapore and Hong Kong. South Korea has moved from Pattern 1 to Pattern 3 with the formation of the Korean Independent Commission against Corruption in January 2002.

Tay S & Seda M (eds) 2003. *The enemy within: combating corruption in Asia*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press

This book addresses general and localised issues relating to the ever-threatening ramifications of corruption in Asia region. Part I examines challenges and experiences on a broad canvas and also in Cambodia and Thailand. Part II describes systems and strategies, drawing on measures used in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia and also on the strategies and experiences of investigative journalism, tax systems, and arenas of resistance. Part II draws lessons from Singapore's systematic and basically successful history of anti-corruption enforcement.

Transparency International 2003. *Global corruption report 2003*. London: Pluto Press.

http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2003#download

This paper focuses on the need for greater access to information in the struggle against corruption. It explores how civil society, the public and private sectors and the media use and control information to combat – or conceal – corruption.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2003. Building integrity to curb corruption: national conference for cleaner public life, Budapest, Hungary. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/National_Conf_Hungary.pdf

This paper documents the National Integrity Meeting for Cleaner Public Life. It discusses the need to fight and address the issue of corruption in an open and transparent way.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2003. *Compendium of international legal instruments on corruption*. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/Compendium_nov03.pdf

This paper documents all the major relevant global and regional international treaties, agreements, resolutions and other instruments including both legally binding obligations and normative instruments designed to provide non-binding standards.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2003. Report of the Third Meeting of the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity, Colombo, Sri Lanka, January 2003. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/judicial_group/Third_Judicial_Group_report.pdf

This paper documents the objectives and outcomes of the third meeting of the aforementioned Judicial Group. The meeting was convened to, inter alia, review the mechanisms utilised in three pilot programs concerned with identifying and diagnosing systemic weaknesses in the judicial system, to share experiences in addressing those systemic issues and to consider a draft Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2003. *United Nations guide on anti-corruption policy*. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/UN_Guide.pdf

This paper provides details of generic principles that should ideally feature in anti-corruption policies.

Vinod HD 2003. Open economy and financial burden of corruption: theory and application to Asia. *Journal of Asian economics* 13(6): 873–890

This paper discusses why corruption remains high and shows that corruption contributes to the Banking distress and to the rapid transmission across international stock and currency markets. Undeveloped derivative securities markets make the risk from stress-induced volatility difficult to manage. The closed economy model is extended to indicate the asymmetry of home bias and the effect of corruption on the value at risk. The paper predicts that capital flight controls will be many, foreign direct investment will be low and cost of capital will be high in corrupt developing countries, which is supported by Asian data. The paper includes some policy recommendations regarding financial institutions and markets.

World Bank. East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit 2003. Combating corruption in Indonesia: enhancing accountability for development. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINDONESIA/Resources/Publication/03-Publication/Combating+Corruption+in+Indonesia-Oct15.pdf>

This paper documents attempts by the World Bank to deal with issues of corruption in Indonesia. It builds upon a comprehensive set of assessments and reviews on some of the key areas in which corruption manifests itself including public expenditure and financial management systems, the financial sector, the justice sector and the civil service.

2002

Asian Development Bank 2002. *Taking action against corruption in Asia and the Pacific*. Manila: ADB. http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_37447_1835936_1_1_1_37447,00.html

This book assembles the papers presented during the Joint ADB–OECD Anti-Corruption Conference held in Tokyo, Japan in November 2000. The Tokyo Conference was the third annual meeting of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia–Pacific, and brought together some 150 senior government officials of Asian and Pacific countries and representatives from the private sector, civil society, the international donor community, and academia. The conference addressed the following three key areas: (1) Developing efficient and transparent systems of public service. (2) Strengthening anti-bribery actions and promoting integrity in business operations. (3) Supporting active public involvement.

Aziz TA 2002. Fighting corruption in Asia and the Pacific. *Singapore Institute of International Affairs reader* 2(1): 21–28

This article is the transcript of a keynote address to the Singapore Institute of International Affairs regional conference in Singapore 10–11 May 2001. It provides an overview of fighting corruption in Asia and the Pacific. It emphasises the importance of political will in fighting and curbing corruption and provides some examples of innovations in eradicating corruption implemented by leaders who had the will to push through their policies.

Bukovansky M 2002. *Corruption is bad: normative dimensions of the anti-corruption movement*. Working paper series WP2002/5. Canberra: ANU Department of Internal Relations

This paper reviews some of the key documents of the emerging global anti-corruption regime, and analyses the moral connotations permeating these documents. It also examines the relative neglect of moral and ethical issues within the scholarly literature on corruption and its consequences. Such neglect, the paper argues, is likely to undercut the legitimacy, and hence efficacy, of international institutional efforts to combat corruption.

Gillespie J 2002. The political–legal culture of anti-corruption reforms in Vietnam, in Lindsey T & Dick H (eds), *Corruption in Asia: rethinking the governance paradigm*. Sydney: Federation Press: 167–200

This chapter explores whether law-based anti-corruption reforms are capable of defining and controlling abuses of power in Vietnam's binary party-state.

Heidenheimer A & Johnston M (eds) 2002. *Political corruption: concepts and contexts*, 3rd ed. London: Transaction Publishers

This book incorporates recent work on economic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of the problem of political corruption and provides critical analyses of approaches to reform. Two-thirds of the nearly fifty articles are especially written or translated for this volume, or based on selected journal literature published in the 1990s. The tendency to treat corruption as a synonym for bribery is illuminated by analyses of the diverse terminology and linguistic techniques that distinguish corruption problems in the major languages. Recent attempts to measure corruption and to analyse its causes and effects quantitatively are also critically examined. New contributions emphasise corruption phenomena in Asia and Africa, contrasts among region and regime types, the incidence US state corruption, European Party finance and corruption; assessments of international corruption rating's, analyses of international corruption control treaties, and unintended consequences of anti-corruption efforts.

Johnston M & Kpundeh S 2002. *Building a clean machine: anti-corruption coalitions and sustainable reform*. World Bank Institute working paper 28639. <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37208.pdf>

This paper argues that social action coalitions, linking public and private actors, are a way to mobilise participation and advocacy. In Part I, the paper employs Wilson's (1973) analysis of the incentives that motivate and reward participation in organisations. This approach helps the paper to identify ways in which the anti-corruption goals can be augmented by other kinds of appeals, even when material incentives are scarce. The report also identifies four stages of the coalition-building process-formation, credibility, expansion, and transformation, in which differing combinations of incentives will be necessary to address the group's most important problems and opportunities. In Part II, the paper examines two important coalition building efforts in light of the discussions thus far – Ghana's Anti-Corruption Coalition, and the Bangalore Agenda Task Force in Bangalore, Karnataka State, India. In Part III, the paper links those cases to a broader analysis, suggesting that while purposive incentives are common in the early phases of all coalitions, other varieties must be added to the mix. Wilson's scheme points to ways in which the imaginative use of incentives can aid the transition from one phase of coalition development to the next. The paper concludes with general strategic issues, suggesting ways in which their analysis can be applied to those questions given the important variations to be found among cases.

Keuleers P 2002. *Corruption in the Lao PDR: underlying causes and key issues for consideration*. Bangkok: UNDP

This paper provides a general overview of the situation in some of the key governance sectors in Laos and describes the weaknesses in the administrative, social and political systems that allow corruption. The paper shows that meaningful work has been done by the government, with support of the donor community, to implement state management reforms. But it is also obvious that there are powerful pockets of resistance to change, cultural obstacles and other impediments that explain the difficulties encountered when tackling the roots of the corruption problem.

Lai A 2002. Building public confidence in anti-corruption efforts: the approach of the Hong Kong special administrative region of China. *Forum on crime and society* 2(1): 135–146

This paper charts the transition of Hong Kong from a place stricken with widespread corruption to a city acclaimed for its integrity. It discusses the strategies, government backing and the need for sufficient resources and powers to tackle corruption. Also discussed is the inception of the Independent Commission against Corruption and the results achieved by the Commission.

Larmour P 2002. Policy transfer in Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific: when, how, who, what and from where? *Pacific economic bulletin* 17(2): 55–67

This paper compares attempts to transfer institutions associated with good governance: land registration, constitutions, representative democracy, public sector reform and anti-corruption. It asks when the transfer took place, who was involved, how it took place, and where it came from, and draws some conclusions about its irrationality.

Lim L & Stern A 2002. State power and private profit: the political economy of corruption in Southeast Asia. *Asian-Pacific economic literature* 16(2): 18–52

This paper reviews the extensive political and economic literature since 1990 on corruption in Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore. After considering each country's individual recent history of corruption, the paper comparatively analyses the relationship of corruption in these countries with, respectively, the roles of the state, the private sector and external actors, democratisation and decentralisation, and the impact of corruption on economic growth and inequality. The paper concludes that while economic liberalisation, democratisation and centralisation of state power influence the forms of corruption and its impact on national economic performance, they are neither necessary nor sufficient for its decline.

Lindsey T & Dick H 2002. *Corruption in Asia: rethinking the governance paradigm*. Sydney: Federation Press

This book argues that more might be achieved sooner by much better understanding of political, legal, commercial and social dynamics in Indonesia and Vietnam, not as they are meant to be but as they are. Multilateral agencies, donors, NGOs, business firms and scholars on the one hand; and local politicians, bureaucrats, business people, lawyers, journalists, academics, and NGOs on the other hand have much usefully to discuss. Only out of that dialogue, a dialogue between the world as it is and the world of ideals, can steady progress be made. This book examines these problems initially in an abstract theoretical sense before testing the frameworks thus established through a series of case studies of Indonesia and Vietnam, two very different Asian states: one (Vietnam) still socialist but in difficult transition from command economy to a limited market structure; the other (Indonesia) embracing a market economy and an emerging democratic system; one with a Confucian legal and political tradition, the other not; one with a socialist, the other a civil law, legal system.

Luo Y 2002. Corruption and organization in Asian management systems. *Asia Pacific journal of management* 19(2–3): 405–422

This paper argues that corruption is an evolutionary hazard, a strategic impediment, a competitive disadvantage, and an organisational deficiency. It explains why an organisational perspective of corruption is an important research agenda in Asian management, outlines how corruption differs from interpersonal business networking and illustrates why corruption impedes organisational development.

MacWilliam S 2002. Poverty, governance and corruption in Fiji. *Pacific economic bulletin* 17(1): 138–145. <http://peb.anu.edu.au/pdf/PEB17-1macwilliam.pdf>

This paper suggests that understanding and describing poverty, as well as corruption and governance, in Fiji should be extended and deepened. In particular, the paper argues that a possible area for further research might be to examine the nature of the wealthy who have become so prominent over the past 20 years (circa. 1982–2002) and who dominate Fiji's economy.

McFarlane J 2002. Corruption a threat to national stability. *Platypus* no.75 June: 26–28. http://www.afp.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/3966/corruption.pdf

This paper covers an address delivered at the Strategic Update 2001 and claimed that over this decade corruption contributed to the demise of governments or the ruling elite's in countries such as Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, The Philippines, Papua New Guinea and to the demise of the Yeltsin era in post-Soviet Russia.

Nicholson P 2002. The Vietnamese courts and corruption, in Lindsey T & Dick H (eds), *Corruption in Asia: rethinking the governance paradigm*. Sydney: Federation Press: 201–218

This chapter explores perceptions of courts and impropriety in contemporary Vietnam through analysis of the role of the Supreme People's Court, the corruption judgements and media commentary. It is structured in three parts. In the first part, Vietnamese legal culture is examined, with a particular focus on the traditional role of courts and dispute resolution in Vietnam. In the second part, the two cases are analysed and in the final part the role of courts and their treatment of corrupt judges and judicial officers is explored.

Pitts M 2002. *Crime, corruption and capacity in Papua New Guinea*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press

This book builds on the arguments and views of many PNG observers that community controls are more effective in controlling crime than state controls. The book guides the reader through anecdotal and factual data to show the relationship between politics leadership accountability corruption and capacity – within and between state agencies and local communities – and how that relationship often stigmatises both state and community crime control initiatives.

Puig GV 2002. Eliminating political and administrative corruption. *Canberra bulletin of public administration* no. 104 June: 46–49

This paper notes that in order to be successful, strategies for the removal of incentives and opportunities for government and administrative corruption should be interdisciplinary in approach – strategies for the removal of incentives for corruption – strategies for the removal of opportunities for corruption.

Rose-Ackerman S 2002. 'Grand' corruption and the ethics of global business. *Journal of banking and finance* 26(9): 1889–1918

This paper explores the ethical obligations of global business to refrain from corruption. Corruption is harmful for the growth prospects of host countries and can introduce inefficiencies and inequities. It argues that business corporations have an obligation to refrain from illegal payoffs as part of the quid pro quo implied by the laws that permit corporations to exist and to operate. The paper goes on to consider how firms might respond, and isolates situations where anti-corruption policies can be profitable for firms. It concludes with an analysis of international efforts to deter transnational bribery and with suggestions for additional international initiatives.

Sherlock S 2002. Combating corruption in Indonesia? The Ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission. *Bulletin of Indonesian economic studies* 38(3): 367–383

This paper reports on the early optimism that post-Soeharto governments would lead a systematic campaign against corruption has largely been disappointed. The creation of the ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission were hopeful signs, but both initiatives are symptomatic of the weaknesses besetting Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts. Despite their best endeavours, both organisations have weak powers, are under-resourced, receive only token political support and exist in isolation from other investigative and enforcement agencies. International research suggests that official efforts to eliminate corruption are effective only as part of a coordinated campaign to reform administration, policy-making, legislative institutions and the judiciary. Threatened exposure or punishment of corrupt officials is not enough: all the institutional incentives and disincentives for abuse of public office for private gain must be confronted. In Indonesia the problem is that most of those empowered to take such initiatives have no incentive to do so because they profit from the status quo.

Thammasat University, Thailand. Faculty of Law 2002. Anti-corruption reform in Thailand, in *New legal frameworks: towards political and institutional reform under the new constitution of Thailand*. IDE Asian Law Series 14. <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Als/pdf/14.pdf>

In Thailand, apparent political and legal reform concretely transpired in the wake of the Bloody May event of 1992 which led to an overthrow of the shortlived military autocratic government and the subsequent promulgation of the new Constitution which is, in deed, claimed to be the popular constitution. As a major legal foundation, the Constitution makes numerous improvements in such areas as the transparency and accountability, popular participation, protection of the human rights, election systems, local government, anti-corruption and judicial review. This work seeks to explore each of these aspects at certain length.

Transparency International 2002. *Corruption fighters' tool kit: civil society experiences and emerging strategies*. Berlin: TI

This book is a compendium of practical civil society anti-corruption experiences described in concrete and accessible language. It presents innovative anti-corruption tools developed and implemented by

TI National Chapters and other civil society organisations from around the world. The book highlights the potential of civil society to create mechanisms for monitoring public institutions and to demand and promote accountable and responsive public administration.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2002. *Report of the interagency anti-corruption coordination meeting 4–5 February 2002*. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/corruption_projects_report_presentations.html

This paper is a summary of presentations made by participating organisations at the aforementioned meeting. Views are expressed here by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, UNDP, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Centre for International Crime Prevention, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, The Council of Europe, Interpol and Transparency International.

Yik KT 2002. Money politics in Malaysia. *Journal of contemporary Asia* 32(3): 338–345

This paper focuses on the issue of money politics in Malaysia and discusses the concept of money politics, relevant laws containing money politics and inefficiency in the enforcement of laws to control money politics.

2001

ADB/OECD 2001. *Combating corruption on all fronts: national efforts, in joint ADB–OECD Conference on Combating Corruption in the Asian and Pacific*.

http://www.adb.org/Documents/Conference/Fight_Corruption/part1.pdf

This paper provides an overview of anti-corruption measures taken by authorities in three countries: South Korea, China and Pakistan. Hong-Bin Kang looks at the success of the systematic approach adopted in South Korea, in particular with regard to Seoul. Arguing that the 1997 financial crisis created the political will and leadership needed to fight corruption, the report notes that the campaign focused on preventive measures based on deregulation, punitive measures based on zero tolerance, transparency based on provision of information via the internet, and enhanced public–private partnership through citizen groups. Further, it analyses the Chinese Communist Party and government's fight against corruption, discussing both legislative and other developments and the evaluates the progress made by Pakistan in the anti-corruption field.

Bai C & Wei S 2001. *The quality of bureaucracy and capital account policies*. World Bank policy research working paper no. 2575. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=632644>

This paper examines the notion that the quality of a country's bureaucracy may be an important structural determinant of open economy macroeconomic policies. The paper suggests that bureaucratic corruption translates into the government's reduced ability to collect tax revenues. The report finds that the more corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls. The report suggests that as countries develop and improve their public institutions, reducing bureaucratic corruption over time, they will choose to gradually liberalise their capital accounts. Removing capital controls prematurely when forced by outside institutions to do so could reduce rather than improve their economic efficiency.

Cain P et al. 2001. Filing for corruption: transparency, openness and record-keeping. *Crime, law and social change* 36(4): 409–425

This paper discusses the rhetoric of language detailing openness, transparency, accountability and combating corruption and then asks how they are to be implemented. What is at issue is that such terms are crucial development goals but, without greater attention to concrete outcomes and processes, may remain rhetoric.

Capulong V, Edwards D & Zhuang Z (eds) 2001. *Corporate governance and finance in East Asia: a study of Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand (Volume 1 – a consolidated report) (Volume 2 – Country Studies)*. Manila: ADB

This paper presents the findings of a regional study of corporate governance and finance in selected developing member countries of the Asian Development Bank. The paper attempts to identify the weaknesses in corporate governance and finance in countries most affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and recommends policy and reform measures to address the weaknesses.

Hamilton-Hart N 2001. Anti-corruption strategies in Indonesia. *Bulletin of Indonesian economic studies* 37(1): 65–82

This paper summarises the reform initiatives carried out in Indonesia since 1998 and offers an explanation for their very limited success. Obstacles to reducing corruption in Indonesia include the economic and political constraints facing the current government and the entrenched nature of corruption. The content of the reform program itself may also contribute to the persistence of the problem. The program consists primarily of moves to introduce monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms that are external to particular government organisations. Internal reforms that aim to improve organisational self-discipline have received much less attention. The reform program may thus be inherently incomplete.

Institute on Governance 2001. *Look before you leap notes for corruption fighters*.
<http://www.developmentgateway.com.au/jahia/jsp/link.jsp?idLink=231>

This paper gives a practical framework for designing anti-corruption initiatives in the public sector in developing countries. It suggests that a direct approach to fighting corruption may not always be the best or the only option.

Jain AK 2001. Corruption: a review. *Journal of economic surveys* 15(1): 71–121

This paper begins with a brief overview of key definitions of corruption, and then turns to a review of the factors that favour or deter the growth of corruption together with a brief look at related models. This is followed by an examination of the consequences of corruption for society, and the consideration of measures that might help to reduce corruption. The paper ends with suggestions for future research and includes summaries of data sources and key variables for use in this research.

Kilchling M 2001. Tracing, seizing and confiscating proceeds from corruption (and other illegal conduct) within or outside the criminal justice system. *European journal of crime, criminal law & criminal justice* 9(4): 264–280

This paper focuses on the confiscation of proceeds from corruption and other illegal conduct within or outside the criminal justice system.

Langseth P 2001. *Value added of partnership in the fight against corruption*. Vienna: Global Programme Against Corruption

This paper promotes an anti-corruption strategy that rests on economic development, democratic reform, strong civil society and presence of rule of law. Based on these principles, the paper recommends concrete measures to be implemented at the national and international level and emphasise the need for coordination with economic and social policies and the development of a civic political culture. The paper also gives information about the activities and experiences of international institutions in the fight against corruption and introduces an evidence-based, non-partisan, inclusive as well as comprehensive and impact-oriented approach to fight corruption.

Larmour P & Wolanin N (eds) 2003. *Corruption and anti-corruption*. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology and Asia Pacific Press

This book deals with the international dimensions of corruption, including campaigns to recover the assets of former dictators, and the links between corruption, transnational and economic crime. It deals with corruption as an issue in political theory, and shows how it can be addressed in campaigns for human rights. Case studies are also presented of reform efforts in the Philippines, India and Thailand.

Lo JMK 2001. Controlling corruption in Hong Kong: from colony to special administrative region. *Journal of contingencies and crisis management* 9(1): 21–28

This paper seeks to delineate the experience of Hong Kong's fight against corruption in the midst of a rapidly changing political and social environment. After describing the context in which the Hong Kong anti-corruption programme is set, this paper identifies the critical policy decisions that account for the programme's success and the lessons Hong Kong has learned from the campaign. It ends by highlighting some of the current issues and problems that arise from the changing circumstances of Hong Kong's development.

Marquette H 2001. Corruption, democracy and the World Bank. *Crime, law & social change* 36(4): 395–407

This paper argues that the World Bank's mandate is in conflict with a politically sensitive issue like anti-corruption, and that it is impossible to separate economic issues from political ones in this instance; however, given the lack of consensus on the relationship between democracy, development and corruption, this may be the best state of affairs for now.

McCoy JL 2001. The emergence of a global anti-corruption norm. *International politics* 38(1): 65–90

This paper analyses the development of a global anti-corruption norm, and specifically its anti-bribery component, through the first two of three stages during the 1990s: (1) awareness raising, (2) institutionalisation through the development of legal and policy instruments, and (3) global adoption, internalisation, and adherence. A hegemonic actor explanation of norm development does not explain the failure of the norm in the 1970s in contrast to the relative success of norm development in the 1990s. The explanation lies in three processes: (1) the changing global environment, including the end of the Cold War and the spread of the principles of democracy and liberalism; (2) social interactions and the information revolution that contributed to wide-spread diffusion of new information about the causes and costs of corruption, as well as strategies to combat it; and (3) internal processes within the nation-state, from an explosion of NGOs and a freer, more investigative media, to changing calculations among political leaders about the costs of corruption. To reach the third stage of norm development will require both international organisations and domestic civil society actors to demand and monitor the implementation and enforcement of current commitments and to establish accountability.

McFarlane J 2001. Corruption and the financial sector: the strategic impact. *Journal of financial crime* 9(1): 8–21

This paper investigates the impact of corruption on the economic and political stability of the Asia Pacific region. It deals with a number of issues including the nature of corruption, the link between transnational crime, corruption and regional security, the role of corruption in the financial crisis in 1997 and the infiltration of organised crime into the Japanese business sector.

McFarlane J 2001. Transnational crime: corruption, crony capitalism and nepotism in the twenty-first century, in Larmour P & Wolanin N (eds), *Corruption and anti-corruption*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press: 131–145

This paper examines the rise and impact of transnational crime and details issues such as its facilitation of corruption and nepotism, the impact of corruption on the Asia-Pacific region, international corruption efforts and the relationship between good governance and anti-corruption.

Moran J 2001. Democratic transitions and forms of corruption. *Crime, law and social change*, 36(4): 379–393

This paper takes a contextual and procedural approach to the analysis of democratisation and corruption. It disaggregates some variables whereby democratisation can provide the context for the development of corruption and crime. This paper does not argue democratisation causes corruption and crime, nor does it argue democratisation does not provide the social space for the reduction of corruption and crime. This paper concentrates on the areas in which democratisation provides an often complex environment for the development of corruption and crime.

Parayno G 2001. Combatting corruption in the Philippines Customs Service, in Larmour P & Wolanin N (eds), *Corruption and anti-corruption*. Canberra: Asia Pacific Press: 204–220

This paper considers the anti-corruption campaigns undertaken by the Philippines Customs Service and considers the way in which the Service is perceived by the public. It examines the nature and causes of corruption within the Service and then discusses the anti-corruption campaigns of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s and assesses their effectiveness and the reasons for their success or failure.

Pitts M 2001. Crime and corruption: does Papua New Guinea have the capacity to control it? *Pacific economic bulletin* 16(2): 127–134 [accessed 12 June]. <http://peb.anu.edu.au/pdf/PEB16-2pitts.pdf>

This paper argues that crime and corruption in Papua New Guinea are rampant and linked through networks of ethnicity and other allegiances. It notes that state crime control strategies are often politically influenced or prompted by fear of negative sanctions by allegiances or tied to international agencies' policy. Finally, it notes that community capacity in relation to crime control is also influenced by aid agency input, state capacity and the economic and social impact of corrupt practice.

Progress in the fight against corruption in Asia and the Pacific – Proceedings of the Seoul Conference held in 2000 (Manila: ADB/OECD, November 2001) <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/proceed2000.htm>

This book assembles the papers presented during the Joint ADB–OECD Conference on Combating Corruption in the Asian and Pacific region held in Seoul, Korea in December 2000. The Seoul conference identified priorities for a successful fight against corruption, including:

- promoting good governance through legal, institutional, and administrative reforms
- strengthening the rule of law
- promoting integrity in business operations
- developing proactive strategies to promote citizens' participation in anti-corruption efforts.

Against this background, this publication provides a review of successful anti-corruption strategies already in place and explores and analyses new approaches. Moreover, it aims to foster the sharing of information and experience and to strengthen coordination and cooperation among key players in the fight against corruption.

Quah J 2001. Combating corruption in Singapore: what can be learned? *Journal of contingencies and crisis management* 9(1): 29–35

This paper deals with the major causes of corruption in Singapore during the colonial period. It describes the features of Singapore's anti-corruption strategy, and identifies six lessons to be learned from Singapore's experience in fighting corruption.

Quah J 2001. Combating corruption in the Asia Pacific region, in Caiden G, Dwivedi O & Jabbra J (eds), *Where corruption lives*. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press

This book explores initiatives being taken by national governments and international organisations to combat corrupt practices, and assess their chances of success or failure.

Quah J 2001. Globalization and corruption control in Asian countries: the case for divergence. *Public management review* 3(4): 453–470

This paper describes and evaluates the three patterns of corruption control in six Asian countries and concludes that the third pattern of anti-corruption laws with an independent anti-corruption agency adopted by Singapore and Hong Kong is the most effective.

Sarkar H & Hassan M 2001 Impact of corruption on the efficiency of investment: evidence from a cross-country analysis. *Asia-Pacific development journal* 8(2): 111–16

This paper identifies a simple concept of the macroeconomic efficiency of investment, establishes its linkage with corruption and estimates the relationship between them. The efficiency of investment variables and Transparency International's Corruption Perception Indices are used as data. The paper concludes that substantial gains in terms of economic growth could be achieved if corruption is reduced.

Transparency International 2001. *Global corruption report 2001*. Berlin: Transparency International. http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/download_gcr_2001#download

This paper provides an overview of the state of corruption around the globe, covering the period from July 2000 to June 2001.

United Nations. Office on Drugs and Crime 2001. *Value added of partnership in the fight against corruption*. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp11.pdf>

This paper promotes an anti-corruption strategy that rests on economic development, democratic reform, strong civil society and presence of the rule of law. Based on these principles, the paper recommends concrete measures be implemented at the national and international levels and emphasises the need for coordination with economic and social policies and the development of a civic political structure.

Wei S 2001. *Corruption and globalisation*. Policy brief no. 79 April. Washington DC: Brookings Institution

This paper argues that anti-corruption is central to the IMF's mission of promoting economic and financial stability in its member countries, and central to its mandate of minimising disequilibrium in the international financial system. In fact, as the world economy becomes increasingly globalised the IMF's anti-corruption efforts are becoming more important.

Wood J 2001. Preventing corruption in drug law enforcement. *Crime and justice bulletin* (61): 1–6

This paper comprises an address given to the Bureau of Crime Statistics National Seminar on Drug Law Enforcement and Harm Reduction, Sydney, 2 November 2001 and dealt with the key factors which foster police corruption in drug law enforcement and the prevention or minimisation of corruption.

2000

Ali M 2000. Eradicating corruption: The Singapore experience. Paper to Seminar on International Experiences on Good Governance and Fighting Corruption, Bangkok

This paper notes the Singaporean experience in fighting corruption, which has made Singapore one of the cleanest, corruption free countries in the world.

Alvazzi del Frate A & Pasqua G 2000. *Responding to the challenges of corruption: acts of the international conference, Milan, 19–20 November 1999*. Milan: UNICRI. <http://www.unicri.it/www/publications/books/series/n63.php>

This paper examines achievements and difficulties encountered within a number of jurisdictions at the political and judicial levels. It examines the role of corruption in the business sector, considers international counter-corruption experiences and activities and examines the role and nature of prevention strategies in dealing with systemic corruption.

Bowornwathana B 2000. Governance reform in Thailand: questionable assumptions, uncertain outcomes. *Governance* 13(3): 393–408

This paper examines the nature of governance reform in Thailand and draws upon theoretical debates in the international literature on administrative reform, and relating these debates to the Thai case. Governance reform in Thailand is still at an early stage, but the role of unintended consequences is important to administrative reform. Furthermore, the Thai case may reflect governance reform in other countries as well.

Brinkerhoff D 2000. Assessing political will for anti-corruption efforts: an analytic framework. *Public administration and development* 20(3): 239–252

This paper focuses on analysing political will as it relates to the design, initiation, and pursuit of anti-corruption activities. The paper elaborates an analytic framework for political will that partitions the concept into a set of characteristics/indicators, and elaborates the external factors that influence the expression and intensity of political will in a particular situation. The conceptual model identifies the links among the characteristics of political will and these external factors, and traces their resulting influence on the support for, design of, and outcomes of anti-corruption reforms. The conceptual framework for political will draws upon analysis and field experience with implementing policy change in a variety of sectors, including anti-corruption. The paper closes with recommendations on the practical applications of the framework.

Chan T 2000. Corruption prevention: the Hong Kong experience, in Iitsuka H & Findlay-Debeck R (eds), *Resource material series* no. 56: 365–377

This paper describes how the enforcement of a strong anti-corruption law based on a zero tolerance approach, backed by effective prevention and educational programs, had a marked impact in Hong Kong.

Combating corruption in Asia and the Pacific: proceedings of the Manila workshop held in 1999. Manila: ADB/OECD. <http://www1.oecd.org/daf/asiacom/proceed1999.htm>

This paper covers a broad set of issues ranging from corruption as a challenge to good governance and economic development to anti-corruption actions at national, regional, and international levels. It provides policy makers, business, civil-society organisations, and other stakeholders with an assessment of specific anti-corruption strategies already in place and explores new approaches. Moreover, it serves as a key element in the network building and information sharing which is essential to successful coordination and cooperation among key players in the reform effort.

Grabosky P & Larmour P 2000. Public sector corruption and its control. *Trends & issues in crime and criminal justice* no. 43. <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/tandi/ti143.pdf>

This paper provides a basic overview of corruption in Australia. It outlines its basic forms, explains why corruption occurs, and, most importantly, spells out what Australian governments and the private sector have done, and can do, to reduce the level of corruption in society.

He Z 2000. Corruption and anti-corruption in reform China. *Communist and post-communist studies* 33(2): 243–270

This paper explores the causes, consequences of corruption and anti-corruption campaigns of the Chinese government. The major conclusion of this paper is that further political reform toward democracy should be the direction of future anti-corruption efforts.

Iitsuka H & Findlay-Debeck R (eds) 2005. *Resource material series*. no 56. Tokyo: UNAFEI

This paper comprises a number of pertinent papers on anti-corruption strategies and in particular upon the criminal justice response to incidences of corruption.

Khanal R 2001. *Transparency and accountability against corruption in Nepal*. Kathmandu: Political Science Association of Nepal

This book collates a number of articles that were presented at a number of seminars held throughout Nepal by the Political Science Association of Nepal on request of TI Nepal. They aim to help understand the problem of transparency and accountability in Nepal and to enlist allies for TI-Nepal in support of its objectives. The articles in this book seem to come to the conclusion that it is sheer neglect by public servants of the people, and a severe lack of transparency and accountability, that have posed a serious threat to democracy.

Klitgaard R 2000. Subverting corruption. *Finance and development* 37(2): 2–3.
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/06/klitgaar.htm>

This paper notes that the focus of countries' anti-corruption efforts typically begins with consciousness raising, shifts to making governments less susceptible, and then addresses the problem of corrupt systems. The paper asks what measures governments, concerned citizens and others might take when the third stage is reached.

Langseth P 2000. *Integrated versus quantitative methods: lessons learned*. Vienna: Global Programme Against Corruption, UNODCCP. <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp7.pdf>

This paper notes that the key to reduced poverty is an integrated approach to development addressing quality growth, environment, education, health and governance. It suggests that government, as the key determinant of a country's domestic and international relations regarding all the various issues previously mentioned, must function efficiently and effectively with integrity. This requires coordination among all governmental and parastatal agencies and increased involvement of all other key stakeholders. A precondition for an integrated approach is an equally comprehensive an integrated assessment of existing institutional rules and regulations, systems and processes, and interfaces and synergies. Moreover, such an assessment in conjunction with strengthened civil liberties and other democratic principles empowers the public to monitor governmental action thus establishing a system of checks and balances.

Marra M 2000. How much does evaluation matter? Some examples of the utilization of the evaluation of the World Bank's anti-corruption activities. *Evaluation* 6(1): 22–36

This paper offers empirical evidence of the utilisation of evaluation findings of the World Bank Institute's (WBI) efforts to help reduce corruption in Tanzania and Uganda. These initiatives are part of the World Bank-WBI program to curb corruption in developing countries. This analysis focuses on the mid-term evaluation of the WBI's anti-corruption activities in those countries. The paper shows, through a series of examples, how evaluation has been used in both an instrumental and an enlightenment fashion by program designers and implementers. Although links between knowledge generation and utilisation are seldom clear and direct, and specific information cannot always be isolated as the basis for a particular decision, the examples show that utilisation has occurred, bringing about change in program design and implementation.

Rosser M 2000. *Promoting transparency and accountability: USAID's anti-corruption experience*. Washington: Centre for Democracy and Governance. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacf740.pdf

This paper provides a snapshot of what USAID has done over the years to combat corruption. It includes early USAID experience in fighting corruption and USAID cooperation with other donors and international organisations. It also outlines the areas the Agency responds to in anti-corruption work, such as legal reform, privatisation and regulatory reform, administrative reform, and judicial reform. The paper also addresses changing attitudes of advocacy organisations, public–private partnerships, and the media.

Schneider F & Enste D 2000. Shadow economies: size, causes, and consequences. *Journal of economic literature* 38(1): 77–114

This paper estimates the size of the shadow economy in 76 developing, transition, and OECD countries.

Segal G & Goodman D 2000. *Towards recovery in Pacific Asia*. London: Routledge

This book represents a vital, up-to-date analysis for students and researchers in Asian studies, International Relations, International Political Economy, as well as policy makers and professionals working in, or with, Pacific Asia.

Shah A & Huther J 2000. *Anti-corruption policies and programs: a framework for evaluation*. World Bank policy research working paper no. 2501. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=632571>

This paper notes that in a largely corruption-free environment, anti-corruption agencies, ethics offices, and ombudsmen strengthen the standards of accountability. In countries with endemic corruption, however, the same institutions function in form but not in substance. The book develops a framework to help assign priorities, depending on views of what does and does not work in specific countries. The framework, based on public officials' incentives for opportunistic behaviour, distinguishes between highly corrupt and largely corruption-free societies.

Wallace-Bruce N 2000. Corruption and competitiveness in global business: the dawn of a new era. *Melbourne University law review* 24(2): 349–378

This paper notes that corruption in global business is a big issue and there is a concerted international effort to tackle it. There are initiatives in both the public and private spheres that aim to minimise, if not eliminate, corruption altogether.

Wescott C 2000. *Measuring governance in developing Asia*. Manila: Asian Development Bank. http://www.info.tdri.or.th/reports/unpublished/os_paper/wescott.pdf

This paper considers whether it is possible to measure the quality of overall governance in a country, whether present measures are robust enough to allow the ranking of countries along a continuum from well-governed to poorly-governed and whether those ranking should be used by donor agencies and private investors in reaching their investment decisions.

World Bank 2000. Designing effective anti-corruption strategies, in *Anti-corruption in transition: a contribution to the policy debate*. Washington DC: World Bank. [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Anticorruption5/\\$File/chapter5.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Attachments/Anticorruption5/$File/chapter5.pdf)

This paper uses a constructed heuristic typology devoted largely to transition and post-communist societies to suggest a number of potential anti-corruption strategies that are tailored to particular socio-political conditions. The typology is based on levels of state capture and administrative corruption as well as other determinants associated with the institutional capacity of the state.

