


ARMED ROBBERY IN AUSTRALIA

Research, Information and
Preventive Considerations



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Preventive Considerations

Edited Proceedings of a Seminar
held in Canberra in June 1977

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FOREWORD

A perusal of the newspapers on any day in Sydney or Melbourne would clearly suggest that, with the possible exception of drug trafficking, armed robbery is the crime causing major public concern in Australia today. This offense lends itself to sensational newspaper reporting and therefore the real concerns of law abiding citizens may not necessarily be accurately reflected by the mass media. Nevertheless, by any objective standard, the incidence of armed robbery in Australia has shown spectacular increase in the past four or five years.

Compared with other crimes such as breaking and entering and larceny in all its forms, the numerical incidence of armed robbery is comparatively trivial; and compared with white collar and corporate crime, armed robbery is not particularly financially ruinous to the nation. Yet armed robbery is widely perceived as totally abhorrent in a civilised community. It is understandable that it should be so, as the personal threat of death or injury motivated by monetary gain is doubly offensive. Robbery is an interpersonal crime as well as being a crime against property and these two elements compound with each other to exacerbate its perceived seriousness.

A further aspect of armed robbery which is troubling is the fact that no simple measures can be taken to eradicate it. Many suggestions can and have been made, such as imposing longer prison sentences on detected offenses, increasing police patrols and installing bullet proof glass in banks and other agencies that handle large amounts of cash. Suggestions such as these deserve consideration, but no one would seriously argue that they would be completely effective. The problem is so complex that simple solutions are not likely to provide total answers.

Bearing in mind the complexity of the problem, the Australian Institute of Criminology organised a seminar on armed robbery in June 1977 and invited experts from police forces, the private security industry, insurance, architecture and academic research to exchange ideas. This publication is an edited version of the proceedings of that seminar. Formal contributions to the seminar and discussion in small groups, all concentrated on the development of practical, as opposed to theoretical, steps that could be taken to reduce the armed robbery problem in Australia. Participants in the seminar agreed upon a number of resolutions or recommendations for action and these are summarised in this volume.

This publication is especially commended to people professionally committed to the reduction to the incidence of armed robbery in this country. It should also be of value to other people with a genuine concern for crime prevention, as, in the final analysis, it is ordinary

people rather than professionals who determine the social climate which accepts or rejects crime in any community.

David Biles

Canberra
February 1978

CONTENTS

Foreword	i
Tables	v
Contributors	vi
Introduction	vii
Summary of recommendations	1

ARMED ROBBERY IN AUSTRALIA

Armed Robbery In Australia - Its Nature And Extent	<i>Paul Delianis</i>	5
Armed Robbery In New South Wales And Victoria, 1975 and 1976	<i>AJ Sutton</i>	17

RESEARCH

Research Priorities In Operational Planning Against Armed Holdups	<i>KL Milte & SI Miller</i>	25
Comment	<i>RA McAulay</i>	37
General Comments On Policy Related Research	<i>AJ Sutton</i>	41
Robbery Security In Particular Target Locations	<i>Roseanne Bonney</i>	45
Robbery, Police, And Research	<i>Bruce Swanton</i>	55
Human Based Research Relative To The Investigation And Prevention Of Armed Robbery - Resolution		69

INFORMATION

The Need For A National Armed Robbery Data Service	<i>Paul Delianis</i>	75
Comment	<i>Ian Rippon</i>	85
Problems Of Data Collection	<i>Roseanne Bonney</i>	89
The Establishment Of An Armed Robbery Information Service - Resolution		93

PREVENTION

The Role Of Private Agencies In The Protective Security Function As It Relates To Armed Robbery	<i>JF Ashby</i>	99
Comment	<i>Arthur Brown</i>	105
Antirobbery Building Design	<i>RM Ure</i>	109
Employee Related Considerations Concerning Antirobbery Building Design	<i>Keith Salter</i>	115
Antirobbery Hardware - Applications And Research	<i>RR Powell</i>	121
Security Philosophies And Action By The South Australian Totalizator Agency Board	<i>PC Page</i>	129
Technological Hardware And Building Design As Defenses Against Armed Robbery - Resolution		135

ARMED ROBBERY IN THE USA

Federal Bank Robbery Violations In The United States Of America	<i>CM Kelley</i>	141
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BIBLIOGRAPHY		159
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TABLES

	Page
1. Armed Robberies, Victoria, 1965-1977	5
2. Bank Robberies, Victoria, 1967-1976	8
3. Armed Robbery Solution Rates, By Type Of Premises, Victoria, 1970-1976	12
4. Cash Losses Due To Armed Robbery, Victoria, 1973-1976	13
5. US Bank Violations: Number Of Offenses, 1972-1976	142

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INTRODUCTION

There are many possible approaches to the reduction of armed robbery in Australia. Whilst police constitute the most important single control agency, there are many other agencies and occupations, *eg*, corrections, courts, probation and parole services, engineers, architects, with important contributions to make.

As one contribution to the control of armed robbery in Australia, the Australian Institute of Criminology conducted a five day seminar attended by interested and relevant persons to consider three carefully defined facets of the problem, *ie*, human based research relative to investigation and prevention, armed robbery data dissemination and, hardware and building design.

This publication contains edited copies of papers contributed to that seminar and comments made upon some of them. The resolutions passed by participants in respect of each of the facets addressed are included also, as a matter of public record.

The experience gained by participants in exchanging ideas and information with representatives of occupational groups as diverse as police and insurers, architects and private protectors, researchers and bankers, and employee associations and academics, was of considerable personal value. Such exchanges create potential for the development of broader based anticrime strategies than have heretofore been the case.

Participants composed a list of concrete recommendations, some general, some specific, relating to the overall aim of armed robbery control. These are summarised in the immediately following pages.

Research oriented recommendations may be basically viewed as a "positions vacant" list for researchers in search of a project.

The information oriented recommendations are in effect prescriptions for action and have been forwarded to appropriate authorities and agencies for information and consideration.

The prevention oriented recommendations are, in the main, general statements of prevention doctrine directed at relevant planners, bureaucrats, engineers, and architects.

The final contribution to this volume, an overview of bank robbery in the United States was contributed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, provides an excellent point of comparison for research already conducted in Australia.

The papers constituting the corpus of this volume are, by and large, informative and interesting. They are designed both to improve understanding of the substance of a particularly obnoxious form of criminal behavior and to encourage counter measures. A restricted range of perspectives only is addressed. To have done otherwise would have been to paint with too broad a brush. It is hoped that further seminars will be held in due course to encourage exploration of other facets of armed robbery in Australia.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

RESEARCH ORIENTED

- * that reliable statistics concerning armed robbery be collected as a basis for further research
- * that a profile of Australian robbers be developed
- * that police patrol deployment strategies be researched
- * that robbery specific patrol and investigation strategies be researched
- * that victimological aspects of robbery, including health and welfare impacts, be researched
- * that protective security measures be researched and evaluated
- * that sentencing policies be researched and, recommendations made to the courts in relation thereto
- * that data be provided for the operation of bail and probation systems
- * that the prosecutorial process be researched, including aspects of criminal procedure
- * that the concept of deterrence be researched as a contribution to the development of a consistent sentencing philosophy
- * that the feasibility of trial *in absentia* be researched

INFORMATION ORIENTED


- * that the Australian Police Commissioners consider the establishment of an armed robbery information service as a matter of urgency

- * that the feasibility of an armed robbery information service be researched by a multidisciplinary working party contributed to by each police force
- * that a national protective security library be established, the holdings of which to be constantly updated; provision to be made for dissemination of materials and information as required
- * that consideration be given to the desirability of holding a seminar for media executives, with a view to encouraging informed and responsible crime reporting

PREVENTION ORIENTED

- * that greater use be made of current security systems in poorly protected and unprotected high risk areas, especially in relation to small businesses and existing premises
- * that greater use be made of competent professionals in basic security planning, particularly in matters of design, method, and equipment, relating to the planning of new and renovated premises
- * that weaknesses in current antirobbery building design techniques be empirically identified, that improved systems be designed, that pilot models be tested, and that evaluation and adjustment be effected as necessary
- * that individuals and organisations be educated in robbery prevention methods generally, including the use of alternative methods of cash carrying, the use of professional services, and the use of electronic devices

ARMED ROBBERY IN AUSTRALIA



ARMED ROBBERY IN AUSTRALIA - ITS NATURE AND EXTENT

PAUL DELIANIS

The one major crime that has escalated more than any other in Australia in recent decades is armed robbery. It has reached serious proportions. To use Victoria as an example, armed robbery has increased more than 1,000 *per cent* since 1962. By any measure, such a steep rise constitutes a significant social problem, a cause for some alarm. The incidence of major armed robberies investigated by special squads in Victoria between 1965 and 1977 is shown at Table 1.

Table 1

ARMED ROBBERIES, VICTORIA, 1965-1977

Year	#	Year	#
1965	17	1972	201
1966	47	1973	214
1967	87	1974	248
1968	83	1975	223
1969	73	1976	248
1970	144	1977	127*
1971	179		

* To 26 Apr 77

When one considers the extent to which armed robbery affects the community, it is unquestionably alarming. No one is immune. We see bank officers gunned down; bank customers taken hostage and terrorised. We see chemists slashed by drug crazed individuals, both male and female. We see taxi drivers robbed and then left to die. We see shopkeepers gunned down as they deliver their takings to the bank. We see families terrorised in their homes at three o'clock in the morning by masked and armed intruders. These are just some of the people in

the community who suffer from the depredations of armed robbers.

The essential tragedy of the robbery problem rests not in the stolen money (over \$4 million between 1973 and 1976) but, in the human misery caused. The number of people shot or shot at; the number of people knifed, clubbed, or otherwise assaulted; the number of people who have been terrorised to the extent of suffering psychic trauma and who will suffer therefrom for the rest of their lives.

Robbery is an "impact" crime if I may term it such. It works as does an explosion. It occurs without notice, suddenly and leaving in its wake death, physical and psychological damage, and suffering. It is a form of terrorism no different to the forms we see occurring on television in other countries. Whilst not an official spokesperson, I can safely say that all Australian police forces are deeply concerned with the problem of armed robbery. I know, too, that law enforcement bodies in many other parts of the world are equally concerned.

But, concern doesn't end with police forces, it is experienced by many other responsible organisations, bodies, and individuals. In 1975, a representative group from this country travelled overseas to look at the problem of armed robbery committed on bank premises. I was fortunate enough to be a member of that group. On returning to Australia, much wiser for the experience, I found myself deeply concerned with the situation obtaining in some of the countries visited. The problem of armed robbery, you see, is by no means peculiar to Australia.

When you see a country like America having 4,252 bank robberies in a 12 month period, and a city like Montreal, only as big as Sydney or Melbourne experiencing over 400 bank robberies in 12 months, then there is a real need for concern. When I returned I prepared a report for my Department. I would like to quote briefly from that report, and suggest that my words could perhaps provide the theme for this seminar. 'I think the knowledge to be gained from all this is that we should take steps now to prevent this situation from coming into existence in Australia.'

Armed robbery is a worldwide problem and responsible people in many nations have previously gathered together in similar fashion to concern themselves with the problem. These people are also aware, as are we, that the crime of armed robbery cannot be eradicated in the type of society in which we live unless it be at gigantic expense. If we look at the problem in this light then we can concentrate our efforts, not at eradication but the next best thing - effective control. To bring about effective control there is a need for cooperation and mutual understanding from many bodies, groups of bodies, individuals and groups of individuals throughout both public and private sectors.

Some form of robbery under arms has been in existence for hundreds of years, but in parts of Australia it commenced to be a major problem from about the mid-sixties, particularly in Sydney and in

Melbourne. Now, all major Australian cities are experiencing an increased rate of armed robbery.

In the late 1960s the Armed Hold-up Squad was formed in New South Wales followed by the Armed Robbery Squad in Victoria. Today both these Squads are taxed to the limit and the prospect for the future is not bright.

Recently some fairly extensive research was conducted by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics for the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. I was a member of the consultative body and was pleased to have been associated with an efficient research team. For the years of 1975 and 1976 we looked at 1,204 armed robberies in New South Wales and in Victoria. Whilst we did not look at every robbery, I think what emerged fairly clearly was that in New South Wales you were more likely to be attacked and robbed as you were walking down the street or driving a taxi cab, whilst in Victoria there seemed to be more commercial robberies, for example of banks or payrolls. Possibly life style and weather conditions contribute to the proportion of outdoor robberies in New South Wales, but it is not clear why commercial robberies were more prevalent in Victoria.

Interference with the financial institutions of any country is a cause for alarm. Whenever an armed robbery occurs at a branch bank additional publicity is assured. This, in turn, engenders additional alarm. Bank robberies not only involve bank employees but, quite often, customers, too. Fairly frequently they have been held hostage for purposes of protection or intimidation.

One particular individual who terrorised Melbourne banks for almost two years, used female hostages for both protection and intimidation each occasion he robbed a bank. The emotional impact of the experience on those women was still very apparent many months later.

When robberies of financial institutions become too prevalent, people become apprehensive in the way they conduct their day to day business. An indication of the rate of bank robberies in Victoria during the last decade is given at Table 2.

If the present rate of armed robberies in Victorian banks continues in the current year, we shall see in excess of 40 such offenses. I hope we don't reach the state of affairs existing in the United States of America where armed robbery, and the fatalities associated with it, are accepted as one of the hazards of modern society.

To give you an example of the extent of the problem in that country, the First National City Bank of New York which has about 250 branches, suffered almost 100 armed robberies in fiscal year 1974/1975 and was expecting over 100 such offenses the following year. One branch was robbed five times in a twelve month period. Staff retention at that branch became, understandably, a serious personnel administration problem for management.

You may be thinking that the United States is a much bigger

Table 2

Bank Robberies, Victoria, 1967-1976

Calendar Year	1 ANZ & ES & A	2 CBA	3 CBC	4 ComBA	5 NBA	6 BNSW	7 SSB	8 Total robberies	9 Total amount stolen \$'000	Mean amount stolen \$
1967	3	0	1	1	2	1	2	10	26	2,609
1968	5	0	1	2	1	2	1	12	64	5,340
1969	1	1	0	0	1	2	4	9	55	6,051
1970	6	2	0	3	1	0	8	20	85	4,265
1971	6	1	1	9	2	0	5	24	261	10,883
1972	7	2	1	5	6	2	11	34	167	4,910
1973	3	1	4	1	2	1	7	19	76	4,007
1974	11	4	0	0	5	6	3	29	210	7,257
1975	15	2	1	0	3	0	5	26	353	13,561
1976	5	3	2	7	6	2	6	31	344	11,099
Totals	62	16	11	28	29	16	52	214	1,641	7,670

1. Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd and ESANDA Ltd, incl ES & A
2. Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd
3. Commercial Banking Co of Sydney
4. Commonwealth Bank of Australia
5. National Bank of Australasia Ltd
6. Bank of New South Wales
7. State Savings Bank of Victoria
8. Percentage increase of robberies during second five year period = 85.3%
9. Percentage increase of cash stolen during same period = 134.1%

country than our own, hence their greater robbery incidence. Well, from my research into the matter I find that on a population basis the United States has a rate three times greater than ours and Canada has a rate more than five times greater.

Since I have been associated with the investigation of armed robbery I have seen different trends in the crime. For example, in 1962 it was unheard of for a pharmacist to be held up and robbed of his drugs. Today, armed robberies at pharmacies are very common and a major problem. It was unknown for a service station to be held up at three o'clock in the morning because such places were never open at that time.

In my view, the most disturbing trend to have emerged, and is continuing to emerge, in the 1970s is drugs in connection with armed robbery.

The relationship of drugs to robbery has three distinct facets:

- a. the use of drugs for the purpose of building courage to commit the offense (offenders under the influence of drugs are potentially very dangerous),
- b. the commission of armed robbery for the purpose of directly obtaining drugs, and
- c. the commission of armed robbery for the purpose of obtaining money to purchase drugs, usually expensive hard drugs such as heroin.

To quote an example: in 1976 a team of "desperates", if I can use that expression to describe criminals who are "hooked" on drugs, held up a particular bank in Collingwood, Victoria, on two occasions and stole well over \$100,000. To make it worse, one of the team was an escapee from prison where he had been serving a term for other armed robberies. Now, when we finally rounded them up, we also confronted a new sort of problem - that of trying to interview suspects concerning serious crime when these suspects are affected by hard drugs. One of those men told us that he was a heroin addict and that he had been injecting himself every two hours at a cost of about \$60 a time. When that sort of situation exists, there are two causes for grave concern:

- a. there are now drug affected people having possession of firearms and other lethal weapons during robberies, and
- b. there is an added need among addicted robbers for large sums of money with which to purchase expensive drugs.

When you talk to law enforcement experts on the drug problem, it becomes abundantly clear that the problem is only beginning and that

the latter part of the twentieth century will see a further escalation in use of hard drugs. If these predictions come true, then there will be a growing need for large sums of stolen money in addition to that required for the traditional needs of criminals.

Another factor that has emerged in the 1970s is the increasing professionalism of armed robbers. Techniques are now being employed by the criminal element that are procuring for them very large sums of money with little risk of apprehension or detection. Many of these techniques have come into this country from overseas, *eg*, the "commando" style attacks on Sydney and Melbourne banks when staff have been processing large sums of cash after business hours. The *modus operandi* followed is similar to that used by a group of criminals in the United Kingdom known as the "Wembley Gang".

"Get away" tactics, after professional robberies have become more sophisticated with the multiple use of vehicles and the use of multiple vehicles.

The number of armed robberies committed by professionals is increasing as is the degree of professionalism exhibited.

During the past twelve months or so, there has been an acceleration in the trend toward bank robbers bounding over the counter to gather large sums of money from strongrooms and safes. They no longer seem to be content with what is available in tellers' compartments.

Undoubtedly, new trends will develop as society changes. But, for our purposes, we must look at change in terms of problems created in areas such as armed robbery. Quite often as we cure one problem, we create another.

As armed robbery evolved, so did measures to combat it. Without a doubt the banking organizations have been leaders in the implementation of security measures, although in Victoria (I can't speak for the other States) the Totalizator Agency Board has been very progressive and responsible in its security attitude.

At the average metropolitan bank branch or TAB agency, several hundred dollars have been spent on security equipment directly related to armed robbery. Some of it is good, some of it is not so good.

It is estimated that in banks and TAB agencies throughout Australia, 4,300 cameras and 5,500 alarm systems have been installed for an approximate total cost of \$10 million. After touring several overseas countries I am satisfied that Australia is one of the leading countries in holdup security in financial institutions.

The holdup camera has proved to be the greatest investigative aid provided by private organizations. Whilst it has a deterrent effect, its main functions are to:

- a. identify offenders directly or indirectly,

- b. produce evidence for use in court,
- c. show the role played by individual offenders,
and
- d. eliminate persons not involved, but suspected
of so being.

Some of Australia's most active criminals have "bitten the dust" so to speak, from the evidence provided by these cameras.

I remember in Victoria the first movie film of an actual robbery was taken in a bank at Moonee Ponds in the year 1970. Pictures of the two offenders were shown in the newspapers and plastered on the walls of police stations and it wasn't until a number of years later that one of the offenders identified himself from a poster in a Perth police station, whilst being questioned about other matters. The second culprit had returned to Yugoslavia and, with assistance from the film, he was dealt with by the authorities in that country and sent to gaol.

Today, in this so-called modern era, law enforcement bodies find it more and more difficult to bring professional criminals to justice for this sort of crime. The value to be gained from security devices will become even more important as the civil rights of citizens increasingly prevail over the rights of law enforcement officers and so favor criminals.

I think it significant that the solution rate for armed robberies at banking premises is generally higher than at other premises. The prime factor is, as I have just suggested, the presence of security measures. The average shop, such as a milk bar, or the payroll office have virtually no security against armed attack. In the area of payroll robberies there is considerable concern among police over the lack of security in premises used for the purpose of handling payrolls or paying staff in cash. With high inflation, some of the payrolls handled are indeed very large. In fact, during the past three years payroll robbery yielded the largest average return to the robber, yet security in such premises, in comparison to banks, is very poor. I have personally campaigned to improve security in payroll offices but with little success to date. A major consideration here, of course, is the fact that these payrolls are insured until distributed to employees.

Table 3 gives some indication of the differences in solution rates between banks, and other classes of premises, *ie*, shops and payroll offices.

The solution rate for armed robbery is fairly high in comparison to the solution rate for certain other major crimes, *eg*, car stealing, safe breaking offenses. This is because armed robbery is a high risk offense where it is necessary for a confrontation to take place between offender and victim. Thereafter, investigating officers have at least the benefit of knowing how many offenders are involved and whether they are male or female, although such details are not always clear.

Table 3

ARMED ROBBERY SOLUTION RATES, BY TYPE
OF PREMISES, VICTORIA, 1970-1976

Year	Banks % solved	Shops % solved	Payroll offices % solved
1970	70	42	16
1971	42	33	38
1972	47	37	0
1973	47	41	9
1974	48	20	13
1975	92	38	47
1976	81	40	23
Mean %	61	36	20

In Victoria, the mean solution rate over the last nine years has been a little over 46 *per cent*. However, in the current year there has been a significant increase in the rate of armed robberies and a decrease in the solution rate.

This may, or may not be, a temporary phenomenon. At the present time we are making optimum use of the resources available to counter this situation.

I think the future will see a need for even greater security measures to be taken by organizations and individuals. For example, pharmacists will have to rid themselves of drugs of addiction or install time locks on their drug safes. Open, friendly counters in some banks will start to give way to tellers enclosed in bullet resistant glass. Taxi drivers will need to insulate themselves from passengers. This is the price the community will have to pay in its endeavor to overcome the armed bandit. I say community, because after all it will be the people at large who will have to bear the brunt of costs involved.

In addition, there will be the "displacement" effect as the curing of security defects in one area will divert robbers to other targets. However, I do not think this should be an excuse why security measures should not be implemented. People are entitled to protect their own property. Whilst law enforcement bodies are entitled to expect that organizations and individuals will take appropriate steps to protect themselves against armed attack, those same organizations and

individuals are entitled to effective law enforcement. If a bank installs a sophisticated alarm system, then it is reasonable for that bank to expect a swift response in the event of a holdup occurring.

In Victoria we have started to use aircraft in the prevention and detection of armed robbery. Whilst aerial support is still in its infancy, the future may see an increase in its use. We now have within our ranks a fully rated helicopter pilot and it may well be that in the not so distant future one of these machines will be airborne for quite a number of hours each day. The important consideration, of course, is cost. Ultimately, the cost may have to be shared between Government and those organisations affected by armed robbery.

When examining costs I think it important to look at how the amount of money stolen in armed robberies has increased in recent years. Table 4 shows this increase.

Table 4
CASH LOSSES DUE TO ARMED ROBBERY,
VICTORIA, 1973-1976

Calendar Year	Amount \$
1973	524,048
1974	801,439
1975	968,733
1976	2,281,617
Total	4,575,837

The firearm is established as the most commonly used weapon in armed robbery. The shotgun and the handgun seem to be the most popular with fairly frequent use being made of the .22 caliber rifle. Use of the machine gun or the high powered rifle is fairly rare. In the professional style robbery, the sawnoff shotgun is commonly used by the offender who commands the robbery whilst his accomplices, armed with handguns, gather and remove the money.

A great deal of thought is put into the type of clothing and disguise worn, particularly by the professionals who usually wear overalls or dust coats, rubber soled shoes and hoods. Often they distort their bodies by the use of padding. The use of nicknames is

fairly common. There is considerable movement between the States of persons engaged in armed robbery and often criminals from different States will team together to commit a major robbery. It has become apparent that in recent years there is a significant number of criminals living comfortably on the proceeds of armed robbery, whereas ten years ago there were none.

The question I am frequently asked, particularly by members of the media, is 'Why has there been an escalation in armed robbery?' Of course, there is no simple answer. The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation, the body responsible for the investigation of bank robbery in that country, did a survey amongst its agents to discover the answer to a similar question. Whilst no particular cause stood out, two received prominent mention:

- a. the influence of the drug problem, and
- b. the decay in law enforcement and in the judicial system.

I think those two causes are equally significant in this country. I would like to list what I consider to be the major reasons why armed robbery is increasing in this country. The order of listing is not necessarily the order of importance:

- a. the reduction in respect for law and order in the community,
- b. the release into the community from prisons of persons previously convicted of armed robbery who are prepared to follow a similar crime pattern,
- c. the breakdown of discipline in the community,
- d. the influence of the drug problem,
- e. the over abundance of firearms in the community,
- f. the escape of prisoners,
- g. the greater emphasis on civil rights,
- h. the lack of police powers to effectively control the criminal element,
- i. sensationalism by the news media in reporting the crime,
- j. the releasing of criminals charged with armed robbery on bail,
- k. the reduction in the effective penalty given for armed robbery,

- l. the non observance of probation or parole in a number of cases,
- m. the over emphasis on rehabilitation as opposed to punishment,
- n. the influence of overseas trends in criminal professionalism,
- o. insufficient coverage by the media of persons charged and convicted of armed robbery,
- p. increases in the quantity and movement of money in the community,
- q. failure to observe simple security guidelines in the handling and transportation of money, and
- r. the lack of visible police presence in commercial areas.

I have not, of course, covered every cause, but I think the basic problems lie in those areas listed.


This paper is not intended as a blueprint for solving all the problems relating to armed robbery in this country. Its primary purpose is to make you aware of the magnitude of the problem not only in this country, but elsewhere. I wish to stimulate thought and discussion.

Armed robbery is one of the most serious crimes in the statute book. In most States it carries a penalty of twenty years imprisonment, and so it ought. I have seen the effect it has had on innocent human beings, not just for a few hours or a few days but for the rest of their lives. I believe there is too little concern for the victim of this sort of crime and too much concern for the robber. If a person places a weapon in his hand and goes out to terrorise members of the community, then, when he is caught, he should expect the sternest punishment.

We all have a role to play. It is out of gatherings such as this that we hope to generate sufficient expertise and influence to stem the tide of a crime that threatens, not only life and limb, but also the long established right of every citizen to go about his business.

Almost twelve months ago a young Constable saw an armed robbery taking place in a suburb of Melbourne. He decided to do something about it and it almost cost him his life. Also, about 11 months ago the manager of a bank in an outer Sydney suburb was gunned down in the course of his business by an armed offender. In the future, there will be others who will meet similar fates.

Let us resolve to do something about it!



ARMED ROBBERY IN NEW SOUTH WALES AND VICTORIA, 1975 AND 1976

AJ SUTTON

The New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research recently completed a study of armed robbery in New South Wales and Victoria over the period 1975-1976. This study began with a suggestion by the Standing Committee of Attorneys General that the Bureau undertake research into robbery.

I think this is the first time that a government research organisation, not within a police department, has undertaken detailed research on data collected by the police departments in two States over a two year period. This venture would not have been possible without the cooperation of the police departments of New South Wales and Victoria.

Information was collected on every armed robbery notified to police in Victoria and NSW in 1975 and 1976. Initially, the study was based on the offenses that came under the notice of the robbery squad in each State but, subsequently we added other cases which had been dealt with by divisional officers, and then handled by the Crime Intelligence Section, but not necessarily passed on to the Armed Robbery Squad for collation.

The source records of the two robbery squads consist of running sheets in which the file number and location, name and address of victim(s), descriptions of weapon, *modus operandi*, vehicle and so on, are entered. From the Victorian *modus operandi* sheet further data are collected by means of a check list. This enables squad members to ensure they collect all relevant information concerning each robbery. This is incorporated into a single sheet, which is then kept by the section.

In New South Wales, it is the responsibility of each police officer to complete Crime Investigation Reports (CIR) and these go directly to the MO Section and part of the information is stored on computer. In this way CIB members can classify and organise any of the material recorded on the CIR. They can, for example, establish within 10 seconds, the number of armed robberies of a particular type in say, the Northern Police District between one month and the next by keying into the machine. The output would flash on a VDU a list of requested information. Generally, this will be the date of the offense, name and address of victim, nature of attack and, location of the attack.

The questionnaires we used could be more precisely described as statistical report forms. They were completed by Bureau staff. In some instances we couldn't get all the required data by this method, so we asked investigating officers for further information. Where the event was distant in time this latter course was not always successful.

That is the source of our data. It is not a sample survey. It is, as far as possible, an actual record of all the cases. The numbers indicate the total picture. Some cases are unfortunately missing from the 1976 Victorian analysis because a final count of cases had not been completed by that Department's statistical section at time of publication.

Firstly, we classified robberies according to the typology of one of the major robbery studies, that performed by McClintlock. By this scheme the biggest single type of robbery is of those "persons who, as part of their employment, are in charge of money or goods". Then came robbery in the open following sudden attack, which includes most of what we call "mugging", then "robberies on private premises", and finally "robberies after a preliminary association between the victim and the offender".

These classifications were devised by McClintlock to be informative. Personally we were not all that happy with them, since we wanted a more detailed breakdown and description.

I think the location of offenses is more informative. This shows that in 1976 in Victoria 21 *per cent* of armed robberies were committed in highways or streets, and in New South Wales, 19 *per cent*. Location patterns varied between the States. For instance, there appear to be more chemist shop robberies in Victoria than in NSW, and more retail store robberies in NSW than in Victoria. That is only in terms of percentages, the absolute numbers are in most cases higher in NSW than in Victoria.

Bank robberies are more of a problem in Victoria than in NSW, both proportionately and in actual numbers but, it is interesting to note that in the minds of the public (perhaps influenced by newspaper headlines), that the whole concept of armed robbery seems to be identified with that of bank robbery, whereas most armed robberies occurred outside premises in the streets. Admittedly, in many cases the victim may be a person going to a bank, or coming from but, the "commando" raids on banks, much loved by the media, are a small proportion of armed robberies. Petrol stations represent a substantial proportion of robbery sites in both States and, taxi robberies are more numerous in New South Wales than in Victoria.

When offenses were classified by time of commission, there was a slight tendency for robberies in Victoria to be committed more often in daylight hours than in New South Wales.

In connection with drugs as a contributing factor to armed robbery we found that the data were too shaky. When asked, police officers could nominate individual instances of situations where drugs were

clearly a factor. But what we were trying to do was to comprehensively cover *all* such cases, and we could not get reliable enough codifiable information. We did ask the question to what degree were drugs associated with the armed robbery offense, but I venture the opinion about this that some police officers have an image of the influence of drugs which implies that the drug was a direct cause of the offense. These images did not appear to conform very easily with the physiological impact of, or pharmacological properties of the drugs in question. Of course, there are many offenses in which people are seeking drugs as the aim of the robbery but, again, we couldn't be sure they necessarily wanted the drugs for their own use. It was equally possible that the drugs were obtained for redistribution on the illicit market.

It has been pointed out to us that there are no reliable statistics available about drug users. Leaving aside armed robberies, or crime related to the use of drugs, there has been a fair amount of investigation in NSW by Select Committees of the State Parliament of this problem. It is therefore surprising that despite all the discussions of drugs, and all the resources of the Health Department utilised to record usage one gets quite extravagant statements made about the extent of usage without any exact quantification. I think we must be approaching the stage where there needs to be a concerted effort made to establish not only robberies related to drugs, but also the level of usage and all crimes related to drugs. Without this we cannot assess how to handle what is probably now, and is going to be, a growing problem.

There were more attacks in NSW on isolated individuals either in the street or in taxis. In both States such offenses are mainly nocturnal. Robberies of chemist shops, and service stations were more likely to occur in Victoria between 9 pm and 6 am than they were in NSW.

The data on the month of the offense are interesting not because of what they said, but for what they didn't say. It is so unenlightening in terms of patterns that one wonders why. The offenses fluctuate from month to month - seeming to run in waves. I am not sure of the explanation of this and why no patterns emerge. It is not random, it seems to go in waves.

There could be many factors influencing fluctuations in armed robbery levels and types of armed robbery. Crime, like clothing, is not indifferent to fashion, as Sutherland and Cressey (1974: 260-261) have rightly noted. For example, information might be circulated within a criminal sub culture, or *via* the media, that a novel *modus operandi* has been successful in certain robberies. Others noticing this might then follow suit and there would be a "wave" of such robberies.

Equally, the arrest of key members of a group or gang, who have been collaborating in the commission of robberies, might result in the temporary decline of the number of robberies committed. The formation and breaking up of gangs has been shown to have an impact on other

crimes. It would be surprising if it was not also a factor in levels of armed robbery.

In time, the increase in armed robbery in Victoria in 1977 might be shown to be a "wave" phenomenon, and inferences which are currently being drawn about the disintegration of law and order and the need for heavier penalties seem to be somewhat premature. It was because little assessment of any use can be based on one year's data that the Bureau insisted that the study be extended to cover 1976 armed robbery as well.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENSE

The ease and speed with which an offender can leave the scene of a crime is a significant factor in its success or failure. In both States for the two years, approximately one third of offenses involved the robber(s) escaping by car. In most cases only one vehicle was used, but in 1975, in Victoria in 17 *per cent* of escapes by vehicles, two were used. This proportion dropped to 6.6 *per cent* in 1976. It should be noted that the means of escape was not stated in 35 *per cent* of cases.

Escapes on foot were just as common, in the two States, as the use of cars. However, it is possible, indeed likely, that the offender entered a car a short distance away from the scene.

In 1976, 322 firearms were used in robberies in NSW, and 236 in Victoria. Handguns figured more frequently in Victorian robberies than in NSW. In fact, 20 *per cent* of firearms used in Victoria in 1976 were revolvers and 30 *per cent* were pistols. The figures for NSW were 9.0 *per cent* revolvers and 31 *per cent* pistols.

In 1976, there were nine handguns stolen from banks in Victoria, and five in NSW. In each State there were two stolen from armored car guards, one in Victoria and three in NSW from other security guards, one in NSW from an illicit drug dealer and, one from a chemist. The totals add to 12 in each State in 1976.

The property stolen was mostly cash, or cash and personal belongings. Together, these categories account for 60-70 *per cent* in each State. Drugs were stolen in 5.6 *per cent* of cases in 1975 in Victoria, and 4.6 *per cent* in 1976. In NSW, the levels were 3.5 *per cent* in 1975 and 0.2 *per cent* in 1976.

No one was injured in 80 *per cent* of the offenses in 1975, in Victoria, and 90 *per cent* of those in 1975 in NSW. However, our data for Victoria in 1976 are inadequate. That is, in 1976 the data collector in Victoria did not have as full an access to robbery files as was had in 1975. We only saw running sheets in a number of cases. So we could only collect limited information. Although the basic information is included, information such as degree of injury is not recorded unless there was some very serious injury. So, while it is likely that all serious injuries were recorded, trivial injuries are probably understated.


Only one offender was involved in about a third of cases. In about the same proportion of cases there were two, and in slightly more cases in Victoria than in NSW there were more than two. In 1976, approximately three quarters of the cases in both States involved single victims. Like offenders, there were slightly more cases in Victoria than in NSW in which two or more victims were robbed at the one time.

The robbers' means of threatening victims was mostly by firearm, but approximately one third of the weapons used were knives or blunt instruments. The clear up rate varies according to the type of robbery offense. The percentages of those not apprehended in 1975 in Victoria was 59 *per cent* and 61 *per cent* in 1976. In NSW, it was 71.5 *per cent* in 1975, and 75 *per cent* in 1976. So, the clear up rate was around 25 *per cent* in NSW last year, and about 39 *per cent* in Victoria. However, one should remember that the two squads are slightly different in size. Also a larger proportion of robberies was undertaken in the streets and night hours in NSW. Such cases are harder to clear up, the offense having occurred and the offender decamped before anybody can get there. This partly accounts for the lower clear up rate in NSW.

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RESEARCH



RESEARCH PRIORITIES IN OPERATIONAL PLANNING AGAINST ARMED HOLDUPS

KL MILTE & SI MILLER

The phenomenon of armed robbery arouses considerable emotionalism in the community. By its very nature it is accompanied by violence or a threat of violence which is invariably acutely distressful to the victim. Armed robbery attracts the attention of the mass media including television writers, film producers, and novelists, for its intrinsic entertainment value, and because it is an exciting form of criminal behavior. In real life, however, and particularly from the point of view of the victim, armed robberies if frequently committed in certain areas or industries, may produce severe anxieties and fear reactions and, contribute to a general state of insecurity. This situation, in turn, tends to create pressures for "panic" solutions.

It is fairly clear from past experiences that assumed holdup "waves", with their accompanying media attention, have produced "crisis" policing, demands for more severe punishments and, added or more elaborate protective measures. These demands are usually difficult for police administrators to resist, especially if the media support demands for action emanating from the various interested pressure groups. Consequently, orderly police operations may be disrupted in an endeavor to achieve quick results only to be redeployed to meet other problems when the immediate crisis has passed. This approach is capable of being extended into protective security measures as well.

The writers, naturally, have no quarrel with any solution proffered provided it can be shown to have a real effect in minimising armed robberies. This paper is an attempt to outline what we believe the criminal justice system can realistically expect to achieve in overcoming armed robberies. Aspects of preliminary research conducted in Melbourne will be discussed and an outline given of the directions we believe future research should take. The focus of this paper is upon the police response to armed holdups.

RESEARCH EXPECTATIONS

Determining what are realistic research expectations is perhaps the most difficult area to discuss. Criminological research throughout

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history has demonstrated that traditional criminology has little to offer the community in relation to explanations for, or the causes of, crime. Theory building has totally failed except insofar as one might state the obvious, although even this is often put in the most naive manner. The community cannot expect to solve what we have come to regard as the "crime problem" in the foreseeable future, if at all. However, the community ought to expect and realise a considered social defense policy which will minimise the opportunities for, and the vulnerability of, persons and property to criminal attack. Our expectations can be to reduce the level of criminal behavior to an admittedly arbitrary point of the "irreducible minimum". Naturally enough, this raises the issue of viewing law enforcement planning in "cost benefit" and "community toleration" terms. Yet, a certain harshness is inescapably produced by this approach, which for us is part of the reality of modern life.

The relevance of this position for planning purposes is clear. The researcher, the police administrator, the architect and the protective security expert are restrained by cost considerations. Criminal justice administrators are also restricted in achieving goals by community ethics written into the laws. The dilemma may be explained by example. Approximately 1,000 Victorians are killed each year on the roads, and notwithstanding this "massacre" we are reluctant to even go so far as to totally prohibit drinking and driving and even the innovation of random breath testing is not applied to its fullest extent. The community regards the social cost in terms of personal interference as not being worth the argued benefits. It is likely that with the application of the enormous resources of modern technology that the number of armed holdups against particular institutions, *eg*, banks and TABs, could be reduced in absolute terms. On the other hand, experience would render it equally likely that a variety of alternative means could be utilised by criminals to circumvent even the most elaborate of security systems and so raise the level of social harm produced in qualitative terms. This escalation would occur, for example, if armed robbers resorted to the use of hostages. At best, one could expect a displacement to other premises not so well guarded.

The difficulties inherent in combatting armed robbery are further exacerbated by the complicated structure of cities and, as they increase in size so, too, will the problems of law enforcement increase. It is trite to observe that compact urban living is closely associated with violent crime because the physical complexity of the city makes crime prevention difficult because an offender can easily disappear within minutes of committing his offense. For police, this factor involving rapid responses can exert great demands on patrol resources.

Research expectations are further complicated by the demands created by "crime waves" because, not only do they produce "fire brigade" (or media response) policing but, they produce considerable pressure for narrowly targetal rather than broad all embracing research strategies. Historically, scientific research has amply demonstrated that the latter has produced more significant results in defined problem areas that targeted research.

The major effort of the writers to date has been collecting background data on the pattern of crime in Melbourne generally, and the phenomenon of armed robbery in particular; and, to ascertain and compare what progress has been made overseas in crime prevention. One thing we are certain of, is that we are examining a very difficult and complex area of criminality and, one that is not susceptible to simple cure all solutions. It is an extremely difficult task to even set out research priorities with any rigorous and logical clarity. At this point it is proposed to digress and set out some developments which have occurred overseas.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENTS

Probably, the most significant police research project yet undertaken is the Kansas City Preventive Patrol experiment. (Kelling *et al*, 1974a, 1974b). The experiment is challenging to police administrators because it calls into question one of the basic assumptions of policing, namely, that a visible police presence is the best crime deterrent. This belief, first articulated by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 (see Critchley, 1967: 52ff) has formed the primary basis of modern policing. The principle is asserted in the preface to the General Orders of most Australian police forces. However, there has been one significant historical difference of emphasis - the advent of the motor car and the virtual elimination of foot policing within police practice in this country.

In 1972, the Kansas City Police Department in conjunction with the American Police Foundation began a research project to evaluate the effectiveness of routine motorised preventive patrol.

The experiment involved variations in the level of routine preventive patrol within 15 Kansas City patrol beats. These beats were randomly divided into three groups. In five "reactive" beats, routine preventive patrol was eliminated and officers were instructed to respond only to calls for service. In five "control" beats, routine preventive patrol was maintained at its usual level of one car *per* beat. In the remaining five "proactive" beats, routine preventive patrol was intensified by two to three times its usual level through the assignment of additional patrol cars and, through the frequent presence of cars from the "reactive" beats.

For the purpose of measurement, a number of hypotheses were developed:

- a. crime, as reflected by victimisation surveys and reported crime data, would not vary by type of patrol,
- b. citizen perception of police service would not vary by type of patrol,
- c. citizen fear and behavior as a result of fear would not vary by type of patrol,

- d. police response time and citizen satisfaction with response time would vary by experimental area, and
- e. traffic accidents would increase in the reactive beats.

The experiment found that the three experimental patrol conditions appeared not to effect crime, service delivery and citizen feelings of security in ways the public and the police often assume they do. The summary report instances examples of the research findings:

- a. as revealed in the victimisation surveys, the experimental conditions had no significant effect on residence and non residence burglaries, auto thefts, larcenies involving auto accessories, robberies or vandalism - crimes traditionally considered to be deterrable through preventive patrol,
- b. citizen fear of crime overall was not effected by experimental conditions,
- c. experimental conditions had no significant effect on either police response time or citizen satisfaction with response time,
- d. no significant differences were apparent in relation to traffic accidents, and
- e. about 60 *per cent* of a police officer's time is typically non committed (available for calls) - of this time, police spent approximately as much time on non police related activities as they did on police related mobile patrol.

While the authors of this report counsel caution against extrapolating too widely from the results, and the report has been questioned (Davis & Knowles, 1975; Larson, 1975) and defended (Kelling & Pate, 1975; Pate *et al*, 1975), it is reasonable to argue that much of the efforts of officers routinely assigned to mobile preventive patrol might well be rechannelled into other activities. Examples could include foot patrol and neighborhood team policing (see Kelling & Fogel, nd). Advanced technology in the United States has meant that highly sophisticated measures have been introduced to gain maximum productivity by decreasing police response time to calls for service. The basic assumption is that decreased response time will mean a greater probability of apprehending the criminal and ultimately a greater probability that potential criminals will be deterred from committing crime. The ultimate in sophistication was probably introduced in St Louis, Missouri, with the use of computer directed patrol strategies using hypercube models (Heller *et al*, 1976) and indexes of crime seriousness (Heller, 1976) as a basis for patrol deployment.

Other research projects in the United States have seriously questioned the concept of reaction time as a primary patrol consideration. One such evaluation was an offshoot of the Kansas City

Patrol Experiment, where it was found that response time was not a significant predictor of the following variables (Pate *et al*, 1976a: xiii-xv):

- a. outcome of encounter,
- b. public satisfaction with response time,
- c. public satisfaction with responding police officers, and
- d. public attitudes toward police in general.

Indeed, the researchers pose that overly high citizen expectations with response time may in fact be counter productive insofar as police assurances of rapid response may result in citizen dissatisfaction. It is suggested that dispatchers be trained to differentiate calls requiring immediate responses from those where longer responses would be tolerable, and citizens advised accordingly. Another study of response time has been commenced by the Kansas City Police Department and as a result of preliminary results a research report (Schell *et al*, 1976: 19) prepared on behalf of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice states:

'While it is unwise to speculate prematurely about the results of research, preliminary and very tentative findings in the Kansas City Study suggest that departments would do well to hold in abeyance judgments of effectiveness which are based on response time as a principal measure.'

A Rand Corporation study tends to agree with the above conclusion and, points out that very little is known of the deterrent effect of police activities and breakthrough will only come from long term research efforts. (Chaiken, 1976: 22). It is noted that three minutes has come to be regarded as the optimal response time which is in accordance with local experience where it is believed that most armed holdups are committed and the offenders depart within a three minute time span. On this basis, Chaiken argues that reduction in response time from, say, five to two minutes, which would be very expensive, would have a noticeable effect but only for a short time.

Therefore, the traditional thrust of modern policing - preventive patrol - has been seriously questioned in its effectiveness as a device to achieve its administratively assumed objectives. Although only recently coming to hand, criminal investigation activities as conducted on an *ex post facto* basis, have been questioned as having a substantial effect on detection rates.

Another Kansas City study (Pate *et al*, 1976b) demonstrated that the use of a criminal information center to disseminate intelligence and information shows that a location oriented approach was superior to an offender oriented strategy. It is too early to predict whether detectives and patrol officers, supported by an efficient collator system, will produce a higher apprehension rate. Both of the writers would indeed be surprised if this was found not to be the case.

MELBOURNE EXPERIMENT

With these research experiences in mind, we have considered their implications for developing crime prevention strategies against armed holdups in Victoria. If the results are shown to be reliable, then one must seriously question the profitability of allocating huge financial and manpower resources to mobile preventive patrol in preference to other strategies. It was initially thought that the Kansas City experiment should be replicated in Melbourne to test both its applicability and accuracy. However, in the light of the high costs involved, it was decided that the American results should be tentatively accepted for our basic research purposes and, that it would be more productive to consider other avenues which might build on the American results. A close working relationship has been developed with the American Police Foundation. Dr George Kelling, project director of the Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment, has visited Australia on two occasions to advise on research methodology. Similar liaison contacts have been effected with researchers in Europe and the United Kingdom. Cost considerations have compelled us to take very careful notice of overseas developments in police research and to capitalise upon their relevance to Australia, where they are thought to be applicable on a cross cultural basis.

It soon became apparent that little value would be gained by looking at armed robberies in total isolation from other assumed patrol preventable crimes. This research attitude is due to the relative infrequency of armed robberies in absolute terms to other crimes and the possible complications produced by the "crime wave" phenomenon. From a preliminary study, it was decided that the number and distribution of armed holdups was such that no reliable and valid measure of the effectiveness of any experimental programs could be obtained due to their relative infrequency in areas small enough to be the subject of careful experimental manipulation.

To reinforce this approach, we believe routine preventive patrol is the "front line" of police service and that it embraces all manner of police duties (whether crime related or not). It was administratively and ethically unrealistic to ask the police department generally to direct all its attention to robbery prevention in isolation to other crimes, so it was decided to take into experimental consideration assumed patrol preventable offenses including:

- a. robbery,
- b. assaults and violence,
- c. sexual offenses,
- d. thefts from motor cars,
- e. arson, and
- f. loitering and malicious damage.

This extension does not detract from the primary concern of armed robbery prevention because, manipulation of police patrol resources would be expected to effect the occurrence rate of all of these offenses uniformly.

A further confounding factor taken into consideration was the notion that in any event police do not have a great impact upon the amount of crime in the community and the crime rate continues to rise steadily in spite of best police endeavors. If this assumption was found ultimately to be true, then all that could be reasonably expected of the police is to produce a greater sense of security on the part of the community. That is, police service is beneficial if the community feels secure. None of these assumptions have received meaningful research attention and notwithstanding their novelty we deem it advisable to keep a completely open mind.

The Melbourne patrol experiment was initially discussed with the Chief Commissioner of Police who was receptive to the idea and, arrangements were made for funding. Assistance was received from the Australian Bankers' Association, certain individual banks, the Totalizator Agency Board of Victoria, and private security firms.

The view now being developed by the American Police Foundation is that the best hope for the future is to return to a method of policing which achieves optimum police-public interaction and mutual support. This means foot patrol (Kelling & Fogel, nd). It would be naive to suggest that all areas of a city could usefully be patrolled on foot, or that motor cars or even helicopters, could not be used to advantage in many instances. But, American experience strongly supports the view that the heart of police service is a combination of information, community assistance, and support. Other projects have demonstrated the deterrent value of specific purpose strategic operations superimposed upon the general patrol program. Accordingly, the writers have decided that a multi pronged approach be utilised to examine various matters impinging upon the effectiveness of police crime prevention strategies in order to present guidelines to the most efficacious use of police resources, which obviously will always be limited.

To return to specific aspects of the Melbourne project, it may be useful to point out the reasoning behind the selection of "experimental" and "control" areas. Melbourne districts have been assigned index figures according to the absolute number of offenses standardised according to population and area. From these indices, compatible experimental and control areas have been delineated and such matters as number of banks, TABs, and garages, have been taken into consideration (as well as the type and density of housing). An effort will then be made to equate the socioeconomic status of the community comprising the geographical areas. In this way it is hoped the experimental areas will provide reliable data. To determine whether there has been a genuine repression or a mere displacement of criminal behavior, crime rates in surrounding districts will also be closely monitored.

The field experiment will involve testing a variety of patrol strategies in the defined field experimental areas and measure their

effect upon the crime rate, apprehensions, and citizen and businessmen's sense of security. It was hoped to conduct the field experiment in December 1976 but, a number of unpredictable events rendered this impossible. These included the need to redesign the preliminary measuring devices as a result of Planning Committee advice and certain high level administrative changes at Police Headquarters. It is now expected that the field experiment will be held towards the end of September 1977.

In practical terms, our overall approach has meant engaging in specific projects which are thought to be directly related to police efficiency. Some of these are extremely comprehensive and involve much painstaking data analysis. The projects are summarised below.

Offense analysis. Having regard to the objects of the experiment, the pattern of armed holdups in Victoria has been examined for the period 1967-77 (to date) largely as an historical exercise. This now represents about 1,700 reported cases. The study confirmed a number of preliminary thoughts, particularly that a significant proportion of armed robbers are the more experienced criminal who utilises a measure of planning and thought in committing the offense. It is the inner suburban areas which are most vulnerable to armed attack and offenses tend to occur in two peaks, one in December and the other in June-August. A recent factor observed is the increase in the number of offenses related to the procurement of drugs. A survey of the last 203 cases shows this to be in the region of 15 *per cent* of the total. This material will soon be published in some detail.

Offender analysis. Closely related to the offense analysis is the study of offenders. This has commenced and will involve an examination of prison files relating to the admission of armed robbers and will include the administration of a questionnaire to a sample of offenders to be compared with a control group of citizens to determine the level of the offender's awareness that he might be apprehended as a deterrent factor in criminal justice planning (see Conklin, 1972: 59). This is a new and difficult area of research and is being conducted with the Universitaat des Saarlandes, Germany.

Occupational role questionnaire. A questionnaire has been administered to all police in Victoria and South Australia. The questionnaire is extensive and will yield a tremendous amount of data relating to the performance of police duty under a variety of conditions across all police tasks. For comparison purposes, it was decided to administer them in another State so that the effect of differing administrative styles might be considered. Australian results will be compared with those of a similar experiment being conducted conjointly in the United States in collaboration with the International Conference of Police Associations.

Police administrative systems. A detailed study has been made of:

- a. police communications and patrol allocation,
- b. police strength and manpower deployment,

- c. collator system,
- d. departmental information, reporting and statistical recording systems, and
- e. demographic aspects of the experimental districts.

We have now reached the point where an enormous quantity of raw data have been collected, and will be accumulated before, during, and after the field experiment. It is a period of consolidation and analysis.

Determinants of reaction time. A project task force comprising University researchers and police officers, in collaboration with the Police Department's Inspectorate and Future Plans unit, has been established to examine the determinants and effects of police response time. The group is well advanced in its efforts to examine a number of important issues relating to the rapidity of police responses to calls for assistance and their outcomes in relation to time factors (and their determinants) and, their association with police and community expectations.

Manpower planning. A group has been established to determine the current manpower situation in relation to police patrol and investigative activities. This project is designed to establish the manpower requirements needed to develop and maintain the planned field experiment.

Helicopter patrols. A planning committee was recently established to evaluate the potential effectiveness of helicopter patrols. A limited trial series will commence in June 1977, to examine the logistic and communication difficulties involved in the strategic use of helicopters as an aid to criminal apprehension.

Intelligence and collator systems. Considerable research attention is being given to support the development of strategic and tactical intelligence facilities in the Victoria Police because, it is in this area, supported by a Statewide crime collator network, that most benefit will be obtained. It will also provide continuous assistance to patrol and investigative units.

CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing has involved a discussion of the priorities regarded by the writers as essential to the police response to assumed patrol preventable crimes. This specialist approach for present purposes does not gainsay our argument in support of a comprehensive approach on the part of the entire criminal justice system to armed robbery. We believe that police response must be supported by the establishment of two principles. First, restrictions on the right to bail of persons charged with armed robbery coupled with a right to speedy trial to offset the undesirable aspects of such restrictions. Second, an acceptance on the part of the legislature that armed robbery is one of the non negotiable crimes and that convicted offenders should expect a

lengthy period of incarceration purely on preventive grounds.

Nor do we gainsay the need for adequate security precautions on the part of vulnerable agencies provided that novel and hitherto extreme measures are only taken after careful evaluation, lest they produce more harm than the problem demands. Finally, we urge caution upon those who may feel constrained to make public their views on armed holdups due to the possibility of precipitating damaging reactions.

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COMMENT

RA MCAULAY

The planning for the Melbourne based research discussed in the principal paper appears to be both comprehensive and imaginative. It should produce useful, indeed vital, information. Unlike some other types of research, it seems to come to grips with a problem in a practical way, at the same time ensuring results are capable of quantification.

My comments are intended to be supportive of and supplementary to the principal paper.

The researchers appear to be influenced by certain findings of the Kansas City preventive patrol experiment. Unfortunately, I am not acquainted with it. Even so, I would have thought that no one would have expected any real reduction of crime in the so called "proactive" beats, at least in the short term.

The popular view now seems to be that crime reduction can only be achieved through routine patrol by means of massive resource inputs. Such inputs are not cost effective. Neither are they within the means of most law enforcement agencies.

Fortunately, there are viable alternatives such as localised saturation (directed toward crime suppression) and selected area treatment (directed toward accident reduction). However, as this is not a primary area of consideration, I will not pursue the point further.

I am surprised it was, apparently, a hypothesis of the Kansas City experiment that 'on scene apprehension for robberies would increase due to improved patrol response time'. As noted in the principal paper, the search for improved response times is very much a victim of the law of diminishing returns. Provided patrol systems are soundly structured, priority despatching, as suggested, is a good way of achieving better response times. It is, in my view, naive to expect improved "on scene" apprehension in the long term for just the reasons advanced in the principal paper. What can be achieved through rapid response is vital information for rapid dissemination to cordon patrols, crime collators and, of course, investigators. These measures, in turn, improve chances of earlier apprehension. Perhaps, the deterrence element arising from improved response times should be considered a bonus.

Reference was made in the principal paper to indices of crime seriousness as a basis for patrol deployment and, presumably, priority despatching. It will be interesting to see which criteria will be used by the Victorians for determining seriousness scales. There has been a tendency for researchers to use economic or legislative factors as measuring sticks. Public abhorrence, on the other hand, is obviously stimulated more by considerations of victim well being. In this particular context, however, the point is quite academic as armed holdups are serious no matter which criteria are applied.

When applied to Australian cities, I reject the Kansas City based assertion that public satisfaction is not effected by poor response times. The Adelaide public at least has demonstrated that it is vitally and vocally concerned. Perhaps, in the USA, it is a matter of a long suffering public being prepared to suffer longer.

For reasons advanced in the principal paper, it was obviously a sound decision to incorporate a number of other "preventable" crimes in the Melbourne experiment. No matter how prevalent robberies are, they are actually rare in terms of time and location. Therefore, the experiment must have wider objectives.

I note that emphasis is placed more on offenses than offenders in the Melbourne experiment. Will collators and intelligence facilities be utilised to develop the "target criminal" project as part of the experiment? We, in South Australia, believe that such a system has much to commend it. No doubt, others will find, as have we, that criminals are totally unreliable. Even when working on the very best information, the police effort can be confounded by this unreliability. The most meticulously planned crimes have been abandoned for reasons such as insobriety, lack of punctuality, or the diverting presence of an amorous girlfriend.

I was somewhat disturbed to see reference in the principal paper to the frequently stated notion 'that in any event police do not have a great impact upon the amount of crime in the community and the crime rate continues to rise steadily in spite of best endeavors'. It is implied in the paper but, unfortunately, seldom pointed out elsewhere, that the situation, however bad, would be worse if it were not for the police effort. Insufficient cognizance is taken of the fact that police, indeed the criminal justice system as a whole, is not responsible to any marked extent for those social conditions which seem to be the primary generators of crime.


The conclusions of the principal paper include reference to actions that may be effective in combatting armed robbery. Some of these measures do not appear to relate to the objective itself but, to the criminal justice system generally. This, of course, highlights the fact that police initiatives alone will never provide a complete remedy.

There seems to be an infuriating tendency by commentators to stress the importance of tremendous public participation in police affairs generally, while at the same time ignoring calls for the same inputs into the remainder of the criminal justice system. I believe

this undue emphasis can have the effect of diverting the attention of those responsible for assigning priorities from more important matters in terms of total approach. I may be wrong but, I consider police-public relations are better developed than those applying elsewhere in the criminal justice system.

These better public relations may be attributed to the fact that police come closer to giving the public what it wants than most other institutions. Organisations that are ultimately responsible to the public, must provide the public with what it wants or, eventually pay the price. If what is wanted is not what is actually needed (and there may be a very great difference between the two) organisations are well advised to concentrate a fair proportion of their efforts in convincing the public that it should want what it needs.

It ought, therefore, to be a priority planning objective for the Victorians to determine, not only the cure for armed robbery but, also, to determine what the public perceives as a cure. I suspect that what the public currently wants is a very large dose of vengeance. The criminal justice system is not satisfying that want.



GENERAL COMMENTS ON POLICY RELATED RESEARCH

AJ SUTTON

Without referring to particular research, I would like to comment on what should be, in effect, a *general* policy for research. That is, I think we should formulate a general plan for research into armed robbery. Elsewhere, mention has been made of a number of problems dealing with research and the antipathy of police practitioners to data collection of this sort. It has also been my experience in other fields that this is the case and reflects no peculiarity of police opinion.

Before taking up my present position as Director of the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, I ran a variety of applied research projects in relation to government agencies, chiefly in the fields of welfare and housing. In one project, we were studying community aid centers to evaluate their efficacy for the Australian Government Enquiry into Poverty. To this end, a researcher went to the centers to interview practitioners. This is what they said:

Our job is to help people. We are volunteers and are not being paid. We come here day by day, the phone is ringing all the time, and you tell us to stop for an hour - not to help this man or this woman - while we answer your questionnaire which has no value at all as far as we are concerned.

I can accept their criticism and think that it is akin to the police attitude to research. Both the practitioners described above and the police are in jobs which involve relationships with the community, which have specific purposes, which engage and deplete them emotionally. Naturally, any researcher who wants them to stop in mid stream to collect data on a research project has got to justify the existence of that research and demonstrate that it will be of use to practitioners.

Any successful organisation, business or government, has a set of aims or objectives which underpin their activities. This is what policy is. In order to implement particular policies you must have a plan which outlines the specific actions which will be taken in order to achieve such objectives.

In conducting research I think we should be geared to providing information that is required to make rational decisions about the sort of plans which will achieve particular objectives. However, even

earlier, I think research can be used at the stage of formulating the objectives. Often, people who are close to a particular problem find it difficult to see unusual possibilities, to see all the alternatives which are available. Sometimes an innovative outside view can produce better results.

Crime research does not fit so easily the cost benefit analyses which might be done in respect of, say, road construction. It is difficult to cost alternatives to crime control which would take into account hidden social costs and, for that matter, benefits. Perhaps, there is no single optimum solution to crime.

The police have got the somewhat broader task of social control which is even more difficult to cost and evaluate. Nevertheless, one can set out the alternatives rationally, and one can look at their feasibility. This information can then be made available to politicians, public servants, private industry, other groups and, private citizens who are part of the decision making process.

You might think that all I have said is fairly obvious, that we all agree with such sentiments. But what does it mean? What methods do we actually use? Well, in practice, social research methods boil down to two. That is, observing what people do and asking questions. It occurs to me that police methods of investigation reduce to two almost like that. In dealing with people, and their behavior there is little else one could do. You could observe them in the physiological sense by tacking electrodes on them, and more extreme psychologists would regard this as the only reliable data. Or, you could observe them in the sense of being a sensitive outside observer recording what was going on in a particular situation. Again, you could be a participant observer and become part of the observed organisation. This, however, risks becoming assimilated into the observed behavior. Whilst research must maintain some distance to preserve objectivity, my feeling is that, at the moment, the distance is infinitely too great.

The levels I described of observation are what social scientists would call degrees of control. Participant observation is much less controlled than physiological observation. However, even asking questions about people's behavior ranges in control from the strictly applied psychological tests to open conversational interviews.

The activities of social scientists could be summarised as: choosing techniques, collating the results, using past experience in the selection of techniques, and then putting them together in an analytical way. Most of the work which the Bureau publishes is quantitative, but we do qualitative research as well. It is quite possible that in time this type of social science operation will become an integral part of the activities of individual departments. However, at the present time this is not generally so.

Maintaining an objective approach to data collection and ensuring objective results presents problems of which many people are unaware. Researchers must guard against bias and ambiguity entering the questionnaire construction or other procedures. In general, this skill

is largely a matter of experience.

How, you might ask, does what I have said apply to the present problem? Do the data we have presented adequately define the true dimensions of the armed robbery problem in New South Wales and Victoria? In part, I don't think they do. If we were starting again, an approach which would better assist policy makers would be one that:

- a. described in more detail each of the potential target areas,
- b. applied what we knew about particular cases in each of the target areas to examine the strategies which the offender used to overcome their security, and
- c. analysed the relative effectiveness of different security measures in preventing successful robberies.

In this respect I do not think our research went far enough. For, although we could establish from Victoria police records what security measures were used in say, banks, we only saw security measures which *had failed*, in that, we only knew of their existence of the target if it *had been robbed*. I think that planning for control needs the type of security effectiveness analysis I have outlined. Unfortunately, at the present time, this type of research is carried out only on a limited and uncoordinated basis. Ideally, a crime analysis unit which brought together the field expertise of the specialist robbery squads with the research unit of the police department *and* the crime prevention unit, could answer this deficiency.

To summarise my position on research, I think that it is to assist policy makers, and I think it should, it must be an ongoing process which provides regular feedback. It should generate the information necessary to formulate realistic objectives. Having done this it should then improve the capacity of a particular plan to meet the aims which have been set.

ROBBERY SECURITY IN PARTICULAR TARGET LOCATIONS

ROSEANNE BONNEY

The locations which I will mention in this paper are streets, taxis and service stations. This may appear to be a narrow range of locations to single out, but they all, in fact, have implications for other offenses. For example, what we say about taxis has application for any other movement of money, or goods in transit operations. The comments on petrol stations would be equally applicable to chemist shops, take away food shops or hamburger shops. Banks have not been included as they are dealt with in other papers.

STREET OFFENSES

Of all categories of robbery there are few which pose such difficult problems for the police as street offenses.

In Victoria, street offenses accounted for 23.5 *per cent* of all armed robberies in 1975 and, 20.9 *per cent* in 1976. In New South Wales, the figures were 18.9 *per cent* and 23.0 *per cent* for the respective years. As with attacks on taxis it is likely that police statistics in both States reflect only the more serious offenses and would exclude snatch/grabs which were not accompanied by assaultive behavior on the part of the robber.

STREET ATTACKS ON PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF MONEY AS PART OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT

If business organisations exercised greater care in the transfer of monies to and from banking facilities this category of offense could be substantially reduced. So lax are some companies that a senior police officer cynically observed:

'I don't know why crims take the risk of robbing banks when they could do better standing outside the bank and grabbing the weekend's takings from some junior girl who has been sent to the bank with it by her boss.'

Police anecdotes of this kind abound and were validated by a member of the research team making observations in several city banks. Unaccompanied young people (and in one case a quite elderly man) were seen not infrequently depositing or withdrawing large amounts of money.

That such people are potential targets for robbers is, however, best confirmed by the fact that in 1975 approximately \$101,000 was stolen from employees in New South Wales whilst transferring their employers' money either to or from a bank. In 1976, although there were fewer offenses, the sum was \$124,629.

It appeared that the transfer of such large sums of money in the hands of unprotected personnel along public streets bordered on contributory negligence. Since successful robberies not only occasion loss to the victim but to the whole community, it is not too extreme to suggest that businesses engaging in irresponsible money transfers of the type mentioned should be subject to State censure.

In May 1975, the National Standing Committee on Bank Security, meeting in Sydney, laid down a number of guidelines for bank security. One part of the recommendations had particular application to money transfer situations. In consequence, sound security procedures were adopted by the banking industry to govern money transfer operations. It would be desirable that other commercial enterprises paid the same attention to their transfer activities. At least, one might hope that they heed the sensible advice offered by the Police Crime Prevention Unit that money be transferred to and from banks at different times of the day, on different days of the week and, by varying routes.

STREET ATTACKS ON PRIVATE CITIZENS FOR PERSONAL BELONGINGS - MUGGINGS

The private citizen cannot be expected to move in a preordained way to avoid being robbed and hence the suggestions in the previous section would have little application here. Additionally, the street mugging has features that make it quite different from the former type of street offense. For example, the amounts stolen in most cases are quite small - ranging from .20¢ to \$240. The average amount stolen is around \$30. In New South Wales, most of the offenses occurred in the outer western suburbs or, in the more depressed areas of Sydney's inner areas. It is therefore quite likely that the robber had no real expectation of large rewards from his attack. Only two reported offenses in either year took place in what could be regarded as affluent suburbs.

Around half of the offenses occurred between 6 pm and midnight. Perhaps surprisingly, men were far more at risk than women of being mugged. However, this may simply reflect that men are more likely than women to be on the streets during the peak hours of mugging.

DATA ANALYSIS

Apart from advocating that streets be well lit (which is not the case in many areas) to make it more difficult for the robber to surprise his victim, analysis of the present data provides directions

for the formulation of a deterrent program on street attacks.

It has been established that certain areas of Sydney are considerably more at risk than others; that muggings are a nocturnal offense and that the victims are predominantly male. However, what is now needed is a thorough and regular monitoring of all muggings* so that police can be quickly mobilised into recognised high risk areas at times of day when people are most vulnerable. In several American police departments, regular analysis of mugging data has enabled them to deploy decoys and/or highly visible foot patrols and police cars in high risk areas to deter robbers.

PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF MOVABLE MONEY - TAXI DRIVERS

In 1975, there were 32 (8.5 *per cent*) armed robberies of taxis in New South Wales. During the same period there were 11 (3.6 *per cent*) such taxi attacks in Victoria. In 1976, there were 33 (6.8 *per cent*) in the respective States.

It is quite likely, however, that these attacks which were recorded in the files of the armed holdup squads of the two States represented only a small fraction of the total altercations in which taxi drivers were involved in any year. For example, the NSW Metropolitan Taxi Council claimed that during the periods under discussion their records showed an average of 1.5 police contacts *per night* from drivers. Many individual drivers to whom we spoke also insisted that sometimes quite serious disputes (including robberies) were "dealt with informally" by the drivers themselves without recourse to police assistance.

In 1976, two taxi drivers were murdered in Victoria, in New South Wales the number was one.

HEAVIER PENALTIES

The murder of part time taxi driver, Hozurni Momota, prompted the New South Wales Attorney General, Frank Walker, to say:

'I want to see heavy penalties meted out to those guilty of the sort of cowardly attacks that have lately horrified the community. (*Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 Oct 76).'

While the imposition of heavy penalties may satisfy the retributive element in sentencing and even express the community abhorrence of what has been rightly described as "cowardly attacks", the general deterrent

* The present study deals only with muggings in which a weapon was used. Therefore cases in which the sheer number of offenders or the assailants' fists were used to intimidate the victim are not included.

value of heavy penalties has not been successfully demonstrated. (Schwartz, 1968). It could be claimed that armed robbery already attracts heavy penalties from the courts and that attention could be better directed to improving the physical safety of the driver before the attack takes place.

HALF LENGTH PERSPEX SCREENS BETWEEN DRIVER AND PASSENGERS

If the provisions in the Victorian *Commercial Goods Vehicles Act*, which requires the fitting of unbreakable perspex screens between the driver and the rear seat, was a factor in explaining the small number of taxi attacks in that State in 1975 and 1976, it might not have been a factor in subsequent years. It was pointed out to us by a representative of Silver Top Cabs in Melbourne that newer cars with head rests behind the driver's seat make it now virtually impossible to fit the screens and they are being phased out. However, following the two murders of taxi drivers in 1976, the taxi industry decided that protective screens were perhaps of more value to drivers than head rests.

REAR SEAT PASSENGERS ONLY AND FULL LENGTH BULLET RESISTANT SCREENS

A sounder suggestion perhaps is that the screens be full length ones, and that the number of passengers be limited to three back seat ones. The screens could be constructed of bullet resistant glass and money for fares and change passed through chutes, such as are used in many foreign banks.

Oddly, opposition to sealing the driver completely from the passengers came from many individual drivers we spoke to in the course of the study. They thought that taxi driving was a lonely occupation and being in contact with, and able to talk to passengers mitigated their loneliness. As well as this gregarious opposition, they anticipated that the public would "not take kindly" to the three passenger limit. As one driver put it:

'If two couples are going out on a Saturday night, the four of them in a cab is not much more than the bus.
But if they had to take two cabs they'd probably end up taking the bus because it's so much cheaper.'

LIMITS ON CHANGE CARRIED AND GIVEN

In New South Wales, the Metropolitan Taxi Council unsuccessfully lobbied the Motor Transport Department to limit the amount of change a driver was obliged to give to \$5.00. Their argument was that if it was well publicised that drivers do not carry much money in change they would be less likely targets of attack.

In deference to the Council, it did appear to us strange that

whereas on buses even \$2.00 will invite a certain caustic comment from the conductor, taxi drivers are frequently presented with \$20.00 bills or larger denominations and expected to have change available.

STEEL SAFETY BOXES

In some overseas countries, for example, Canada and the United States, buses give no change at all. Entry to the bus is effected by placing the correct fare into a locked box supervised by the driver. Robberies on buses have all but been eliminated where this system has been introduced.

The idea of locked steel boxes in taxis was not endorsed by the Metropolitan Taxi Council, although at one time they had considered it. They believe that the consequence might be that the robber will simply force the driver from the car, take the taxi, and open the box at his leisure.

Another suggestion has been that excess cash be dropped at the base for safe keeping. This idea was also rejected, for the reason that a complex bookkeeping or safety deposit system would have to be introduced at the base to accommodate the cash flow of individual drivers working for individual owners in the cooperative.

EDUCATION

Although more experienced drivers adopt certain precautionary ground rules in talking to passengers, younger drivers are not exactly reticent in giving away information which would be useful to a potential robber. The Taxi Council was inclined to think that the Crime Prevention Unit of the Police Department should be more involved in teaching drivers to avoid robbery prone situations. They stressed the increasing use of taxis as transport for documents and other valuables (computer printouts) which might attract a more professional, organised, and determined criminal.

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXI SECURITY

There was little support for the idea of arming taxi drivers as is done in some overseas countries. Police in both States noted that it is not unusual for armed victims to be disarmed by the robber and thus swell the number of illegally held handguns in the criminal community.

VEHICLE LOCATION SYSTEM

In Chicago, a system has been introduced which enables the base

to physically locate a taxi under attack. That is, when a driver triggers the alarm in his car, his location is flashed on a screen and he can be physically tracked. The technology for such a system is available in Australia and is already in use in some areas. Presumably, the cost factor is all that restrains taxi companies from introducing it.

SERVICE STATIONS

Service stations are popular sites as robbery targets in both States. I shall comment here on some of the problems implicit in their particular type of operation.

Hours of operation. The New South Wales, *Factories, Shops And Industries Act* imposes a minimum trading period of 75 hours per week on service station activities. How long and how often they open their stations beyond these hours is for station operators to decide. However, a number of factors may influence such decisions. And some of these decisions may have criminogenic potential.

Longer hours of trading. A service station might be given the inducement of cheaper petrol from his supplier if he trades beyond the mandatory 75 hours. This deal can be negotiated if the market researchers of the oil company decide the operative is not fully tapping the sales potential of his area. A second (and for the operative, more lucrative) arrangement can be effected if he agrees to become a commission agent for the oil company. Under this deal the operator agrees to take a certain amount of petrol per week and to trade for as long as the market researchers say is viable to maximise profits for both the operator and the oil company. He remits all the money from petrol sales to the oil company, but receives a much bigger return per gallon of petrol sold. The oil company representative we spoke to stressed that the stations to whom this deal was offered would not necessarily trade 24 hours per day. They would only trade that long if, in the opinion of the oil company, there was a 24 hour market to be tapped.

After hours personnel. It is unusual for there to be many more than one person operating service stations after 7 p.m. Often this person will be a junior employee. At present, it is generally necessary for the attendant to leave the "shop" part of the station to tend to customer's petrol needs. It could be argued that this creates a robbery prone situation in which, additionally, the attendant is "at risk" of physical injury.

Rostering. In Western Australia, legislation has been introduced which limits the numbers of service stations that may trade after normal hours. There would be both advantages, disadvantages and, problems, if such a system were considered in other States.

- a. Advantages and disadvantages. The primary advantage would be that the police would have a smaller number

of potential robbery targets to keep under surveillance in a given area. However, since all of the business in that area would flow through the one site it might become a more attractive target and therefore need to provide better protection for the sole operative working the station.

- b. Problems. How would the service stations be selected for the roster? For example, if Oil Company X has 400 million dollars invested in service station installations and Oil Company Y has only 100 million dollars, would X get 4 times the share of the roster than Y got? Another argument which was put to us was that since Australia is a "free enterprise" economy it is not for 'the Government to say what share of the market a dealer can have. It is for them to decide how long and how hard they want to work.'

Education. Two of the major oil companies utilise the facilities of the NSW Crime Prevention Unit to lecture on security to their Advanced Dealers Course. Nonetheless, we formed the opinion that the services of this police unit are under utilised by the oil industry.

Self serve installations. It is encouraging to note that several oil companies have solicited the aid of the Crime Prevention Unit to "build security into the design" of new stations which will operate on a self serve basis. It will be less necessary for the operatives to leave the "shop" in these installations, especially when the self serves are "gas bars" only. (Gas bars are installations which sell only petrol. They do not offer other services like car wash or, maintenance). Since they are either new installations or modified older stations they provide an excellent opportunity to improve the security features of the contemporary service station.

One oil company is currently considering plans which, to our mind, provide maximum protection for staff and money, especially at times when the station is solo operated.

After 7 pm, the operative would be locked into the "shop" which is so placed as to offer complete surveillance of the drive in approaches and exits. The driver would attend to his own petrol needs and come to the "shop" to pay for it. The "shop" would be completely surrounded by bullet resistant glass. Money would pass between the customer and the operative through a chute. This chute would also permit other commodities to pass to the customer, eg, cigarettes and sweets.

Older style service stations. It is difficult to recommend preventive measures for the older style service stations. Keeping money in excess of \$50.00 in a slot safe, for which the operative has no key has been adopted by some stations. However, in itself this offers little additional protection to the operative. Perhaps, slot safes in conjunction with the principle that no change is given would be a better solution. Generally, if it became known that robberies of service stations would net very small returns to the robber they may become less attractive targets.

If, as alleged, it is beyond the means of smaller stations to employ more than one person to man the station after hours, it would also not be feasible for them to consider various forms of electronic surveillance systems. Perhaps, the best that can be hoped for with such stations is that ultimately they will be replaced by outlets into which good security has been designed at the outset. Alternatively, that in any given area, there are limited numbers of such stations operating after hours.

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ROBBERY, POLICE, AND RESEARCH

BRUCE SWANTON

Throughout history robbery has attracted condemnation and punishment in virtually all societies. As long ago as 1187, robbery was considered a royal plea; an indication of the seriousness with which it was regarded even in those early days. (Plucknett, 1956: 426). Today, robbery, in all its various forms and definitions, is still strongly condemned by public and police alike - particularly when firearms are employed. (Normandeau, 1970; Rossi *et al*, 1974; Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964).

There appear to be several factors contributing to the seriousness with which society views robbery. John Conklin (1975: 2), a well known researcher and writer on the subject, identified the two most important factors when he says:

'[R]obbery evokes stronger reaction than other crimes [because] it includes *two* threatening elements, either of which alone would induce fear ... the use of force against the person and the theft of property from the person.'

The order of presentation by Conklin of these two factors is not accidental. He correctly indicates the order in which their seriousness is perceived by the public, *ie*, the violence factor is regarded more seriously than the property factor. (Heller & McEwen, 1975: 45).

There is some evidence to suggest that certain forms of robbery, particularly armed robbery, are more seriously regarded than assault and theft considered in aggregation (Colston, 1973), *ie*, the whole crime is perhaps considered by some to be greater than the sum of its parts. If this is the case, and I suspect that it is, it is most probably so because people see robbery as a return to the law of the jungle. It certainly is a crime that strikes at the very basis of civilised society in a peculiarly primitive way.

The psychosocial impacts of the violence factor were well expressed by the United States National Commission On The Causes And Prevention Of Violence (1969: 1).

'[T]o suffer deliberate violence is different from experiencing an accident, illness or other misfortune. In violent crime man becomes a wolf to man, threatening or destroying the personal safety of his victim in a terrifying act. Violent crime (particularly street crime) engenders fear - the deep seated fear of the hunted in the presence of the hunter.'

Such impacts, if sufficiently great, can have a negative influence on levels of individual life satisfaction and thus perhaps lessen the overall quality of community life. In the US in recent years, the impact of that country's robbery rate is thought to have significantly detracted from the quality of urban life. (McDonald & Brannan, 1975). A similar situation does not as yet obtain in Australia, although in the opinions of some expert observers (Ashby, 1977; Delianis, 1977) Australia has the potential to follow the American trend.

The rate of robbery in Australia is relatively neither high nor low. It was in 1972, the third lowest (just) of the seven selected crime indicators. (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1975). However, the robbery rate is now undoubtedly higher than in 1972, quite apart from the present upsurge of the crime in our two major cities.

Anxiety in the community relative to crime does not necessarily correlate highly with actual rates of commission. It has been observed by researchers and others that the crimes most worrying to people are those having the lowest rate of commission, *eg*, murder, rape. (President's Commission On Law Enforcement And The Administration Of Justice, 1967: 51-52).

Whilst the rate of robbery does not necessarily reflect actual levels of concern in the community, it is probably the most socially significant of all crime indicators. I say this because robbery rates indicate psychological, social, and economic impacts upon the host society and at the same time indicate (in some gross way) the capacity of public protection agencies to protect both the property and the person of their clients.

Human costs far outweigh the economic costs of robbery. I do not here propose to compare these two aspects of crime because they defy adequate comparison. Neither do I intend to compute the economic costs of crime. That is a difficult and highly subjective actuarial exercise beyond the temporal resources available to me. In direct terms, though, it can be said that in Victoria alone, between 1973 and 1976 inclusive, more than four and one half million dollars were stolen in the course of armed robberies. (Delianis, 1977). The average "take" of armed robberies appears to be currently increasing substantially. We can expect a doubling of the 1973-1976 figure in the period 1977-1980 if present trends remain unchecked.

These sums may not seem large when compared, say, to the retail cost of shop stealing (an estimated \$100,000 *pa* in Australia). It should be borne in mind that money as a commodity retains its value. Professional shopstealers, breakers, freight hijackers, all have the problem of disposing of their loot normally at a considerable discount. The robber does not have such a problem, and neither does he lose time as do some thieves in hawking their loot around fences or other potential receivers. The robbery "take" is high compared to most other stealing type crimes. Robbery is a more profitable undertaking than it may at first appear.

In the light of the foregoing, I suggest that a case exists for police and researchers in appropriate areas and agencies to nominate

robbery as a "target" crime, *ie*, a crime upon which should be focussed a large proportion of resources and thought in an effort to reduce its rate of commission *vis a vis* other crimes. The argument rests mainly on a human and social base, but its economic aspects are not inconsiderable. But, more than anything else, I think, we should take concerted, and highly concentrated activity now to redeem a situation which is still, perhaps only just but, still capable of redemption.

This paper primarily addresses itself to matters of police oriented robbery reduction methods from a research perspective. It also takes a brief look at relations between police and researchers. Underpinning everything that is said is an awareness of the need for concerted action.

DIMENSIONS OF RESEARCH

Anticrime operations can be usefully collated into a number of different classifications, both functional and specific. One broad but useful, functional classification is that of: proaction, interdiction, and reaction, *ie*, before, during, and after a crime event.

Proactive police measures in relation to robbery are essentially those activities aimed at preventing an event from occurring. Such measures include a wide range of educative, technological, tactical, and other initiatives. Some of these measures, of course, include other agencies and industries, some of which are represented here, acting either individually or in cooperation with police. An important category in the police preventive repertoire is that of crime prevention. Australian police forces vary a great deal in the emphasis they place on crime prevention activities. It is noted, though, that the New South Wales Police Department is particularly active in this regard, to the extent of identifying future robbery victims and attempting to prepare them in advance of the predicted attention of robbers. In addition to victims as individuals, there are considerations such as protective devices and methods ranging from electronic sensors, through surveillance, to the provision of cash carrying and escort services. Much of the research in these areas necessary to keep the protectors ahead of the expertise of robbers is technological in nature and is not dealt with here other than to note its importance to the cause of robbery prevention.

The design and construction of buildings suitable for use in the storage, processing, and disbursement of valuables such as cash, gems, and bonds, is another area constantly in need of research and development by architects, planners, and engineers.

Interdictive measures, because of their midway status, often overlap with both proactive and reactive measures. The operational mode best suited to interdictive measures is patrol, either general or specific purpose.

We are slowly learning at the present time that crime is not a distinct social phenomenon but, rather a variety of activities too diverse in nature to be successfully countered by any single strategy. Thus, in the United States for instance, interest is gradually developing in "crime specific" measures which focus on particular types of behavior and even subsets of behavior. A great deal of research is currently under way in that country developing and evaluating such strategies. It is noted a start has been made in Australia with the collaboration of the Victoria Police and Kerry Milte of Melbourne University's Criminology Department.

The reactive role of police in relation to criminal events lies basically in investigation, *ie*, the identification and apprehension of offenders and the obtaining of sufficient evidence to ensure their conviction.

The overall success rate for robbery investigations in Australia is not high, although there is considerable variation between different types, *eg*, the clear up rate in relation to bank robberies is high, whereas in relation to payroll office robberies it is far lower. This general fact indicates, amongst other things, the difficulty of investigating robbery events. The reactive dimension of crime control is probably the least researched and, I suspect, partly as a result, the least effective.

APPLIED RESEARCH

So far, I have looked at three broad dimensions of police anti-crime effort and, indirectly, suggested the relevance of research thereto. I propose now to be more specific and identify robbery related matters that have either benefitted from research or would do so. Inasmuch as robbery reduction research in Australia is in its early days as yet, there is an inevitable emphasis on overseas cases.

Special purpose units. Over the last half dozen years a number of US police agencies have introduced crime specific patrols, either by means of permanent units or special short term teams.* A number of these antirobbery initiatives are interesting both in their own right and as an indication of the potential possessed by police for proactive and interdictive operations. In so doing, I am not indirectly criticising efforts already under way in this country. Improved patrol systems, the use of aircraft, the improved use of intelligence, and special patrol groups are all proving beneficial in combatting robbery and other crimes at the present time. My concern here is to direct attention to alternative approaches available to us, approaches that are really constrained only by the limits of our imagination and the law.

* Gratitude is expressed to George L Kelling, of the Police Foundation, who in a private communication provided a great deal of information relevant to these matters, and which has been heavily drawn on in this paper.

During 1971, the Detroit Police Department introduced an anti-street crime (primarily robbery) program under the acronym of STRESS (Stop Robberies And Enjoy Safe Streets). The program was implemented by a special unit of police operating for the most part in plain clothes. Performance of unit members appears to have left a lot to be desired. They killed a number of citizens including an off duty sheriff's deputy. The unit leader was indicted for murder in relation to another matter. Public reaction to the program was most unfavorable, and the press was uniformly critical of the unit and its operations. (Kohn, 1973). It became necessary to disband the unit, and although ritual claims were made for its success (Nichols & Bannon, 1972) it was clearly a disaster.

It has subsequently been realised that the unit was doomed (quite apart from its own inadequacies) before it started. Public opinion was strongly opposed to the policies and covert tactics of the unit. It operated in an environment of almost total citizen noncooperation. Adequate preliminary research would have revealed this potential for disaster. Lack of success was even further assured by the total lack of provision for any form of ongoing evaluation. In other words, they did not even try to learn from their mistakes as they went along.

Also in 1971, the New York City Police Department formed a Street Crime Unit (SCU), aimed primarily at reducing robberies and breakings. The unit, which is still operational, employs a combination of decoy and "blend and observe" tactics. Unit evaluations vary, but, generally it can be claimed to be successful in that the robbery rate has been reduced in a number of precincts. (See Halper & Ku, nd; ABT Associates, 1974). Importantly, the program implemented by the unit has enjoyed high public and media support. A factor contributing to the unit's success is said to be the lack of resort to firearms and the total absence of killings. Another, and unheralded, contribution to the unit's success has been the careful and continuous dedication to developmental and evaluative research by the originators and administrators of the SCU.

Other, similar programs and units, claiming varying degrees of success include Boston's Robbery Suppression Unit (Conklin, 1972: 2); Virginia's High Incidence Target Program (Commonwealth of Virginia Division of Justice and Crime Prevention, 1976); and Miami Police Department's STOP Robbery/Burglary program (State of Florida Bureau of Criminal Justice, Planning and Assistance, 1976).^{*} A considerable amount of evaluative research has been performed in relation to all these undertakings.

Evaluative research in ongoing situations permits the selection of most favorable alternatives facing a unit at any point in time. A case in point is Denver's Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT). It has largely discarded tactics such as decoy operations, and suspect and location surveillance. Reliance is now placed on rapid response, field interrogation, more timely investigative responses, and target hardening. From originally being proactive/interdictive it has now become primarily interdictive/reactive.

^{*} For a further list of low visibility programs see Webb *et al.* (1977).

The successful departure of Denver's SCAT team from the more established style of street operations is an interesting area for researchers. Quite obviously, a great number of interacting variables were involved. But, in an overall sense, it may just demonstrate the geographic variability of robbery (Conklin, 1972: 4) which has also been noted in Australia.

The utilisation by police of proactive/interdictive robbery reduction methods has brought general duty personnel into the main stream of crime fighting, an area normally associated only with detectives. An interesting range of occupational, managerial, and personnel administration questions flow from such moves, all of which - if the trend becomes substantial - will require to be researched.

Patrol. A limited literature of police patrol research has emerged in recent years. (Eg, Elliott, 1973; Elliott & Sardino, 1971; Kelling *et al*, 1974; Larson, 1972; Pate *et al*, 1976). Most patrol based research is not specifically addressed to robbery and so does not warrant discussion here despite its relevance. It is noted, though, that Police Foundation research conducted in Kansas City found that apprehension oriented patrol yielded more arrests of robbery and burglary suspects than so-called preventive patrol. In the same research, location oriented strategies appeared more fruitful than offender oriented strategies.

An important aspect of patrol relative to robbery concerns response times. It is claimed by the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals (*Police*, 1973: 193) that:

'[T]he clearance rate of crime goes up as response time of patrol units is reduced. The figures show that police solve two thirds of the crimes they respond to in less than 2 minutes, but only one out of five when the response time is 5 minutes or longer.'

But, both Police Foundation and Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) financed research suggest there is little if any relation between response time and apprehension of robbery suspects. The critical element appears to be time intervening between the event and reporting to the police. Kansas City experience indicated a victim/citizen delay of 10-20 minutes before informing police. In such circumstances, the shortening of response times by police of one or two minutes is of little benefit. The main point here is that a great deal of research and expense was necessary to establish even such obvious seeming facts as these.

EARLY WARNING ROBBERY REDUCTION (EWRR) PROJECTS

In an endeavor to reduce overall response times by eliminating citizen delays, engineers have developed robbery alarms (Eliot *et al*, 1976). These sensors are sometimes victim activated and sometimes not. This latter category can be activated by, for instance, the removal of the last bill from a gas station's cash register. Normally, in

conjunction with these alarms, a force of special purpose police equipped with receivers and in unmarked cars are located close to protected premises. In exercises such as these, the need for good predictive robbery data is absolute if effectiveness is to be achieved. The strategy is essentially interdictive in nature, aimed as it is at either catching the robbers in the act or very shortly thereafter. Programs employing this technique have not yet been fully evaluated but, results to date are promising according to Gerald Caplan the then head of the US National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice.

Robbery data. An important factor in robbery reduction planning is the availability of accurate, relevant data. Without good, predictive data, adequate planning is impossible, except for the most *ad hoc* efforts! Relevance of data is extremely important as a good deal of the data currently collected are, I suspect, of neither predictive nor strategic utility. Commenting on the US situation, Arnold Sagalyn (1971: 2) says:

'[I]t seems evident that most police departments lack data on robberies in the amount and detail needed to make any kind of statistical analyses for predictive purposes. Consequently, they are greatly handicapped in assigning and employing their manpower on a purposeful and effective basis. In the absence of good predictive data and analysis or of reliable intelligence, they are forced to patrol and conduct preventive measures on a very rudimentary, hit-or-miss basis.'

Now, whilst nowhere in Australia is the situation quite that bad, equally, nowhere has a police force all the predictive data needed for planning purposes. It is easy to make comments of this nature. It is much harder to produce remedies. But, before remedies can be produced we need to determine the precise nature of needed data. That in itself represents a substantial research exercise. The problem is compounded in Australia by the uneven spread of population (and crime) and the different police boundaries. It is not, though, I suggest, beyond the ability of the Commissioners in conference to coordinate such activity should they so wish.

Investigations. The major police antirobbery method is that of investigation. This is quite understandable, even inevitable. However, police investigations of criminal matters, a reactive approach, tend not to be effective, as a general proposition, according to two pieces of recent research. According to LEAA (1976):

- a. if a perpetrator is not identified at the time a crime is reported, it is unlikely he will be identified subsequently,
- b. more than one half of all serious reported crimes receive no more than superficial attention by investigators, and
- c. differences in police training, organisation, workload, and staffing appear to have no appreciable effect on crime, arrest, or clearance rates.

A complementary study conducted by the Stanford Research Institute largely confirmed these findings. As a result, researchers have recommended:

- a. follow up investigations be confined to only the most serious crimes,
- b. creation of major offenders units to investigate serious crimes, and assignments of serious offense investigations to closely supervised teams rather than to nominated investigators,
- c. strengthening evidence processing,
- d. employing strike forces, and
- e. creating programs to impress upon citizens their crucial role in solving crime.

I have no doubt the circumstances investigated by the LEAA and Stanford researchers were highly situational and do not necessarily reflect situations obtaining elsewhere. Indeed, this research has come under strong criticism from the International Association of Chiefs of Police. And yet, we know that at least some of the problems listed here are present in our own police forces. It would seem most desirable that police forces place their investigative systems under their respective microscopes and attempt as objective an analysis as possible. No doubt, results will emphasise the need to push proactive and interdictive measures at the expense of reactive measures. That is, the balance presently existing between the three approaches most probably needs altering somewhat.

Displacement. For some time now I have been talking about robbery reduction and research as if each and every move proposed will take place in a vacuum. Everything we do, influences something someone else is doing. Thus, if we attempt a particular style of antirobbery patrol or undertake a new style of robbery analysis, the situation will change as a result. Maybe we will create more problems than we cure. Maybe the cures are too expensive and deprive other programs of much needed funds. The New York City Police Department found that it could almost completely prevent subway robberies and/or apprehend the perpetrators of those robberies that did occur at a cost of \$35,000 *per* robbery event. It was felt that the cost of prevention was too high and that a limited robbery rate had to be accepted.

Whatever the upshot of our efforts, formal and informal, intended and unintended, we need to know them. With regard to antirobbery measures we particularly need to establish the form of displacement effected. James Tien and Richard Larson (1975) have identified five types of crime displacement. These are:

- a. temporal - robbers may change the time pattern of their criminal activities, *eg*, night to afternoon,

- b. tactical - robbers may change their methods, *eg*, stop/start using weapons,
- c. target - robbers may change the focus of their attentions, *eg*, drunks to gas stations,
- d. territorial - robbers may go to areas where they feel less susceptible to police activities, *eg*, move from city area to suburbs, and
- e. functional - robbers may decrease their robbery activities but increase their commission of other functionally similar crimes, *eg*, change from muggings to breakings.

It will be appreciated that to monitor displacement impacts requires substantial research inputs. The establishment of research personnel in some Australian criminal investigation branches represents a start, perhaps unintended, in this direction.

I hope by now that I have demonstrated the importance of research to the successful countering of robbery and a sound understanding of the problems involved. Researchers, be they sworn personnel, civilian employees of police departments, or outsiders, exist to support the people in the field. I make the point because I am well aware of the hesitation felt by many field workers toward researchers.

POLICE AND RESEARCHERS

The relationship between practitioners and researchers is, I think it fair to say, generally an uneasy one. There are faults, no doubt, on both sides. With regard to police, and much the same applies to those of you working in the private protection area, resources are usually extended just keeping on top of current events. The agency struggling to meet the most basic needs of its clients, *eg*, protection from robbers, is not in a good position to attend to research. As Stanley Brodsky (1977: 4) (an experienced police educator and instructor of former years) recently put it, 'Just as it is the well fed person who appreciates art, it is the flourishing and comfortable agency that appreciates research'. Whilst this is an overstatement, there is a kernel of truth in it. Researchers, on the other hand, like many specialists, tend to allow their own concepts (including their accompanying jargon) and interests to dominate their horizons, to the extent, sometimes, of obscuring the needs of clients. In a more general sense, 'some people simply hear no one or nothing; very little outside information makes a difference in their lives and work. Some view research as irrelevant, intrusive, abstract nonsense. And others are so restricted by agency bonds and binds that they have little freedom to implement their own pet ideas, nevermind the ideas that arise from research results'. (Brodsky, 1977: 4).

Despite all this, a situation exists in which researchers - of whatever status - can be of assistance to police and other public

protection workers. It can even be said they are vital to the continued advancement of policing and crime control. (Willmer, 1976). I don't wish to labor the point concerning relationships between police and researchers. Suffice it to say that substantial applied research is required if the rate of robbery in Australia is to be checked, let alone reduced. The promotion of police effectiveness is the desire of us all, and research is a vital element in the promotion of that desired effectiveness.

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HUMAN BASED RESEARCH RELATIVE TO THE INVESTIGATION AND PREVENTION OF ARMED ROBBERY - RESOLUTION

PREAMBLE

The offense of armed robbery requires little description other than to say that in real life, particularly from the victim's viewpoint, armed robbery can produce not only death or physical injury but, also severe anxiety.

2. The United States National Commission On The Causes And Prevention Of Violence¹ observed that every successful crime is an inducement to further crime and that it advertises society's inability to enforce generally accepted rules of conduct. Both overseas and local experience indicate there is a real possibility that armed holdups in urban areas will become more acute in the future. It is obvious that greater efforts must be made to prevent the escalation of violent crime in the community.

3. Determining realistic research expectations is a difficult task. Past experience demonstrates that traditional criminology has little to offer the community in terms of explaining crime or identifying its causes.

4. Australian experience shows that statistics have been used to identify crime problems but, they usually do little more than tell us what has happened quantitatively. They fail to tell us what has happened qualitatively.

5. We believe that many armed robberies are often carried out by professional criminals who use detailed planning and sophisticated methods. They move from State to State, and even internationally. There are also many offenders who are not professional and not migratory but, who still present a danger to the victim. Such offenders also require research and planning attention, although the focus of attention will be different from that applied to the professionals.

6. Our assumptions are made on the limited information available but, unfortunately, in some instances they are mere personal opinions lacking a firm basis in fact. Future research should be directed at validating these assumptions.

7. We recognise the urgency for research into the total phenomenon of armed robbery. We are concerned that very little research has been conducted in Australia relative to this subject. Considerable effort

¹ (1969). *Statement On Violent Crime: Homicide, Assault, Rape, Robbery*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.

should be made to determine the nature and extent of the crime, to evaluate methods of prevention, and to enable police, commercial organisations, and the general public to work together to reduce the rate and the damage caused by the actions of violent criminals. Such research must be comprehensive, meaningful, and firmly committed to action based principles. The research should be conducted on a national basis with a uniform format whenever possible. Common formats facilitate the use of computer analysis, storage, and retrieval. Results should be of value for investigations, crime intelligence, and crime prevention planning purposes.

8. We encourage cooperation between State police departments. There should be a free exchange of information for investigative purposes. This applies also to State and Commonwealth police relations. Such cooperation will enable meaningful national research to be undertaken.

9. We are concerned with public apathy to crimes of violence and recommend that those involved in public affairs be mindful of the adverse long term effects on society of such violence.

10. We are of the opinion that the armed robber is a dangerous individual who threatens our person and property. Robbers belong to a group which may be described as "hard core" criminals with personalities resistant to rehabilitation. They belong to a unique subculture.

11. We also express concern that little attention has been given to victimological aspects of the crime. There are certain behavior patterns on the part of victims which, before a robbery, or when confronted by robbers, are crucial factors in the prevention of the crime and the prevention of violence during its commission. Research in this area is necessary. Arnold Sagalyn¹ has commented on the lack of information concerning robbery in the United States, despite its seriousness. A similar situation exists in Australia. That situation needs to be remedied as a matter of some urgency and appropriate measures developed to control and reduce robbery events.

12. We provide the following list of general research areas for the benefit of potential researchers. We feel that research activity in these areas can have beneficial results in reducing the rate of armed robbery in our community. The order of presentation does not indicate a ranking of priorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

13. We accordingly recommend:

- a. that reliable statistics concerning armed robbery be collected as a basis for further research,
- b. that a profile be developed of Australian armed robbers,

¹ (1971). *The Crime Of Robbery In The United States*. Washington, DC: National Institute Of Law Enforcement And Criminal Justice.

- c. that police patrol deployment strategies be researched,
- d. that robbery specific patrol and investigation strategies be researched,
- e. that victimological aspects of robbery, including health and welfare impacts, be researched,
- f. that protective security measures be researched and evaluated,
- g. that sentencing policies be researched, and recommendations made to the courts in relation thereto,
- h. that data be provided for the operation of bail, and parole systems,
- i. that the prosecutorial process be researched, including aspects of criminal procedure,
- j. that the concept of deterrence be researched as a contribution to the development of a consistent sentencing philosophy, and
- k. that the feasibility of trial *in absentia* be researched.

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THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL ARMED ROBBERY DATA SERVICE

PAUL DELIANIS

Who knows how many bank robberies were committed in Australia in the year 1970 or in the year 1975, or for that matter, any other year? In all probability, no one. I certainly do not. I have personally attempted to assess the amount of cash stolen during the commission of armed robberies. But, at best I can only make an estimate because such figures are not officially available. I don't think such a situation is acceptable in the latter part of the '70s, particularly when armed robbery is increasing at such an alarming rate.

I can say that during the first six months of 1975 there were five bank robberies in Alaska, 406 in California, and 14 in Nevada. I can do this because the figures are on record and distributed to interested persons by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I can tell you that in 1974, in the Republic of France, there were 863 armed robberies at banks, whereas the figure for 1963 was a mere 15.

I can also tell you that in a six month period during 1975, of 3,272 persons identified as being involved in bank offenses in the United States of America, 1,002 were found to be users of narcotics. Now, early in 1977, Assistant Commissioner Miller, the officer responsible for crime control in Victoria, wished to know the extent of drug involvement in armed robbery in his home State. To attempt an answer has been a most difficult task and, even when completed, the data obtained will not be completely reliable.

I know also, that of 2,296 bank robbery incidents in the United States, 1,958 occurred at open counters. This sort of information also is not readily available in Australia.

I have referred repeatedly to the American situation because the Americans place so much reliance on data gathering and dissemination. They do so on a national basis so that the statistical data is available to all who have a need for it.

I think the time has arrived in Australia for armed robbery offenses to be dissected and the statistical data obtained made available to responsible people in the community having a need for it.

Whilst it is disturbing to note that in the first half of 1975, 15 persons were killed and 126 injured during bank robberies in the United States, these data are essential for such organisations as the bank employee unions and the Australian Banker's Association. Currently,

there is no way of discovering what the figures are - Australia wide.

Maybe someone among you believe that the gathering of statistics concerning armed robbery is simply adding to the bureaucracy by creating more jobs for more public servants. Perhaps it is.

Maybe you believe that the statistics will prove only what it is wanted to be proven. I think this is taking a narrow view of the real aim of obtaining and processing data concerning a crime that has become, without a shadow of doubt, a scourge in this country and throughout the western world.

I think the gathering of statistical data on armed robbery can tell us a lot of things we do not presently know but ought to know if we are ever going to control this type of crime. The sorts of information that could be produced by a crime specific data analysis and information service include:

- a. the extent of the crime at the national level,
- b. the extent of the crime at the State and Territory level,
- c. the precise type of armed robbery, *eg*, bank, pharmacy, taxi cab,
- d. the type and number of offenders,
- e. the type and value of property stolen,
- f. the extent of the drug influence in armed robbery,
- g. the extent of security devices protecting the various victims of armed robbery,
- h. the utility of security devices, including their functioning or nonfunctioning during a robbery situation,
- i. the precise *modus operandi* of each robbery, *eg*, presented demand note, scaled the counter,
- j. the type of weapons utilised,
- k. the number of occasions weapons were actually used, *eg*, guns fired,
- l. the number of persons killed or wounded during the crime, the category of the victims and the nature of their injuries,
- m. the extent of hostage taking for protection and/or intimidation,
- n. the effect of such installations as bullet resistant glass,

- o. whether any offender had prior convictions, particularly in the armed robbery field,
- p. whether any offender was an escapee from prison or released on bail, parole or probation, and
- q. the "time" of the robbery in terms of month, day and time.

Such information need not be the only data gathered. However, the list presented includes most of the categories necessary for crime specific planning by a number of organisations and individuals.

The centralised collection, collation and analysis of such data will be an important step forward in providing a reliable information service for those who are genuinely concerned about the prevalence of this sort of crime and who are concerned to do something about it. A considerable number of organisations could use such data for anti-robbery planning and I propose to discuss them in turn.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

It is essential to know crime patterns not only within the narrow confines of particular regions but also across a broader spectrum. No police department can function at optimum efficiency unless it understands the full extent of the problem it is endeavoring to combat and the effect of measures taken. For example, if there was a combined effort throughout Australia to reduce the amount of firearms available in the community, then the effect of such an effort on armed robberies could only be gauged through a national data service. A great deal of research is being undertaken in this country and other places throughout the world on various methods of policing and the effect of these methods upon particular crimes, armed robbery being no exception. I don't think there is any doubt that if you place a policeman in uniform on the beat in a shopping center that he would be of some deterrent effect to someone intending to commit an armed robbery. In Victoria we have had some interesting results out of an operation known as "Crime Beat". Effective planning for police operations cannot be achieved without statistical data. Similarly, proper assessment or evaluation of such operations is not possible without adequate data. Deterrent methods, as opposed to investigation, have to be closely assessed; particularly, as we operate with limited human and material resources.

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Individual financial institutions are particularly interested in the sort of data envisaged here in order to determine the steps necessary to be taken at any given time, either now or in the future. Presently, they may know figures of robbery patterns concerning their own premises but may not have any idea of what is happening in other areas. This is important if management is to determine high risk areas, if they are to decide whether to install security measures such as

bullet resistant glass in particular branches or agencies. They need to be able to assess the likely extent of outside pressures for better security.

AUSTRALIAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION

The American Bankers Association relies very heavily on statistics produced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In fact, the headline on their publication, the *Bank Protection Bulletin*, for September 1975, indicated that bank robberies had increased 50.9%. The details in that publication came from the FBI. The Australian Bankers Association has a standing committee on security. Often, important statistics are sought by the Association concerning aspects of bank robbery. Generally, the required data are not available, and certainly not on a nationwide basis. Often, the Association has to be satisfied with information provided by individual police officers attending their meetings. Very seldom though, is there representation of all States at such meetings.

As an advisory body, there is no doubt the Association could function better were it to have more extensive and better quality data available to it.

BETTING AGENCIES

Betting agencies throughout Australia are in a different category to the financial institutions inasmuch as they are confined to State boundaries. Therefore, unless there is very close interstate liaison between these agencies, each Totalizator Agency Board can have very little idea of the armed robbery situation concerning its counterparts elsewhere. Once again, a data service could provide a basis upon which to build, increase, or decrease security. Until recently there has been very little movement into the provincial cities or country areas by the armed robber. But, in the past couple of years there has been a considerable increase in the number of major armed robberies away from the Melbourne metropolitan area. The betting agencies and the financial institutions are very prominent in the country areas of Australia. Such organisations will have to carefully watch the spread of the crime into non metropolitan areas. An armed robbery data service could not only make such data available to clients but spell out the trends, such as the move into country areas, as well.

COMMERCIAL BODIES

There is considerable apathy and ignorance in a number of the commercial organisations concerning armed robbery against individuals and premises controlled by them. The point applies to bodies such as:

- a. petrol filling stations,
- b. cab companies,

- c. licensed liquor outlets, and
- d. companies and individuals handling payrolls.

A major national petrol retailing company has had considerable problems with robberies committed at its service stations. Despite this, the matter has never been raised at any of the company's executive meetings. There seems to exist a great ignorance and lack of concern amongst such organisations. Even if the company did show interest, there are few national data of significance that could be made available to it.

We find in the past 12 months a new concept arising in service station design - the self serve petrol station. Lone attendants at such premises are frequently held up at all hours of the night. Attendants and cashiers could be protected fairly simply and at not a great deal of cost to the oil companies. However, it is unlikely that the oil companies will carry out such installations unless they are convinced they have a real problem in the holdup area. Such companies would be much more susceptible to government pressure to improve security measures if the requisite facts and figures were available.

The payroll area is particularly sensitive. There has been a number of significant losses in payroll robberies. If a nationwide tally was made of losses over the last two years, the total would be staggering. In Victoria, the largest mean losses occur in payroll robberies.

With regard to the amount of money involved, security in payroll offices is by far the worst. Efforts have been made by police to encourage greater awareness amongst those responsible of the dangers involved in handling large payrolls in unsuitable premises. Often such premises are without a single antirobbery device. Generally speaking, police efforts in this area have fallen upon deaf ears.

Insurance companies are somewhat to blame here.

We see a payroll of say \$100,000 delivered by a sophisticated armored car to a payroll office made of three ply and glass. As soon as the armored car leaves the bandits arrive. That's the end of the payroll and perhaps the paymaster, too.

One method of convincing the people who pay their employees by cash of the extreme dangers of armed payroll robbery (one paymaster was shot recently in a Melbourne suburb trying to save his payroll) is to have available nationwide data of the extent of the problem. With continuing inflation, amounts of money stolen in this type of robbery will reach gigantic proportions within a few years.

Payrolls attract the attention of really professional criminals. Victorian data suggest that the solution rate is fairly low for payroll robberies. No doubt, that fact is partly responsible for the popularity of the crime. It may eventually be necessary to pass legislation to enforce security in premises where large sums of money are handled.

BANK EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS

Probably the bodies that would derive some of the greatest benefit from a national armed robbery data service would be the bank employee associations. Such benefits would primarily be:

- a. the data would provide material capable of being used to support arguments relating to salaries and conditions, and
- b. the data and analyses provided would enable the associations to closely examine the security situation from time to time with relation to the welfare of their members.

The death and injury rate in armed robbery is very significant in terms of employer-employee relationships. The availability of accurate data is essential to that relationship. For example, banking organisations will need to be accurately informed of armed robberies in order to anticipate industrial problems that may arise. Quite frequently, police are asked to supply statistical information to interested employee associations. Much of the information sought is just not readily available.

LEGISLATIVE BODIES

Were a national armed robbery data service available, its findings could be made available to legislative bodies so that proper assessments may be made of the need or otherwise of legislation concerning the provision of antirobbery security measures. Presently, such legislation exists in at least two western countries - West Germany and the United States of America. France was contemplating such legislation in 1975.

Legislators could be provided data concerning the extent to which armed robbery is being committed by persons at large in the community in the following categories:

- a. on bail,
- b. on probation or parole, and
- c. who have escaped from legal custody.

BAIL ABSCONDERS

This latter category of armed robbery committed by persons at large has been most controversial for a number of years. Complete figures have never been available, certainly not on a nationwide basis, on the extent of this particular problem. Hence the reluctance of authorities to act. The amount of armed robbery committed by persons in these three

categories is far too high. Particularly disturbing is the repetition of the crime of armed robbery by those on bail for exactly the same crime. There have been incidents in both Victoria and New South Wales, where persons on bail for armed robbery have reoffended for the same offense. Whilst this paper was being written, three such matters came to notice on the one day, thus:

- a. a person who had that day failed to appear on bail on a charge of armed robbery had been identified as having held up a bank on the previous day,
- b. a person charged with an \$80,000 payroll robbery and who had been granted bail, had then been charged with a further armed robbery and had again been granted bail. He was being sought by police for failing to appear for his trial, and
- c. a person on bail for bank robbery was being sought by police for two further bank robberies.

This problem will not be looked at fairly and squarely unless reliable figures are kept to show its true extent. Let me give you a few of the disturbing "statistics" that come to mind. These cases are by no means isolated:

- a. a man charged with breaking offenses in Victoria was granted bail. He was then charged with armed robbery in Victoria and granted further bail. Whilst awaiting court proceedings he was arrested and charged in New South Wales with conspiracy to commit a further armed robbery. He was granted further bail and is presently at large,
- b. a man charged with nine counts of TAB robbery in Victoria was granted bail. He was subsequently arrested after a payroll robbery and charged. Bail was again granted. He then committed bank robberies in Victoria and New South Wales. He was subsequently arrested in Queensland after assaulting a person with a firearm stolen from one of the bank robberies,
- c. two men with extensive criminal records were charged with a payroll robbery totalling some \$70,000 in Victoria and granted bail. Subsequently, both were involved in a bank robbery where over \$60,000 was stolen,
- d. an escapee from the United Kingdom was charged in New South Wales with conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was rearrested in Victoria and charged with three armed robberies. He was convicted but, after a successful appeal, was retried and acquitted. He was returned to New South Wales and charged again with the conspiracy. He was granted bail of \$50,000 but again failed to appear,

- e. a man was charged with armed robbery in Victoria after being extradited from Queensland. He was granted bail and travelled to New South Wales where, in efforts to interfere with a witness, he was charged with murder and has been sentenced to life imprisonment,
- f. a man with a bad history of armed robbery, escaping from legal custody, and failing to appear on bail, was again charged with armed bank robbery in Victoria. In that robbery a bystander was shot. Despite protests he was granted bail and immediately absconded,
- g. a male heroin addict charged with bank robbery in Victoria. The evidence against him was that the money stolen was needed to buy hard drugs. Despite objections from people concerned with the banking industry, he was granted bail. Soon afterwards he committed an armed robbery upon a pharmacist, and
- h. a man was arrested in New South Wales and charged with five counts of armed robbery committed in Victoria. He was extradited but then granted bail. He was later arrested soon after committing a payroll robbery in Melbourne. He was again granted bail but, failed to appear in court. He was subsequently located in New South Wales.

These cases, of course, are but a few. The "Top Ten" list of wanted criminals in Victoria mainly comprises persons who have failed to appear on bail. If the facts of all these sorts of cases were on record, then I am certain there would be much greater concern by people. I think the media, by emphasising cases where armed robbers have failed to appear on bail, plus other lobbying, has stemmed the tide of what appeared to be further relaxation of bail conditions.

METHOD

Now, to turn to questions of method, the method of feeding data into the central collection body. The system should be as simple as possible and not burden the officers who investigate the crime with much additional work. Having worked in the field I know how annoying it is when someone produces an additional form to fill out, particularly if its purpose is the provisions of statistics. Policemen have an inbuilt dislike of such forms. Therefore, it is best for the data to come from documents normally prepared in the course of an investigation.

In Victoria, we devised a form for reporting armed robberies. It was simple to complete and covered almost every aspect of the robbery. Whilst we do not contend it is a perfect specimen, I feel that it is in this sort of documentation that the data can be simply gathered. As it is, we prepare the form in multiple copies, thus, it would be a simple process to despatch an additional copy to the data collecting organisation.

Whilst this would provide the bulk of the information, the data collectors would need to follow up on two points:

- a. whether a subsequent arrest has been made and, if so, obtain a profile of the offender(s), and
- b. where an arrest had been made, the decision of the court.

It may be possible for departments to prepare an armed robbery report form that will be suitable for both the requirements of departments and the data collection service.

Finally, we need to consider which organisation should be given the responsibility of collecting armed robbery data. I am certain that it will be a fairly complex task, but if performed properly will provide invaluable information. It will take us out of an era, where statisticswise, we have been "flying by the seat of our pants". Probably, the greatest problem to confront the data service will be in ensuring that members of State police departments feed in all the required information. It will be a matter of education and cooperation.

I think this task is best left in the hands of law enforcement. The law enforcement body best suited is the Commonwealth Police Force.

Like all data collection services, its value will be determined by staff expertise and the extent of the material made available to them.

No matter from what angle the problem of armed robbery is perceived, anticrime activities must be more effective if reliable and complete statistical material on a nationwide basis is available.

For instance, if you are going to argue that:

- a. bail provisions should be made tougher, or
- b. bullet resistant glass is or is not needed in a certain area, or
- c. sentences are too light, or
- d. taxi drivers should be totally isolated from passengers, or
- e. bank robbers should be executed by a firing squad, then, data are needed to support the particular argument advanced.

To use an old police expression, "You have to hit them with the facts". To do this one has first to find the facts.

COMMENT

IAN RIPPON

To comment adequately on the proposal for a national armed robbery data service, two assumptions are necessary:

- a. that all robberies committed in Australia, armed or otherwise, are reported, and
- b. that of those robberies committed in Australia and reported to police as being without violence or the use of weapons, a proportion would have become armed robberies had there been anyone else around at the time.

In making these assumptions, I am, in fact, implying that details of armed robbery are at present scanty, and although nationally documented, will remain scanty and thus of little value.

There is an argument contained in Paul Delianis' case for a national armed robbery data service to the effect that part of the blame for non protection of victims lies with the insurance industry.

Unfortunately, the insurance industry can only go so far with suggestions and inspections. It cannot take the ultimate responsibility of forcing clients to take adequate insurance cover against robbery and burglary.

Officialdom itself must take some blame for non protection of robbery victims. Here in the ACT, a situation exists where double locking (key operated both sides) doors are recommended by all insurers and security companies for new premises. However, the fire authority refuses to permit occupation of premises until such locks are removed. The reason given is that doors must be capable of being opened from the inside by persons escaping from a fire.

Whilst agreeing in principle with the need for a central bureau providing statistical and analytical services for crimes such as robbery, I see difficulty in the collection of useful data. The difficulty is based on factors of human nature.

It requires mention here that a national collection of robbery events already exists. The collection relates to insured risks only, *ie*, it exists in printed format, on a national basis, as a result of claims submitted against insurers.

This list is a valuable tool for insurers in upgrading premium rates against certain classes of business which appear to be prone to attack.

It can also be deceptive in some respects. Some influential clients, who suffer losses that would be embarrassing if publicly known, have a way of presenting their case so that their claims are met whilst at the same time not having to report their loss to police.

An armed robbery occurred in the ACT two weeks ago. The police have no knowledge of the robbery but, a claim has been made in respect thereof. No firearms were used in the course of the robbery, but sufficient force was employed to ensure that the client handed over the \$6,000 he was carrying as a result of his business. His business is illegal. Such instances will continue to occur.

The list used by the insurance industry is, however, a step in the right direction. It contains almost all of the information that would be required by clients and analysts alike in a robbery data service, including day, date, time, place, class of business, method of robbery, gender of offenders, and much else.

Police have from time to time held discussion with insurers on all these matters. All agree that the standard of protection offered by some clients is less than adequate to keep at bay the simplest schoolboy.

One of the reasons for the low levels of protection assumed by clients is complacency - the thought that it could never happen to me. To illustrate the point, let me mention two examples of such thinking that occurred quite recently in Canberra.

On a public service pay day some weeks ago, I was walking along a street behind a security guard. The guard was carrying a large box, which obviously contained money, to a bank. He was accompanied by a companion, who held two leather bags, one in each hand. On the rear of his belt was a holstered revolver, the holster being of the open type. I said, loud enough for my companion to hear, and for the second guard, too, 'I could take his gun quite easily and rob him'. The guard visibly paled. He stopped and scrutinised me very carefully as I passed. That man's complacency could easily have cost him his life. His follow up man was out of sight, around the corner, and had no idea of what was happening.

My second instance of client complacency occurred in a Canberra bank just after trading hours. A teller check was being made by the accountant and a security officer. In full view of the passing public, along the counter of the bank, arranged in neat piles for easy selection by a would be robber, were thousands of dollars in bills. The front door of the bank was still open to permit easy entry for intending criminals. Once again, complacency.

I therefore envisage a data analysis service as suggested by Detective Inspector Delianis as being effective only if the full cooperation of all agencies in these areas is sought and granted. I cannot help the feeling though, that the operators of the service would

think from time to time, 'I wish we could have some more armed holdups so that we could get on with the job of working out statistics'.

In summary, and whilst agreeing that a national armed robbery data service may be of some help, I feel that the best and most sure method of prevention is education of the client - backed up by legislation if necessary.

Statistics can never be up to date, can never be fully accurate, and can be made to read possibly what is not intended. Preventive efforts are of greater benefit than telling people where they went wrong.

PROBLEMS OF DATA COLLECTION

ROSEANNE BONNEY

This paper relates to the problems involved in the armed robbery data collection performed by the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research for the period 1975-1976.

Police were involved from the outset in the design of the questionnaire and the collection of the data. Unfortunately, and also at the outset, we geared our data collection system to information that existed in Victoria Police Department files, but to a lesser extent only in the NSW police files. This was unfortunate. It meant that a number of questions could not be answered in the NSW questionnaires. Because of this we revised the questionnaire substantially for the 1976 data collection.

The basic problem encountered was the variable nature of police data. Sometimes you have quite excellent files on a particular robbery event. Other times, the files are so terse that one gets the impression the robber arrived, got what he came for, and immediately departed. That is all you know about the robbery event. Police data are also unreliable in other respects. For example, the number of victims stated in a file turns out, if you read the victim's statement, to be erroneous. Other times, the numbers of offenders are not accurately stated.

But, from the research point of view, it was a most valuable exercise to work with the police. Too frequently, research is divorced from the problems which police encounter. Data collection models are often quite inconsistent with police values and needs. Basically, the police are interested in collecting information which will assist them in their investigation, or in the presentation of information in the court situation. Now, this is not necessarily the same data a researcher wants to collect in order to establish an accurate picture of the robbery event.

An additional problem is the police attitude to data collection. Some of the police officers I encountered in Victoria and New South Wales, who were charged with data collection exercises, felt emasculated by this role. They did not regard it as "proper" police work. One police officer put it very plainly when he said he felt humiliated and even degraded by data collection.

Also problematic is the police attitude to social researchers. Some regard researchers as people who collect data with no particular

function in mind, and seek information for its own sake. In part, I can accept that criticism as some criminological research does fall into this category.

In some circumstances, police perceptions of the robbery event appeared to be governed more by "gut" reaction than by fact. This was especially true in the context of drugs. For example, Detective Inspector Delianis mentioned in his paper the case of an arrested robbery offender who claimed to be taking two hourly injections of heroin costing \$60.00 *per* injection. Surely, if such a claim were true, the person would be dead within a short time or, if not dead certainly incapable of carrying out robberies. And yet, this offender's claims were apparently accepted without question. I find the offender's claim to be incompatible with the pharmacological properties of heroin, especially in the doses mentioned. However, this is not to deny that a correlation has been established between aggressive criminal behavior and certain drugs. In this respect one thinks immediately of the amphetamine group and alcohol, whether used by the victim or the offender.

The format adopted by police in recording details of an offense could be improved. The Victoria Police Crime Specific Report used by the Armed Robbery Squad is already better than other police forms. If it was changed slightly to maximise computer compatibility it would be even better. One would hope to see the same development in New South Wales of Crime Specific Report utilisation in specialist police sections. Consideration could even be given to the merits of a forced choice format.

As it stands, the quality of the robbery file will be determined by the experience of the officer filling it in. An inexperienced officer might not always give a full and accurate description of a robbery.


Many of the items we included in the 1975 questionnaire called for subjective police judgments. For instance, they were asked if they thought the robbery was the work of "professional" robbers and, if they thought it was a "planned" robbery. These subjective assessments were discarded in 1976 because they just didn't work. Personally, I believe there is little scope for subjective questioning in research of this kind.

On the positive side, many police files were full and accurate descriptions of a robbery. However, it was not clear that these files were fully utilised for their investigative potential. For example, if these records were analysed, say, on a 3 monthly basis, excellent profiles could be derived of the *modus operandi* and locations in vogue at a particular time. By this means problem areas could be more easily identified and such profiles would, additionally, be of great use to Crime Prevention Units.

My comments and criticisms should be seen in the context of one of the stated aims of this seminar. That is, the feasibility of setting up a national data collection service on armed robbery. The problems I have mentioned would have to be faced on a much broader scale if such a service were to be established. If they are to be avoided, a data

format must be found which incorporates into the information the police normally collect, the additional questions research seeks to answer.

In conclusion, I would like to say that I found the 18 months working with the police on this project a valuable exercise. Too few researchers get the opportunity to work with practitioners in the field. If they did, they might develop a sharper appreciation of police problems.



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMED ROBBERY INFORMATION SERVICE - RESOLUTION

PREAMBLE

1. It is apparent that armed robbery in Australia has reached a stage where it is causing considerable alarm.
2. A clear understanding of the problem requires not only an operations approach but, an analysis of the crime in terms of "offense" and "offender". To adequately attempt this, an armed robbery information service is necessary.
3. Both police and potential victims require information relative to prevention and detection of the crime, as well as offender based data. Control of robbery requires such information on a national basis, if accurate planning is to be attempted.
4. We feel that the national collection and collation of relevant information by an armed robbery information service will make a meaningful contribution to combatting dangerous and ruthless criminals.
5. The setting up of an armed robbery information service will not be simple and may not be readily acceptable in some quarters. However, we believe the problem can be overcome. The end result will permit greater efficiency, not only in law enforcement but, also in preventive measures, and legislation.
6. We envisage the broad objectives of an armed robbery information service as assisting in the planning and evaluation of preventive strategies, aiding the detection of offenders, and permitting a better understanding of the crime generally.
7. We expect that an armed robbery information service would provide information of two classes. One, gross statistics available to the public subject only to the normal constraints pertaining to the release of information to the media. Two, commentaries available to selected contributors for further dissemination at their discretion but, within policy guidelines determined by contributors.
8. To be capable of achieving stated objectives an armed robbery information service would need to address itself to four basic orientations - offense, offender, victim, policy.
9. We expect that primary armed robbery data would be collected by investigators. For this reason we recommend that the source document incorporate research needs thereby minimising the collection task. For

a single information service to satisfy all clients, data compilation must be standardised thus we note a need for a standardised armed robbery report format to be employed by all police forces.

10. We are aware that standardised report formats will require the concurrence of all State and Territory police Commissioners, and heads of other contributing agencies. Existing police reporting procedures relating to armed robbery may well need to be expanded.

11. The relatively low incidence of armed robberies in the community indicates that an armed robbery information service should be situated within an existing police record or statistical data center.

12. We appreciate that if an armed robbery information service is to become a reality, the agreement of the police Commissioners' conference will be necessary. As an example to the Commissioners' conference of a successful analysis, we recommend to the Commissioners the report on armed robbery offenses for the period 1975-1976 in New South Wales and Victoria prepared by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research. Any standardised reporting format would be totally dependant upon the Commissioners' decision.

13. We suggest that a multi disciplinary working party could be usefully employed to fully explore the potential of an armed robbery information service. Such a body could investigate matters such as formats, costs, funding, collection, analysis, publication, and dissemination.

14. We feel the benefits deriving from the establishment of an armed robbery data service should be concretely demonstrated prior to its establishment. Results of the investigation recommended above when considered in conjunction with the study of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research may well provide the required demonstration.

15. We expect that banks and other financial institutions would benefit from the inter-State dissemination of vital data relating to protective security measures and the current activities and identities of itinerant armed robbers and their respective target preferences. Unions and staff associations could also be recipients of useful information designed to protect those members whose daily duties make them vulnerable to attack by dangerous and sometimes desperate criminals.

16. In conclusion, we wish to state that the crime of armed robbery must, as a matter of urgency, be subjected to critical analysis and, resulting information made available on a national basis to all those professionally engaged in opposing the growing incidence of armed robbery.

17. We further conclude that the information the proposed armed robbery information service is capable of providing would be of utility to all law enforcement agencies, financial houses, betting agencies, commercial enterprises such as service stations, taxi companies, payroll delivery and escort services, and other bodies that are targets of armed robbers.

The various State and federal legislatures could also expect to benefit from such a service.

18. Finally, we wish to state that the complete and unfettered cooperation of all the abovementioned contributors would be necessary to ensure the successful establishment and operation of the proposed armed robbery information service. The nationwide circulation of details of all convicted armed robbers released on parole would greatly facilitate the investigative process of all police departments. Similarly, the dissemination by the proposed service of information relating to all offenders known to participate in armed holdups, their individual *modus operandi*, and their known associates would be of great benefit. The resultant overall increased effectiveness in police efforts to combat the activities of armed robbers would, it is expected, provide a significant deterrent in its own right.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. We accordingly recommend:

- a. that the Australian Police Commissioners consider the establishment of an armed robbery information service as a matter of urgency, and
- b. that the feasibility of an armed robbery information service be researched by a multi disciplinary working party contributed to by each police force.

PREVENTION

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE AGENCIES IN THE PROTECTIVE SECURITY FUNCTION AS IT RELATES TO ARMED ROBBERY

JF ASHBY

The security industry in Australia is essentially private in nature. It does not function in the public sector. Yet the industry performs a preventive function and, should circumstances warrant, some components have a detection capability.

The industry has developed, and continues to exist, to prevent loss from crime or from any other of the complex range of hazards which are to be seen today on all sides of commerce and industry.

Beyond the duties as laid upon us as citizens in general, the protective security industry has no special rights or powers to enforce the laws - nor do we seek them. Our functions are exclusively preventive in character. We exist to protect private property. Our functions are to identify and deal with risk - any kind of risk that can endanger the commercial and industrial enterprises which choose to employ our services.

To do this, we must have the capability to carry out programs of surveys and risk analysis, employ trained personnel to patrol within or about our clients premises, transport their cash or bullion in conditions of high security, and/or to efficiently install and monitor various types of alarm equipment.

It is the desire of the responsible members of the industry to provide a range of services which supplements, and is complementary to, the protective and detective services provided by police.

The industry is concerned that to reach a state of effective control of crime each service must operate in support of the other - the security industry in the private sector and the police in the public sector. Each must make its own special contribution of expertise and initiatives to the protection of people and the possessions.

Only by creating a combination of preventive activity within both the public and private sectors can a much improved defense against crime be achieved and maintained.

We are currently facing a new crime situation in Australia. New and daunting patterns of violence are emerging. We are operating against a somber background of rising crime. The escalation in armed robberies in this country is frightening, and unless it is halted we can expect an extension of this crime into kidnapping, hostage taking and

other terror tactics.

The private security industry must realise the gravity of this deplorable situation and be prepared to play its part in meeting this challenge.

The industry has very real responsibilities - to its clients, to its own employees, to its shareholders, to its insurers, and to the community in general. In this latter area there is a need for recognition of a moral obligation to extend the industry's responsibilities to meet changing attitudes towards crime and, indeed, patterns or trends in crime.

General responsibilities embrace recruitment, training and retraining of staff at all levels, continual review and upgrading of equipment, procedures and methods, maintaining of work environment, safety and security of its own and its clients people and property, maintaining service standards, maintaining its image - all of these are common and reasonably standard.

It must be accepted by industry members that changing times are with us and these mean changing responsibilities.

Let's look at the industry's operations most attractive to armed robbers - armoured car operations.

In this field, Mayne Nickless is the leader. The firm has over a long period of years had the necessary experience and knowledge. As a result of this expertise, Mayne Nickless Ltd has developed a format of material and procedures which is basic to the Australian scene, and which permits of very little improvement.

It may surprise some of you to know that on some days of the week 85% of all cash handled in Australia goes through the Mayne Nickless system alone. The company services 80% of all bank branches in all capital and provincial cities throughout the country. Smaller percentages are handled by Brinks, TNT, and certain other carriers.

Most major business or industrial organisations, State and federal governments, and sporting bodies, for example, use one of the professional agencies for the carriage of their payroll monies. A large proportion is carried as bulk cash, still to be processed. But, an increasing proportion is enveloped prior to delivery. So, at banks and other locations, thousands of separate amounts of cash are delivered to thousands of separate locations each week. All of which are potential targets for armed robbers.

Speaking from experience of the Mayne Nickless operation, many innovative, protective, and preventive measures have been designed and instituted to meet the increasing challenge. Such measures include the introduction of improved armored vehicles fitted with better radio equipment and improved alarm systems to meet the tamper and hijack threats. Firearms are improved, too, in that automatic pistols are being rapidly phased out and replaced with .38 revolvers as standard

issue. Alarm containers with smoke emission and staining devices for use in across the footpath or exposed cash carries have been introduced as have also improved training facilities and more demanding training standards. Individual personal radios, beeper and two way, have been supplied for use by car crews. Numerous other improvements and introductions include the refining of security fittings and alarm systems and locking devices at premises, the use of additional "shadow" or "support" vehicles and staff, and additional security supervisory staff. A standard car crew of three men has been the Mayne Nickless practice for many years. The armored vehicles in which the crews travel are designed for Australian conditions and, to date, have withstood all attacks mounted against them.

The keynote of armored car operations is insurance cover. The major protection companies all provide cover on payroll monies which extends from the time of delivery until eventual disbursement. Thus, we have another enormous area of exposure and armed robbery is a real threat to the maintainance of acceptable insurance conditions.

This adds further responsibilities to the shoulders of private security agencies who, in order to protect their insurance arrangements, have to enter the area of client education.

In the case of Mayne Nickless, some 30 people are employed to perform this education function, which includes surveys of premises, subsequent advice concerning protection of both people and cash, and supervision of improvements. This service is provided at no cost to the client.

Experience has, however, convinced me that there now is a need to go further than this.

Major, responsible private security companies should be prepared to go beyond the normal scope of their business in order to meet their moral obligations.

They should use their influence to:

- a. advise and instruct clients and the general public,
- b. support the police function in every way that can assist in the control and reduction in crime, and
- c. express concern at all appropriate levels on matters such as:
 - (1) lack of police finance and manpower,
 - (2) attitudes of the judiciary as regards parole, bail, and sentences that appear to favor the criminal or in other ways fail to be a real deterrent against crimes of violence,
 - (3) attitudes and actions of the legal occupation that hamper police and appear not to be in the best interests of the community in the area of violent crime,

- (4) attitudes of soft social services legislation and administration effecting violent crime,
- (5) government policies or lack of policy not seen to be in the best interest of the community in general, particularly in the area of crime prevention, detection and punishment, and
- (6) on the other hand, see that government policies appearing to be in the best interests of the community are fully supported.

These latter points, will be new to some companies. However, they represent responsibilities that should be gladly accepted by all private agencies if the incidence of armed robbery and other crimes of violence is to be reduced.

Most major private agencies are members of the Australian Security Industries Association Ltd (ASIAL). The objects of ASIAL include items that lend themselves to the responsibilities referred to.

Major private agencies have human and material resources that could be utilised to assist in the prevention of armed robbery.

The Mayne Nickless Security Support Group adequately illustrates this capability. In Melbourne the group comprises 25 staff members, all using radio controlled unmarked vehicles. As an example of their effectiveness, they report a weekly average of twelve suspicious vehicles and on numerous occasions these reports have resulted in apprehensions by police. Victoria police have also made use of this section to locate suspicious or missing vehicles. One of the group's members has received a cash reward from the Associated Banks for the part he played in the apprehension of a bank robber. Similar situations exist in other States, and there is no doubt about the benefits that close liaison in this area has produced. This is only one area where cooperation and assistance has proved its worth. It is gratifying to know that the police themselves do regard the private agencies as a valuable ancillary.

Experience leads me to believe that there is room for improvement in cooperation between the various State police forces - this situation could improve should a central armed robbery data service be instituted.

Such a bureau or data centre, by providing speedy information concerning persons and *modus operandi*, would greatly assist in combatting the problem of interstate mobility on the part of armed (and other) offenders.

This problem of mobility is not confined to movement within Australia. It also applies to international movement by criminals. It appears far too easy to obtain the necessary documentation to leave this country. Either false passports are used or genuine passports are far too easily available. More stringent measures concerning passport issue should be part of the answer. In this same area, there is a need for "Police with Passports" or, in other words, experienced Australian police personnel resident in overseas countries, particularly the United

Kingdom. The UK is open house to thousands of Australians - no doubt including many dubious and identifiable characters. Action should be taken to make movement between countries much more difficult for those with records for crime of violence.

I am also convinced that the media in all its forms, and particularly TV, is not used to advantage by police. We should take note of the advantage taken by politicians and union leaders of this means of influence and image building.

The media is used to the maximum in mounting propaganda against police by the ultra liberal sections of the community. It can be used equally successfully as a counter measure to such activities. Consideration should be given to this being done. There is a real need for public awareness programs and for potential victim education as well as the need for continual promotion of the police image. Public awareness and education can play an important part in the reduction of crime, in particular the high incidence of armed robbery. Every opportunity must be taken to educate the public and bring about a degree of willing cooperation and assistance. The media should be used as of now to stimulate desirable reactions.

Trends in Australian crime appear certain to follow the US pattern. The media play a part in this also, with their constant featuring of violence and its never ending series of "Cops and Robbers" stories. These can be helpful to a degree as long as the cops keep on winning. Unfortunately, such shows on TV often serve also as an educational medium for criminals when they show detailed sequences of criminal activities.

We are all well aware that the area of drug taking and addiction has not helped the armed robbery situation. If the US pattern is followed in Australia, then the future looks bad indeed. Again, the media should be used to the fullest extent as a much needed counter measure to such threatening trends.

These are not the only trends in the US that are matters for concern. The trend in social attitudes toward police and law and order in that country has a dangerous potential to lower the level of police effectiveness almost to a point of no return. This can be disastrous!

We seem to be in an era of social revolution. People seem to have forgotten that the hardened criminal who makes a habit of perpetrating armed robberies has made a conscious decision to go "bad". He has rejected the opportunity to go straight and has purposely turned against the system which has freed him or has offered him his chance of rehabilitation. When society treats this type like naughty boys and tries to understand rather than punish them, then such criminals merely exploit further the opportunity for crime. Tougher sentences and unpleasant gaols have an important role in deterring these criminals.

Our modern "Freedom Seekers" and "Social Do Gooders" adopt doctrines of rights and freedoms that apparently blind them to the

reality of the needs of the community for an effective administration of the criminal law.

Today we have many problems that have to be faced. We cannot afford to lose the slight advantage we now have - we must act before it is beyond our capability to do so.

This is easy to say. The problem is what action do we take? How can the security industry help in this effort, bearing in mind its strictly private role and its recognition of the fact that it cannot infringe on the public police function? The resources of the private security industry are available and the industry itself is willing to play its part. Meetings such as this can help develop answers to these questions.

COMMENT

ARTHUR BROWN

I believe the Australian police community generally recognises that private security firms have an important role to play in deterring crime by their physical presence, through their programs to educate the private sector in matters of security, and their ability to provide around the clock protection of valuables and business premises. Police also recognise that their own capabilities in the area of property protection are thinly spread and that we possess insufficient manpower to adequately provide the service that is necessary to the public.

Police organisations have a relatively short history and have had difficult years keeping abreast with the rapid escalation of the world's economy. The police mission is complicated somewhat by the fact that social and technological progress has been extremely rapid since the end of World War II. Businesses flourish, personal wealth is greater, and it is fair to say that we live in a materialistic and affluent society. It is because of this that individuals, businesses, and multinational companies demand proper and total security in order to protect their assets, whether they be cash or property. Alone, the police service is incapable of totally satisfying this demand. Therefore, the security industry meets a definite need. In so doing, it utilises technological aid, *ie*, monitor cameras, silent alarms, and other up to date devices, necessary to protect property from criminals.

Today's criminals are more mobile, more intelligent, more educated, more sophisticated in their planning of crimes, possessing modern equipment themselves, and willing to travel vast distances using all modes of transportation to further their criminal activity. The criminal of today bears little resemblance to the criminal of yesterday. Today, crime is a business, a multimillion dollar organised business, which derives its motivation from greed rather than need. The community expects quick and instant movement of valuable property and large sums of money to be available on demand. With this type of movement, it is easy to become disinterested. Often, without realising it, we all place considerable faith in the honesty and skill of private security agencies to successfully carry out these tasks, thereby providing the community with an essential service.

Increasingly, armed robbery has become the crime which has been described as Australia's most recent epidemic (*The Age*, 19 May 77). Armed robberies have become a most lucrative crime. Sometimes, the perpetrators are professional criminals, sometimes amateur opportunists; in either case their crimes involve violence, whether by the use of

firearms, bludgeons, knives, acid, or whatever. Armed robberies, with other crimes, join the ranks of escalating crimes of violence, aided and abetted by dubious law reforms and changing social values.

Both security firms and police must recognise that they function in a hostile environment nowadays. On one hand, the community calls out for police to act decisively against the criminal element. On the other hand, it desires us to work within sometimes impossible guidelines. With this type of backdrop I would see it all the more important for us to cooperate between ourselves. The recent draft legislation, the *Criminal Investigation Bill 1977*, seeks to lay down guidelines and controls over police investigatory conduct. Police and other law enforcement bodies view such legislation as counter productive, hampering police investigations, and giving an unfair advantage to the criminal element. I believe it is important to mention the *Criminal Investigation Bill* because of the effect of similar legislation and court decisions, mainly in the United States of America, where police efficiency has been reduced and public admiration of law enforcement bodies has declined. In some cases, security firms and private guard services in the United States have taken the place of police in certain law enforcement capacities. Such private companies are seen as viable alternatives to traditional police agencies. Security companies are not burdened by case law decisions and departmental regulations following those decisions, which are tempting police more often than not these days, to proceed more cautiously in the field of criminal investigation. However, security firms also must be mindful of the law, especially reformation of laws which set down guidelines for conduct. We do recognise this role of security firms but, we would not like to see the day arrive when such firms are considered by the Australian community as being a complete alternative to police.

I think that, in Australia at least, there should exist a clear demarcation between the roles of police and private security firms. I would not like to personally see that situation which has occurred in the United States, nor would I like us to follow a trend similar to that existing in the United States. In that country, more than 40,000 law enforcement bodies of one kind or another, are joined by a legion of private security firms in order to combat crime. I think such a situation is pure insanity! As I have already said, private security firms have an important role to play, mainly as an aid to the protection of property in the private sector. Police on the other hand, are responsible for the protection of life and property in both the private and public sectors, and for the investigation of all crimes. I do not want to see that situation change.

Both police and security personnel must work together in areas of mutual interest. I am aware of cases in the Australian Capital Territory where security firms have been instrumental in providing police with information which has led to the arrest or identification of an offender. There is no doubt that prevention is ten times better than cure. In an armed robbery situation, it may mean the difference between life and death for some employee, an innocent bystander, or a member of our own service. If private security agencies educate workers in security, and school them in safe and proper procedures, and if they successfully encourage the installation of sophisticated equipment such

as alarms, security locks, and other preventive equipment, then would be armed robbers will, in some instances, be deterred from their intended crime. In the case of professional criminals, we know they weigh the odds, they place likely victims under surveillance, they place premises under surveillance, determine their avenue of attack, and consider their probability of success.

A point is raised in the principal paper concerning the involvement of drugs in motivating some people to commit crimes of violence, particularly armed robberies of chemist's shops, service stations, and shops. Such drug offenders, whilst under the influence of drugs, are highly unpredictable and dangerous. Their mental processes are deranged and they may be confused at the time they are committing the act or, if they are fully aware of the act, they are not concerned about the consequences of their act. It is because of this, that they will have no hesitation in taking a life in order to cater for their addictive habits. This is a relatively new motivational element for robbery offenses. Police are fully aware of this reasoning and constant intelligence is being received from Consorting Squads, Drug Squads, and others.

The principal paper also refers to responsibilities possessed by the security industry to persons both within and outside the industry. It recognises the responsibility to the community at large. These are very real. What we must try to get across to the public is, that without security, whether it be supplied by traditional police or by private security firms, our community will not be a safe place to live in. Academics and civil libertarians do not have a mortgage on knowledge when it comes to crime and criminals. Police are usually the first people on the scene of the crime, the first to see the victim, and usually the first to see the offender upon his apprehension. Those "on scene" circumstances differ vastly from the scenes that are played out later in the air conditioned comfort of court rooms and seminars such as this.

I think it important to state quite clearly that there are differences between security firms and ourselves. Police exist as a nonprofit community service which is not influenced, or should not be influenced, by politicians, shareholders, clients, or profit and loss considerations. Private security firms are concerned about clients and I also believe are concerned about profit and loss. This is, of course, understandable.

The principal paper refers to increased use of the media by police. In the Australian Capital Territory, at least, the need is recognised. I cannot speak for other police forces. Police take the opportunity in this Territory of appearing on television or radio when the necessity arises. We do, however, see that it is necessary to refrain from becoming overexposed. We want the public to sit up and take notice on matters of real importance, particularly when we desire public assistance in solving a crime. Too much publicity of police grievances or reports of minor crimes, will only be rewarded with disinterest.

References in the principal paper to the need for improved cooperation between various State police forces on the question of armed

robberies are not clear. From my own knowledge and experience I know there is a constant exchange of both detectives and information between States. The identity of criminals, their *modus operandi*, and their movements are frequently exchanged.

I am of the opinion our community seeks the best of both worlds. On the one hand, it wishes crime to be eradicated. And, yet, on the other hand, it wants law enforcement agencies to keep within the bounds of unreasonable "fair play", whilst criminals follow rules outside those bounds. The community expects police to maintain law and order effectively under such circumstances and, as long as such rules apply, organisations such as ourselves must realise the grave situation we are in and cooperate. If apathy exists, firearms are not properly controlled, and realistic criminal codes are nonexistent, we shall, unfortunately, slowly but surely lose our effectiveness.

In conclusion, I believe that security firms and the police community, should work toward common goals: the interchange of ideas and information, and the prevention of crime through education and vigilance.

ANTIROBBERY BUILDING DESIGN

RM URE

This paper is an attempt to deal in general terms with antirobbery building design. It is based on personal experience of secure project types such as Reserve Banks, the Royal Australian Mint note printing premises, and similar projects having potential security problems. Whether the measures that have been evolved, by the partnership of architectural designer and a security conscious client, would be effective in all cases is not known - it is doubtful if any security measures or procedures could withstand a determined plan of attack combined with killing if this was found to be necessary.

Antirobbery building designs are ways and means to reduce the opportunity of theft and loss of life. The measures, hopefully, will also prevent armed robbery.

Historically, Australia has been relatively free of American types of armed assault. Our record in the area of robbery prevention building design is good.

The security of vaults associated with central banks, commercial banks, and Mint organisations, employ two methods to prevent illegal penetration.

A secure perimeter enclosure with the strong room door of sufficient strength to resist attack for a predetermined period. In conjunction, the provision of sonic detectors which operate alarms from sound waves generated within the vault area, and air pressure detectors which operate alarms if the air pressure is reduced or increased within the vault area.

The construction of security vaults is by mass concrete enclosure, generally surrounded by a perimeter ambulatory. Typical dimensions would be of the following order:

the floor and walls should be 1m thick and the ceiling 1.5m. If one vault is above the other, the ceiling can be 1m thick. Perimeter corridors are only required in those cases where a vault wall does not adjoin another vault, or where it forms part of the space in front of the vaults.

The vault door and escape hatch are constructed to the security strength required by the bank authorities. During working hours, and

while the door is open, an additional high tensile steel inner grille protects the door opening.

All mechanical services used within the vault during working hours (such as electrical services, telephone, air conditioning) are disconnected prior to closing the vault.

The security reasons which produce this type of criteria can be summarised as follows:

- a. the provision of a perimeter ambulatory prevents an enclosing vault wall from being located and used as a boundary wall,
- b. the ambulatory can be checked visually by means of mirrors at all return corners,
- c. as all mechanical and electrical services connect and disconnect as part of the vault door, there are no penetrations through the surrounding concrete enclosure, and
- d. the provision of sonic/air alarms ensures detection of attack from both outside and inside the building.

Access to the vault areas is the next link in the security chain; a typical design brief for several levels of vaults would read:

the vaults shall be accessible from rooms on a higher level which can be locked by means of vault doors. These rooms should give access by means of stairs and lifts to the space in front of the various vaults and to individual vault doors. In principle, each vault shall have its own lobby, but the stair and lift wells shall be centralised in one or more units and used exclusively for the carriage of valuables and attendant staff.

The next critical building area is the vehicle entry point of a security complex, and it is good security practice to check the credentials of the drivers and guards, and the contents of vehicles on every occasion that they enter the building. This measure is designed to detect assault groups who may be concealed in bullion trucks prior to entry to more sensitive security areas in the following manner.

Access to the premises from the street should be controlled by an armed guard, protected by bullet proof glass on all exposed faces of a guard box which is located on an external wall adjacent to the vehicle entry point. The vehicle can be identified before admittance through the external security gate to the internal checking area, which is normally a section of the trafficway isolated from the security area by enclosing walls and two grille gates - one of which is the security gate previously referred to.

Upon entering the checking area, the external gate is closed - permitting a thorough check at close quarters of the guard's credentials

and the interiors of the vehicle with the aid of wall mounted mirrors. The principle that the guard does not leave his enclosure during the security check and that both security gates are in a closed position before the second gate is opened should always be maintained.

Various methods have been devised to maintain consistent and appropriate security standards where valuables move between process areas, *eg*, from vault to banking chamber, or vault to despatch area as in the case of Reserve Banks.

Where possible each processing department is planned as a separate functional area which is isolated from similar activity sections by security walls or grilles. Secure overnight storage is provided in the form of day vaults with a reduced security rating for walls and doors. Bullion or cash lifts which serve the bulk vault and working areas are separated from the passenger lifts and only serve the security areas.

In many cases the cash lift lobby serving a particular department is separately secured from access to the working area by grilles and security gates which are monitored by closed circuit TV.

Self contained toilets that are only accessible from within the security area are also provided for the more sensitive areas. Consideration has also been given to providing ensuite meal facilities which would ensure that all staff remain within the secure area until accounting procedures clear the day's work without discrepancies.

A variation on this theme, where a factory type process such as the Royal Australian Mint is carried out, is the twin change room/lockers concept. This reduces the opportunity of staff taking samples which can be hidden in their street clothes. One locker room accommodates street clothes, the second separate locker accommodates factory clothes, toilets and showers. Staff are not permitted access to their street clothes during the working shift, and transit between the two areas is in underclothes.

Where interface occurs between the public and the secure area, for instance the banking chamber, further problems must be anticipated and solutions devised.

Dealing first with internal security and accounting practice for cash issues to staff, one overseas method provides cashiers with a small fireproof day vault adjacent to their office which is *not on the counter line*. The day vault is used at lunch or in a case of emergency, but not at night.

In addition, each cashier is provided with a mobile cash box designed as two hinged leaves which are subdivided internally into pigeon holes for the storage of notes and cash. The box can be locked between transactions and is secured in the day vault as required. At the close of business, all cash and securities are placed under maximum security within the main vault area.

The problem of cash at the counter line has not in the past been considered the security risk that it is today - the open glazed screen

teller's box, the counter width, the dimensions of the access gate and the height of the glazed enclosure being designed for the unlikely quick snatch.

Administrative procedures and detailed architectural planning in Holland, however extreme, would appear to strengthen this weak area.

The public area of banking chambers is separated from the working area by a continuous close mesh steel grille some 2.75m high. Small access panels are provided for each counter position. Each transaction then concerns the cashier who is located some distance from the counter and an intermediate counter attendant who deals with the clerical aspects of payments and is issued with the cash needs for each transaction.

Indepth antirobbery security systems which may be incorporated in maximum security situations are necessary to monitor all occupants of the building. They cannot be guaranteed because we are dealing with human beings who are unpredictable - an attack from inside the organisation is always a possibility.

Reducing opportunity has already been discussed, and ways and means to detect and prevent staff from planned or spontaneous opportunity for theft is an associated aspect of anti-robbery building design.

A fairly primitive prototype of the past was the observation gallery which oversighted the mail sorters at some of our General Post Offices. Today, more sophisticated methods are employed which monitor both vehicle and staff movement by means of closed circuit TV, whether or not security doors are open or closed, regardless of the movement and location of all lifts, and whether alarms are activated. These security aids are normally terminated in a self contained, well protected, control center.


To indicate the depth of thought involved in security planning, the optimum staff number of three controllers has been selected to provide the least opportunity for collusion and misuse of the system to assist others in an attack.

In the case of staff providing information which would assist others to plan and execute a robbery, it is often said that all secrets go out the door at close of business. Obviously, a knowledge of security methods and procedures can assist others - the only counter to this problem is application of the "need to know" principle. This applies to the architect as well as others.

Safety of life during attack is also an important detail design consideration. We believe that in some cases high strength steel grilles in isolation are not an appropriate barrier against armed attack. In the case where an armed intruder can threaten a guard through an open steel grille and so gain entry through the door, we believe that an additional glass barrier, which is not necessarily bullet proof, will provide additional psychological protection against attack.

It is difficult to generalise on the subject of security building design. Problems differ from project to project. In some cases it has been necessary to prevent an intruder destroying administrative records. In the case of the Royal Australian Mint, an important security consideration is how to prevent staff from throwing bullion or coins through windows - hence high windows in the production hall.

A case did occur at an overseas mint where gold bars were stolen in this manner during winter, and the culprit was subsequently apprehended - three months later at the end of the thaw!



EMPLOYEE RELATED CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING ANTIROBBERY BUILDING DESIGN

KEITH SALTER

My topic is extremely wide in application and to deal with it fully one needs to consider firstly, the practical operating requirements of a company occupying premises, before attempting to build in security requirements. For example, the practical operating and security needs of a service station and of a bank vary greatly.

Because of a life time involvement in the banking industry, initially as a conservative practical banker and presently as a full time officer of the Australian Bank Officials' Association my remarks are addressed specifically to the matter of antirobbery building design as applied to banks.

In talking of bank buildings, I refer in the main to branch bank buildings of which there are some 8,000 throughout Australia. The vast majority of these branches do not have a staff complement in excess of 8 or 9 persons. However, throughout the suburbs of the various capital cities there are numerous branches with staff complements in excess of that number and still more branches with branch complements below that number.

Whether or not there are too many of these small bank branches throughout Australia is a matter for discussion at some other time, never the less it is a situation to which we have been committed, and we must deal with the resultant problems accordingly.

Some thirty years ago, before Australia "took off" on the growth pattern of the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of bank branches irrespective of actual location, were substantial buildings constructed of brick or stone with a manager's residence built in under the same roof, either at the rear of the bank or above it.

The external doors usually had steel plate backings and most windows were protected by ornate looking iron bars. The passer by at street level had little opportunity to see what went on inside the bank, for in addition to iron bars, many windows were equipped with black woven fabric screens for the specific purpose of keeping out the inquisitive eyes. If a person had good reason to enter the bank, most probably the only member of staff he could see readily, was the teller. He would have been situated behind a substantial looking counter approximately 1.1m high and 1.5m wide in a "wooden cage". Half-way across the counter separating teller from customer would have been

wooden partitions approximately 1m in height joined by a metal grille. Unless other staff were working directly behind the teller's cage they would not be visible to the public for they too, were (presumably) at work behind high wooden partitions.

Situated in the teller's cage at floor level would have been an audible alarm button which on being depressed, set off a buzzer or bell, sounding usually in the manager's office. Manager, accountants, tellers and ledger keepers all had custody of a pistol. Altogether, a forbidding sight to customers. That then was the general scene common to the bank branches of yesteryear and from which led to the coining of a phrase, "it is as safe as a bank!".

The validity of that phrase is today being questioned. How, then can we best ensure that a bank's negotiable assets, its staff and customers, are made safe from the actions of armed bandits?

We are all aware of the many facets that need to be pieced together to make up the overall security pattern, such as education of staff, building design, antirobbery hardware, aids to apprehension, and ultimately treatment of the offenders.

Community attitudes and social behavior have changed dramatically over the last 20 years, and the commission of serious crimes is taking place in many areas of our community - areas that we previously regarded as safe.

However, it is my firm belief that despite the views just expressed, one of the main reasons why previously "safe" areas have become vulnerable, is the influence of the marketing people, not only in Australia, but on a worldwide scale.

During the early 1950s the word "growth" was on the tongue of every business leader in this country, and the banking industry was about to witness the greatest degree of expansion relative to population since the turn of the century. Banks were eager to be represented at almost every point that a cluster of factories, retail shops or houses appeared. Concurrent with this expansion came the change in policies of most banks with the tendency to open branches in rented premises, in fact almost any type of shop was used in the desperate but not unnatural desire to obtain representation at any cost. Attached residences for managers were no longer built or sought.

The continuance of this growth period brought increased pressures on senior bank staff - just as it did to all sections in the work force, and saw the introduction of more junior males and females into areas of considerable responsibility, particularly that of cash handling. Within a few years this area of responsibility was to become "the lot" of the 16 to 20 years old employee. Experience in these areas was extremely shallow. Numerous stringent measures previously carried as a matter of course in the banking world were relaxed and it often crossed my mind during those days that security-wise, banks were wide open and ready for the "picking".

Australia was not the only country in which the banking explosion was taking place, and I quote the words of a leading United States security man - many times a visitor to this country. Speaking of the USA he said 'In the 1960s the banks started a move to go to the public; to make as much direct contact as possible. It was said they should take banking to the public and to do this they should take down the barriers. They put banks everywhere. If "A" put a bank somewhere, "B" did likewise. We finished up with banks on every corner, in fact the USA is over banked. Architects design banks without any thought to security, low counters, etc., to be nice to the housewife. Bankers are a peculiar breed in that they think alike in their efforts to draw business, but they are not security conscious'.

In my view this comment on the US scene also applies to Australia.

Security was talked about but in reality it was forgotten in the clamor to win business. Hundreds of thousands of pounds were spent on publicity but little was spent on architectural design embodying security. It was the day of the open look, almost like the supermarket self service store - and that's precisely what some people did, helped themselves with the aid of a gun!

Screens and bars were removed from windows, glass doors replaced the steel plated ones, the partitions separating staff from customers disappeared, counters were lowered, locked doors to staff areas were replaced by small half size "flap" doors, the grilles separating teller from customer were removed and some banks removed teller's cages altogether - allegedly to "humanise" awesome banks.

Certainly, banks looked brighter, more modern, perhaps more comfortable for staff to work in, but the low narrow counters like low cut frocks were attractive and pleasant to look at, but potentially dangerous for the owner.

Since the middle and late 1960s, armed holdups have become more prevalent and more daring.

Security has improved but armed bandits have also improved their techniques, and they remain well ahead in the race for easy money.

Some bank officers have been killed, some have been injured physically, and many more injured in a way that is extremely difficult to assess - psychologically. An even greater number have left the industry due to the aftermath of being involved, and it is authoritatively stated that some members of the public are now becoming apprehensive at the thought of having to enter a bank.

It could be that at this stage, readers are searching for my thoughts on antirobbery building designs. However, I have delved a little back in history for three reasons, namely - to refresh our minds of the sorts of measures taken in relation to security in pre-war years, to remind us all of the change in social behavior that has taken place in our community over recent years, and to demonstrate that some of the ideas I shall put forward are by no means new but which I believe have valuable application in today's security scene.

EXTERNAL CONSTRUCTION AND FACADE

Brick, stone, or concrete are the most desirable materials, with a brick facade to eye level and reflector glass above.

EXTERNAL DOOR

Of metal construction, through which public and staff pass to double swing doors or revolving door.

ROOF AND CEILING

Normal roofing materials with sealed wiring of beam or sonic protective alarm systems.

Public space, staff space, and all staff facilities, constructed under one roof with no outbuildings.

INTERNAL DESIGN

Assuming a square or rectangular area is available, counters should be constructed in such a way as to provide maximum view of the teller's line from the staff work area.

All tellers should be within direct view of at least one other staff member at all times.

All counters should be constructed of bullet resistant materials from top to floor level (approximately 1.1m).

It is desirable that bullet resistant glass screens be built into the full counter structure to a height of at least 1.5m above counter level. Such screens to be installed flush with front edge of counter or if a "ledge" is required at counter level, the glass should be fixed at an angle of approximately 150 degrees.

If bullet resistant glass is not to be used above counter level, bullet resistant partitioning should be installed to 1m above counter level with metal grilles joining partitions directly in front of teller's position.

The sides and rear of tellers' cages should be constructed of bullet resistant material to counter level with glass above to enable staff viewing.

The cash handling activities of tellers should be visible only from the rear (staff area) and by person(s) directly in front of the teller(s).

MANAGER'S ROOM

Constructed of bullet resistant material in all cases with bullet resistant glass panel on staff area side.

STRONGROOM

Constructed of usual materials and so placed that "dead" pockets of space are eliminated.

ACCESS TO STAFF AREA FROM PUBLIC SPACE

By one door only - in all cases to be constructed of a size to prevent possibility of scaling. Of bullet resistant material and opened only from staff area.


REAR WINDOWS AND VENTILATION

Barred and/or protected by beam or sonic devices. Locking devices to be used on metal window frames.

In addition, to the foregoing one would wish to see numerous pieces of antirobbery hardware used, some items of which are simple ones, built in to the building and no doubt mention will be made of those items in other papers.

Overall, the object is to "buy time" at every point; from the moment the bandit enters the building, construction and design of fittings should be designed to make each move a little more difficult to achieve.

Bank customers will not be concerned if there is a little inconvenience, provided they have visual evidence that good security is working in their general interest.



ANTIROBBERY HARDWARE - APPLICATIONS AND RESEARCH

RR POWELL

Good physical security has two bases, design and hardware. Although closely interrelated they each represent substantial categories in their own right. Although more concerned here with the latter, I propose to commence with a few relevant comments concerning the former.

DESIGN

To ensure that buildings are resistant to attack, it will be necessary for clients, architects, and security advisers to combine in the development of adequate designs. Taking banks as an example, greater consideration needs to be given to the protection of tellers and/or cash handling areas. Substantial counters will need to be designed, as present models are incapable of supporting bullet resistant glass.

In a more immediate vein, it is observed that grilles on all external windows are integral to good security design. Good quality locking systems are equally necessary. It is important to utilise locks in conjunction with a commercially designed key register. The possibility of unauthorised keys being cut is not totally excluded but, is substantially reduced as blanks for such keys are harder to obtain.

Quite a different situation exists in the computer industry where architects still strive for good looking computer suites rather than secure design. The following recommendations are made in relation to computer suites:

- a. they should be built on the lines of a concrete block house within the perimeter walls of the host building, not at street level,
- b. they should contain their own no break emergency power generating plant to ensure that downtime cannot occur from power loss, and
- c. they should be equipped with an access control system, together with other electronic security devices.

Other premises requiring special security design consideration include commercial warehouses, government establishments, jewellers, retail stores, and pharmacies. Similar attention, also, requires to be

paid to matters such as bullet resistant glass, grilles, and good quality locking systems.

Carefully designed buildings have the advantage of permitting the installation of antirobbery hardware at any stage of occupation. Above all, proper design can make a building a hard target to penetrate, the prime aim of antirobbery planners.

HARDWARE

Security hardware and methods have two basic applications, during daytime or normally occupied hours, and during night time or normally unoccupied hours.

Occupied hours

Two major risks of daytime security are:

- a. holdups, and
- b. persons secreting themselves on premises during business hours with a view to attacking their target during unattended hours.

Holdups are difficult to prevent unless physical obstructions are employed. We are currently experiencing a robbery boom but, are only using alarms and hard film fixed lens cameras.

Holdup alarms are generally connected by means of a Telecom line to a remote monitoring point. The monitoring point is usually located at a private, central station. Some banks and government institutions possess their own control centers.

Hard film cameras offer a description only of those attacker(s) appearing within the camera's focus. Holdup film is nevertheless of great utility to investigators.

Persons secreting themselves on premises during business hours with a view to committing a crime during unmanned hours indicate flaws in the operation of security procedures and/or equipment. There is a number of methods and devices designed to counter such a tactic. They can be used either singly or in combination as indicated by particular circumstances. Systems considered here include CCTV, interlocking door systems, photo ID, and access control.

- a. CCTV. The potential of CCTV is only now starting to be fully exploited for security purposes in Australia. The medium is versatile, having the capacity to operate in light through near dark circumstances. CCTV systems can consist of a basic camera and one monitor or, any aggregation thereof. In addition, time lapse videotape standard reel recorders are capable of up to 96 hours uninterrupted operation.

CCTV systems can be programmed for automatic sequential switching from camera to camera, and will lock on to any intrusion through the use of video sensors. Audio detection equipment, used in conjunction with CCTV, can be programmed to respond to certain sounds, *eg*, pistol shots or shattering glass, the nearest camera being automatically switched to a main monitor and an alarm sounded.

In terms of cost effectiveness and surveillance efficiency, there is no doubt CCTV has an important role to play. Such systems can be monitored by personnel during business hours, and operated automatically in unmanned times.

- b. Interlocking door systems can be effectively employed in conjunction with CCTV to operate remote door locking and unlocking. It can also be utilised to enable controlled access to specific target areas. Identification by CCTV and intercom to a central guard position guarantees knowledge of personnel in restricted areas.
- c. Photo ID systems supplement other security systems. Considerable flexibility is obtainable with such cards and the color coding and/or embossing thereof.
- d. Access control systems. Due to the basic cost involved in setting up a guardroom situation, there is a requirement for automatic controlled access systems. Such systems basically involve a magnetically coded card key. Such keys have the ability to be programmed with infinite combinations and cannot be reproduced by anyone other than the manufacturer.

The potential sophistication of card key systems and their utility to security purposes is now being fully appreciated. Modern access control equipment allows for time zoning both cards and terminals, voiding or cancelling of individual keys, security access level coding, and alarm monitoring.

Card access systems range from standard one door entry systems through coupled multisectional door control systems with interface to microprocessors and/or mini-computers.

Unoccupied hours

The unmanned situation possesses an entirely different set of conditions from those obtaining during manned hours. During manned hours, guards or company employees keep a watchful eye on the situation. During unmanned hours, electronic equipment and security hardware must take over. There is an enormous range of security equipment available today. A selection thereof are discussed here.

- a. Door contact switches. This is a basic switching device, utilised to indicate door status by changeover contacts in the form of micro switches or a magnetic reed contact. There is a variety of sizes available, variously suited to normal doors, roller shutter doors, and special door applications.
- b. Window equipment. Two commonly used types of window detector devices currently in use are magnetic foil tape, and window vibration sensors.
- c. Movement detectors. There are three basic forms of motion detectors utilising microwave, infra red, and ultrasonic principles:
 - (1) Microwave detectors transmit through an antenna precisely defined microwave energy patterns into the surveillance area and the returning reflective energy wave is recorded by the unit. The reflected wave is then compared to the transmitted wave utilising the Doppler shift principle. A difference in frequency between the transmitted and reflected wave signals indicates the presence of an intruder in the target area. The system is not effected by air turbulence, draughts, noise, or temperature extremes. They must, however, be placed with great discrimination, due to the high penetration nature of microwave energy.
 - (2) Passive infra red detectors do not emit a signal but, sense rapid changes in infra red energy only. Should an intruder enter or leave the surveillance area, a rapid change in the infra red energy level is created, thereby creating an alarm condition. Nearly all construction materials, including glass, provide a penetration barrier to infra red energy ensuring stable operation within the area covered by the detector.
 - (3) Ultrasonic detectors are becoming the most widely used motion detectors in the world today, combining the best features of ultrasonic and microwave units. They are unaffected by air turbulence, radio frequency noises, and vibration, thereby avoiding the most common causes of false alarms in motion detectors. The signal process of ultrasonic detectors is such that alarms depend on net changes in range of targets. Blowing curtains, vibrating walls, air turbulence are not recognised as net changes in range.
 - (4) Control equipment. To ensure that detection does not go unnoticed, the previously mentioned detectors can be connected to three different types of control equipment:

- (A) Local alarm systems, which are local audible devices designed to deter burglars or vandals in less valuable areas,
- (B) Automatic alarm dialling devices can be used in addition to local alarm systems. Upon alarm, a dialling device, utilising a private Telecom network, dials up to three separate preprogrammed telephone numbers. When answered, an eight track pretaped cartridge verbally indicates the nature of the alarm. Should the first number be engaged, it will automatically switch to the second and third numbers. If all three are engaged, it will reset, and if the alarm condition is still apparent, the sequence is repeated. If, at any time after the alarm call is transmitted, the receiver wishes to cease a machine's operation, he need only dial a device's prescribed number to terminate the sequence. Dialling devices have excellent application where Telecom lines, due to distance, become prohibitively expensive.
- (C) Direct line alarms are connected to a central station. Alarm conditions are transmitted over a pair of Telecom cables and received at a continuously monitored operations area. Accredited bureaus generally have direct communication with appropriate police control centers, response being only seconds away.

Direct line alarms are preferable for high value target areas. Clients are thereby assured of constantly monitored premises during unattended periods.

- (5) Perimeter security. In recent years, defense establishments, government offices, and large commercial premises, have increasingly been protected by perimeter security detecting devices. They represent an excellent first line of defense.

Fence mounted alarm equipment offers early warning of intrusion in instances of lengthy unmanned boundaries. Earlier problems with externally mounted detecting devices have been solved by the application of modern technology. Such technology as microwave pressure, infra red energy, vibration detection, and the more recent E/Field perimeter alarm system, are all commonly employed in perimeter protection.

PRESENT SITUATION - SUMMARY

To summarise the present situation with regard to antirobbery hardware the following points are reiterated:

- a. buildings should be designed to make target areas as inaccessible as possible,
- b. physical obstructions such as grilles, and bullet resistant glass should make high value areas difficult to attack,
- c. good quality locking systems should be used in all areas,
- d. a combination of card key access control, CCTV, and photo ID should be employed to control access during operational hours,
- e. motion detectors and door contacts connected to a sophisticated central station alarm system should be used to ensure detection of attackers during unattended hours, and
- f. that serious consideration be given to first line defense perimeter detecting devices.

If these measures were to be widely, intelligently, and appropriately employed, we may not eliminate the problem of robbery but, it would be reduced considerably.

ANTIROBBERY HARDWARE - FUTURE

A few brief remarks only are possible here, as conditions within the electronics industry change daily. Two major research areas can be classified as local and overseas.

Local

The Wormald Security Group through Wormald International Electronics perform substantial research and development in the security field. Efforts are primarily directed at the control equipment area.

Recent development enables consideration of microprocessors for control equipment. After considerable development, production units are now being tested. Units will eventually be utilised as combined access controllers and security systems. They represent the highest degree of sophistication available in security hardware.

The system will control access (using card keys) to certain areas and at restricted times. Cards will be able to be validated or cancelled directly by the controller. Such matters as door contacts, and motion detectors will also be supervised by it.

The system has been designed with an IBM compatible output to permit interface with a large main frame computer. This compatibility offers almost unrestricted parameters for data storage.


Microprocessors are not only technically sophisticated but, are also inexpensive when compared to the older, hard wire equipment. A compact, inexpensive approach to modern security control for commercial, government, and banking institutions is thus on the threshold.

Overseas

Little can be said concerning the overseas security research scene. As a general proposition, Australia follows American and European leads in relation to antirobbery hardware. We are completely abreast of the latest technological developments.

Apart from keeping an eye on specific developments, the annual world security conference provides a forum for the display of the latest equipment and "know how".

Although not immune from the current worldwide upsurge in armed robbery, Australia's private security industry is well informed on all matters of antirobbery technology. Clients are accordingly able to take advantage of the world's latest available equipment should they so wish.



SECURITY PHILOSOPHIES AND ACTION BY THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN TOTALIZATOR AGENCY BOARD*

PC PAGE

Awareness of the risk of armed holdups was built into the initial planning of the South Australian Totalizator Agency Board (SATAB). This awareness flowed both from essential features of the Board's activities and from the experience of similar institutions in other States. Security equipment was in place and appropriate procedures were established prior to SATAB commencing operations in March 1967. A fulltime security officer was appointed to further implement security by way of risk surveys, staff training, and development of procedures.

During 1969, an indepth review of SATAB security requirements was conducted. The primary purpose of the review was to examine, evaluate, and determine the type of security hardware best suited to SATAB needs. The Board's desire was to ensure: (1) it was meeting social and community obligations, and (2) it was maintaining desirable levels of morale by safeguarding staff safety through the use of adequate security precautions.

In the course of the review, crime trends generally were examined, and details of holdups on other TABs, banks, and similar cash handling premises were analysed. The attitudes of other business organisations to crime related matters were solicited and considered. Overseas crime trends were looked at. The views of the insurance industry were taken into account as were those of the public. Security equipment such as alarms and cameras were evaluated. Police opinions were asked for and legal ramifications were assessed. Even the views of some criminals were taken into account, although the criminals concerned were unaware of the use to which their views were put.

The review took several months to complete. It included recommendations concerning alarm systems. Specifications for a new type of alarm system were even included. Selected extracts relevant to crime prevention are given here:

- a. 'There is a significant increase in the crime rate, especially against persons and property where "fast profit" was the motive. Crime trends show that the majority of serious crimes are committed by those in the 20-29 age group and a survey in South Australia indicates that over the next 10 years the greatest growth in population will be in that group, an estimated 32% more than other age groups.'

* This paper relates exclusively to the South Australian Totalizator Agency Board. It should not be generalised to other States or agencies.

- b. 'Because of the nature of our business (cash handling) our business hours (day, evenings and weekends) and our staffing in agencies (nearly all females) we are high on the list of probable holdups.'
- c. 'There is no means of total protection against holdups so the best that can be expected is to make the task as difficult as practicable and the risk of detection/apprehension as high as possible.'
- d. 'Security measures should be commensurate with the threat and the amount of time, money and effort which may justifiably be spent on security is governed by the risks to which the TAB agencies are likely to be exposed.'
- e. 'We should consider security in terms of Prevention - Protection - Detection and Apprehension although the latter is a Police function.'
- f. '"Prevention" is often said to be a Police function but it is becoming more evident that the community, particularly business organisations must share the burden of crime prevention. Our most feasible way is to deter any wouldbe offender.'
- g. '"Protection" can be achieved by equipping agencies with security hardware and training staff in correct security attitudes and procedures.'
- h. '"Detection" - Again by similar means as those of "Protection".'
- i. 'The hold-up offender usually considers the risks involved in his actions, the likely gains for his effort, the time factor and the ease.'
- j. 'In considering the risks involved the two greatest for the criminal are apprehension and the punishment from the courts.'
- k. 'The current alarm systems available are not keeping up with the technology being displayed by some criminals and the value of surveillance cameras has not been fully appreciated in this country.'
- l. 'A statistical prediction based on crime trends since 1956 indicates that "Robbery with Violence" offenses will be one (sic) of the fastest growing offenses. In 1966 there were 18 such offenses in SA with a "jump" to 28 in the 1967/1968 year and by 1977 we can expect more than 30 if we use such statistical predictions.' (NOTE: In 1975 there were 192).

Subsequent to the review, specifications for alarm equipment were put out for tender. Contracts were entered into and the equipment was manufactured in accordance with our needs. Surveillance cameras were installed in most metropolitan TAB branches, together with silent alarm systems utilising digital technology. Warning signs were placed in agency windows adjacent to entrances. In other words, we publicised the fact that our premises are protected.

Arrangements have been entered into with the SA Police Department whereby SATAB offer rewards, on police advice, to persons materially assisting in giving evidence leading to convictions against persons robbing or attempting to rob their premises.

Further products of the security review were the introduction of a security manual, the formalisation of security policy, and improved staff training. SATABs security department is responsible for relevant staff training and maintains a close liaison with all branches.

SATAB faces a number of special problems in terms of effective security against holdups. The Board must provide a service to the public and this requires branch agencies to be open during days, evenings, Saturdays, and public holidays. Most staff are part time and female. The hours of work result in a significant staff turnover which in turn makes security training an ongoing process. For operational purposes, branch agencies are widely decentralised. Many punters identify with particular agencies and this client characteristic needs to be respected. In order to maintain good relations, staff need to be accessible and not sealed away or obscured from clients by such things as glass screens (a growing overseas trend). Race sheets are displayed for customer reference. It is a simple matter for persons to loiter by such sheets and be perceived as clients. Staff vacate the branch agencies at times when most other business are closed, thus leaving them exposed to possible danger. All these problems were considered during the course of the security review and wherever feasible steps were taken to preserve and reinforce security.

Amongst other things the review brought about was the establishment of criteria for agency design. It was determined that selling counters should be in full view from the street, and as far away from the entrance as possible. It was also determined that steel grills should be installed in branch agencies to deter people from jumping over the counter top. The psychological deterrent posed by the grill was also taken into account. It was decided that public entry and exit should be through a single doorway in order to maximise the effect of surveillance cameras. Other hardware and electronic equipment must, for present purposes, remain confidential. It was understood that by minimising the possibility of robber(s) jumping over the counter (a method used on several occasions in banks), the risks of demand by threat at counters, or forcing departing staff back into premises, or the taking of a member of the public as a hostage, were increased.

Because security is so intangible it is not possible to objectively prove that our security measures are effective. However, the first SATAB holdup in a protected agency attracted a certain amount of

publicity as it was the first time in SA that a holdup had been recorded by a surveillance camera. The offender was arrested soon after as a result of the photographs so obtained. Due either to the resultant publicity or coincidence, the holdup rate in SA dropped rapidly, particularly at TAB branches. All TABs communicate with each other on various matters, including robberies. All holdups are reported in a set format to permit *inter alia* comparative analysis. The results of such analysis in SATAB are fed into the Board's ongoing security planning processes.

In the event of a SATAB branch agency robbery, members of the security department attend the scene. They are responsible for both establishing liaison with attending police and attending to the welfare of staff. In the event of a court case, security personnel accompany SATAB employees attending as witnesses. By such means staff welfare is catered for and an opportunity is provided to assess reactions to the occurrence. Although SATAB has been subjected to only nine holdups, much has been learned from the experience. Fortunately, no one has been physically injured during a SATAB robbery to date but, psychological trauma has been suffered. This fact, together with the morale effect on those working in the company of a traumatised robbery victim, can on occasions have a serious impact on staffing.

As the result of a follow up of staff holdup victims, we have established that there is less anxiety suffered during first moments of a robbery than subsequently, when shock sets in. The psychological after effects of a robbery are the most disturbing and damaging to staff. In some cases, staff victims have found it necessary to seek other and less vulnerable employment.

Although the incidence of holdups against TAB and bank branches in South Australia has declined, no sense of false security has resulted. There is a philosophy of alertness amongst security personnel which ensures that security defenses are maintained in a high state of preparedness.

It would be very satisfying to know the reason for the declining incidence of holdups against bank and TAB branches in South Australia. Holdups overall are increasing, of course, but appear to be aimed at businesses lacking protection. And yet, in other States, robbers continue to hold up banks and TABs regardless of their sophisticated security hardware. It is answers to problems such as these that are necessary to permit proper evaluation of our security system. In the meanwhile, local and interstate robbery trends are under constant examination as a means to maintaining security in an optimum state of readiness.

ROBBERS, VICTIMS, AND DETERRENCE

Past experience as a detective with the South Australian Police Department together with knowledge gained from research into holdups and other security problems has led to the reaching of certain conclusions concerning robbers, their victims, and the best forms of deterrence.

Persons who commit holdups against TABs, small banks, and small businesses are not normally "hard core" criminal types. It is often their first attempt at robbery. As with most offenders they no doubt consider the risks of Detection - Apprehension - Conviction - Punishment - Consequences. The lone robber, if armed, is usually very tense and presents a danger due to his nervous condition. Where there are two or more robbers, a "pack" instinct is more prevalent and they are more likely to resort to violence. But, in all cases, if they are armed there is a distinct risk they may use their weapon, especially in the event of sudden movement or in other efforts to hamper escape from the scene.

It would seem that the principles of punishment and consequences attendant to the commissions of a crime are currently unpopular amongst jurists and others. So much so, that many offenders accept the risks of criminal activity with little fear for what may happen to them in the event of apprehension. This being the case, there is a real need to consider if current sentencing practices are adequate.

Rehabilitation of criminals is certainly worthwhile with respect to those individuals capable of responding positively to the demands of society. But, criminals are known who brag of their ability to deceive court officers, judges, probation officers, and parole officers. A South Australian criminologist recently stated it was nonsense for police to claim that they "know" criminals and how best to handle them. A criminal caught in the act or shortly thereafter is a very different person from the one seen later by the social worker, social investigator, or whomever. At that time, he is looking for goodwill and favors. Behavior will naturally be modified (briefly) to achieve those ends.

There is in society today, a less than desirable level of concern for victims of crime. Anyone who has seen at close range the physical and psychological damage suffered by robbery victims cannot fail to feel strongly on the point. People are awarded damages for injuries received as the result of a motor accident, why not compensation on a similar scale for victims, the offender to be responsible? The same can be said in terms of financial loss to TABs, banks, and others. Why should an offender steal thousands of dollars by force, enjoy the proceeds, and yet not be responsible for repayment when convicted?

TECHNOLOGICAL HARDWARE AND BUILDING DESIGN AS DEFENSES AGAINST ARMED ROBBERY - RESOLUTION

PREAMBLE

1. We wish to record our deep concern with the current escalation of armed robbery in Australia and, the frightening impact of the crime on the reasonably expected quality of life of the community.
2. We accept and stress there is no magic solution. Defense is a total matter which includes prevention, protection, detection, detention, and education. It necessarily involves a high cost factor that the entire community must ultimately bear. Defense also involves a comprehensive approach by the entire criminal justice system to support police efforts by means of restricting rights to bail (coupled with the right to speedy trial), parole, and the acceptance that convicted offenders should expect a lengthy period of imprisonment.
3. We further express our concern that these are areas seriously vulnerable to attack by robbers, and that these problem areas are not recognised. In addition to banks, where media attention has sometimes been excessively focused, we point to high risk areas revealed by research, such as chemists, retail stores, service stations, hotels and clubs, taxis, TABs, post offices, pay offices, restaurants, and places of entertainment.
4. We are concerned with the high incidence of street robberies. We believe the situation can be improved through the application of various devices and currently available knowledge. Resort should be made to further developing these means through research, as well as to the utilisation of professional courier services.
5. We believe there is limitless scope in revealed high risk areas for the application of available design concepts, devices, and services, in relatively simple "housekeeping" adjustments to existing premises and, more particularly, in the planning of new premises. A special need exists in small businesses for such applications.
6. Scope also exists for further research by equipment and service industries. Often such research should be undertaken in conjunction with clients operating in high risk areas.
7. We express our dismay at the lack of use made of the advice and expertise of security and design specialists in many areas of anticrime planning. We emphasise that hardware and design considerations are merely a means to preserving reasonable levels of public safety.

8. While not dismissing many innovative and novel approaches that have arisen in relation to hardware and building design, we caution on the need for proper testing and evaluation. We condemn extravagant claims, often unwittingly promoted in the media, for materials and methods which have not been properly evaluated.

9. We express our concern at occasional, sensational media treatment of certain aspects of armed robbery - particularly those instances relating to hardware and building design. We strongly feel there is a case for enlisting constructive media support in protective security matters. In this regard a professionally managed and oriented seminar for media executives could be of some benefit. Such a seminar should include a wide range of matters and not be confined solely to hardware and design considerations.

10. In the long term, we see some alleviation from the problem of armed robbery resulting from the demonetisation of our economy. However, we also note the potential for different types of crime which will in turn require research.

11. In developing our recommendations we envisage a conceivably wider catalyst role and some broader activity for the Australian Institute of Criminology than may currently be the case. Nevertheless, our recommendations are in line with the broadly defined functions of the Institute 'to conduct criminological research, training and seminar courses for persons engaged in criminological research or in work related to the prevention or correction of criminal behavior, and to provide library and information services', as well as matters 'incidental or conducive to these functions'. Should our view not be correct, it may be necessary to seek enabling legislation. The catalyst role of the Institute should always be aimed at recruiting and involving the services of all bodies and organisations with special interests in the furtherance of defense against criminal activity.

12. Also, in developing our recommendations we have drawn upon the experience and expertise of persons possessing formidable collective experience in the handling and custody of large sums of money, and in its protection through the utilisation of building design and technological hardware. Our deliberations have been enlightened by the previously unavailable research performed by Dr Jeff Sutton, Ms Roseanne Bonney, and Mr Kerry Milte. Their contributions highlighted high risk areas, and activities, requiring urgent public recognition and attention.


13. We are aware of the lack of information and expertise available to those operating in unrecognised high risk areas. Current literature, and other information sources relative to defense against armed robbery, are generally outdated, not keeping pace with sociological knowledge and technological change.

14. We feel that a national library of protective security and crime prevention publications should be established as a means to disseminating the latest knowledge available to interested parties, and providing a literary basis for substantial research by practitioners and others in the field.


RECOMMENDATIONS

15. We accordingly recommend:

- a. that greater use be made of current security systems in poorly protected and unprotected high risk areas, especially in relation to small businesses and existing premises,
- b. that greater use be made of competent professionals in basic security planning, particularly in matters of design, method, and equipment relating to the planning of new and renovated premises,
- c. that weaknesses in current anti-robbery building design techniques be empirically identified, that improved systems be designed, that pilot models be tested, and that evaluation and adjustment be effected as necessary,
- d. that a national protective security library be established, the holdings of which to be constantly updated; provision should be made for an information service in relation to such materials,
- e. that consideration be given to the desirability of holding a seminar for media executives, with a view to encouraging informed and responsible reporting, and
- f. that individuals and organisations be educated in robbery prevention methods generally, including alternative methods of cash carrying, the use of professional services, and the utilisation of electronic technology.



ARMED ROBBERY IN THE USA



FEDERAL BANK ROBBERY VIOLATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CM KELLEY

JURISDICTIONS AND BACKGROUND

The Federal Bank Robbery Statute was enacted into public law on May 18, 1934. In essence, the statute states:

'The crime, if committed against a Federally insured financial institution, is a *robbery*, if (1) property, money or a thing of value is feloniously taken, or a felonious attempt to take it is made, from a person or the presence of a person and the taking or the attempt is accompanied by force and violence or putting in fear, and (2) the property, money, or thing of value belongs to or is in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of a bank, savings and loan association, or credit union.

The property protected against burglary and larceny is identical with that protected against robbery. A *burglary* is committed by entering or attempting to enter the Federally insured financial institution or any building used in whole or in part as a financial institution.

A *larceny* is the simple taking or carrying away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property, money, or thing of value like that discussed under robbery, above.

Another offense is the crime of *receiving*. This crime is committed when a person receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barter, sells, or disposes of any property or money or thing of value, knowing the same to have been taken from the Federally insured financial institution by robbery, burglary, or larceny.

The maximum penalty for either a robbery or a burglary is a fine of \$5,000 or imprisonment for 20 years, or both. The maximum for larceny of over \$100 is a fine of \$5,000 or imprisonment for 10 years, or both. The maximum for a larceny of less than \$100 is a fine of \$1,000 or imprisonment for 1 year, or both. The penalties for receiving are identical with those for larceny.

If an assault is committed as a part of any of the above offenses the financial penalty rises to a maximum of \$10,000

and the imprisonment penalty rises to a maximum of 25 years. If the robbery, burglary, larceny, or receiving is accompanied by a killing or kidnapping, the imprisonment penalty becomes not less than 10 years and the crime is punishable by death if the verdict of the jury shall so direct '.

(By a United States Supreme Court decision in 1968, the death penalty provision of the statute is invalid.)

STATISTICS

Bank robbery is today running at an alarmingly high rate and represents a serious danger to the nation.

Violations have shown a steady rise since 1950, and have recently escalated at an alarming rate as indicated by the calendar year statistics shown at Table 5.

Table 5

US BANK VIOLATIONS: NUMBER OF OFFENSES, 1972-1976

Calendar Year	Robberies	Burglaries	Larcenies	Total
1972	2,618	344	202	3,164
1973	2,521	330	249	3,100
1974	3,513	405	327	4,245
1975	4,159	414	310	4,883
1976	3,816	373	377	4,566

In the month of December 1975 alone, a total of 515 bank robberies, burglaries, and larcenies were reported, the single highest monthly total ever recorded by the FBI.

RISE OF GANGSTERISM IN 1930s

The early 1930s was a period of intense criminal activity in the United States, highlighted by such infamous names as John Dillinger, Alvin Karpis, Eddie Bentz, the Barker brothers and Benjamin Dickson. These individuals, intent on advancing their own selfish interests, had no respect for law and order.

Bank robbery was one of the most frequent of crimes in this era. To these gangsters, the banks represented a place where money - lots of money - could be obtained. Their theory was simply that if you wanted a pair of shoes you went to a shoe store; if you wanted money, you went to a bank.

In these days, many of the banks were not prepared - through protective devices - to meet such criminal assaults. Law enforcement was also handicapped. The criminal gang, using high powered automobiles, would commit the robbery and speed across State lines. Local officers were unable to follow. Cooperation between law enforcement agencies was not as effective as at present, and often legal technicalities hindered swift investigative action. Between 1929 and 1934 there were literally thousands of bank robberies in the nation. In the year 1932 alone, 606 armed robberies occurred.

The crisis of gangsterism became so acute that in the early 1930s the Congress passed a series of bills - of which the bank robbery statute was one (May, 1934) - giving the FBI jurisdiction in a number of crimes which involved interstate activities. From this point the FBI attacked the problem and with the assistance of local law enforcement the numerous gangs were broken up and their members brought to justice. In 1934, the year the FBI was given this jurisdiction, a total of 417 bank robberies was committed. In subsequent years a decline started until in 1943 there was a nationwide total of only 22.

BANK ROBBERIES SURGE UPWARD

The decline in bank robberies suddenly stopped during the war years. Now the curve began to flicker upwards. From a low of 22 in calendar year 1943, the number jumped to 51 in 1945 - the last year of World War II. These were times of great tension - families were uprooted, individuals were away from home and the nerves of many were upset. At that time the explanation for this serious increase could be given as wartime conditions.

However, in the postwar period the number of bank robberies increased - not decreased. By 1950, they had reached 100 or roughly double the number of 1945. By then it was clear that bank robbery represented a serious danger. The statistics since - 3,816 robberies being committed in 1976 - confirm this statement.

Although the FBI is neither a research nor a policy making agency, we have determined from our field organization that there are several factors which may contribute to the excessive number of external attacks being made against financial institutions. These factors include, but are not necessarily limited to the following:

- a. the economic problems of the country, the unemployment situation, and the involvement of many people in gambling,

- b. the use of narcotics, resulting in expensive habits,
- c. the great number of branch banks adjacent to superhighways and freeways, making the bank robber's getaway easier,
- d. physical design aimed at attractiveness as opposed to security and extended business hours,
- e. criminal recidivism, causing an eventual gradation to crimes such as bank robbery, and
- f. the failure of some financial institutions to take adequate steps for physical security.

CURRENT TRENDS

Bank robbery violations, as previously indicated, have risen sharply in the last few years. However, there are differences between the type of bank robber who is operating today and his counterpart in the 1930s.

ROLE OF THE AMATEUR

A large percentage of the bank robbers today are amateurs - that is, individuals who do not have a previous criminal record. Many of them decide to rob a bank on the spur of the moment. They may find themselves suddenly short of money. They may want something to do while waiting in a strange town or they may simply want a thrill. Increasing numbers of narcotics addicts are turning to bank robbery to support their expensive, and deadly, habits. These persons do not plan their robbery in advance. They often walk aimlessly down a street just looking for a bank. They may look through the door - if there are many people inside they may leave and try another. They may be armed or not. If armed, they may have bought the pistol just a few hours previously. Then again they may go to the dime store and buy a toy pistol, use a knife or make some object which looks like a bomb or explosive. Their dangerousness lies in their unpredictability, their willingness to enter even the most guarded banks and their seeming disregard of any personal risk.

For the bank employee and customer, the amateur bank robbery represents a serious menace to personal safety. Many do not know how to adequately handle a gun. They often are nervous - their hands twitching and their voices shaking. A person in such a condition is apt to do any thing. Some are very cool, even nonchalant; yet the element of a rash act is always possible.

For the law enforcement officer, the amateur poses problems. First of all, many of these amateurs do not have previous criminal records. Often, cases are solved by law enforcement through information previously known by officers, such as the *modus operandi*, physical descriptions or, criminal speciality of the robber. In the case of

amateurs, such data are not available. The robber is a "newcomer" in the field of crime. This makes investigation of the case more difficult.

On the other hand, the amateur is more apt to leave clues than the professional. His preparations may not be completely adequate - a handkerchief used as a disguise falls off his face, he leaves a scrap of paper, he does something to attract attention. He may make mistakes - such as running through the wrong door in the bank and getting caught in back room, falling down or, getting his orders mixed up. Outside, his plan for a getaway may develop its own problems, such as his car runs out of gas, he runs into a dead end street, etc.

DECLINE OF OLDER TIME GANGS

Along with the rise of the amateur bank robber there has been a decline in the operation of gangs. Seldom do you find a criminal gang, including anywhere from four to twelve hardened criminals, robbing banks. There are, of course, loose knit temporary gangs - formed to rob a special bank. This group may then rob additional banks. But effective law enforcement is a strong deterrent to the rise of gangs which are able to operate successfully over any continuous period of time.

The amateur, in most cases, operates by himself. Sometimes several amateurs thinking they are much "better" than they really are - will cooperate in a bank robbery. There are some individual professional operators. This indicates that the professional gang is today committing - in terms of percentages - only a small number of robberies.

This does not mean, however, that the professional bank robber is not operating today. In fact, he is today robbing banks, especially banks where he feels he can secure a large amount of loot. The professional can be roughly defined as the individual with a previous criminal record, who has had previous "experience" in armed robberies. Many professional bank robbers have robbed liquor stores, service stations or restaurants. They have had "training" in getaways and execution of robberies. They have no respect for law and order and live by the authority of the gun. These professionals depend on robberies - expertly planned - to gain money for their livelihood.

Many of these men have contacts in the criminal underworld - with "fences", for the disposal of stolen merchandise or the exchange of marked currency or with criminal "specialists" who will provide data on "casings", etc.

These professionals, as a general rule, carefully prepare for bank robberies. Nothing is left to chance. They survey the bank in advance, observe the activity of the employees, carefully choose the best time of the day for the offense. The getaway is thoroughly studied. Sometimes even the route is "run" in advance, with every effort being made to iron out any obstacles or to measure the time required to negotiate such a distance. Each member of the gang during the operation, has a specific duty. There is to be no mixup. Bank robbery is their business. They try to be as "scientifically" accurate as possible.

In combating these gangs, law enforcement, however, has many advantages. Many times these professionals can be recognised by witnesses through pictures. Their *modus operandi* may be similar to previous bank robberies in which they were involved. Law enforcement officers, drawing upon previous knowledge, know many of their criminal "hangouts", associates, friends, etc. Then there is the old adage "A criminal gang is no stronger than its weakest link". If one member is apprehended or identified, then the officers have still more clues to use in identifying his associates.

ADVANCE PLANNING FOR ROBBERY

Normally you would expect the robber to select the prospective bank with great care. That is true in some cases, not in others. Advance planning can be roughly divided into these three categories.

Random. In these instances the robber selects the bank either by chance or on the spur of the moment. There is no advance planning.

Partial planning. Many times the bank robber decides to rob a bank, but is not too sure which one. He may make a number of advance plans, such as preparing a disguise, a note and arranging for a getaway. Yet he has not attempted to "case" the bank. In these instances the plans of the robber are often changed on short notice.

Professional planning. The professional robber - making bank robbery a business - makes very careful advance plans. He will generally "case" the bank - meaning to look over the bank a few days before, sending in an associate who is an "expert" in alarms and protective devices, observing the activities of the bank from across the street.

Individual robbers prefer banks of different types. When looking over a bank they may see one or two items which cause them to favor or dislike a bank as a potential target.

AGE

Persons of all ages rob banks. The United States Bureau of Prisons compiled a statistical profile based upon the 928 bank robbers committed to federal penal institutions during the period 1 Jul 70 through 30 Jun 71. This profile revealed that committed bank robbers covered an age span of under 15 years to over 60. However, approximately 25 per cent were between the ages of 22 and 25.

SEX

The great majority of bank robbers are men. Women, however, have robbed banks. The Bureau of Prisons study cited above found a 98 per cent male and 2 per cent female breakdown of convicted robbers.

The Los Angeles, California, Division of the FBI recently completed the investigation of a series of bank robberies committed by a young black female, who on at least one occasion fired her weapon at pursuing vehicles. Through comparison of *modus operandi*, description, surveillance photographs, and getaway vehicle, this woman was determined to be responsible for approximately 16 bank robberies, obtaining over \$17,000 in loot.

MODUS OPERANDI

Every bank robber thinks his plan for committing a robbery is good otherwise - except in cases involving psychopaths - he wouldn't try. Advance planning is necessary, *eg*, casing the bank, arranging for the getaway, hiding the loot. Equally important are his actions inside the bank.

Most robberies are short - three, four, to possibly eight minutes. Once the robber has announced his purpose he must act fast. He never knows when a bank employee or customer will sound an alarm, scream, or dash out of his way. The slightest mistake may make the difference between a "successful job" or a "fluke".

In discussing *modus operandi*, a number of factors can be considered.

Time of day. Experience has shown that bank robberies are committed at practically any hour when the bank is open. However, there is a tendency to concentrate on early in the morning, when the bank is opening up, at noon, or near closing time. Sometimes the bandits have already entered the bank before the employees and are waiting for them. Other times an employee may be met on the outside and forced to open the door.

Actions inside the bank. The bank robber hopes to execute the robbery without exciting attention inside the bank. The two common techniques used for announcing the robbery are oral and written instructions. In the oral approach, the bandit may give his demands to the teller quietly, cautioning against any outcry. Again, the bandit does not want to attract attention to himself, but merely secure as much money as he can from one teller and slip out. In more than one robbery a bandit has secured thousands of dollars from a cashier, and the next customer in line has calmly stepped up to the cage completely unaware of what had transpired. Another type of oral approach is the "takeover" style robbery. This approach, used with success by many bank robbery gang operations, involves three or four bandits entering the bank. The leader will station himself at a vantage point, usually the lobby area, where he can control the actions of the bank customers and employees, who normally are ordered to lay down on the floor or to stand against a wall. The other bandits will proceed to the teller stations and gather up the take. After a predetermined amount of time, the leader will instruct his confederates to exit and the getaway is made.

Written instructions are another approach to announcing the intentions of a bank robber. The bank robbery demand note, often

written on the blank side of a deposit slip, check, or other piece of paper, and instructing the teller to turn over her money, was used in approximately 36 *per cent* of the 3,816 robberies reported in the United States during 1976. In this type of robbery, the bandit will wait his turn in line with the other customers, present his demand note to the teller and, in most cases, exhibit a firearm in his waistband or coat pocket. After receiving the money, the robber clamly walks out of the bank, trying to be as inconspicuous as possible.

Disguises. Disguises obviously vary with the ingenuity of the robber. The basic purpose, of course, is to prevent identification. A favorite type of disguise is sunglasses or a handkerchief across the face. Some bandits have robbed banks in localities where they are well known; thus a very complete disguise is necessary. Ski masks, which completely cover the head and face, except for the eyes, are used by many bank robbers, especially when the bank being robbed is equipped with bank surveillance cameras that might photograph the robbery in process. Theater disguises, such as wigs, mustaches, beards, and full face masks, have also been used in attempts to hide the identity of a bandit. Some cases have been noted where male bank robbers dress up as females in order to prevent identification. Other disguises used have included dressing as workmen, security guards, and even clergymen.

Carrying the loot. Here again, the variety is infinite. Pillowcases and paper bags are probably the most common methods used to carry off bank loot. They are easy to secure, conceal, and use. Some bank robbers tape their demand note to the outside of a paper bag and present it to the teller. The briefcase is another favorite. Little attention is attracted by carrying it. Some bandits carry the loot out in their hands, while others stuff it into pockets, purses, or open shirts.

Use of weapons - role of violence. The threat of violence - often a gun in hand - gives the bandit the temporary advantage during the bank robbery. This placing of human life in jeopardy makes bank robbery the infamous crime it is.

The bank employee facing the robber never knows whether the bandit will use the gun or not. Many times the robber himself doesn't know. The danger increases when an obviously unstable individual is the robber. Often he, as well as other amateurs, is totally unfamiliar with guns. All they know is that a gun shoots out of one end and you hold the other. A slight squeeze of the trigger and serious injury or death may result. On the other hand, the professional, even though he may have more knowledge of handling guns, is often totally oblivious of sentiment. He knows that apprehension may mean 20, 25, or even 50 years in jail. For that reason, he isn't hesitant to shoot. One bank robber told FBI Agents, "It's like war. It's you or me." Just recently, a police officer responding to a bank robbery alarm was brutally murdered by two bandits exiting the bank.

A great variety of weapons are used by robbers: revolvers, automatics, rifles, shotguns. Firearms were used in approximately 56 *per cent* of the 3,816 robberies reported in the United States during

1976. The robber knows that his authority depends exclusively on the gun. Sometimes the bandit secures a gun by stealing it. Maybe it is some old souvenir weapon around the house or one he has borrowed. It may be a new one or a gun that is old and won't even shoot. Some bandits even use toy guns purchased in the variety store minutes before the robbery.

As a general rule the bandit keeps the gun hidden until he has given the command order. Otherwise the sight of the gun will tip his intention, though one robbery band, for example, openly carried rifles from the getaway car into the bank. Also, as a general rule, the gun is shown only slightly - as a quick glimpse or the barrel hidden under some cover. The purpose: don't arouse unnecessary alarm in other employees. On the other hand, some bandits openly exhibit the gun and give loud orders. There is no set pattern.

In one instance a holdup man carried a sawedoff shotgun into a bank in a long florist box.

Time after time the robber will attempt to frighten the bank employee by simulating a gun, that is, bulging something in his pocket to give the impression that he has a gun. He may have, or he may be faking.

Firearms are not the only means used by bandits to place their victims in fear. An attache case carried into the bank by a robber may contain a bomb or a simulated bomb. Knives have been used to threaten tellers and customers unless money is handed over to the robber. An infinite variety of weapons, real or simulated, is available to the bank robber.

How to handle customers and employees. Bank employees and customers represent major problems for the robber. He must be ready to handle them. In some instances the robber comes prepared with a plan of action - such as tying up the employees. Other times the decision seems to be made on the spur of the moment. Robbers are afraid of alarms. In one instance a bank employee moved her feet to push some pieces of scrap paper toward the wastebasket. One of the bandits, noting her movement, came over to her, pointed his gun and asked, "Did you ring a buzzer?" She replied in the negative, whereupon he ordered: "Back against the wall - turn around and face the wall."

Most bandits do not desire to injure bank employees or customers. They realise the added penalties of such injury. However, these criminals are not to be trusted. In the heat of passion or the desperation of violating the law, they are apt to do anything.

During April 1977, a temporary banking facility in a rural town in the State of Tennessee was robbed of approximately \$28,000 by two armed bandits. All three bank employees and one customer were lined up next to each other in the vault area and murdered execution style. Both robbers have been identified and arrested in this heinous crime.

During 1976, 142 persons were injured during bank robbery statute violations. These injuries included 18 customers, 44 employees, 45

perpetrators, 22 law officers, seven bank guards, and six others. Deaths during this same period totalled 28, including two customers, 18 perpetrators, three law officers, and five bank guards.

Individual operator versus gang operation. Just because a gang robs a bank does not necessarily mean a more efficient operation. Many times, if advance planning has not occurred, members of the gang interfere with each other or get jittery. In a crisis, each is interested in preserving his "own skin", regardless of the others. In a recent robbery attempt, two bandits entered a bank and announced the robbery. While one bandit covered the customers and bank employees from the lobby doors, the second bandit attempted to jump over the teller counter and obtain money. To the chagrin of the second bandit, the bank had recently installed counter to ceiling bullet resistant shielding. The jumping bandit smashed into the clear shielding and fell backwards. His partner at the door ran over to help and together they stumbled out of the bank. Meanwhile, the getaway car driver, seeing the commotion inside the bank and his two partners stumbling out the door, panicked and deserted the getaway car and ran down the street in an attempt to escape. All three bandits were eventually identified and prosecuted.

The gang, of course, gives the bandits greater control in the bank. Members usually take different jobs: one looting the cash drawers or vault; another guarding employees; perhaps a third watching the front door. If efficiently carried out, a gang operation is very dangerous. However, this should always be remembered: just because two or more bandits enter a bank, there are more possibilities of mistakes and clues. In instance after instance the identification of just one gang member leads to the apprehension of all members.

Loot. The amount of loot can vary from nothing to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Generally speaking, bank robbery is one of the poorest paying jobs in the world. A recent survey conducted by the Los Angeles, California, Division of the FBI revealed that the convicted bank robber's income amounted to about 40 cents per hour for his time spent in prison. That is assuming he was allowed to keep the loot. In many instances, especially where the bandit is quickly apprehended, much of the loot is recovered.

However, several cases investigated have involved extremely large sums of loot. On September 27, 1974, in a Reno, Nevada, bank, three armed and masked individuals obtained loot totaling \$1,044,000 during the robbery. This is believed to be the largest known cash bank robbery in the history of the United States. Intensive investigation resulted in the identification of the three robbers and two were convicted for their roles in this crime. The third subject was acquitted. Approximately \$700,000 has been recovered.

Several weeks after the Reno robbery, bandits looted the vault of Purolator Security, Incorporated, Chicago, Illinois, and obtained in excess of \$4.3 million. This is believed to be the largest cash theft in the history of the United States. Six persons were arrested in connection with this theft and four have been convicted, one acquitted, and one awaiting trial. More than \$2.5 million has been recovered.

Getaway. Once the robber has obtained the loot, getting away becomes his paramount concern. While the methods of leaving the robbery scene are limited only by the imagination of the robber, the usual method is through use of an automobile.

Some getaway techniques used have included: bicycles, motorcycles, subway, public buses, taxis, and even airplanes. Other bandits prefer to escape on foot, seeking anonymity among busy pedestrian traffic characteristic of large cities everywhere.

The favorite - and most commonly used - getaway technique is the automobile. The car may be parked directly in front, on the side, or in back of the bank. The chief consideration is speed of getaway. This means that the car must not be locked by traffic and can be easily reached when coming out of the bank.

The lone bandit must be able to start the car by himself. Often, he may choose to leave the motor running. In a gang operation, a member of the group will wait inside the car while his partners obtain the money. This "wheelman" also serves as a lookout during the robbery.

Becoming increasingly important is the use of "switch" cars; that is, escaping from the bank in a car, driving to a previously secreted car, and then speeding away. The "switch" car serves the purpose of confusing law enforcement officers. The success in using this technique can be best illustrated by the following case. During an approximate two and one-half year period, ending in August 1975, a group of three bandits robbed 36 banks in the New York City, New York, area, which resulted in bank losses of over \$1,000,000. Generally, after leaving the bank, the robbers would enter a stolen vehicle, abandon this vehicle within a short distance of the bank, and switch to a second vehicle which they would drive for two or three miles and abandon. In many instances, this second vehicle would be used in a subsequent bank robbery. The break in this case came on 20 Aug 75, when a vehicle believed to be the switch car was located. Around the clock surveillance of the vehicle was maintained by FBI Agents and local police officers, and after the identification of the robbers, surveillances of the robbers were established. As a result of these surveillances, which lasted over a two month period, arrest warrants were obtained for the three robbers. All are now serving lengthy prison terms.

In the great majority of cases, the getaway car will be stolen. Sometimes the car is stolen a day ahead of time, other times just a short while before the robbery. The robber usually feels that a stolen car will provide more protection to him, since the license plate (a key aid to law officials seeking the identity of a robber) will be registered to someone else. In several instances, the robbers have taken the extra precaution of wiping the getaway car with a damp rag before switching to another car, thus removing any fingerprints that may later link them to the crime.

A frequent technique used by bandits is to steal a license plate or plates and put them on the getaway car. By doing this, a robber can use his own car in a robbery but still not be traced through a check of

license numbers. One robber has gone so far as to steal the license plates off a car that is the same make, model, and year of the car he plans to use as the getaway vehicle. To cover up the theft of license plates, the robber goes through the additional theft of yet another set of license plates from another car that matches the description of the car he stole the first license plates from. Apparently this robber feels that should his actions cause a police officer to do a license check of the car, the response will match the car's description to the license and remove any suspicions the officer may have.

VICTIM FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

What kind of banks do robbers look for?

Many factors enter into selecting a bank to be robbed. The spur of the moment robber, as mentioned previously, may decide to rob the first bank he sees. However, as a general rule, the bandit has a number of considerations in selecting a particular bank.

The basic consideration is this: is the bank an "easy" bank, meaning that the chances of success rank high? In this connection, the robber may consider the possible presence of law enforcement officers. One individual selected a bank in a small town, saying that he knew there wasn't a sheriff or deputy sheriff there.

Another factor is previous knowledge of the terrain, the robber having previously lived or worked in the vicinity. One individual selected a bank in a city where he had been raised. He knew the layout of the bank. In another instance, a robber had worked as a laborer in the community and was familiar with the location of the bank.

Previous knowledge also comes if the bandit has been a former customer of the bank. In one savings and loan association, a former customer decided he would rob the institution. In this instance, however, the plan failed. He was too well known and was recognised.

Then there is access which can be gained by individuals employed as workmen in the bank. In this capacity, they have an excellent opportunity to observe the bank's layout, movement of personnel and methods of operation.

In addition, there are factors of getaway, knowledge of roads in the area, availability of hiding places (one robber planned to secrete his car in the woods until dark) or where a second getaway car can be stored. Each of these, for some reason, may influence the robber.

No definite conclusions can be drawn that robbers prefer rural or city banks. It is not as much a matter of rural or city, but the factors just discussed. It is true that a rural bank may appear as a tempting bait. Many times bandits will enter banks in small towns. The robber feels that he has greater advantages there, than in large urban communities.

However, there are drawbacks. Though the getaway appears easier, there may be more witnesses. A strange car or person in a small town attracts attention. A car driving down a road at high speed is very noticeable. The bandit may have to drive long distances - if he is not a local fellow - to get away. Anywhere along the route he may leave valuable clues.

In fact, today practically any bank - large or small - is not immune from the attack of the robber. With more than 77,000 financial institutions operating in the United States, the number of possible victims of bank robberies and related crimes is tremendous. Banks, as well as law enforcement, should be prepared to handle this danger.

ROLE OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES IN BANKS

Protective devices in banks represent one of the most potent weapons against the robber. As mentioned previously, the robber is afraid of alarms. He will often warn in his note or orally not to "press any button". He carefully watches the slightest movement of the bank employees for any such alert.

Time after time, alarms have frightened off robbers, caused them to leave the bank hurriedly (leaving behind their money) or resulted in their apprehension. Also, if in the advance planning the robber feels the bank is too well protected with alarms, he may just pass it up.

BANK PROTECTION ACT OF 1968

In response to the spiralling increase of bank robbery and related criminal attacks against financial institutions, the Congress of the United States, in July, 1968, enacted the Bank Protection Act. This law, which had the dual function of discouraging robberies, burglaries, and larcenies, and assisting in the identification and apprehension of persons who commit such acts, required the Federal regulatory agencies to issue minimum standards for security devices and procedures.

Under the rules issued by these regulatory agencies, each Federally insured financial institution is instructed to:

- a. designate a security officer.
- b. provide for:
 - (1) illumination of vaults, if visible from outside the banking office,
 - (2) the installation of tamper-resistant locks on exterior doors and exterior windows designed to be opened,
 - (3) the installation of an alarm system or other appropriate device to notify police of a robbery or burglary,

- c. consider the appropriateness of other security devices, and
- d. establish a written security program which includes:
 - (1) a testing schedule for all devices actually installed,
 - (2) currency minimums at each teller station,
 - (3) inclusion of marked, bait money at each teller station,
 - (4) delegation of certain inspection duties, and
 - (5) periodic training of employees.

A survey of financial institutions from various sections of the United States has found general compliance with the provisions of the Act. Violations, meanwhile, have continued to increase and there are currently moves underway to strengthen the security devices and procedures portion of the Act.

CRIME RESISTANCE

Law enforcement is today doing a highly efficient job in solving bank robberies. The FBI currently has a solution rate of approximately 74 *per cent* over the past four year period. However, without the cooperation of private citizens, its job would be much more difficult. Time after time, the alert observation, ingenuity and thoughtfulness of bank employees, bank customers and others have greatly aided in the solution of cases.

BANK EMPLOYEES AND CUSTOMERS

The bank employee is usually in the best position to observe the bandit. The robbers realise this, hence the great effort to perfect disguises. In one instance, a robber cautioned the banker several times about looking at him too closely. In another instance, a woman cashier recognised a bank robber - because of his "penetrating eyes" as the one who had previously robbed the bank. This was his second robbery of the same bank.

In addition, bank employees can also be of help in providing background information about possible advance casing of the bank. In this regard, we consider the bank employee the "first line of defense" in combating bank robbery violations. Maybe the employee can remember a stranger coming into the bank and asking for change or a person loitering around the premises. These are little items, seemingly unimportant at the time, but, in view of later events, become of great value. A recent investigation bears out this observation. A small bank was robbed of over \$25,000 by two bandits armed with a handgun and a switchblade knife. The lone bank teller was locked in the restroom by the holdup men. Investigation determined that approximately one week

prior to the robbery, an alert teller noticed two men sitting in cars in the bank parking lot and copied down the license numbers of each vehicle. A trace of the license numbers was made and the owners of the vehicles, upon interview, admitted the robbery. Almost the entire \$25,000 was recovered.

The importance the FBI places on the necessity of ensuring bank employees are trained in proper conduct before, during, and after a robbery, is underscored by the fact that during the period July 1, 1975 to June 30, 1976, over 114,000 bank employees and law enforcement officers participated in more than 2,000 conferences, seminars, and clinics sponsored by the FBI on bank security and related topics.


The FBI is currently engaged in research with the United States Bureau of Prisons. This research consists in part of interviewing incarcerated bank robbers to determine what their motivating factors are in choosing a bank to rob. It is hoped that the results of this research will enable us to provide meaningful information to the law enforcement and financial communities to jointly work toward stemming the increase of violations in this criminal area.

Additionally, each of the FBI's 59 field divisions are engaged in helping financial institutions evaluate the security needs of their office to insure that security programs are comprehensive and up to date.

CONCLUSION

It is difficult to reduce to paper the insight and experience the FBI has obtained from nearly 45 years of investigating bank robbery and related offenses. The FBI has in the past, and continues today, to consider bank robbery a priority area. During the 12 month period ending 30 Jun 76, the FBI commitment to investigating bank robberies, burglaries, and larcenies totalled 651 man years. In terms of dollars, this represents an expenditure of over \$17,000,000. And, we feel this expenditure is well worth the cost, not only in terms of the number of criminals identified, apprehended and convicted, or the amount of stolen bank money recovered, but also in the deterrent factor the swift apprehension and incarceration of a bank robber has on other potential would be bank robbers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ROBBERY



FORMAT

This bibliography of robbery has only five classifications. They are:

- a. bibliographies,
- b. theses,
- c. audio visual
- d. monographs (and monographs in series), and
- e. serials.

A title and name index is also provided.

Entries are designed to maximise speedy reference.

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AUTHOR INDEX

ACEITUNO, Thomas	166 186
ADAMS, Gerald	161
ADKINS, Ottie	217
AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY	217
ANDREWS, JA	217
ASHBY, JF	217 218
AUDETT, JH	167
BANNON, JD	241
BARRETT, JE	219
BAUER, G	219
BEATTIE, RH	220
BECKER, HK	161
BEKAERT, H	168
BELLEMIN-NOEL, J	220
BENES, BL	168
BERKOWITZ, Marvin	168
BERTRAM, DK	220
BLANKENBURG, Erhard	220
BLAZICEK, DL	168
BLOCK, EB	168
BLOCK, MK	221
BLUMSTEIN, Alfred	221

BOON, NA	221
BOTTOMS, AM	169
BOURDETTE, Philip	169
BOYDELL, CL	163
BRANNAN, CD	196
BRENNAN, CD	169
BULL, JL	176
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING AND ASSISTANCE, FLORIDA	169
BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CALIFORNIA	169
BUREAU OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION, CALIFORNIA	170
CADWALLADER, ML	247
CAMERON-SMITH, A	171
CAMP, GM	163
CAPORALE, R	171
CAPSTICK, WP	223
CARLSON, Alan	171
CARMODY, Matthew	223
CARPER, RS	171
CARR, JD	172
CAVATO, J	172
CHAIKEN, JJ	172
CHELIMSKY, Eleanor	173
CHERRY, James	173
CITY-COUNTY JUSTICE PLANNING OFFICE, PORTLAND (OR)	173
COHEN, Y	173
COHN, Yona	174
COLARDYN, M	223
CONKLIN, JE	174

CONSO, G	224
COOPER, D	174
COOPER, J	174
CORDREY, JB	175
COSTELLO, BM	175
CRAIG, Dennis	184
CRAIG, RN	224
CROMIE, Robert	176
CROW, WJ	176
CULVER, DC	161
CURTIS, B	176
CURTIS, LA	177
CURTIS, SJ	177
DANIELS, MR	225
DASKAM, SW	178
DEBAUN, Everett	225
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES	178
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS	178
DICKINSON, K	215
DIVISION OF JUSTICE AND CRIME PREVENTION, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA	178
DOHERTY, P	197
DUFFALA, DC	225
DUNLAP, VK	194
DUNN, CS	179
EDGAR, JM	161 162
EGAN, FJ	169

EINSTADTER, WJ	163 226
ELDRED, J	180
ELIOT, WA	180
ELLIOTT, CV	185
ELLIOTT, WE	180
FAIRLEY, W	181
FALLON, B	227
FATTAH, EA	181
FEDER, Sid	181
FEELEY, J	212
FEENEY, Floyd	171 173 181 182 183 227
FEEST, Johannes	220
FELKENES, GT	161
FISHER, L	227
FLETCHER, F	180
FOLEY, Charles	227
FOSTER, Harvey	183
GABRIEL, C	174
GARTHE, David	184
GEHRIG, F	228
GERASUN, AA	253
GIACINTI, TA	172
GIBBONS, E	181
GIBSON, Evelyn	197
GIBSON, NB	184

GLEISSNER, G	184 195 208
GOFF, C	191
GOLDSMITH, J	228
GOLDSMITH, SS	228
GOODIN, CV	228
GORDON, F	174
GOSLING, John	184
GOULD, LC	228
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, MINNESOTA	185
GRAHAM, GW	163
GRANT, Alan	228
GRAY, D	185
GREEN, JB	194
GREENBERG, B	185
GREENWOOD, PN	185
GRINDLE, Russell	186
GRISTWOOD, Jean	229
GRIZZLE, GA	186
GUNN, John	186 229
GUNN, LG	186 187
GURVICH, Bernice	229
HAAS, HH	230
HAEFNER, LE	188
HAILS, JA	213
HALPER, Andrew	188

HANSON, Robert	188
HARAN, JF	230
HATTERY, LH	230
HAWKINS, GJ	188
HEILWEIL, M	215
HEMPHILL, CF	189
HENDRICKSON, Robert	189
HERREN, R	252
HEWITT, WH	162
HOBSBAWM, EJ	189
HOLCOMB, RL	189 190 231
HOWARD, MK	190 231
HUDSON, FW	231
HUGHES, RH	190
HUNT, Morton	190
INCIARDI, JA	191
INDEPENDENT DATA COLLECTION STAFF, PORTLAND (OR)	191
INSKEEP, NR	191
INTASA	191
JOHNSON, Malcolm	192
JOINER, R	172
JOYNER, D	172
KADLER, H	253
KATZENELSON, Susan	214
KAUFMAN, SH	233
KENNEY, JP	220

KERN, G	233
KERNER, H-J	193
KINDICE, JP	233
KNIGHT, DA	193
KOHN, Howard	233
KOLLANDER, L	193
KRAFT, LP	185
KRUSE, HH	234
KU, Richard	188
KUPERSMITH, Gerrie	193
LAHAYE, N	168 246
LAMSON, PA	235
LARSON, Richard	221
LARSON, RC	194
LATEEF, AB	235
LAWLESS, MW	172
LAWRENCE, NL	235
LEE, JF	235
LEHMAN, Edward	161
LEHR, K	235
LE MOUEL, F	236
LEPPA, S	194
LE TAILLANTER, R	236
LETKEMAN, Peter	194
LIECHENSTEIN, M	181
LIROL PRODUCTIONS	194
LORENZ, RW	237

LORENZ, W	194 195 208
LUCIANOVIC, Judy	214
LUEDTKE, G	195
LUNDEN, WA	237
LYSTAD, E	195
MACDONALD, JM	196 238
MACDOWELL, C	174
MACINNES, C	238
MACKENZIE, Colin	196
MACLEAN, A	238
MACMUNN, George	196
MAKARUSHKA, C	174
MALTZ, MD	238
MARCUS, Marvin	162
MARTIN, JM	230
MARY, RL	196
MATCHETT, Michael	166
MATHIESON, Donald	239
MAY, V	196 197 208 239
McCARTHY, D	172
McCARTHY, M	174
McCLINTOCK, FH	197 246
McCORMICK, Mona	197
McCULLOUGH, PM	172

McDONALD, WF	198
McLAUGHLIN, AJ	197
McPHETERS, LR	239
MEEK, Victor	197
METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT COMMISSION, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	198
MILLER, SI	198
MILTE, KL	198
MISNER, GE	198
MITCHELL, John	239
MOLOF, MJ	172
MORGAN, LD	198
MOSER, Michael	173
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE	199
NEPOTE, Jean	241
NEWTON, GD	199
NICHOLS, JF	241
NIEDERBERGER, WV	199
NKPA, NKU	241
NORMANDEAU, Andre	164 242
NORTE, GC	200
O'NEILL, JF	243
O'NEILL, WP	243
ORTS ORTS, J	243
OZENNE, Tim	243
PAGE, PC	244
PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, FLORIDA	202
PARRAS, W	202
PASSELL, Peter	239
PELLETIER, P	215

PETERS, T	244
PETTIGREN, Joyce	244
PICKARD, D	174
PINKSTON, Joseph	176
PROCTER, HS	185
QUINN, J	174
RADZINOWICZ, Leon	246
RARDIN, RL	246
RATCLIFF, K	172
RATHORE, Margaret	246
RAUBALL, R	203
REFFKEN, H	203
REGIONAL COMMISSION, ATLANTA	203
REICHERT, I	246
REILLY, Patricia	162
REMOUCHAMPS, M	168 246
REPPETTO, TA	204
RISSLER, LE	247
ROEBUCK, JB	205 247
ROEMER, FP	206
ROLPH, CH	247
ROSS, S	247
ROSS, WC (B)	206
ROTH, SH	171
SAGALYN, Arnold	207
SCHIMERMAN, S	207

SCHNEIDER, AL	207
	208
SCHRODER, G	248
SCHUBERT, D	208
SCHUHMAN, H	248
SHEPHERD, Donald	248
SMITH, William	209
SOBEK, R	252
STATE UNIVERSITY, PORTLAND (OR)	209
STELLING, W	209
STEVENSON, KA	172
STIRLING, N	209
STRACK, JR	180
SUTOR, A	180
SYVRUD, GA	164
TAYLOR, B	172
TAYLOR, N	172
THOMPSON, RG	164
TITUS, CM	249
TOMKINS, DC	162
TRAINI, R	249
	250
TRAVERS, Robert	210
VAN COURT, Charles	211
VAN STRATEN, J	251
VARGO, Alexander	220
VON HENTIG, Hans	251
WAGNER, WF	199
WALSH, Kevin	175

WARD, Paul	212
WARD, RH	212
WARD, TJ	212
WEINSTOCK, N	252
WEIR, Adrienne	173 182 183 212 213 227
WENZKY, O	252
WHISENAND, PM	213
WHITE, L	213
WHITING, D	214
WILCOX, Susan	214
WILLIAMS, Frank	214
WILLIAMS, KM	214
WILLIAMSON, JC	194
WILLWERTH, James	215
WILSON, JQ	215
WITTER, AE	180
WOODS, GD	212 215
WRIGHT, R	215
WURTENBERGER, T	252
ZALINSKI, AE	253
ZIMRING, FE	199
ZUEHLSDORF, H	253

TITLE INDEX

BIBLIOGRAPHIES

<i>Bank Robbery In Australia: A Bibliography</i>	162
<i>Bibliography Of Crime And Criminal Justice 1932-1937</i>	161
<i>A Bibliography Of Police Administration, Public Safety, And Criminology</i>	162
<i>Crimes And Crime Prevention. (A Bibliography With Extracts)</i>	161
<i>Criminal Justice Bibliography</i>	162
<i>Law Enforcement: A Selected Bibliography</i>	161
<i>The Offender, A Bibliography</i>	162
<i>Robbery</i>	161 162

THESES

<i>Armed Robbery: A Career Study In Perspective</i>	163
<i>Demographic Correlates Of Urban Crime Rates</i>	163
<i>One Hundred Burglars And One Hundred Robbers.</i>	163
<i>Robbery In America</i>	163
<i>A Study Of Girls Involved In Auto Theft, Armed Robbery, Or Assault And Battery</i>	164
<i>Trends And Patterns In Crimes Of Robbery (With Special Reference To Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1960 to 1966)</i>	164
<i>The Victim Of Robbery</i>	164

AUDIOVISUAL

Patrol Procedures 1 - Violent Crimes 165

Robbery In Progress 165

MONOGRAPHS

<i>Albuquerque - Police Department - Property Crime Reduction Program - Final Evaluation</i>	199
<i>Analysis Of Armed Robbery In Albuquerque</i>	202
<i>Analysis Of 1972 Denver Victimization Survey - High Impact Anti-Crime Program</i>	172
<i>An Analysis Of The Apprehension Activities Of The New York City Police Department</i>	185
<i>Anatomy Of A Crime - Final Report</i>	194
<i>Armed Robbery</i>	171
	188
	189
	193
	206
	212
	214
	215
<i>Armed Robbery - A Manual For Persons Likely To Be Held Up</i>	190
<i>Armed Robbery, Characteristics Of Offences In New South Wales And Victoria In 1975</i>	166
<i>Armed Robbery - Draft Paper</i>	166
<i>Armed Robbery - Offenders And Their Victims</i>	196
<i>Atlanta - Police Department - Anti-Robbery/Burglary Project - Final Evaluation Report, March 30, 1973 - April 30, 1974</i>	167
<i>Atlanta - Police Department - Anti-Robbery/Burglary - Semi-Annual Evaluation Report, March-September 1973</i>	203
<i>Baader - Meinhof Group - West Germany</i>	203
<i>Bandits</i>	189
<i>Bank Holdups</i>	168
<i>Bank Robberies - California Compared With Other States 1931-1968</i>	169
<i>Bank Robbers, An Article On The Theory Of Structurally Differentiated Chances Of Access</i>	196
<i>Bank Robbery In The Federal Republic Of Germany, v1</i>	197
	208

<i>Bank Robbery In The Federal Republic Of Germany, v2</i>	184
	194
	195
	208
<i>Caper Data Book, 1971 (San Jose Crime Reports)</i>	190
<i>Careers In Crime</i>	191
<i>Chicago - Systems Analysis Of Effectiveness Of Tactics In Preventing CTA Bus Robberies</i>	188
<i>Combating Felonious Crimes By Citizen Involvement - Evaluation - Final Report</i>	191
<i>Commercial Robberies In Oakland, 1 February, 1969 - 1 August, 1969 - A Preliminary Study</i>	196
<i>Commercial Robbery In A Medium-Sized City - Columbus, Georgia - Equipment Systems Improvement Program Report</i>	186
<i>Commercial Security, Burglary, Robbery, Shoplifting, Employee Theft</i>	185
<i>Controlling Urban Crime</i>	215
<i>Cops And Robbers</i>	197
<i>The Cost Of Crimes Against Business</i>	175
<i>Crime And Community - Crime Prevention Policies</i>	175
<i>Crime And The Physical City - A Pilot Study Prepared For The NILECJ</i>	195
<i>Crime And Victimization In Portland (OR) - Analysis Of Trends, 1971-1974</i>	207
<i>Crime As Work</i>	194
<i>Crime Frequency Analysis - 1971</i>	175
<i>Crime Frequency Analysis - Spring, 1972</i>	175
<i>Crime In Eight American Cities - National Crime Panel Surveys Of Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland, And St Louis - Advance Report</i>	176
<i>Crime In Retailing</i>	178
<i>The Crime Of Robbery In The US</i>	207
<i>Crime On The Labor Front</i>	192
<i>Criminal Investigation, v2 - Specific Offenses</i>	176

<i>Criminal Typology</i>	205
<i>Criminal Violence: National Patterns And Behavior</i>	177
<i>Criminological Investigations Of Bank Robbers</i>	203
<i>Denver - Police Department - Project Scar (Special Crime Aerial Reconnaissance) - Interim Report, October-December 1973</i>	190
<i>Development Of Electronic Robbery Stake-Out Alarm System - Final Report</i>	178
<i>Dillinger, A Short And Violent Life</i>	176
<i>Early-Warning Robbery Reduction Projects: An Assessment Of Performance</i>	180
<i>Evaluation Of Merchant Security Program</i>	168
<i>Exemplary Project Validation - Miami Police Department/Robbery Control Project</i>	213
<i>Felony Investigation Decision Model - An Analysis Of Investigative Elements Of Information</i>	185
<i>Final Report: City Of Miami STOP Robbery/Burglary</i>	169
<i>The Fine Art Of Robbery</i>	184
<i>Firearms & Violence In American Life</i>	199
<i>Florida - A Statistical Study - An Offender Profile - Robbery</i>	202
<i>Fulton County (GA) - Adult Probation Department - Intensive Counselling Of Burglary/Robbery Offenders</i>	180
<i>The Great Brinks Holdup</i>	181
<i>Great Train Robberies Of The West</i>	168
<i>The Great Train Robbery</i>	184
<i>Handbook On Community Crime Prevention</i>	188
<i>Harrisburg (PA) - Bureau Of Police-Foot Patrol Unit - Final Evaluation Report</i>	180
<i>Help For Victims Of Robbery - 2 Researches</i>	173
<i>High Impact Anti-Crime Program</i>	193
<i>High Impact Anti-Crime Program - National Level Evaluation - Final Report, v1</i>	173

<i>High Incidence Target (HIT) Program. Final Evaluation Report</i>	178
<i>Hold-Up In Belgium</i>	168
<i>Hold-Ups - What To Do</i>	190
<i>The Impact Of Crime</i>	174
<i>The Impact Of Police Activity On Crime: Robberies On The New York City Subway System</i>	172
<i>Impact Of Street Lighting On Crime</i>	215
<i>Improving Public Safety In Urban Apartment Dwellings - Security Concepts And Experimental Design For New York City Housing Authority Buildings</i>	181
<i>Is The Victim Guilty? The Role Of The Victim In Murder Incident To Robbery</i>	181
<i>Jones: Portrait Of A Mugger</i>	215
<i>Lady Beware</i>	166
<i>Law And Order In Australia</i>	212
<i>Law Enforcement Armed Robbery Alarm System Utilizing Recorded Voice Addresses Via Police Radio Channels</i>	178
<i>Leniency In Sentencing, Bail, And Parole</i>	175
<i>Methodological Approaches For Measuring Short Term Victimization Trends</i>	207
<i>Miami (FL) - Police Department - Robbery Control Project - Final Report, October 1, 1971 - December 31, 1973</i>	197
<i>The Most Wanted Man</i>	196
<i>The Mugging</i>	168 190
<i>Natural Language Computer Processing Of Los Angeles Police Department Crime Information - Progress Report No.1</i>	199
<i>New York City Anti-Crime Patrol - Exemplary Project Validation Report</i>	199
<i>New York City Police Department Street Crime Unit - An Exemplary Project</i>	188
<i>No Fixed Address, Life On The Run For The Great Train Robbers</i>	214

<i>On The Alert - How To Protect Your Business And Property</i>	201
<i>Oregon Crime Prevention Bureau - Evaluation Report #1</i>	185
<i>Patterns Of Robbery Characteristics And Their Occurrence Among Social Areas</i>	179
<i>Philadelphia - Police Department - Northwestern Philadelphia Strike Force - ACT (Anti-Crime Team)3 - Final Report</i>	174
<i>Philadelphia - Police Department - West Philadelphia Strike Force - ACT (Anti-Crime Team)1 - North Central - Northwest Strike Force - ACT (Anti-Crime Team)2 - Final Report</i>	174
<i>Police Here Use Special Cameras To Catch Robbery Suspects</i>	188
<i>Police Programs For Preventing Crime And Delinquency</i>	198
<i>Police Robbery Control Manual</i>	212
<i>Police Tactics Against Robbery</i>	169
<i>Police Yearbook</i>	183
<i>Portland (OR) - Burglary And Robbery</i>	191
<i>Preliminary Evaluation Of The Portland (OR) Lighting Project</i>	191
<i>Preventing Burglary And Robbery Loss</i>	177
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery (5 vols)</i>	182
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, v1</i>	166 181 182 186 212 213
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, v2</i>	171
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, v3</i>	214
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, v4</i>	169 173 182 184 209
<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, v5</i>	211

<i>The Prevention And Control Of Robbery, A Summary</i>	183
<i>Principles Of Police Planning: Armed Robbery</i>	198
<i>Problem Of Personal Security In Buses Along A Transit Route In Milwaukee And Its Effect On Ridership</i>	206
<i>Professional And Organized Crime - A Stock-Taking And A Report On New Development Tendencies In The Federal Republic Of Germany And In The Netherlands</i>	193
<i>Profile Of Portland (OR) Target Crimes, 1972</i>	173
<i>Project Cares - Columbus Armed Robbery Enforcement System - Equipment Systems Improvement Program Report</i>	187
<i>Protecting Your Business From Embezzlement, Burglary, And Robbery</i>	202
<i>Protect Yourself, Your Family, And Your Property In An Unsafe World</i>	213
<i>Rap Sheet: My Life History</i>	167
<i>Reduction Of Robberies And Assaults Of Bus Drivers. (Final Reports), v1: Summary And Conclusions</i>	203
<i>Reduction Of Robberies And Assaults Of Bus Drivers. (Final Report), v2: The Scope Of The Crime Problem And Its Resolution</i>	198
<i>Reduction Of Robberies And Assaults Of Bus Drivers. (Final Report), v3: Technological And Operational Methods</i>	203
<i>Research On Street Crime Control</i>	204
<i>Residential Crime</i>	204
<i>A Review Of Robberies In Helsinki In 1963-1973</i>	194
<i>Review Of The Tanpa STAVS (Sensortized Transmitted Alarm Video System) Operation - An Anti-Robbery Alarm System</i>	171
<i>Ripoffs</i>	189
<i>Robbery</i>	170
<i>Robbery And Burglary In The District Of Columbia</i>	214
<i>Robbery And Burglary Victimology Project - A Study Prepared For The Portland High Impact Crime Program</i>	209
<i>Robbery And The Criminal Justice System</i>	174
<i>Robbery - Deterrence - An Applied Behavioral Science Demonstration - Final Report</i>	176

<i>Robbery Events: A Risk Reduction Manual For Police</i>	204
<i>Robbery In London</i>	197
<i>Robbery In San Jose</i>	205
<i>Robbery Prevention: What The Literature Reveals</i>	197
<i>Rogues' March, A Chronicle Of Colonial Crime In Australia</i>	210
<i>Scrip System Of The DC Transit System, Washington DC - Final Report</i>	198
<i>Security Control - External Theft</i>	176
<i>Security For Business And Industry</i>	189
<i>Serious Crime In Metropolitan Washington, 1973</i>	178
<i>Shapes Organized Crime Takes And Methods Of Combatting It In Sweden</i>	193
<i>Social Psychological Inquiry Into The Effects Of Criminal Victimization By Robbery On Cognitive Dimensionality</i>	168
<i>Special Crime Attack Team (SCAT) - Annual Report, January-December, 1974</i>	169
<i>Statement On Violent Crime: Homicide, Assault, And Robbery</i>	199
<i>St Louis High Impact Anti-Crime Program - Field Review And Evaluation Reports For Foot Patrol Project, Home Detention Program, And Burglary Prevention Project</i>	172
<i>St Louis - Metropolitan Police Department - Expand Mounted Patrol - Final Evaluation Report</i>	207
<i>St Louis - Metropolitan Police Department - Foot Patrol - Field Review Report</i>	172
<i>To Stop A Thief</i>	200
<i>Toward The Formulation Of Crime Indicators - Robberies In Los Angeles County</i>	171
<i>Training Key</i>	204 205
<i>The Underworld Of India</i>	196
<i>Use Of Victimization Surveys For Evaluation And Planning - An Overview Of The Portland (OR) Studies, 1974</i>	208

<i>Using Time Series Analysis To Evaluate The Impact Of Team Policing - A Discussion Paper For The Charlotte (NC) Police Department</i>	186
<i>Victimology: A New Focus, v2</i>	174
<i>Violence In Human Society</i>	186
<i>Violence, Race, And Culture</i>	177
<i>What Should Be Done About Bank Hold-Ups</i>	213
<i>Worcester (MA) - Crime Impact Program - An Evaluation Report</i>	194
<i>You And The Bank Robber</i>	216
<i>Your Money Or Your Life</i>	209
<i>Youth Between Guilt And Destiny - Increasing Criminality Of A Generation Without Allegiances - West Germany</i>	209

SERIALS

<i>Acta Criminologica</i>	242
<i>Algemeen Politieblad, (Holland)</i>	221
<i>American Behavioral Scientist</i>	225
<i>Annals Of International Criminology</i>	242
<i>The Annals Of The American Academy Of Political And Social Science</i>	220 244
<i>Archivio Penale, (Italy)</i>	224
<i>Australasian Security Journal</i>	244
<i>Australian Security Journal</i>	223 246
<i>Banking</i>	219
<i>British Journal Of Criminology</i>	223 229 242
<i>Bulletin</i>	227
<i>Bulletin Van Het Brestuur Der Strafrnrichtingen, (Belgium)</i>	223
<i>California State Bar Journal</i>	246
<i>Case Reports In Clinical Psychology</i>	229
<i>Criminal Law Review</i>	217
<i>Criminology</i>	221 227 231 239
<i>Current Medicine For Attorneys</i>	244
<i>Drug Enforcement</i>	227
<i>Economist</i>	246
<i>FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin</i>	219 225 228 231 235 236 238 243 247 250

<i>Federal Probation</i>	230
<i>Fortune</i>	221
<i>Harper's Magazine</i>	225
<i>International Criminal Police Review</i>	231 232 236 241
<i>International Journal Of Criminology And Penology</i>	220
<i>Journal Of Criminal Justice</i>	238 246
<i>Journal Of Criminal Psychopathology</i>	233
<i>Journal Of Legal Studies</i>	239 243
<i>Journal Of Police Science And Administration</i>	235
<i>Journal Of Popular Culture</i>	234
<i>Jugendschutz, (FRG)</i>	219
<i>Kriminalistik, (FRG)</i>	228 235 248 252 253
<i>Law And Order</i>	243
<i>Monatsschrift Fuer Kriminologie Und Strafrechtsreform, (FRG)</i>	239
<i>Neue Polizei, (FRG)</i>	245 251
<i>New Society</i>	238 247
<i>Operations Research</i>	221
<i>Pacific Sociological Review</i>	247
<i>Perspective On Aging</i>	228
<i>Police Chief</i>	217 220 231 233 238 241 248

<i>Police Journal</i>	219 224 228
<i>Police Review</i>	239 240 247
<i>Policia Espanola</i>	243
<i>Prosecutor</i>	230
<i>Ramparts</i>	233
<i>Revista De Policia Tecnica, (Peru)</i>	231
<i>Revue De Droit Penal Et De Criminologie, (Belgium)</i>	244 246 252
<i>Revue De La Police Francaise</i>	219
<i>Revue Internationale De Criminologie Et De Police Technique</i>	220 233
<i>Security Gazette</i>	222 223 236 249 250
<i>Security Management</i>	217 238
<i>Security Service Letter</i>	217 218
<i>Security World</i>	224 227 237
<i>Social Forces</i>	228
<i>Social Problems</i>	226
<i>Social Work</i>	249
<i>STS Newsletter</i>	230
<i>Systems, Technology, And Science For Law Enforcement And Security</i>	230
<i>Target</i>	252
<i>Tijdschrift Voor De Politie, (Holland)</i>	251

<i>Victimology</i>	241
<i>Voprosy Bor'by S Prestupnost'ju, (Russia)</i>	253
<i>West Virginia Law Review</i>	224

SUBJECT INDEX

- ASIAL, 102
- Air surveillance, 13
- Alarm systems, 122, 124-125
- Antirobbery building design, 109-122
- Armed robbery
 - cash stolen
 - statistics, 13
 - characteristics, 18
 - classification, 18
 - costs, 56
 - data collection, 75-87
 - deterrence, 1
 - drugs, 9-10
 - firearms, 13
 - information service, 1-2, 75-87
 - recommendations, 95
 - resolutions, 93-95
 - investigation, 61-62
 - research, 69-71
 - newspaper reporting, i
 - police squads, 7
 - prevention, vii, 2, 57-58, 62-63, 85-87
 - air surveillance, 13
 - costs, 62
 - research, 69-71
 - professionalism, 10
 - public concern, i, 55-56
 - reasons for increase, 14-15
 - reduction, vii
 - research, 57-64
 - research, 1, 25-71
 - Melbourne, 27
 - recommendations, 70-71
 - resolutions, 69-70
 - sentencing, i
 - seriousness, 55
 - solution rate
 - Victoria, 12
 - statistics, 5-13, 17-21
 - NSW, 17-21
 - Victoria, 5, 8, 12-13, 17-21
 - NSW, 17-21
 - US, 140-155
- Victoria, 5-15
 - see also specific offenses e.g.
 - bank robbery, muggings,
 - pharmacies, service stations,
 - taxi-drivers
- Armoured cars, 100-101
- Australian Institute of Criminology
 - seminar, i, vii
 - recommendations, 1-2
- Australian Security Industries Association Ltd, 102
- Bail absconders
 - armed robbery, 80-82
- Bank employee associations, 80
- Bank employees
 - role in prevention, 154-155
- Bank Protection Act 1968 (US), 153-154
- Bank robbery
 - amateur, 144-145
 - characteristics of offenders, 146-147, 155
 - crime patterns, 143-144
 - investigation
 - costs - US, 155
 - law
 - US, 141
 - modus operandi, 147-152
 - planning, 146
 - protection devices, 153
 - solution rate
 - US, 154
 - statistics
 - US, 142
 - US, 141-155
- Banks
 - antirobbery building design, 115-119
 - external design criteria, 118-119
 - internal design criteria, 118-119
 - security measures
 - law - US, 153-154
 - use of statistical data, 78

- Betting agencies, 78
 - SA
 - security, 129-133
- Building design, 57, 109-122
 - recommendations, 137
 - resolutions, 135-136
- CCTV, 122-123
- Cash stolen, 13
- Characteristics
 - armed robberies, 18
- Classification
 - robbery, 18
- Compensation, 133
- Controlled access systems, 123
- Costs
 - investigation
 - US, 155
 - prevention, 62
 - robbery, 56
- Crime displacement, 62-63
- Crime and media, 102
- Criminal activity
 - characteristics, 105
- Criminal identification
 - cameras, 10-11
- Criminal mobility, 102
- Data collection, 75-87
 - problems, 85-86, 89-91
 - recommendations, 95
 - resolutions, 93-95
- Deterrence
 - armed robbery, i
- Displacement of crime, 62-63
- Drugs, 9-10, 107
- EWRR, 60-63
- Early warning robbery reduction, 60-63
- Evidence, 11
- External security, 110-111
- FBI, 154-155
- Financial institutions, 77-78
- Firearms, 13, 148-149, 158-195
- Gangs, 142-143, 145
- Information service, 1-2, 75-87
 - recommendations, 1-2
 - resolutions, 93-95
- Interlocking doors, 123
- Internal security, 111-113
- Investigation, 61
 - costs
 - US, 155
 - research, 69-71
- Kansas City Police Dept, 27-29, 38
- Larceny
 - law
 - US, 141-142
- Law
 - bank robbery
 - US, 141-142, 153-154
- Law enforcement agencies, 77
- Legislative bodies, 80
- Mayne Nickless, 100-102
- Movement detection systems, 124-125
- Muggings, 46
- New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics & Research, 17
- Newspaper reporting of crime, i
- Pharmacies, 9, 18
- Photo ID systems, 123
- Police
 - investigation, 61-62
 - public opinion, 103
 - research, 57-64
 - researchers relations with, 63-64
 - robbery squads, 7, 58-61
 - role, 106
 - use of statistics, 77
- Police and media, 103
- Police patrol
 - Melbourne, 30-33
 - research, 27-29
 - robbery prevention, 58-61
 - special purpose units including robbery, 59
- Prevention
 - armed robbery, vii, 2, 57-58
 - building design, 109-122
 - recommendation, 2
 - security industry, 99-108
- Preventive measures, 58-61
 - research, 57
 - service stations, 51-52
 - taxi drivers, 48-50
- Preventive patrol, 27-29
- Private security, 99-108
 - role of, 106-107
- Professionalism, 10
- Public opinion
 - armed robbery, 55-56
- Receiving
 - law
 - US, 141-142
- Recommendations
 - building design, 137
 - information service, 1-2, 95

- prevention, 2, 137
- research, 1, 69-71
- security, 137
- Research, 1, 25-71
 - investigation, 69-71
 - police patrol, 27-29
 - prevention, 69-71
 - preventive measures, 57
 - priorities, 25-34
 - recommendation, 1, 69-71
 - relation with police, 63-64
 - resolutions, 69-70
- Resolutions
 - building design, 135-136
 - data collection, 93-95
 - information service, 93-95
 - research, 69-70
 - security measures, 135-136
- Response times, 60
- Retail trade, 78-79
- SCU, 59
- STRESS, 59
- Security equipment, 122-127
- Security industry, 99-108
 - role of, 106-107
- Security measures, 10, 121-127
 - identification, 10-11
 - recommendations, 137
 - resolutions, 135-136
- South Australian TAB, 129-133
 - see also specific security measures such as armoured cars, security industry, police, building design, alarm systems etc.
- Security vaults
 - design, 109-110
- Seminar recommendations, 1-2
- Sentencing
 - armed robbery, i
 - US, 141-142
- Seriousness of robbery, 55
- Service stations, 50-52
 - preventive measures, 51-52
- Solution rate
 - Victoria, 12
- South Australian Totalizator
 - Agency Board
 - security, 129-133
- Statistics
 - armed robbery, 5-13, 17-21
 - cash stolen, 13
 - collection methods, 82-83
 - need for, 75-87
 - use by banks, 78
 - use by police, 77
 - uses of, 77-80
- Street offenses, 45-47
- TAB
 - SA
 - security, 129-133
- Taxi drivers, 47-50
 - preventive measures, 48-50
- Violence, 55, 148-149
- Weapons, 13, 148-149, 158-159

