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**Armed Robbery**



## CONTENTS

PREFACE	(v)
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS	(vi)
INTRODUCTION	1
METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION	2
A. Survey of armed robberies	
B. Interviews	
RESULTS OF SURVEY OF OFFENCES	4
PRECAUTIONS AT PARTICULAR LOCATIONS	
A. Street offences	22
B. People in charge of movable money-taxi drivers	25
C. Service Stations - Locations operating late hours with few personnel	28
D. Report on bank security after an overseas study tour	30
DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS	43
APPENDICES	
1. Bureau statistical report forms used in 1975 and 1976 data collection	45
2. Armed Hold-Up report form used by Victoria Police	53



## PREFACE

This report summarizes the results from a study of all armed robberies in New South Wales and Victoria in 1975 and 1976. It discusses the problems of security against armed robbery in a number of relatively vulnerable industries and concludes with recommendations for action to improve the efficiency of precautions taken to prevent armed robberies and the likelihood of apprehension of offenders.

The study was commenced following submissions to the Standing Committee of Attorneys General in July, 1975, outlining a proposed study of robbery. After discussion it was decided to limit the initial phases of the study to armed robbery in New South Wales and Victoria. The research was conducted by the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research with the support of the New South Wales and Victoria Police Armed Hold-Up Squads and the Australian Institute of Criminology. Financial support was provided by the Australian Criminology Research Council.

A working party was formed consisting of members of the above bodies to monitor the progress of the research. The Bureau is grateful for the help of this Committee in the formulation of the questionnaire and the interpretation of results. Most of the data in this phase came from the records of the armed hold-up squads in the two States and special acknowledgement is made of their cooperation in providing this material and assistance in discussing problems associated with their work and with records concerning armed hold-ups.

The Bureau prepared an interim report which was presented to the Standing Committee of Attorneys General in September, 1976. The current report discusses all phases of the research and supersedes the interim report. It was written by Roseanne Bonney and Dr. Jeff Sutton. The data collection was carried out by Roseanne Bonney and Maggie Buckland and the computer analysis by Adam Sutton and Rosemary Leonard. During the interpretation of the findings and the discussion of draft documents all members of the Bureau staff contributed.

Inspector Paul Delianis of the Victoria Police assisted us greatly both by discussing the results and by providing a report of his overseas study tour on bank security. A summary of this report is included in the present report. Sergeant Ross Morrison of the New South Wales Armed Hold-Up Squad also discussed the findings with us and assisted at every point in the collection of material.

The report was discussed by the Standing Committee of Attorneys General in 1977. The recommendations were supported by the Committee.

A.J. Sutton,  
Director,  
Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research



## SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. There should be development of the data collection systems used by police armed robbery squads, using the one which is employed by the Victoria Police Department as a base. Such a system should be integrated with a computer information network similar to that used in New South Wales so that detailed information on armed robbery can be readily transmitted between police in all States and at the same time generate summarized information for use in comparison with other crimes and for management advice within State Police forces.
2. The movement of money or other valuables along public streets to or from banks should be positively discouraged, especially, when such movement is on foot. The transfer procedures adopted by banks should be followed by other commercial organisations.
3. The Victorian practice of fitting full length safety screens behind the driver in taxis should be more widely followed. Motor Transport Departments should ensure that more adequate robbery alert signals are introduced into all taxis.
4. The installation and design standards of security devices should be subject to the forthcoming recommendations of the Standards Association of Australia.
5. Given the number of times that hand guns are stolen from victims, consideration should be given to the gradual withdrawal of hand guns from such premises which currently hold them.
6. Because of the high cost of introducing adequate security systems into buildings once they are built the Royal Australian Institute of Architects should be approached with a view to influencing architects to become more security conscious in their designs. The States might consider making awards to architectural plans which reflect attention to robbery (and burglary) crime prevention.
7. Parallel to the activities of Police Crime Prevention Units consideration might be given to the creation of small multi-disciplinary crime analysis units within, or working with, police departments. The function of such units would be to analyse crime data and prepare detailed reports for specialist squads within police departments. In this way the heavy load of working investigators would be relieved. Initially the efficacy of such a unit could be tested nationally using the invaluable experience gained from the present research on armed robbery.



## INTRODUCTION

The element which distinguishes robbery from larceny from the person is the use or threat of force, however small (McClintock, 1961). In practice there is obviously a continuum from robbery in which no particular violence is used to that in which violence is accompanied by either the threat or use of a weapon.

For the purposes of this study armed robbery has been defined as an offence which involved the presence of a real or simulated weapon, or where the victim believed a weapon was present. Weapons range from a piece of wood to a sawn off shotgun. The relevant offences are defined in Section 75(3) of the Crime (Theft) Act of Victoria and Sections 97 and 98 of the Crimes Act of New South Wales.

Several British writers have noted that the increasing number of sophisticated robberies is indicative of the growth of "organised crime" on the American pattern (Cressey, 1972). In this study attention is paid to the characteristics of the offence which might indicate planning or organization and an attempt is made to estimate the proportion of planned, "professional" robberies.

Another kind of armed robbery which attracts special concern is the single and sometimes spontaneous action of young people with access to weapons, in banks or other commercial premises; in taxis; or against individuals in the street. Morton Hunt says in the beginning of his book called 'The Mugging' (1973):

"Ask virtually any American city dweller today what crime he fears and feels he is most apt to be a victim of someday. In all likelihood he would answer, a mugging".

As Hunt points out, such crimes are a small proportion of crimes in general and the value of property lost is probably much less than that which can be gained through illegal practices of other kinds. On the other hand, dramatic armed robberies can symbolise the impotence of law enforcement agencies in the face of highly organized gangs and unpredictable street robberies. They can make people fearful of going out in the street even when the chance of such a robbery occurring is small. Because of the increase in robbery in most countries there is a growing literature of the problem. A bibliography prepared by the Australian Institute of Criminology is available.

The two studies which have had the most influence on the design of the present research are those of McClintock (1961) and the Police Robbery Control Manual of the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (Ward, Ward and Feeley, 1975).



## METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

### Survey of Armed Robberies

Information was collected on every armed robbery notified to police in Victoria and New South Wales in 1975 and 1976. Over the two years there were 584 such offences reported in Victoria, and 868 in New South Wales. The primary data source differed in the two States. In New South Wales the initial record made by police in the Armed Hold Up Squad is on running sheets in which the file number, date, location, name and address of victim/s, description of weapon/s, modus operandi, and vehicles if any, are included. From these sheets the Criminal Investigation Report (C.I.R.) is completed and passed to relevant authorities.

In Victoria running sheets are also used but a specialized report form has been developed by the armed hold-up squad. This is compiled in addition to the running sheet and is equivalent to the N.S.W. C.I.R. The Victoria armed hold-up reports contain considerably more information than is recorded in the running sheets in N.S.W. or C.I.R. report. The data collected in the present study is based to a great extent on the information available in Victoria. Where this information was not available in New South Wales (for instance, with respect to the number of persons arrested who were on bail at the time of the offence), reference was made to other records, or information was obtained from the individual police officers, who were involved in the arrest.

In 1972, the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics did some preliminary work on a study of robbery. A form was designed for the purpose of examining the Criminal Investigation Reports of robbery in New South Wales. This experience provided a valuable base for the preparation of the existing form because it had been piloted with N.S.W. material. To it was added material available in the armed hold-up reports held by the Victoria police. As a matter of policy the study concentrated on the characteristics and patterns of the offence rather than the offender.

To provide up to date information it was decided after the presentation of the interim report to collect data for 1976 armed robberies. A further statistical report form was designed which eliminated those aspects of the 1975 form which had not produced sufficiently useful information. The reported results combine the analysis of the 1975 and 1976 forms. Both forms are shown in the appendices together with the 1976 data form used by the Victoria Police Armed Robbery Squad.

### Interviews

A number of interviews were conducted with persons in organizations subject to armed robberies, security organizations and crime prevention units. These were carried out after the 1975 results were analysed which enabled the research team to explore the questions raised by the results of the analysis.

As proposed in the interim report the Research Team asked a number of key groups their opinion of the adequacy of security or precautionary measures against armed robbery. In addition, the Team made a number of on-site visits to places which were the target of robberies in both years.

In some cases the opinions expressed contradicted each other. For example, the spokesperson for an employee group might have certain notions about what would be an acceptable and desirable level of security for his members which the employer group, even if conceding the desirability of the proposed measures, would find prohibitively expensive to install. Inevitably, therefore the research group in arriving at its own position had to balance desirability against feasibility. An approach was adopted that checked out expressed opinions against available data either from the information collected in the course of the study or from other local or overseas studies.

Interviews were conducted in both States and the Team wishes to express its appreciation to the following groups and organisations who spoke to us:



Australian Bankers Association  
Australian Bank Officials Association  
Metropolitan Taxi Council of New South Wales  
Silver Top Taxi Company of Victoria  
Metropolitan Security Services (New South Wales)  
Mayne Nickless (Armour Car Division) Pty. Limited (Victoria)  
Crime Prevention Unit of the New South Wales Police Department  
Crime Prevention Unit Victoria Police Department  
Pharmacy Guild of Australia (New South Wales)  
Pharmacy Guild of Australia (Victoria)  
New South Wales Service Station Association  
Victorian Automobile Chamber of Commerce  
Totalisator Agency Board of New South Wales  
Totalisator Agency Board of Victoria  
New South Wales Police Department, Armed Hold-Up Squad  
Victoria Police Department Armed Robbery Squad



## RESULTS

In 1975 there were 302 armed robberies in Victoria and 376 in New South Wales, or 8.6 per 100,000 of population in Victoria and 8.1 per 100,000 in New South Wales. In 1976 there were 282\* such offences in Victoria and 492 in New South Wales. In McClintock's study he categorised robbery into a number of types based on the circumstances under which the attack occurred. There are five broad groups in McClintock's classification and the incidence of armed robbery in each of the groups is shown in Appendix I at the end of the report. More pertinent to this study however is the location of the offence.

TABLE I - LOCATION OF OFFENCE

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Highway, Street Etc.,	71	59	23.5	21.0	71	113	18.9	23.0
Chemist	39	28	13.0	10.0	28	14	7.5	2.9
Retail Store	29	20	9.7	7.0	49	70	13.0	14.2
Petrol Station	28	22	9.2	7.9	34	50	9.0	10.1
Bank	26	31	8.6	11.0	19	25	5.1	5.0
Residence	21	18	7.0	6.3	36	65	9.6	13.2
Take Away Food Stores	15	15	5.0	5.3	21	9	5.6	1.9
Hotels	13	18	4.3	6.3	18	16	4.8	3.2
Taxis	11	11	3.6	4.0	32	33	8.5	6.8
Railway Station	9	9	3.0	3.1	3	15	0.8	3.0
Office	8	8	2.6	2.9	-	10	-	2.0
Factory	6	8	2.0	2.9	-	8	-	1.7
T.A.B.	4	13	1.3	4.7	13	12	3.4	2.5
Park	3	7	1.0	2.4	-	5	-	1.0
Hospital	2	-	0.6	-	8	1	2.1	0.2
Other Places Entertainment	1	-	0.3	-	11	1	2.9	0.2
Restaurants/Cafes	1	4	0.3	1.4	-	9	-	1.9
Post Office	-	4	-	1.4	5	6	1.3	1.2
Social/Sporting Club	-	1	-	0.3	-	10	-	2.0
Other (1)	15	6	5.0	2.1	28	20	7.5	4.0
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

(1) Includes all locations where there were fewer than five offences in both States combined.

In both years the most common location for armed robbery was the street. Although the majority of victims were attacked for personal belongings ("muggings") some were attacked for money or goods they were carrying as part of their employment.

Although locations holding large amounts of money are not the most common target for robbers there was a slight increase in 1976 of robbery at such sites. For example, banks were the fifth most common location in Victoria in 1975, but ranked second in 1976. Banks ranked eighth in New South Wales in 1975, but seventh in 1976. There was also an increase in T.A.B. robberies in Victoria in 1976.

\* Just prior to publication we were informed by the Victoria Police Department that additional cases of armed robbery in 1976 had been discovered by their Statistics Section. Details of 52 cases were forwarded and included in the analysis. Almost all of the additional cases were "muggings". It is probable that at least another 30 cases exist, however, the details are not available. The 1976 Victorian data, especially any reference to street offences, should be read with this deficiency in mind.



TABLE 2 - OFFENCES CLASSIFIED BY WHEN COMMITTED

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Midnight - 4.59 a.m.	57	39	18.9	14.2	82	78	22.2	16.1
5 a.m. - 8.59 a.m.	21	18	7.0	6.6	8	22	2.2	4.6
9 a.m. - 11.59 a.m.	38	32	12.5	11.8	32	42	8.6	8.7
Noon - 1.59 p.m.	12	34	4.0	12.5	27	43	7.3	8.9
2 p.m. - 4.59 p.m.	54	45	17.9	16.5	37	56	10.0	11.5
5 p.m. - 11.59 p.m.	120	105	39.7	38.4	184	243	49.7	50.2
	302	273	100.0	100.0	370	484	100.0	100.0

\* Time at which offence occurred not known in 9 cases in 1976.

\*\* Time at which offence occurred not known in 6 cases in 1975 and 8 cases in 1976.

#### Time of day

In both States the largest numbers of armed robberies were committed in the evening. In Victoria almost one in four offences (24.1 per cent) and in New South Wales approximately a third (30.5 per cent) occurred between 9 p.m. and 11.59 p.m. Evening robberies were less frequent in 1976, accounting for 21.9 per cent of cases in Victoria and 28 per cent in New South Wales.

However, there is one difference between the two States. In Victoria a large proportion of all armed robberies happened during business hours, that is, between 9 a.m. and 4.59 p.m. In 1975, 34.4 per cent of Victorian offences took place during these hours. The figure for 1976 was 41 per cent. However, in New South Wales in both years the level of business hours robberies was approximately one in four.

A possible reason for this difference is that, as the next table shows, there are far more attacks in New South Wales on isolated individuals, either in the street or in taxis. In both States such offences tend to be nocturnal.

Even robberies of chemist shops and service stations, (which in New South Wales are more commonly after-hours robbery venues) were more likely in Victoria to be robbed between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. For example, in the two years combined, slightly more than a half (52.5 per cent) of chemist shop robberies in Victoria were perpetrated during day time business hours. In New South Wales only a quarter (23.9 per cent) of chemist shop robberies were during these hours.



TABLE 3 - LOCATION BY WHEN COMMITTED

(1) Highways, Streets Etc.,

9 a.m. - 5.59 p.m.  
 6 p.m. - 11.59 p.m.  
 M'nght - 8.59 a.m.

VICTORIA*		N.S.W.**	
Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976	Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976
24	20.3	54	30.6
65	55.0	90	51.2
29	24.7	32	18.2
118	100.0	176	100.0

\* Time not stated 12 cases

\*\* Time not stated 7 cases

(2) Taxis

9 a.m. - 5.59 p.m.  
 6 p.m. - 11.59 p.m.  
 M'nght - 8.59 a.m.

Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976	Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976
5	26.3	6	9.5
5	26.3	30	47.6
9	47.4	27	42.9
19	100.0	63	100.0

\* Time not stated 3 cases

\*\*Time not stated 1 case

(3) Chemists

9 a.m. - 5.59 p.m.  
 6 p.m. - 11.59 p.m.  
 M'nght - 8.59 a.m.

Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976	Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976
31	55.3	10	25.0
18	32.1	29	72.5
7	12.6	1	2.5
56	100.0	40	100.0

\* Time not stated 3 cases

\*\*Time not stated 2 cases

(4) Petrol Stations

9 a.m. - 5.59 p.m.  
 6 p.m. - 11.59 p.m.  
 M'nght - 8.59 a.m.

Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976	Number 1975/1976	Percentage 1975/1976
10	20.0	3	3.7
14	28.0	50	61.0
26	52.0	29	35.3
50	100.0	82	100.0

\*\* Time not stated 2 cases



#### Day of the week

A somewhat greater number of armed robberies occur on Thursday, Friday and Monday, as shown in the following table.

TABLE 4 - DAY OF THE WEEK OFFENCE COMMITTED

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Sunday	33	25	11.0	9.0	41	48	10.9	9.9
Monday	50	43	16.7	15.4	67	81	17.8	16.7
Tuesday	37	37	12.2	13.2	40	61	10.6	12.5
Wednesday	36	38	12.0	13.6	47	60	12.5	12.3
Thursday	67	48	22.2	17.2	69	101	18.4	20.8
Friday	44	58	14.7	20.8	68	81	18.1	16.7
Saturday	34	30	11.2	10.8	44	54	11.7	11.1
	301	279	100.0	100.0	376	486	100.0	100.0

\*Not known in one case in 1975. Three cases 1976

\*\*Not known in six cases in 1976.

#### Month of robbery

Monthly variations in the numbers of reported offences showed no particular patterns within each of the States in either year. However, peaks in one State roughly approximated troughs in the other. For instance, in early January, 1975, reported armed robberies in New South Wales fell from + 4.0 per cent above the monthly average to - 1.0 per cent below. By contrast in the same period, reported armed robberies in Victoria went from + 0.5 per cent above to + 4.5 per cent above. This same phenomenon - contradictory peaking and troughing - was noted in other periods of the two years under study.

#### Criminal movement

This raises the interesting idea mentioned in some overseas studies, and certainly endorsed by a number of police here, that a relatively small group of persistent offenders move backwards and forwards across State borders committing robberies and returning to their home State, perhaps, even on the same day. Interesting as this speculation might be, our study revealed only one case in which an offender was known to have committed robberies in both States.



TABLE 5 - MONTH WHEN OFFENCE COMMITTED

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
January	27	18	9.0	6.3	46	34	12.2	7.0
February	27	16	9.0	5.7	44	30	11.7	6.1
March	45	12	14.9	4.2	31	41	8.2	8.3
April	29	26	10.0	9.2	27	27	7.2	5.5
May	23	21	7.6	7.4	31	43	8.2	8.8
June	22	23	7.3	8.1	33	48	8.9	9.8
July	33	28	10.9	10.0	19	61	5.1	12.5
August	35	22	11.6	7.8	28	65	7.4	13.2
September	23	30	7.6	10.6	32	41	8.5	8.3
October	7	19	2.3	6.7	30	36	8.0	7.3
November	18	30	5.9	10.6	27	30	7.2	6.1
December	12	37	3.9	13.4	28	35	7.4	7.1
	301	282	100.0	100.0	376	491	100.0	100.0

\* Month not known in 1 case in 1975

\*\* Month not known in 1 case in 1976

## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE OFFENCE

## The use of firearms

In 1975, 296 guns were used in robberies in New South Wales and 198 in Victoria. In 1976, 322 guns were employed in New South Wales and 236 in Victoria. The table below shows the type of firearm used by robbers in both States. As was noted in the Interim Report, a greater proportion of the guns used in Victorian robberies were handguns than was the case in New South Wales. In fact, in 1976, half of the guns used in Victoria were handguns compared to two in five in New South Wales.

TABLE 6 - TYPE OF FIREARM

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
<u>Sports Guns</u>								
Rifle	58	40	31.5	18.9	129	112	45.1	37.8
Shotgun	38	59	20.7	27.9	47	55	16.4	18.5
Air rifle	2	3	1.0	1.4	2	3	0.7	1.0
			(53.2)	(48.2)			(62.2)	(57.3)
<u>Handguns</u>								
Revolver	44	43	24.0	20.2	26	26	9.0	8.8
Pistol	40	65	21.8	30.6	77	93	27.0	31.3
			(45.8)	(50.8)			(36.0)	(40.1)
Other	2	2	1.0	1.0	5	8	1.8	2.6
	184	212	100.0	100.0	286	297	100.0	100.0

\* Type of firearm not known in 14 cases in 1975, 24 cases in 1976.


\*\* Type of firearm not known in 10 cases in 1975, 25 cases in 1976.



# Robberies by Month - Victoria and New South Wales - 1975 and 1976

Percentage variations from annual monthly average

Victoria —  
N.S.W. - - -





## Armed Victims

The validity of the police fear that armed victims, in the course of a robbery might be relieved of their weapon is demonstrated by the following table. It was established that one of the guns listed below was used in a subsequent robbery in 1976.

TABLE 7 - NUMBER OF HANDGUNS STOLEN FROM ARMED VICTIMS IN 1976

	VICTORIA	NEW SOUTH WALES
Bank Employees	9	5
Armoured Car Guards	2	2
Other Security Guards	1	3
Illicit Drug Dealer	-	1
Chemist	-	1
	12	12

## Use of Vehicles

A car was used to escape in 36 per cent of Victorian and 41.5 per cent of New South Wales robberies in 1975. The use of cars was not so pronounced in 1976, but this might be explained by the fact that in approximately a third of cases the means of escape was not stated.

TABLE 8 - MEANS OF ESCAPE FOR OFFENDER

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Motor car	109	90	36.0	32.0	156	160	41.5	32.6
Motor cycle	7	1	2.3	0.3	9	5	2.4	1.0
On foot	158	89	52.3	31.6	157	176	41.8	35.8
Public transport	-	-	-	-	2	-	0.5	-
Other	1	3	0.4	1.0	8	11	2.1	2.2
Means of escape not stated	27	99	9.0	35.1	44	140	11.7	28.4
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

In most cases only one vehicle was needed but in Victoria in 1975 in 17 per cent of robberies involving vehicles, two were used. This proportion dropped to 6.6 per cent in 1976.



# Amount gained from offence

For many robbers, robbery is not a lucrative venture. Half of the robberies in New South Wales resulted in gains of less than \$100. This category includes 102 cases in which the robber got nothing at all. Even those robbers known to be involved in three or four robberies would have gained insufficient to fully support themselves in anything more than the most basic fashion.

The proportion of cases in which \$0-\$100 was stolen was smaller in Victoria. At the other end of the scale, there were proportionately more cases in which more than \$5000 was stolen. Of this category, in 1976, included the infamous Victoria Club robbery, in which, it is alleged, approximately \$1,500,000 was stolen. Whether the amount was more or less than this is a matter for speculation.

It might be inferred from this data that most robbers are not full time operators. That is, they are not crime specific. They must either be very poor, or derive additional income from some other source. It is possible that they combine their criminal activity with regular legitimate work or some crime other than armed robbery. Certainly, they do not support themselves on armed robbery alone. Even relatively large robberies, say ones of \$50,000 (and there are very few of these) would, if split 5 or 6 ways between the participants, only provide quite average annual incomes.

TABLE 9 - VALUE OF PROPERTY STOLEN

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
NOTHING	52	41	17.2	15.0	72	102	19.2	21.3
Less than \$50	64	45	21.1	16.6	76	98	20.3	20.5
\$50 less than \$100	47	31	15.5	11.3	54	51	14.5	10.6
\$100 less than \$500	56	59	18.5	21.7	71	108	19.0	22.7
\$500 less than \$1000	11	17	3.7	6.2	25	33	6.7	7.0
\$1000 less than \$3000	17	18	5.7	6.7	32	35	8.6	7.3
\$3000 less than \$5000	22	24	7.2	8.9	13	9	3.5	1.9
\$5000 less than \$10000	14	19	4.7	7.0	12	18	3.2	3.8
\$10000 less than \$50000	11	15	3.7	5.5	15	19	4.0	4.0
\$50000 plus	8	3	2.7	1.1	4	4	1.0	0.9
	302	272	100.0	100.0	374	477	100.0	100.0

\* Amount not stated in 10 cases in 1976

\*\*Amount not stated in 2 cases in 1975. 15 cases 1976.



TABLE 10 - DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY STOLEN DURING OFFENCE

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Cash only stolen	177	171	58.7	60.6	219	289	58.2	58.7
Cash and personal belongings stolen	33	37	11.0	13.1	36	61	9.6	12.3
Articles for sale stolen	3	2	1.0	0.8	3	4	0.8	0.9
Cash and articles for sale stolen	8	3	2.7	1.0	7	10	1.9	2.0
Personal belongings only	5	8	1.6	2.9	8	19	2.1	3.9
Drugs stolen	17	13	5.6	4.6	13	1	3.5	0.2
Cash and drugs stolen	5	5	1.6	1.7	10	4	2.7	0.9
Other	2	2	0.6	0.8	5	2	1.3	0.4
None stolen	52	41	17.2	14.5	75	102	19.9	20.7
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

#### Characteristics of the offenders

The study mainly concentrated on the circumstances of the robbery but a number of questions related to information about the offender.

In 75-82 per cent of all armed robberies there were only one or two offenders. However, proportionately there were slightly more robberies with three or more offenders in Victoria than in New South Wales. The details are shown in the table below.

TABLE 11 - NUMBER OF OFFENDERS INVOLVED

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
1	109	108	35.0	38.5	149	218	39.6	45.2
2	119	116	39.5	41.2	149	177	39.6	36.8
3	51	38	16.9	13.6	55	66	14.7	13.7
4	15	14	5.0	5.0	17	17	4.5	3.5
5	4	1	1.3	0.3	3	3	0.8	0.6
6 or more	7	4	2.3	1.4	3	1	0.8	0.2
	302	281	100.0	100.0	376	482	100.0	100.0

\* Not known in 1 case in 1976.

\*\* Not known in 10 cases in 1976.

Some locations were more likely than others to be victimised by three or more offenders. The major locations are shown below by the number of offences in which 3 or more robbers actively participated. The percentage columns refer to the proportion of offences at this location in which 3 or more robbers were involved.



TABLE 12 - MAJOR LOCATIONS BY OFFENCES INVOLVING THREE OR MORE OFFENDERS

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Highway, Street Etc.,	19	18	26.7	30.6	20	22	28.1	19.5
Chemist	8	6	21.0	21.4	-	2	-	14.3
Retail Store	5	3	17.2	15.0	9	5	18.3	7.1
Petrol Station	7	1	25.1	4.5	6	6	17.6	12.0
Bank	4	11	15.3	35.5	5	2	26.4	8.0
Residence	9	6	43.0	33.4	12	21	33.4	32.8
Take Away Food Stores	2	-	12.5	-	4	1	19.0	10.0
Hotels	3	3	23.1	16.7	3	2	16.7	12.6
Taxis	2	1	18.2	9.1	5	9	15.6	27.3
Railway Station	4	-	44.4	-	-	2	-	13.3
T.A.B.	-	-	-	-	2	-	15.4	-

## CRIMINAL HISTORY OF OFFENDERS

In connection with the 492 armed robbery offences committed in 1976 in New South Wales a total of 128 people have, to date been arrested. The criminal antecedents of these people have been checked through 3 sources: the Criminal Records Section of the New South Wales Police Department, the Department of Corrective Services and the Office of the Clerk of the Peace. The following information has been derived from these records: the percentages shown represent proportions of arrestees.

1. At the time of the commission of the 1976 armed robbery four people (3.1%) were on bail for an earlier offence, not necessarily armed robbery.
2. 36 people (27.3%) had prior robbery convictions but not necessarily armed robbery convictions
3. 10 people (7.8%) were on parole for earlier offences but not necessarily robbery offences.

In Victoria, there were too many cases in which the criminal antecedents of the arrestees were not known. For this reason figures for Victoria are not shown.



## The Victims

In most cases only one victim was involved in the offence but in 1975 in Victoria there were more instances where more than one victim was involved, probably because of the larger proportion of commercial robberies undertaken. The details are shown in the following table.

TABLE 13 - NUMBER OF VICTIMS INVOLVED IN OFFENCE

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES**			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
1	180	222	59.9	82.9	275	360	73.1	73.3
2	62	19	20.5	7.0	76	92	20.2	18.8
3	14	12	4.7	4.4	12	23	3.2	4.7
4	13	3	4.3	1.1	4	3	1.1	0.6
5	13	3	4.3	1.1	5	5	1.3	1.0
6 - 10	12	7	4.0	2.7	3	7	0.8	1.4
11 - 20	7	2	2.3	0.8	1	1	0.3	0.2
	301	268	100.0	100.0	376	491	100.0	100.0

\*Number of victims not known in 1 case, 1975. 14 cases, 1976.

\*\*Number of victims not known in 1 case, 1976.

In 1975, robbers intimidated their victims more frequently with firearms in New South Wales than in Victoria. However, in 1976 there was a marked increase in the use of firearms to coerce in Victoria. This increase was at the expense of knives as a threatening weapon. In 1975 a weapon was actually used against the victim in 24 per cent of New South Wales cases and 19 per cent of Victorian cases.

TABLE 14 - ROBBER'S MEANS OF THREATENING VICTIM

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES*			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Firearm	159	185	52.6	65.6	250	273	66.5	55.4
Knife	118	76	39.0	26.9	117	168	31.1	34.1
Blunt Instrument	15	16	4.9	5.6	20	43	5.3	8.7
Physical Force	2	4	0.6	1.4	2	7	0.5	1.4
Other means of threat	1	-	0.3	-	7	-	1.9	-

\*Percentages do not add to 100 because on some occasions more than one means of threat was used. On other occasions no threat at all was made - the robber simply attacked - generally from the rear.



TABLE 15 - WEAPON USED WHEN ACTUAL ATTACK OCCURRED

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES*			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Firearm	14	1	4.6	0.3	11	7	2.9	1.4
Knife/sharp instrument	11	3	3.6	1.0	6	25	1.6	5.0
Blunt instrument	42	25	13.9	8.8	22	56	5.9	11.3
Physical Force	14	18	4.6	6.3	35	58	9.3	11.7
Other method of attack	10	-	3.3	-	15	-	4.0	-
No attack (threat sufficed)	220	68	72.8	24.1	287	367	76.3	74.5
Details of attack not stated	-	117	-	62.7	-	-	-	-

\* Percentage do not add to 100 because several means of attack were used in some instances.

#### Discharge of firearms

In Victoria in 1975 there were no cases when gun shots were fired by the victim or other person, but in New South Wales there were 8 such cases. In 1976, firearms were discharged 20 times in New South Wales and 6 times in Victoria.

TABLE 16 - RESISTANCE OFFERED BY VICTIM

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
None	263	77	87.1	27.3	312	117	83.0	23.8
Physical	6	15	1.9	5.3	43	91	11.4	18.4
Verbal	30	5	10.0	1.8	16	35	4.3	7.1
Other	3	-	1.0	-	5	-	1.3	-
Not known	-	185	-	65.6	-	249	-	50.7
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

In the majority of cases in both States the victim offered no resistance to the attack. It is difficult to comment on either State for 1976 since information about the degree of resistance offered was unavailable for more than half of the cases.

The preferred verbal weapon of younger female victims who resisted was their lungs. That is, they screamed, and not infrequently with the result that the robber immediately decamped. Surprisingly, older female victims who resisted did so physically. They either clung to their possessions (purses) or tried to fend off sometimes quite brutal attacks by the robber.

In several instances male victims were themselves armed with guns or other weapons and fired at, or otherwise attacked the robber. In one case the victim pretended that the robber had by his actions triggered a (non-existent) silent alarm. The robber left immediately.

In four cases, abuse from the victim, couched in foul or Anglo-Saxon language caused the robber to withdraw.



In 1975 a larger number of cases in Victoria than New South Wales there were persons injured during the offence. Because of the incompleteness of the 1976 Victorian data no comparisons should be attempted but it should be noted that there was an increase in 1976 in the number of people injured in robberies in New South Wales.

TABLE 17 - PEOPLE INJURED IN THE OFFENCE

	VICTORIA*				NEW SOUTH WALES*			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
No-one	239	76	79.1	25.1	311	270	88.7	75.2
Attacker	3	2	0.9	0.7	2	5	0.5	1.0
Victim (staff)	30	4	9.9	1.4	26	39	6.9	7.9
Victim (customer)	2	-	0.6	-	1	4	0.2	0.8
Victim (other)	28	24	9.2	8.5	35	77	9.3	15.6
Bystander	1	-	0.3	-	1	-	-	0.2
Security Guard	1	-	0.3	-	1	-	-	0.2
Police	-	-	0.3	-	1	-	0.2	-
Other Person								
Not known	-	180	-	63.8	-	-	-	-

\*Does not add to 100 because more than one person injured in some instances.

The kinds of injuries suffered are shown in the following table.

TABLE 18 - INJURIES TO VICTIM

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Death	1	-	0.3	-	4	1	1.1	0.2
Fractures*	2	1	0.7	0.3	3	7	0.8	1.4
Cuts, gashes, stabs*	20	8	6.7	2.9	19	40	5.1	8.1
Shock*	4	1	1.3	0.3	-	3	-	0.6
Other*	3	6	1.0	2.1	5	8	1.3	1.7
Bruising or other minor injury	24	1	8.0	0.3	20	29	5.3	5.9
None or negligible	246	78	81.4	27.7	325	393	86.4	79.9
Injury not stated	2	187	0.6	66.4	-	11	-	2.2
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

\*Require hospitalization or other medical attention



# Clear Up of Armed Robberies

In 1975, of the 678 armed robberies committed in the States, one third (33.9%) resulted in the arrest of at least one offender. The proportion of arrests fell slightly in 1976 to 30.1 per cent. The ways in which offenders were apprehended are shown for each State in the following table.

TABLE 19 - MODE OF APPREHENSION

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Not apprehended	179	172	59.2	61.0	269	369	71.5	75.0
Arrested by police	18	9	6.0	3.1	18	15	4.8	3.0
Detained by victim/passers by	4	-	1.3	-	7	3	1.9	0.7
Cleared up after police investigation	101	101	33.5	35.9	82	105	21.8	21.3
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

Note: In calculating clear-up rates the police's own criteria were used. Any robbery where at least one alleged offender was subsequently detained was classified as 'cleared up'. This means that some cases where the detainee was subsequently found 'not guilty' or not all the persons involved were arrested would still fall within this category.

Since, however, the respective squads are almost equivalent in size (Melbourne 16 detectives, Sydney 19 detectives) perhaps a more just comparison is the actual numbers of offences solved. In Victoria police cleared-up 123 armed robberies in 1975 and 110 in 1976 whereas their New South Wales counterparts solved 107 in 1975 and 123 in 1976.

TABLE 20 - MAJOR LOCATIONS BY NUMBERS OF OFFENCES CLEARED UP

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number of Offences		Number Cleared Up		Number of Offences		Number Cleared Up	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Highway, Street Etc.,	71	59	29	20	71	113	15	25
Chemist	39	28	20	11	28	14	8	4
Retail Store	29	20	12	6	49	70	16	17
Petrol Station	28	22	6	5	34	50	5	12
Bank	26	31	22	21	19	25	12	8
Residence	21	18	5	7	36	65	10	22
Take Away Food Stores	15	15	4	4	21	9	9	3
Hotels	13	18	4	7	18	16	3	4
Taxis	11	11	2	2	32	33	3	6
Railway Station	9	9	7	5	3	15	2	1
T.A.B.	4	13	1	6	13	12	6	4



TABLE 21 - MAJOR LOCATIONS BY PERCENTAGE OF OFFENCES CLEARED UP

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number of Offences		Percentage Cleared Up		Number of Offences		Percentage Cleared Up	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Highway, Street Etc.,	71	59	40.8	33.8	71	113	21.1	22.1
Chemist	39	28	51.2	39.2	28	14	28.5	28.5
Retail Store	29	20	41.3	30.0	49	70	32.6	24.2
Petrol Station	28	22	21.4	22.7	34	50	14.7	24.0
Bank	26	31	84.6	67.7	19	25	63.1	32.0
Residence	21	18	23.8	38.8	36	65	27.7	33.8
Take Away Food Stores	15	15	26.6	26.6	21	9	42.8	33.3
Hotels	13	18	30.7	38.8	18	16	16.6	25.0
Taxis	11	11	18.1	18.1	32	33	9.3	18.1
Railway Station	9	9	77.7	55.5	3	15	66.6	6.6
T.A.B.	4	13	25.0	46.1	13	12	46.1	33.3



TABLE 22 - APPREHENSION AND TYPES OF ROBBERY

		Number of Armed Robberies				Number of cases cleared up				Percentage cleared up			
		Victoria 1975 1976		N.S.W. 1975 1976		Victoria 1975 1976		N.S.W. 1975 1976		Victoria 1975 1976		N.S.W. 1975 1976	
Group I	Robbery of persons who as part of their employment were in charge of money or goods.	215	210	274	319	93	83	83	76	43.2	39.5	30.3	23.8
Group II	Robbery in the open following sudden attack	53	42	56	83	21	15	6	15	39.6	35.7	10.7	18.0
Group III	Robbery on private premises	18	2	32	49	4	-	10	11	22.2	-	31.3	22.4
Group IV	Robbery after preliminary association of short duration	5	9	3	21	1	3	1	13	20.0	33.3	33.3	61.9
Group V	Other	11	19	11	20	4	8	7	7	36.3	42.1	63.6	35.0

In both States in 1975 the highest clear up rate was for bank robbery. In New South Wales almost two-thirds and in Victoria nine out of ten such hold-ups were solved.

In 1976, banks still had the highest clear up rate in Victoria but the level of clear-up fell to 68 per cent. In New South Wales less than a third of bank robberies were cleared by the police.



APPENDIX 1

INCIDENCE OF ARMED ROBBERIES ACCORDING TO McCLINTOCK'S TYPOLOGY

	VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
	Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
Robbery of persons who as part of employment were in charge of money or goods	215	210	71.1	74.4	274	319	72.9	64.8
Robbery in open following sudden attack	53	42	17.5	14.9	56	83	14.9	16.9
Robbery on private premises	18	2	6.0	0.8	32	49	8.5	10.0
Robbery after preliminary association of short duration between victim/offender	5	9	1.7	3.1	3	21	0.8	4.2
Other	11	19	3.7	6.8	11	20	2.9	4.1
	302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0

In both years the great majority of all armed robberies in the two States was of people in charge of money or goods as part of their employment. The second category in McClintock's classification includes what are commonly referred to as "muggings". The 1976 figure for this category in Victoria is certainly understated and, as mentioned earlier in the report, comparisons between the two States are not recommended for this reason.

In both years robbery on private premises was more likely to occur in New South Wales than in Victoria.

The McClintock classification has more detailed categories which are shown in Appendix 2.



APPENDIX 2 - CLASSIFICATION OF ROBBERY ACCORDING TO McCLINTOCK'S TYPOLOGY

GROUP I - Robbery of persons who, as part of their employment, were in charge of money or goods

In transit  
 Carried during every-day employment  
 In shops, banks, etc. during working hours  
 In factories, offices and other premises during working hours  
 On business premises following illegal entry  
 On business premises following violent entry  
 On business premises - entered during non-business hours and waited for staff

GROUP II - Robbery in the open following a sudden attack

Male victim (wallets, etc.)  
 Female victim (handbags, etc.)  
 More than 1 adult/or adult and child  
 Child victim under 14 years

GROUP III - Robbery on private premises

By offenders who knocked and forcibly entered on the door being opened  
 By housebreaker subsequently disturbed by a member of the household  
 By offender who entered by subterfuge

GROUP IV - Robbery after preliminary association of short duration between victim and offender  
 (mainly for heterosexual or homosexual purposes)

Of victim decoyed by prostitute  
 Of victim in street or open space following preliminary association  
 After going home together  
 Near public house after drinking with offender

GROUP V -

Robbery in cases of previous association of some duration between victim and offender, e.g. friends, lovers, workmates  
 Other

VICTORIA				NEW SOUTH WALES			
Number		Percentage		Number		Percentage	
1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976	1975	1976
26	23	8.7	8.1	28	54	7.4	11.0
7	10	2.3	3.6	42	18	11.2	3.7
116	97	38.4	34.4	133	110	35.3	22.3
57	77	18.9	27.4	50	115	13.3	23.3
9	1	3.0	0.3	14	19	3.7	3.9
1	1	0.3	0.3	4	1	1.1	0.2
-	1	-	0.3	3	2	0.8	0.4
46	34	15.2	12.1	44	50	11.7	10.1
3	7	1.0	2.5	10	18	2.7	3.7
2	-	0.7	-	2	11	0.5	2.2
1	1	0.3	0.3	-	4	-	0.9
7	1	2.3	0.3	21	20	5.6	4.0
10	-	3.3	-	7	21	1.9	4.2
1	1	0.3	0.3	4	8	1.1	1.6
2	1	0.7	0.3	-	-	-	-
2	3	0.7	1.1	1	4	0.3	0.9
-	2	-	0.8	2	5	0.5	1.0
1	1	0.3	0.3	-	3	-	0.7
-	2	-	0.8	3	9	0.8	1.9
11	19	3.6	6.8	8	20	2.1	4.0
302	282	100.0	100.0	376	492	100.0	100.0



## PRECAUTIONS AT PARTICULAR LOCATIONS - STREET OFFENCES

The most common single location for armed robbery in both States is the street. This was true in both years of the study. In Victoria, street offences accounted for 23.5 per cent of all armed robberies in 1975, and 20.9 per cent in 1976. In New South Wales, the figures were 18.9 per cent and 23.0 per cent for the respective years. As with attacks on taxis, it is likely that police statistics in both States reflect only the more serious offences and would exclude snatch/grabs which were not accompanied by serious assaultive behaviour on the part of the robber.

While the majority of street offences are attacks on private citizens for personal belongings approximately 23.0 per cent of street robberies in 1976 were commercial robberies. That is, robbery of people for money or goods carried in the course of their employment - usually payrolls or shop takings en route to or from a bank.

### Commercial street robberies

This latter category of street offence is worth comment. Without awakening the vexed question of victim precipitation, one was forced to note the degree of victim facilitation present in these robberies. In all but two cases there was strong evidence to support that these money transfers were carried out according to a regular observable routine - same day, same time, same route. In only three cases were the couriers accompanied by other people or given security back-up.

So lax are some companies in their transfer operations that a police officer working on our study observed cynically:

"I don't know why crims take the risk of robbing banks. They could just as easily stand outside the bank and grab the week-end takings from some junior kid who has been sent to the bank with it by her boss".

Police anecdotes of this type are legion. But to validate their observations members of our research team positioned themselves in several city banks in Sydney over a number of days. It was not uncommon to see young, and in some cases quite elderly people depositing or withdrawing large amounts of money on behalf of their employer. That this money was not for their personal use was usually advertised by the carrying of a Globite suitcase. In no case was there evidence that the courier was accompanied by another person.

That such people are potential targets for robbers is, however, best confirmed by the fact that in 1975, approximately, \$101,000 was stolen from employees in New South Wales whilst transferring their employers' money to or from a bank. In 1976, although there were fewer offences the amount stolen was \$124,629.

It appeared to the Research Group that the transfer of such large sums of money in the hands of unprotected personnel along public streets bordered on contributory negligence. Since successful robberies not only occasion loss to the victim but to the whole community, it is not too extreme to suggest that businesses engaging in irresponsible money transfers of the type mentioned should be subject to State censure.

In May, 1975, the National Standing Committee on Bank Security, meeting in Sydney laid down a number of guidelines for bank security. One part of the recommendations had particular application to the money transfer situations described above. In consequence, sound procedures were adopted by the banking industry to govern money transfer operations. It would be desirable that other commercial enterprises paid the same attention to their transfer operations. At least, one might hope that they heed the sensible advice offered by the Police Crime Prevention Unit that money be transferred at different times of the day; different days of the week and via different routes.



## Street attacks on private citizens for personal belongings - "muggings"

Although businesses can be expected to organise their movements, the private citizen cannot be expected to move in pre-ordained ways to avoid being robbed. Additionally, the street mugging has features which make it quite different from the former type of street offence.

For example, the amounts stolen in most cases are quite small. They ranged from 20c to \$240 and the average amount stolen was rarely more than \$30. In New South Wales the offences occurred mostly in the outer Western suburbs or the more depressed areas of the Inner city. It is therefore quite likely that the robber had no real expectation of large rewards from his attack.

Only two of the reported offences in either year took place in what could be regarded as affluent suburbs. Around half of the offences happened between 6 p.m. and midnight. Men were far more at risk of being mugged than women but this might simply reflect that they were more likely to be on the streets during the peak hours of mugging.

Although the financial loss is small in street attacks on private citizens the risk of serious injury is much greater than if he or she was robbed in, say, a bank. In 22.0 per cent of street offences the victim was physically attacked by the robber from behind. The weapons used were generally blunt instruments (bottles, bricks, lumps of wood). Guns were rarely used. Most victims required medical treatment of some description - usually stitching for scalp or facial lacerations. In 24 cases the robbery was not preceded by a threat, it was initiated by the attack itself.

### Data analysis

Apart from advocating that streets be well lit (which is not the case in many areas), to make it more difficult for the robber to surprise his victim, analysis of the present data provides directions for the formulation of a deterrent program on street attacks.

It has been established that certain areas of Sydney are considerably more at risk than others; that muggings are a nocturnal offence and that the victims are predominantly male. However, what is now needed is a thorough and regular monitoring of all muggings so that police can be quickly mobilised into recognised high risk areas at times of day when people are most vulnerable (1). In several United States police departments regular analysis of mugging data has enabled them to deploy decoys and/or highly visible foot patrols and police cars in high risk areas to deter robbers(2). Victoria Police Department is also experimenting with putting the policeman 'back on the beat'.

- (1) The present study deals only with muggings in which a weapon was used. Therefore cases in which the sheer number of offenders or the assailants' fists were used to intimidate the victim are not included.
- (2) See, for example, the program against Street offences introduced in New Haven, Connecticut in Attachment.



ATTACHMENT

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

Program Title: Street Crime Task Force.

"Street Crime Task Force" employs 11 police officers, and one supervisor. No detectives or civilians are utilized.

The primary object of the program is to identify behaviour patterns of perpetrators, apprehend assailants, and prevent street crime. The program was implemented in July, 1971.

Description of program

The Street Crime Task Force of the New Haven Police Department is a nine man specialized patrol force which concentrates on stopping muggings, purse snatchings, and robberies and burglaries. The casually dressed, long-haired appearance of the Task Force members allow them to blend in with the culture of the street people.

By operating only during night hours and by responding to only street crime calls, the Task Force becomes familiar with street crime perpetrators and their modes of operation. The supervisor initiates demographic studies and anticipates monthly crime trends and so redirects the patrol patterns of the Task Force.

Informants are used, primarily because their familiarity with street people facilitates identification of methods of particular persons. Decoys attract purse-snatchers, etc., who may confess to a number of past street crimes.

Additional Equipment and Techniques

Unmarked cars, communications equipment, decoys, stakeouts, low visibility patrol.

Cost: \$124,000

This program is reported in: Police Robbery Control Manual, U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, April, 1975. at page 45.



## PEOPLE IN CHARGE OF MOVABLE MONEY -- TAXI DRIVERS

In 1975, there were 32 (8.5%) armed robberies of taxis in New South Wales. During the same period there were 11 (3.6%) such attacks in Victoria. In 1976, there were 33 (6.8%) and 11 (3.9%) in the respective States.

It is quite likely, however, that these attacks which were recorded in the files of the armed hold-up squads of the two States represented only a small fraction of the total altercations in which taxi drivers are involved in any year. For example, the N.S.W. Metropolitan Taxi Council claimed that during the periods under discussion their records showed an average of 1.5 police contacts per night from drivers. Many individual drivers that we spoke to also insisted that sometimes quite serious disputes (including robberies) were "dealt with informally" without recourse to police assistance.

In 1976, two taxi drivers were murdered in Victoria and one in New South Wales.

### Heavier Penalties

The murder of part-time taxi driver, Mr Hozurni Momota, prompted the New South Wales Attorney General, Mr Frank Walker, to say:

"I want to see heavy penalties meted out to those guilty of the sort of cowardly attacks that have lately horrified the community". (1)

While the imposition of heavier penalties may satisfy the retributive element in sentencing and even express the community abhorrence of what has been rightly described as "cowardly attacks", the general deterrent value of heavy penalties has not, to date, been successfully demonstrated.(2) It could also be claimed that armed robbery already attracts heavy penalties from the courts and that attention could be better directed to preventing an attack taking place.

### Half-length perspex screens between driver and passengers

If the provisions of the Victorian Commercial Vehicle Act which required the fitting of unbreakable perspex screens between the driver and the rear seat was a factor in explaining the few taxi attacks in that State in 1975 and 1976, it might not have been a factor in subsequent years. It was pointed out to us by a representative of the taxi industry in Melbourne that newer cars with head rests behind the drivers' seats made it impossible to fit the screens. Hence they were being phased out. However, following the two murders of taxi drivers in 1976, the taxi industry decided that protective screens were of more value to drivers than head rests.

### Rear seat passengers only and full-length bullet resistant screens

A sounder suggestion perhaps is that the screens be full length ones, and that the number of passengers be limited to three back seat ones. The screens could be constructed of bullet resistant glass and money for fares and change passed through shutters, such as are used in many overseas banks.

Oddly, opposition to sealing the driver completely from the passengers came from many individual drivers we spoke to in the course of the study. They thought that taxi driving was a lonely occupation and being in contact with, and able to talk to passengers mitigated their loneliness. As well as this gregarious opposition they anticipated that the public would "not take kindly" to the three passenger limit. As one driver put it:

1. Sydney Morning Herald, 13th October, 1976.
2. See for example, Schwarz B., The Deterrent Effect of longer Sentences for Rape in Philadelphia, 1968, J. Pol. Sci. In this Schwarz argues that despite the well publicised imposition of longer sentences for rape there was no alteration in the incidence of that offence in Philadelphia.



If two couples are going out on a Saturday night the four of them in a cab is not much more than the bus. But if they had to take 2 cabs they'd probably end up taking the bus because it's so much cheaper.

#### Limits on change carried and given

In New South Wales, the Metropolitan Taxi Council unsuccessfully lobbied the Motor Transport Department to limit the amount of change a driver was obliged to give to \$5.00. Their argument was that if it was well publicised that drivers do not carry much money in change they would be less likely targets of attack.

In deference to the Council it did appear to us strange that whereas on buses even \$2.00 will invite a certain caustic comment from the conductor, taxi drivers are frequently presented with \$20.00 bills or larger denominations and expected to have change available.

#### Steel safety boxes

In some overseas countries, for example Canada buses give no change at all. Entry to the bus is effected by placing the correct fare into a locked box supervised by the driver. Robberies on buses have all but been eliminated where this system has been introduced. There has been no particular outcry from the Canadian population over the introduction of this system.

The idea of locked steel boxes in taxis was not endorsed by the Metropolitan Taxi Council although at one time they had considered it. They believe that the consequence might be that the robber will simply force the driver from the car, take the taxi and open the box at his leisure.

Another suggestion has been that excess cash be dropped at the base for safe-keeping. This idea was also rejected, for the reason that a complex book-keeping or safety deposit box system would have to be introduced at the base to accommodate the cash flow of individual drivers working for individual owners in the co-operative.

#### Education

Although more experienced drivers adopt certain precautionary ground rules in talking to passengers, who, ugly as the thought is, might be planning to rob that driver, younger, less experienced drivers are not exactly reticent in giving away information which would be useful to a potential robber.

For example, one researcher on this project had no difficulty with taxi drivers establishing by casual conversation that:

- (1) The driver was near the end of his shift (and had the day's takings with him);
- (2) that business was good at this time of the year - he had been flat out all day/evening (therefore the takings would be quite considerable),
- (3) he would have no trouble giving change for a large bill. (In two cases the researcher suggested \$20.00 bills in one case \$50.00. In the case of the \$50.00 the driver checked to see if this was possible from his case "hidden" behind the sun-visor in front of him).

Although older drivers probably share their experience with younger ones (we were assured that no long-time driver would pass on to a passenger the above information), there is no formalised training given in avoiding robbery prone situations.

#### Police participation in training

The New South Wales Police Department offers a lecture to prospective taxi-drivers. However, this mainly concerns the driver's obligations under the Public Vehicles Regulations Act - the categories of people and goods he may and may not carry.

The Taxi Council was inclined to think that the Crime Prevention Unit of the Police Department should be involved to teach drivers to avoid robbery prone situations. They



stressed the need for crime prevention training not only because the drivers' takings are a target for robbers but because of the increasing use of taxis as transport for documents and other valuables which might attract a more professional, organised and determined criminal.

#### OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENTS IN TAXI SECURITY

##### Armed Taxi-Drivers

No-one that we spoke to was attracted to the practice in some countries of arming taxi-drivers. It is also our opinion, and that of many police officers, that to increase the number of legally held hand-guns would probably have the consequence that some would fall into criminal hands in the course of robberies. The police in both States pointed out that it is not unusual in bank robberies for the bank's hand-gun to be taken in addition to the money.

##### Vehicle Location System

In Chicago a system has been introduced which enables the base to physically locate a taxi under attack. That is, when a driver triggers the silent alarm in his car, not only does he alert the base that he is under attack but his location is flashed up on a screen and can be physically tracked. In this way the police and other support can be immediately directed to where the driver is.

The technology for such a system is available in Australia and is already in use in some areas. Presumably the cost factor is all that restrains taxi companies in New South Wales and Victoria from introducing it.



## LOCATIONS OPERATING LATE HOURS WITH FEW PERSONNEL - SERVICE STATIONS

Service stations, like hamburger shops, milk bars and other take away food shops, are locations operating late hours with few personnel. In 1975, 34 stations were held-up in New South Wales and 28 were attacked in Victoria. In both States, robberies in service stations accounted for approximately 9.0 per cent of all robberies. In 1976, there was little change in Victoria, but there was a slight increase in service station robberies in New South Wales (50 cases, 10.1 per cent of all armed robberies).

In 1975, when one looked at the time the offence took place a very different pattern emerged for the two States. In New South Wales, only 3 (8.8 per cent) occurred in normal business hours - between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m. Almost a third of the offences occurred during these hours in Victoria. Nonetheless, 67.9 per cent of service station robberies in Victoria were committed outside normal daytime hours.

Time differences between the two States disappeared in 1976.

### Hours of operation

The New South Wales Factories, Shops and Industries Act imposes a trading minimum of 75 hours per week on service station operations. They must trade from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sundays and Public Holidays excluding Christmas Day, Good Friday and Anzac Day when the station need not open at all. How often and for how long they open their stations beyond these hours is for the station operative to decide.

### Longer hours of trading

In some cases a service station might be given the inducement of cheaper petrol from his supplier if he trades beyond the mandatory 75 hours. This greater discount is offered to those dealers whose operations the market researchers of the oil company have decided are not fully tapping the sales potential in a given area.

A second, more lucrative for the station operator, deal can be effected if he agrees to act as commission agent for the oil company. Under this arrangement (which is different from the more usual lessee relationship in which the dealer buys his petrol on a C.O.D. basis from the oil company), the dealer agrees to take a certain amount of petrol per week and to trade for as long as the market researchers say is viable. He remits all the money from petrol sales to the oil company but receives a much bigger return per gallon sold. The representative of the oil company who spoke to us stressed that this arrangement is not offered to all service stations but "only to those stations where there is a recognised market potential". He added that such stations would not necessarily trade 24 hours per day. They would trade this long only if there was a 24 hour market to be tapped.

### After hours personnel

It is unusual for there to be many more than one person operating service stations after 7 p.m. at night. Often this person will be a junior employee. At present, it is generally necessary for the attendant to leave the 'shop' part of the station to fill the customer's petrol requirements. It could be argued that this creates a robbery prone situation in which the attendant is 'at risk' of physical injury.

### Rostering

In Western Australia legislation has been introduced which limits the numbers of service stations which may trade after normal hours. The primary advantage of such a system would be that the police would have a smaller number of potential robbery targets to keep under surveillance in any given area. However, since all of the business in that area would flow through the one site it might become a more attractive target and therefore need to provide better protection for the sole operative working the station.

But how would the service stations be selected for the roster? For example, if Oil Coy. X has 400 million dollars invested in service station installations and Oil Coy. Y has only 100 million dollars invested would X get 4 times the share of the roster that Y got? Another argument which was put to us was that since Australia is a "free enterprise" system, it is not for the "Government to say what share of the market a dealer can have. It is for them to decide how long and how hard they want to work".



## Education

The New South Wales Service Station Association Journal Automotive Service, in its July, 1976, issue, published sound advice on robbery prevention, and two of the major oil companies utilise the facilities of the Crime Prevention Unit of the New South Wales Police Department to lecture on security to its Advanced Dealers Course. Nonetheless we formed the opinion that the services of this police unit are underutilised by this industry.

## Self-serve installations

It is encouraging to note that several oil companies have solicited the aid of the Crime Prevention Unit to "build security into the design of new stations which will operate on a self-serve basis". It will be less necessary for the operatives to leave the "shop" in these installations, especially when the self-serves are "gas-bars" only. (Gas-bars are installations which sell only petrol. They do not offer other services like car wash, maintenance etc.) Since they are either new installations or modified older stations they provide an excellent opportunity to improve the security features of the contemporary service station.

One oil company is currently considering plans which would provide (if adopted) maximum protection for staff and money, especially at times when the station is solo-operated.

After 7 p.m. the operative would be locked into the "shop" which is so placed as to offer complete surveillance of the drive-in approaches and exits. The driver would attend to his own petrol needs and come to the "shop" to pay for it. The shop would be completely surrounded by bullet-resistant glass. Money would pass between the customer and the operative through a chute. This chute would also permit other commodities to pass to the customer (cigarettes, sweets etc.).

## Older style service stations

It is difficult to recommend preventive measures for the older style of service station. Keeping money in excess of \$50.00 in a slot safe for the which the operative had no key has been one suggestion, but in itself this offers little additional protection for the operative. Perhaps, slot safes in combination with the principle that no change is given would be better. However, if it became generally known that robberies of service stations would net such a small return then they may become less attractive targets.

If, as alleged, it is beyond the means of smaller stations to employ more than one person to man the station after hours, it would not be feasible for them to consider various forms of electronic surveillance systems. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for with such stations is that ultimately they will be phased out by stations into which good security has been designed at the outset. Alternatively, that in any given area there are limited numbers of such stations operating after hours when they are most at risk of being robbed.



## A REPORT ON BANK SECURITY AFTER AN OVERSEAS STUDY TOUR

Summary of a report prepared by Detective Inspector Paul Delianis for the Victoria Police Department.

The Working Party wishes to express its appreciation to the Commissioner of Police in Victoria for his permission to summarise and publish this confidential report.

### INTRODUCTION

In 1972 the Standing Committee on Bank Security was formed in response to a growing number of bank robberies in Australia. The group, comprising representatives of the Australian Bankers' Association, the Australian Bank Officials' Association and various police departments, was convened to consider and advise upon the standard of security at bank branches.

Although the Committee agreed on the desirability of a number of security measures, the deterrent or protective value of bullet resistant glass remained a vexed question. As a consequence, the Australian Bankers' Association, in 1975, sponsored an overseas study tour to examine the effectiveness of bullet resistant glass against armed attacks and any other program which might contribute to better bank security or a reduction in armed bank robberies. The five man study group was formed by two members of the banking industry, a representative of a bank employees' union and two police officers.

The present report which is here summarised, was prepared for the Victoria Police Department by a member of that study group. The views expressed are his and do not necessarily reflect those of the group as a whole. A joint report was submitted to the Australian Bankers' Association.

### Countries visited

In the course of the tour the Group visited Singapore, the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Belgium, the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada. A full list of the organisations which contributed information is shown at the end of this section.

### SINGAPORE

With the exception of drive-in banks, none of the banks in Singapore had bullet resistant material protecting the cash areas. However, at every bank visited there was a police officer posted in uniform as a guard. It was not possible in the time available to establish how widespread this practice was, or to evaluate the deterrent value of the guards. Singapore is a city which uses armed guards in various situations. In the hotel where the Group stayed, armed uniformed guards were posted on each floor.

### THE UNITED KINGDOM

Almost all of the 12,000 bank branches in the United Kingdom are fitted with screens of anti-bandit glass protecting tellers in the cash areas, and in many cases, other bank staff. These screens commenced to evolve toward the end of the last decade in order to combat attacks on bank tellers by the use of corrosive or noxious liquids and sprays. By the end of 1973, protective screens were fitted nationwide.

### Security Screens

Initially the screens were installed to a height of six feet. They were subsequently extended to the ceiling when it was found that bandits could climb over the six foot barrier. Other installation modifications were also effected. For example, the support fittings had to be strengthened, and the size of the glass screens reduced when it emerged that the fittings were vulnerable to attack from sledge hammers or pick axes. Inner doors connecting the banking chamber with the public areas were reinforced and steel bars fitted on outer windows to prevent robbers smashing through them to gain entry to the tellers' area, either immediately before the attack or during the night.

English bank tellers are unarmed and the majority of those who were interviewed said they took considerable comfort from the fact that they had protective screens in front of them. However, several commented that the screens created a depressive atmosphere



but one which they were prepared to tolerate because of the additional security.

#### Incidence of bank robberies

It should be remembered that the screens were primarily installed to protect tellers from acid attacks, and, as such, have been successful. There have been no such attacks in either 1974 or 1975. However, although not designed to withstand ballistic weapons it was generally accepted that the screens had made a significant contribution towards curbing robberies involving firearms.

Although the United Kingdom has always enjoyed a low hold-up rate there have been reductions in the numbers of bank hold-ups and the amounts stolen since the introduction of the barriers. Bank security personnel said that it has become more difficult for the offender to take possession of the money from the teller through one or other of the devices used to transfer cash between the teller and the customer.

#### Hostages

The installation of the screens in banks did not appear to have created any serious problem involving the taking of hostages for the purpose of overcoming the barriers. However, it was conceded that the taking of hostages would probably be successful as a means of coercing staff, but only a small minority of offenders would go to this extreme. Banking officials and police expressed the opinion that only the truly committed armed robber was now concentrating on banks, while the amateur and semi-professional was now seeking less well secured targets. Inspector Delianis summarised the English situation as follows:

"I think the important lessons to be learnt from the situation in the United Kingdom are these:

- (a) The glass security screens have made a significant contribution in reducing bank hold-ups.
- (b) The screens have not at this stage created the serious hostage problem that was envisaged by many people.
- (c) It is unnecessary to use a highly effective bullet resistant glass to bring about a satisfactory deterrent result.
- (d) It is unnecessary to introduce a law to compel banking companies to bring to effect security measures involving considerable expense."

In many branches glass security screens are complemented with the use of alarms and cameras, and some banks were experimenting with time delay devices in tellers' stations. Although initially the introduction of the screens generated a more violent "ambush" or "commando" type hold-up, the overall result was a significant reduction in the incidence of the crime. Armed hold-up was being controlled in the United Kingdom to a much greater extent than in most other countries of the world.

#### FRANCE

Between 1963 and 1974 the number of armed bank robberies in France rose from 15 to 863; the rate is still increasing at this same dramatic rate. There are 10,000 bank branches in the country and 80% of the robberies take place in branches employing less than 5 people. An average of 3 offenders is involved in each offence. The use of machine guns is fairly common. The police clear up rate is approximately 40%.

#### Security Measures

At the present time banking organisations in France use a number of measures to combat the armed attacks on their branches. Legislation is imminent that will compel banks to introduce at least three security measures. However, bullet resistant glass will not be compulsory. There is resistance on the part of bank management to the legislation and they appear "utterly confused as to what measures should be taken". One banking company which had been generally using bullet resistant glass has now abandoned this practice. They are experimenting with either less costly glass or spring loaded metal screens. It is too early to know the success of these screens but results so far are encouraging.



These "pop-up" screens can completely enclose the tellers' areas in less than one second when activated by the staff; three robberies have thus far been thwarted by this method.

Loud hold-up alarms are also being used and except in one case, when retaliatory shots were fired by the robbers, the offenders fled when the alarm went off. The banks argue that the introduction of bullet resistant glass will result in more violent robberies and the taking of hostages. However, the admittedly serious hostage problem in France appeared to be related to other factors. For example, the arrival of the police at the bank while the robbery was still in progress.

#### SUMMARY

1. There is a serious bank robbery problem in France (17 per million of population).
2. The banks are unclear about what is the best method of security.
3. Opposition to bullet resistant glass might be motivated more by cost and loss of customer contact than the stated reasons of increased violence and hostage taking.
4. French bank robberies are demonstrably more violent than those in the United Kingdom and more guns are used. (Machine guns are not infrequently the weapon of choice.)

#### BELGIUM

Delianis cited Belgium as the country with "the most advanced thinking on bank security of those visited on the tour". It has a population of eleven million and a bank hold-up rate of 5.5 per million of population. Half of the hold-ups take place in Brussels at the smaller unprotected branches.

#### Clear-up rate

Although Belgium is a country of high density policing (there is one policeman to every 250 people), the clear up rate on armed hold-ups is quite low (approximately 27 per cent). The explanation of this situation offered by the police is that offenders frequently come across the borders from France and Germany and return there immediately after the offence.

Bullet resistant glass is not universal in banks but there is a strong trend in that direction. There has only been one attempt to rob a bank fitted with the glass and the offender was arrested immediately after he left the bank.

The study group visited a branch of the Brussels Lambert Bank which Delianis described as the "ultimate in physical bank security". The bank had the following features:

1. The staff were totally enclosed behind bullet resistant glass in an air conditioned space.
2. Silent alarms were connected to the police communications centre.
3. Time locks were fitted to the tellers' main cash drawers, preventing them from being opened for a period of four minutes.
4. Minimum amounts of money were available in working drawers.
5. Carriage of money outside the bank was in combination locked radio controlled satchels. The satchels contained dye and smoke devices which could be activated by remote control.

Delianis added that "the fitting of hold-up cameras would have completed a perfect security set up.

The Societe General de Banque of Belgium which has bullet resistant glass in all of their 1,200 branches with a combination of time locks held the view that the barriers did not, as is frequently alleged, detract from, or hamper good customer contact. On the contrary, they believed that the public are attracted to their banks because of their progressive and responsible policy. They were however slightly concerned that



bank personnel might be kidnapped and held for ransom. They have developed standing plans against this eventuality.

#### Police perspective

The police spokesperson interviewed said that bullet resistant glass was a more successful deterrent measure than any other. He was critical of silent alarms because of the false alarm rate. He pointed out that the police disconnect alarms after three false calls. Perhaps, for this reason banks are re-routing their silent alarm systems to private security companies. Although Belgium police are encouraging the introduction of bullet resistant glass they are not prepared to say with certainty what the eventual results will be as far as hostages are concerned. To date, no hostages have been taken. The police also believe that as bank security improves there will be a swing away to other targets.

#### WEST GERMANY

##### Compulsion to install security glass

In West Germany certain financial institutions are compelled by law to install bullet resistant glass. The legislation, passed in 1967, against a background of a record number of bank attacks, provided that institutions with fewer than ten personnel in the cash area, should protect those personnel in a bullet resistant enclosure. The law proceeded on the correct assumption that smaller branches were more vulnerable than larger ones.

The legislation stipulated standard specifications for the glass to be used; four layered laminated to total minimum thickness of 25 millimetres; height of security barriers and minimum construction standards for inner doors to cash compartments. Ten thousand of the 40,000 financial institutions were affected by the new law. Installations were calculated to have cost in excess of five hundred million Deutschmarks.

##### Impact

In the two years following the introduction of the new security requirements, armed attacks were reduced from 430 to 220. There has been a gradual increase since 1969, but West Germany remains the one country visited in which "the hold-up rate on banks is less now than it was nine years ago."

##### Attitude of banks to legislation

Despite this reduction in bank hold-ups the banking industry representatives who were interviewed were generally hostile to the legislation. They admitted that they would not have introduced the measures without the compulsion of law. They argued that although the barriers had reduced the numbers of attacks, those that did take place were more violent in nature and the barriers would produce a hostage problem. (The hostage fear was not supported by any available data.)

##### Police attitude to legislation

The police endorsement of the legislation is based on the significant reduction in bank hold-ups. They would like to see the requirements for bullet resistant glass extended to all financial institutions regardless of size. They concede that there has been an increase in attacks on other institutions not so well secured as banks, but find this no justification for the banks not to be well secured. The barriers have not, in the police mind, created any sizable hostage problem and are the most important factor in the reduction of armed attacks.

##### Clear-up rate and false alarms

The present rate of armed robbery in West Germany is 6 per million of population and the clear up rate is approximately 60 per cent. The police charge banks 100 Deutschmarks for responding to false alarms. Several senior police officers expressed dissatisfaction with lenient treatment which bank robbers received from the courts.



Delianis summarised the German situation as follows:

"The legislation to enforce tighter security in certain branches was bitterly resented. As is often the case with the compulsion of legislation, the banks carried out only those security measures that were required by the law. For example, the Dresdner Bank with its 900 branches has installed only 20 hold-up cameras. As a comparison, the A.N.Z. Banking Group Ltd. with over 1,000 branches in Australia has installed 850 cameras. The two major factors concerning the banks were cost and the loss of customer contact due to the installation of glass barriers. Whilst these financial institutions agreed that the security measures taken had reduced armed attacks, they strongly emphasised that there was an increase in violence and hostage taking. The available facts did not seem to support this contention although undoubtedly persons had been threatened for the purpose of overcoming resistance. Of course, this sort of desperate action is not exclusive to banks with bullet resistant materials. A more unbiased view was obtained from the Frankfurt police who think that bullet resistant glass has been a major factor in the reduction of armed attacks on banks. The fact that the number of armed hold-ups at banks is less now than nine years ago is very significant and almost unique for this era."

#### THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Between 1955 and 1975, the numbers of armed bank robberies rose from 335 to 4,252. 1976 has shown no abatement in this upward trend. Although the American rate is four times the Australian rate it is less than Canada's. In 1975 more than 30 million U.S. dollars were lost in such hold-ups.

The amount of bullet resistant glass used in the U.S.A. is insignificant and most banks conform to the open planned tellers stations model. The death and injury rate in bank hold-ups in the first half of 1975 is shown in the following table:

Categories of victims	Killed	Injured
Customer	2	14
Employee	2	51
Offender	8	39
Police	1	8
Guard	1	9
Other	1	5
Total	15	126

There are no national banks in the United States; branches being confined to State boundaries. There is a total of over 65,000 branches and most of them come under Federal jurisdiction for reason of the requirement for independent insurance and the banks' membership of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. This gives the Federal Bureau of Investigation authority to investigate the majority of bank robberies. There now is a very close liaison between the Federal and State law enforcement bodies. The F.B.I. has the responsibility of maintaining statistics on Federal bank robberies. Banks in some of the States are more prone to hold-up than others. This is particularly true of California, New York State and Pennsylvania. In fact, 60 per cent of all bank robberies occur in ten States.

#### 1968 Bank Protection Act

In July, 1968, the Bank Protection Act became law throughout the U.S.A. The Act was designed to discourage bank robberies and to assist in the identification and apprehension of the persons who commit these crimes. The regulations under this Act make it mandatory for banks to observe the following requirement:



- (a) Each bank shall designate a security officer who shall be responsible for the development and administration of a security program and for the installation, maintenance and operation of security devices.
- (b) Such security officer shall seek the advice of law enforcement officers in determining security measures taken.
- (c) A record shall be kept by the bank showing the name and rank of the law enforcement officer from whom the advice was sought.
- (d) Each bank shall install a silent robbery alarm if, in that area, a response can be expected from the police within five minutes.
- (e) Each bank shall provide "bait" money at each tellers' station and shall keep a record of this currency.
- (f) The exterior window of every walk-up or drive-in tellers' station shall be glazed in with bullet resistant glass.
- (g) Banks shall instruct employees in responsible actions to be taken during and after a robbery.

Apart from what has been set out in this regard, there is no requirement for banks to install bullet resistant glass, nor is there any compulsion to provide security cameras. For those who do use cameras, there are advisory regulations. The Act does not appear to have had any impact on the hold-up situation and, in Delianis' view "is only playing with the problem, and when statistics are taken into consideration, it has been a failure." According to the American Bankers' Association, the banks are not resentful of the legislation as it does not commit them to great cost. If the Act was repealed, security would remain the same.

#### New York Banks

The Chase Manhattan Bank of New York has 250 branches in New York State. Their security officer, an accepted authority on bank protection, is a former F.B.I. officer and played a significant part in the invention of the hold up camera used extensively by them. The bank is currently installing bullet resistant glass as an experiment at five vulnerable branches, but is concerned at the almost prohibitive cost of security glass. In 170 of their branches there are armed guards, but the bank is having a closer look at the deterrent value of these guards, as in many instances, the guard is also being held up and his firearm stolen.

#### Incidence of Armed Robberies

In the first six months of 1974 the bank had 18 armed robberies and in the corresponding period of 1975 there have been 29 offences. This means that in a 12 months period more than a fifth of their branches will be held up. The average loss is about \$U.S.6,000.

#### "Security Pac"

The Chase Manhattan Bank makes considerable use of a device called the "Security Pac" This is an explosive faked bundle of bank notes that is triggered electronically as it is taken through a magnetic field set up at the front door of the branch. The device emits smoke, dye and tear gas. According to the Bank's security officer, it has had a tremendous success throughout the United States. Not every State allows the use of tear gas in such devices, therefore smoke and dye only are used. The bank also uses a sequence camera that takes 16mm pictures at the rate of one every 15 seconds.

#### Rewards and Informants

Unlike Australia, there is no bank employees' union in the United States, but banks appear concerned over the increasing danger to personnel during robberies. As a joint effort, the banks publish pictures from hold-up cameras and offer a \$U.S. 10,000 reward to any person who identifies an offender. This has met with considerable success. The banks will also pay informers large amounts of money for information, upon advice by the police, in appropriate cases.



## American Bankers' Association

A spokesperson for the American Bankers' Association was critical of the courts in handing down light sentences to convicted bank robbers but also in allowing bail before trial. Another serious problem was false alarms - a rate of around 97 per cent. False alarms, they thought, ultimately created negative attitudes in police personnel but also exposed them to danger through nonchalance. The Association favoured police arriving at the bank during the robbery but observed that many Police Departments will not allow members to enter if the offenders were still present.

They maintain an open mind on bullet resistant glass. However, some banks have gone ahead and fitted out branches with the glass and achieved a reduction in hold-ups. As in other countries, the Association fears both the cost of installing the glass and the possible increase in extortion attempts accompanied by the taking of hostages.

## The Bank of America

The second largest banking company in the world the Bank of America, has 1,084 branches in California. Thirty-five per cent of the branches have walk-up and drive in facilities and these, as required by law, are protected by bullet resistant glass. The glass is not used in other types of banking chambers. Extensive use is made of hold-up cameras and silent alarms.

## Police as tellers

In San Francisco and some other places the Bank of America officially employs off-duty police officers as tellers. This system is preferred to the use of private armed guards and has had considerable success in terms of offenders arrested. There are moves to extend the use of off-duty police officers in banks. Additionally, the Bank is now equipping branches with explosive money packs ("scorpions").

The Chief Security Officer with the Bank of America, whilst admitting that robberies rarely occur in their branches fitted with security glass, did not think that the glass was generally necessary in all branches. He thought the screens were incompatible with the open teller concept and personal contact with the public.

## Delianis comments:

I do not understand the argument that the public desire personal contact with bank tellers when it is more and more apparent throughout the United States that mechanical tellers and exterior bank facilities are being used to a large extent and their use is increasing.

## Extortion

The most common type of kidnap/hostage situation was initiated by a telephone call which stated that an officer, employee or family member was being held captive or would be harmed unless the bank made a ransom payment.

## Washington: Federal Bureau of Investigation + Bank Robbery Unit

Because of the concern felt about the dramatic increase in the incidence of bank robbery the Bureau has conducted a survey of agents working in this field to measure their subjective assessment of the major reasons for the increase. The responses fell into the following categories but it should be noted that there was no general consensus among the agents interviewed:

- (a) The economic recession
- (b) The need for money to buy narcotics
- (c) The extremely large number of bank branches
- (d) General deficiencies in the criminal justice system. (Short prison sentences; general leniency by the Courts; an ineffective probation and parole system; too early release from prison; the release of armed robbers on bail.)



## Hostages

The F.B.I. agents appeared to hold the same reservations as some organisations about possible hostage problems resulting from the widespread use of bullet resistant glass in commercial installations. They were far more confident of the investigative and deterrent value of cameras and explosive devices which emitted smoke, dye and tear gas. They knew of no recorded incident when such devices had presented a danger to the public.

## San Francisco: Robbery Squad

In 1974 this Squad investigated 2246 armed robberies of which 106 were bank robberies. Bank robberies have a clear up rate of approximately 70 per cent. Like their Federal law enforcement counterparts the officers in this Department expressed displeasure with restraints placed on their investigative powers by the law. In particular they complained about the limits on interrogation, search and seizure, plea-bargaining and the uncertainty of punishment for convicted robbers. One officer summed the situation up as follows:

If you commit a crime, you may not get caught; if you get caught, you may not get charged; if you get charged, you may not get convicted; if you get convicted, you may not get a gaol sentence.

## Police attitude to bank security

The officers interviewed were reasonably satisfied with bank security if hold-up cameras had been installed which were capable of producing good quality photographs of the robbery. They didn't think that bullet resistant glass was necessary at this stage and that probably the cost factor would block the widespread use of this measure. In police opinion the part-time employment of off-duty policemen as tellers was a good security measure and had worked well. In San Francisco, police responding to a hold-up alarm are instructed to wait until the offenders have left the bank before trying to arrest them. There are about six to eight incidents annually when police exchange shots with offenders at armed robberies.

## Mosler international

At Hamilton, Ohio, the study group visited the bank security company of Mosler International where they were briefed on the various relevant aspects of bank security and shown the manufacture and operation of equipment. The following equipment is worth mentioning:

- (a) A 16 millimetre camera that operates continuously taking one frame every 15 seconds. This does away with the need for activation and is also a value in fraud cases.
- (b) A new silent alarm system that can identify a line fault before sending the alarm through to the alarm centre.
- (c) Time lock devices on tellers' cabinets which prevent anyone opening a cash drawer for a set period of time.
- (d) A machine known as a "tellermatic" for installation at supermarkets, railway stations, outside banks, etc, that can:
  - (i) Pay money out by use of credit card.
  - (ii) Receive money as a deposit to the account.
  - (iii) Pay bills.
- (e) Television teller consoles known as "tellervue" for interior and exterior installation. This allows remote banking transactions to take place by means of closed circuit television and vacuum tubes.
- (f) Drive-in and exterior walk-up tellers' windows in bullet resistant material with transference of cash by vacuum tube or security money exchange devices.



- (g) Vault ventilation units to allow proper ventilation in the event of persons being locked in the vault.

An officer of the Mosler company made the following comments:

In the 1960's the banks started a move to go to the public; to make as much direct contact as possible. Someone said they should take banking to the public and to do this they should take down the barriers. They have put banks everywhere. If "A" put a bank somewhere, "B" did likewise. We finished up with banks on every corner. The U.S.A. is overbanked. Architects design banks without any thought to security. Low counters etc. to be nice to the housewife. Bankers are a peculiar breed in that they think alike in their efforts to draw business, but they are not security conscious.

#### Bullet resistant glass

The spokesman for Mosler International on bullet resistant glass was not convinced that this type of glass was necessarily the answer to the hold-up problem. He said that there was a small trend towards experimentation with glass barriers and gave as an example a banking organisation in Virginia which was replacing open counters with security screens. The bank had experienced no further robberies. Mosler believed that the best concept was for the working cash at a bank to be removed away from the counter to a secure remote area. The A.N.Z. Banks are experimenting with this concept known as "central cash" in which a master teller is situated towards the rear of the banking chamber enclosed with bullet resistant materials.

Delianis summarised the situation in the United States:

It is quite certain that armed bank robbery presents an enormous problem. Allied to this is the even more disturbing incidence of hostage/kidnapping for ransom. There are many factors that bring about the frightening number of robbery offences, but having regard to the type of modus operandi used, I believe one of the major causes is the open concept of banking. The Bank Protection Act, had done little to alleviate the position and law enforcement agencies seem to be working with their hands tied at a time when crime is rampant. There are signs of friendly open counters starting to give way to a more secure type of teller's station, and automation in banking is increasing. The criminal, running unchecked, is applying tremendous pressure on financial institutions in the United States and taxing security officers to the limit. I think the knowledge to be gained from all this is that we should take steps now to prevent this situation from coming into existence in Australia.

#### CANADA

Canada has the world's worst hold-up rate on bank premises; about 45 offences per million head of population. The city of Montreal with a population of two and a half million has an extremely high rate and out of all proportion to the rest of Canada. The incidence of hold-ups is set out in the following table:

Year	All Canada	Montreal
1971	379	84
1972	381	83
1973	470	155
1974	511	147
1975	555	368
(to 31.7.75)		



## The Canadian Banking Industry

Delianis described the Canadian Banking Industry as fiercely competitive "with a passionate concern for customer contact" and the least security conscious of all banking organisations visited on the tour. There are about 6,000 bank branches in Canada and the use of bullet resistant glass is negligible. The use of cameras is not common and virtually no use is made of explosive note bundles. The main security measures are:

- . Silent alarms
- . Flashing blue lights outside bank branches (These are being phased out because of their recognised lack of success)
- . Armed guards (it should be noted that it is not uncommon for the guards themselves to be held up and their weapons stolen).

### Bullet Resistant Glass

The reluctance to introduce security screens was couched in much the same terms as in other countries: the cost; the loss of customer contact; uncertainty about its effectiveness as a robbery deterrent. However, although this was the official view, several security officers with banks privately stated that "given a free hand they would progressively introduce security glass". In particular, one security officer referred to the situation in Kingston, Jamaica, where the Bank of Nova Scotia has 26 branches "which were being held up regularly". Following the introduction of security glass in all the branches there had been no further robberies. One bank with a particularly high bank hold up rate (27 per cent of its 217 Quebec Province branches were held up in a twelve month period) appeared ambivalent about security glass. They had considered its introduction but feared the loss of customers to other banks if they were first to install glass. Another bank insisted that the upsurge in bank robberies was to be explained less in terms of the physical security in banks (or lack of) than by the lower penalties being handed out by the courts in recent years. The Canadian Bankers' Association also expressed this view and were equally caustic about bail reform and the failure of prison rehabilitative programs for robbers.

### Kidnapping And Extortion

There has been an increase in the type of robbery which employs kidnapping and extortion as the modus operandi. In a 13 month period Canadian banks paid out four million dollars in extortion demands accompanied by kidnappings. The courts in this type of robbery are said to deal very sternly with convicted offenders. Nonetheless the risk of being kidnapped and held for ransom is said to explain the high turnover in banking personnel 50 to 60 per cent annually. A limited compensation scheme has been introduced by the banks. That is, any bank officer who has been exposed to a bank robbery is paid one hundred dollars.

## AUSTRALIA

Inspector Delianis described the Australian bank robbery situation as follows:

There are about 7,500 bank branches throughout Australia. Many of these branches are small and there are, in my view, an excessive number of sub-branches. All the evidence indicates that the smaller the branch, the more vulnerable it is to armed attack. Australia, like North America, is over-banked. Every senior bank officer recognises this, but due to strong competition none of the major banks are prepared to take the initiative and commence to eliminate small, uneconomical branches.

Australia's bank robbery rate is relatively low; about 5.5 offences per million of population. Although there is little bullet resistant glass used here Australia is a world leader in the utilisation of hold-up cameras. From a police perspective this device offers the greatest investigative assistance and has resulted in the identification of many robbers. Considerable success has also been from the use of explosive note bundles (scorpions).



## Silent Alarms

By itself the silent alarm is not regarded as a great security measure and presents serious problems because of the high rate of false alarms. However, in conjunction with bullet resistant glass and/or time delay mechanisms, Delianis argues that silent alarms can be important in limiting the time the robber can afford to spend in the bank being robbed. For example, in the U.K. police had ample time to arrive at the scene of a bank robbery if alerted by a silent alarm, before the robbers had managed to "smash their way through the security glass".

## Armed tellers

Delianis observed that the practice of arming tellers "caused considerable amazement overseas" where it has not been done for many years, if at all. He expressed his own reservations about the habit noting that although "action by an armed teller had resulted in the arrest of an offender in a number of cases" this was counterbalanced by the number of weapons that were stolen from tellers in the course of robberies. In the last five years 35 weapons were stolen from banks in Victoria.

## General Conclusions

Although armed robbery generally has increased in all the countries visited on the study tour, armed bank robbery has been contained, and in some respects decreased in the United Kingdom and West Germany - the two countries making extensive use of bullet resistant glass. By contrast, in the United States of America and Canada where little use of bullet resistant glass is noted, armed bank robberies are increasingly common. Having considered all the other possible causes of the difference in the levels of armed robberies, Delianis concludes that the use of security glass is the single most significant feature.

## Consequences of better bank security

Although probably correct, Delianis rejects as spurious the argument that better bank security will only result in more robberies of other organisations which are less well secured. This proposition has been raised by both local and overseas banking organisations and he likens it to the idea that "my next door neighbour should not install a good quality lock on his front door because this will entice burglars to break into my house where I have a poor quality lock." He continues:

My mandate was to examine and report upon the effectiveness of bullet resistant glass and other bank security and make recommendations as to any implementation of these measures. I do not think I would be carrying out this function properly if my judgment was affected by the fact that the consequences of reducing armed attacks at banks was to increase them at other establishments.

## Hostages

The frequently expressed view that the introduction of bullet resistant glass would result in an increase in the taking of hostages to overcome the screens did not appear to be supported by much hard data. The English experience, where security screens are nationwide suggested that hostage taking was no serious problem. The Societe Generale de Banque of Belgium which has the glass in 1,200 branches had, since its installation, experienced only one futile attempt at robbery. Although in West Germany, where the glass is compulsory in many cases, bank officials said the screens created a hostage problem, they could produce no figures which supported their assertion and their view was not shared by the police.

The kidnap/extortion type of robberies which are prevalent in the United States and Canada could not be attributed to the screens because so few have been erected. Delianis concluded that a false picture of the hostage situation had been generated in part because of a hostile attitude to compulsory physical security and in part because of the factor of installation.



## Recommendations

On the basis of the study tour, Delianis formulated the following recommendations which were forwarded to the Commissioner of Police in Victoria:

- (1) "Bullet Resistant Glass. Bullet resistant glass capable of withstanding three shots fired from a hand gun into approximately the same region of the glass, without spalling, should be progressively installed in appropriate bank branches in order to protect the bulk monies held by the teller or tellers. The branches in which the glass should be installed should be decided upon by the members of the Standing Committee on Bank Security. The installation of the glass in the designated branches should be completed within five years of a date to be determined by the members of said Committee.
- (2) Bullet Resistant Materials All other vulnerable areas surrounding the teller or tellers shall be protected with bullet resistant materials.
- (3) Exterior Windows. Exterior windows away from street frontages shall be protected with steel bars.
- (4) Bank Sub-branches. The sub-branches of banks in urban areas should be phased out as soon as possible and small branches should be amalgamated with other branches so that the minimum size bank branch within a metropolitan area has no less than ten personnel.
- (5) Carriage of Money. The carriage of bank monies away from a branch or sub-branch by bank personnel presents a serious security risk and should be discontinued. This would not apply where bank personnel use an armoured car.
- (6) Bank Firearms. Bank firearms should be withdrawn forthwith from the tellers and issued only to senior members away from the teller stations. This should not apply to those tellers who operate under a central cash system.
- (7) Bank Security Officers. The major banks should in New South Wales and Victoria appoint security officers who should be primarily responsible for security in banks and co-ordinate a programme of training for bank personnel.
- (8) Anti Hold-up Devices. That banking organisations should also be encouraged to install or utilize the three anti hold-up devices considered to be of the greatest value:
  - (i) The hold-up camera.
  - (ii) The explosive, chemical filled, imitation bundle of notes.
  - (iii) The time delay lock on the teller bulk cash drawer.
- (9) Silent Alarm. A record should be kept of false alarms originating from particular branches, and after three false alarms from any one branch, a charge should be made for police attendance in response to a further false alarm."



GROUPS CONSULTED IN COURSE OF STUDY TOUR

The Banking Information Service, United Kingdom.  
Crime Prevention Officer, New Scotland Yard, U.K.  
The National Union of Bank Employees, U.K.  
Chubb Security Services Ltd, London, U.K.  
The Officer in Charge, Robbery Squad, New Scotland Yard, U.K.  
Barclays Bank Ltd, U.K.  
The National Westminster Bank Ltd., U.K.  
The Credit Lyonnais Bank, France  
S.A. Glasexco, Glass Manufacturers, Belgium  
Association Belge Des Banques  
Frederick Sage Pty. Ltd., Bank Fitters, Belgium  
Belgium National Police.  
Societe Generale de Banque, Belgium.  
Fabrique Nationale, Belgium.  
Bundesverband Deutscher Banken E.V. West Germany.  
The Deutscher Bank, West Germany.  
The Dresdner Bank, West Germany.  
The Frankfurt Police Department.  
The Bank Fur Gemeinwirtschaft Aktiengesellschaft.  
(Trade Union Bank), West Germany.  
The First National City Bank, New York, U.S.A.  
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.S. New York, U.S.A.  
The American Bankers' Association, Washington, U.S.A.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, U.S.A.  
The Canadian Bankers' Association, Montreal, Quebec.  
The Royal Bank of Canada, Montreal, Quebec.  
The Toronto Dominion Bank, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.  
The Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto, Ontario.  
Mosler International, Hamilton, Ohio, U.S.A.  
The First National Bank, Chicago, U.S.A.  
The Bank of America, San Francisco, U.S.A.  
The Officer in Charge, Robbery Squad, Police Department, San Francisco, U.S.A.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Francisco, U.S.A.



## DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

### Monitoring armed holdups

In New South Wales a greater proportion of robberies involved a single offender in unplanned attacks on the street or in taxis than in Victoria, where proportionately more robberies were in commercial premises and in banks. There was a general feeling amongst both armed robbery squads that there were more professional organized criminals committing armed robberies in Victoria than in New South Wales. On the other hand, over recent months in New South Wales there seems to have been an increase in carefully planned armed holdups. The proceeds from major robberies may be of such a magnitude that the movement of criminals from State to State to carry out crimes may become an increasingly common feature of armed robberies. Perhaps we will approach the kind of situation where it was asserted that in Britain there had been an increase in "well organized and lucrative crime, suggesting the activity of a small number of persistent professional criminals". (Cressy, 1972).

It is easy to exaggerate the development of this kind of threat. On the other hand, if there is an increase in the coordination and planning of armed robberies then there is clearly also a need for an increasing sophistication in the methods of apprehension for such offences. The pattern of organization and planning needs to be thoroughly understood and of course police officers acting in the course of their duty will develop that kind of sophistication with increasing experience. One increasingly important basis for the apprehension of planned crime is the collection of information on the characteristics of offences and offenders.

The research team was of the opinion that the level of data collection and reporting available to the police officers with respect to armed robbery could be greatly improved. The system in Victoria is substantially more developed than that in New South Wales. After the publication of the interim report in both States developments were made in their systems of recording however the discrepancy still remains. It would be desirable to initiate a system of comparable data collection which provided information which could be transferred readily from State to State as required. Such a development might contain something like a combination of the sophisticated data collection in the Victorian armed robbery squad and the computer feedback system being developed in New South Wales.

Not all of the material collected and used by the Squads could be placed on the computer file, but it would certainly be desirable for a good deal of the Victorian data to be more widely available. It is possible that two levels of data could be established in a Computer System - one level pertaining to the work of a particular squad which would be chiefly of interest to them and their counterparts in other States and another level containing material which could be compared with other crimes and of interest to where the work of other squads and divisional officers overlapped. Such material is of particular interest to management and is of the type already collected and stored on the computer in New South Wales.

### The Movement of Money

The report indicates that there appears to be a serious security problem in the movement of money or other valuables in public streets by individuals who take few precautionary measures. They often display easily the purpose of their movements by carrying bags which are clearly out of place. For instance, there could be few young women who carry as a normal procedure down the street a "Globite" suitcase and yet this kind of action can be seen in city streets. Often a great deal of money is moved around by this procedure. Sometimes people are sent to the bank to collect or pick-up money at the same time each day. The potential for successful robberies is so great that it is perhaps surprising that more do not occur. Perhaps potential offenders are frightened off by acting within the crowded city street. It would certainly require some speed and skill which they would perhaps rather not acquire. The casual movement of money in this way should be discouraged.

The procedures used by banks are a suitable model for secure transfer of money. It may be that the crime prevention agencies are reluctant to encourage the use of particular security companies and that clients may be unwilling to use security



services on the grounds that their promotion is largely for commercial reason and not actually necessary. The cost of secure transfer of fairly large sums of money appear to be relatively modest and some objective analysis of the problem should be made so that this information could be dispersed amongst people who might take advantage of it and so reduce the possibility of robberies and injury within the street.

#### Taxis

The security of taxis appears to present an increasing problem and despite some controversy the research team is inclined to support the fitting of bullet resistant screens between the driver and passengers in all taxis. Such procedures should be policed by the Motor Transport Department, and in each State made a condition of registration. It also seems important to develop an alert system in taxis. Some sophisticated systems are extremely expensive and it would be necessary to examine closely the various alternatives before any such proposals were made mandatory.

#### Standards for security devices

Security devices are offered in a competitive market situation with an increasingly complex technology. It is difficult for clients to make objective assessment of the relative value of particular devices. They can gain useful advice from the crime prevention bureau in each State but on the other hand there are limitations on the degree to which a government agency can promote or recommend against a company marketing a particular device. It would be of considerable importance if a set of standards existed for security devices and the forthcoming recommendations of the Australian Standards Association should be considered in this respect.

#### Handguns

There seems to be an increasing number of times in which hand-guns are stolen from premises in which armed robbery occurs. It is an unfortunate trend noticed in armed robberies over the recent months that the number of hand guns used has increased. Further, the likelihood of such weapons being anything other than a danger to all in such a situation is so high that consideration should be given to the gradual withdrawal of hand guns from such premises which currently hold them.

#### Architecture for Crime Prevention

Because of the high cost of introducing adequate security systems in buildings once they are built, the Australian Institute of Architects should be approached with the view to influencing architects to become more security conscious in their original designs. The State may consider making awards to architectural designs which reflect attention to robbery and burglary crime prevention.

#### Crime analysis

The experience of the Bureau in conducting this research has led us to believe that there would be value in carrying out similar kinds of crime analysis activities on other crimes in a variety of locations. The research team has needed to contact a number of agencies, each of which have a substantial and important job to do in the apprehension and prevention of crime. However, it is not always easy to bring about coordination between such activities and to provide the data and interpretation of information which may be of value to the various agencies involved. It is not only a matter of crime prevention as carried out by the Crime Prevention Unit but also a matter of developing the relationship between prevention and apprehension. Further in a crime of such potential magnitude as armed robbery many other groups are directly involved, e.g. companies, the organisations which are the targets of robberies and the employees and public involved in the functioning of such organizations. For this reason the research team believes that consideration should be given to the creation of small multidisciplinary crime analysis units within or working with the Police Department. The function of such units would be to analyse crime data and prepare detailed reports for specialist squads within police departments, and where appropriate other organizations. In this way the heavy load of working investigators will be relieved. Initially, the efficacy of such a unit could be tested in different states using the experience gained from the present research on armed robbery.



Robbery Questionnaire Code Number

Police File Number

1. Type of Robbery I

Group I

Robbery of persons who, as part of their employment, were in charge of money or goods:

- 01 in transit
- 02 carried during every-day employment
- 03 in shops, banks etc. during working hours
- 04 in factories, offices and other premises during working hours
- 05 on business premises following illegal entry
- 06 on business premises following violent entry
- 07 on business premises - entered during non-business hours and waited for staff.

Group II

Robbery in the open following a sudden attack:

- 08 male victim (wallet, etc.)
- 09 female victim (handbags, etc.)
- 10 child victim, under 14 years.
- 11 more than 1 adult/or adult and child

Group III

Robbery on private premises:

- 12 by offenders who knocked and forcibly entered on the door being opened
- 13 by housebreaker subsequently disturbed by a member of the household
- 14 by offender who entered by subterfuge

Group IV

Robbery after preliminary association of short duration between victim and offender (mainly for heterosexual or homosexual purposes):

- 15 of victim decoyed by prostitute
- 16 of prostitute by client or by person waylaying her for her takings
- 17 of victim in street or open space following preliminary association
- 18 of victim in vicinity of public house after drinking with the offender
- 19 after going home together

Group V

- 20 Robbery in cases of previous association of some duration between victim and offender, e.g. friends, lovers, workmates.
- 21 Other (Specify)

2. Type of Robbery II (enter code)

- 1 Street robbery - visible
- 2 street robbery - non visible
- 3 residential robbery
- 4 vehicle robbery
- 5 commercial robbery

3. Date offence committed

4. Day of week offence committed (enter code)

5. Weather conditions (enter code; fine 1, rainy 2, not known 3)

6. Time offence committed (hours)

7. Local Government area where offence committed



8. Police (sub)-district where offence committed
9. Grid location
10. Location of offence (enter code)
  - 01 Bank
  - 02 T.A.B.
  - 03 Hotel
  - 04 Retail store
  - 05 Chemist
  - 06 Petrol station
  - 07 Theatres
  - 08 Sporting fixtures
  - 09 Other places of entertainment
  - 10 Residence
  - 11 Highway (road, alley, street, etc).
  - 12 Public park
  - 13 Post office
  - 14 Railway station
  - 15 Drive-in liquor store
  - 16 Take-away food store
  - 17 Taxi-cab
  - 18 Armoured car
  - 19 Other
11. If payroll - (enter code)
  - 1 Payroll within one hour of delivery
  - 2 Payroll in armoured car
  - 3 Payroll in other vehicle
  - 4 Other payroll
  - 9 Not relevant
12. If bank robbery (enter code)
  - 1 Silent (note passed etc.)
  - 2 Announced
  - 3 Ambush - illegal entry wait for staff
  - 4 Commando - violent entry
  - 5 Announced - with hostage/s
  - 6 Other hostage
  - 9 Not relevant
13. If bank robbery - during business hours?
  - 1 Yes
  - 2 No
  - 3 Not relevant
14. If Post Office, T.A.B. or Bank had premises been specifically designed for use as Post office, T.A.B. or Bank, or had they been converted? (Enter code: Yes 1, No 2)
15. Had location been subject to a previous robbery within the preceding 5 years  
(enter code: Yes 1; no 2)

OFFENCE REPORTING INTERVAL

16. Interval before offence known to police (enter code)
17. If police not notified immediately, state reason for delay
18. Interval before Police interview victim (enter code)
19. Offence cleared up
  - 1 No
  - IF YES
  - 2 arrested by Police
  - 3 detained by victim or passer-by
  - 4 cleared up after Police investigation



20. Planning of offences
  - 1 Planned
  - 2 Unplanned, impulsive
  - 3 Insufficient information
21. Was robbery for purpose of directly obtaining drugs: Yes 1, No 2, Don't know 3.
22. Was offence motivated by need for money to obtain drugs:  
Yes 1, No 2, Don't know 3.
23. Was the possible use of 'insider' information:
  - 1 Ruled out by police
  - 2 Suspected by police
  - 3 Confirmed by police (ie. after arrest)
  - 4 Not known
24. Number of offenders involved in offence
25. Was a woman involved: Yes 1, No 2  
Was she only a 'lookout'; Yes 1, No 2.  
Was she only a driver of vehicle: Yes 1, No 2.
26. Were there any characteristics of the offence or of the offender which led the police to believe he had been involved in other robberies (Enter code: Yes 1 No 2).
27. If 26 equals 'Yes' what were these characteristics (Enter code: Yes 1, No 2)  
Words used  
disguise  
mode of dress  
weapons used  
mode of entry  
race  
peculiarity of appearance (eg.tattoo)  
modus operandi  
other (specify, eg. tying people up, speech accent, names referred to, build etc.)
28. Was any offender on bail for previous offence at time of commission of this offence? Yes 1, No 2, Not known 3.  
IF YES specify offence/s
29. Was any offender on parole for previous offence at time of commission of this offence Yes 1, No 2, Not known 3  
  
IF YES specify offence/s for which parole was granted
30. If offender arrested, did he have a previous robbery conviction (Yes 1, No 2).
31. Type of robber: (enter code)
  - 1 Professional
  - 2 Semi-Professional
  - 3 Opportunist/Amateur
  - 4 Addict
  - 5 Drunk
32. Number of Victims (give number)
33. Had any victim previously associated with attacker: Yes 1, No 2, Don't know 3.
34. Closest degree of relationship of any victim to any attacker
 

1 No previous association	6 Casual acquaintance
2 Spouse, lover	7 Casual business relations
3 Family relationships	8 Employee/employer
4 Friends	9 Other
5 Workmates	



35. Was the relationship cultivated to obtain inside information Yes 1, No 2,  
Not known 3, Not relevant 9
36. Did victim(s)' pattern of activity at time of robbery correspond to a regular  
observable routine: Yes 1, No 2.  
If yes, specify
37. Did any victim offer resistance (if yes give details)
- Physical  
Verbal  
Other
38. Robber(s)' means of threatening victim (enter code)
- 1 Firearms (or imitation)
  - 2 Sharp instruments
  - 3 Blunt instruments
  - 4 Punching, kicking etc.
  - 5 Other (specify)
39. Actual means of attack
- 1 Firearm (Yes 1, No 2)
  - 2 Sharp Instrument (Yes 1, No 2)
  - 3 Blunt instrument (Yes 1, No 2)
  - 4 Punching, kicking, etc. (Yes 1, No 2)
  - 5 Other (specify)
  - 6 None (specify)
40. Persons injured
- Attacker (Yes 1, No 2)  
Victim - staff (Yes 1, No 2)  
Victim - customer (Yes 1, No 2)  
Victim - other (Yes 1, No 2)  
Bystander (Yes 1, No 2)  
Policeman (Yes 1, No 2)  
Security guard (Yes 1, No 2)  
Other (specify) (Yes 1, No 2)
41. Injury to victim (give most serious injury to any victim)
- 01 Death
  - 02 Fractures
  - 03 Cuts, gashes, stabs requiring medical attention
  - 04 Categories 2 and 3
  - 05 2+ Hospital
  - 06 3+ Hospital
  - 07 5+6
  - 08 Shock requiring medical attention
  - 09 Other conditions requiring medical attention
  - 10 Bruises abrasions or minor wounds
  - 11 None or negligible
42. Description of injuries
- Insert wound location
- |                                    |               |
|------------------------------------|---------------|
| Chest                              | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| Abdomen                            | " "           |
| Head                               | " "           |
| Back                               | " "           |
| Neck                               | " "           |
| Shoulders                          | " "           |
| Legs                               | " "           |
| Not known/Not Stated (Yes 1, No 2) |               |
43. Had alcohol been consumed prior to offence (enter code)
- |                                 |                       |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 By a victim                   | 4 No alcohol consumed |
| 2 By an offender                | 5 Not known           |
| 3 By both a victim and attacker |                       |



44. Had drugs been consumed prior to offence (enter code)

- 1 By a victim
- 2 By an offender
- 3 By victim and attacker
- 4 No drugs consumed
- 5 Not known

45. Type(s) of firearm(s) used by offender(s)

<u>CODES</u>	<u>PREFIX</u>	<u>WEAPON</u>
1	Single shot	1 Rifle
2	Repeater	2 Shotgun
3	Self loading	3 Air-rifle
4	Double barrel	4 Revolver
5	Imitation	5 Automatic pistol
6	Not relevant	6 Speargun
		7 Explosive powered tool
		8 Other
		9 Not known/not stated

EXAMPLE Double barrel shotgun is code 42

First firearm (Enter code)

More than one firearm (enter code)

Second firearm

Third firearm

Fourth firearm

46. Modifications to firearms (ie. sawn-off, cut down) (enter code)

(Modified 1, Not modified 2, not known 3)

First firearm

Second firearm

Third firearm

Fourth firearm

47. Calibre of firearm(s) enter code.

First firearm

Second firearm

Third firearm

Fourth firearm

CODES

01	9mm
02	12 gauge
03	16 "
04	.17 "
05	20 "
06	.22 "
07	.25 "
08	.32 "
09	.38 "
10	.45 "
11	.177 "
12	.222 "
13	.242 "
14	.270 "
15	.303 "
16	.308 "
17	.410 "
18	other
19	not stated
20	not relevant

48. Were gun shots fired

- 1 by attacker/s
- 2 by victim
- 3 by both
- 4 by other person/s
- 5 no shots fired



49. Description of property stolen
- 1 cash only
  - 2 cash and personal belongings
  - 3 articles for sale
  - 4 cash and articles for sale
  - 5 personal belongings only
  - 6 drugs
  - 7 cash and drugs
  - 8 other
  - 9 none stolen
50. Value of property stolen
- 01 Less than \$50
  - 02 \$50 less than \$100
  - 03 \$100 less than \$500
  - 04 \$500 less than \$1000
  - 05 \$1000 less than \$3000
  - 06 \$3000 less than \$5000
  - 07 \$5000 less than \$10000
  - 08 \$10000 less than \$50000
  - 09 \$50000 plus
  - 10 None
51. Value of property recovered (See 50 for code)
52. Had any special precautions been taken
- Physical precautions
- |                            |               |
|----------------------------|---------------|
| (a) Alarm silent           | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (b) Alarm loud             | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (c) Camera                 | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (d) Scorpion               | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (e) Bait money             | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (f) Bullet-Proof Glass     | (Yes 1, No 2) |
| (g) Other device (specify) |               |
- Other precautions
- |  |             |
|--|-------------|
| (a) Variations of times in handling/delivering money | Yes 1, No 2 |
| (b) Armed guard/s                                    | Yes 1, No 2 |
| (c) Victim/s armed,                                  | Yes 1, No 2 |
53. Means of escape
- 1 Motor car
  - 2 Motor cycle
  - 3 On foot
  - 4 Public transport
  - 5 Other (specify)
- If Motor Vehicle used by offender
54. Number of vehicles used
55. Number of stolen vehicles used
56. Were stolen number plates used Yes 1, No 2, Don't know 3.



- 1 Type of Robbery Classification 1 (See Code Sheet)
- 2 Type of Robbery Classification 2 (See Code Sheet)
- 3 Date committed
- 4 Day of week
- 5 Estimated time committed
- 6 Suburb where committed
- 7 Location of offence (See code sheet)
- 8 If Payroll - type (See code sheet)
- 9 If Bank robbery - type (See code sheet)
- 10 If Bank robbery - during business hours 1. Yes 2. No
- 11 If delay in reporting to police state reasons
- 12 Offence cleared up? 1. No 2. Arrested by police 3. Passer-by or victim  
4. Cleared up after police investigation
- 13 Was offender disguised? 1. Fully 2. Partially 3. Not at all.
- 14 Number of offenders
- 15 Number of female offenders
- 16 Any offender on PAROLE at time of offence? (specify offence/s)
- 17 Any offender on BAIL at time of offence? (specify offence/s)
- 18 Any offender have previous robbery conviction? 1. Yes 2. No
- 19 Number of victims
- 20 Number of female victims
- 21 Relationship of any victim to any attacker  
1. None 2. Spouse/lover 3. Other family 4. Friend 5. Workmate 6. Casual acquaintance 7. Casual business 8. Employee/employer 9. Other.
- 22 Victim/s pattern of activity at time of robbery corresponded to regular observable routine. (See code sheet)
- 23 Details of resistance offered by any victim (See code sheet)
- 24 Means of threatening victim Firearms (imitation) Sharp instruments  
Blunt instruments Punching/kicking Other threat specified
- 25 Means of attacking victim (Categories as for previous question)  
Other attack specified
- 26 Persons injured Attacker. Victim(staff). Victim(customer) Victim(other)  
Bystander. Policeman. Security Guard
- 27 Most serious injury to any victim (See other sheet)



FIREARMS

- 28 Type and modification (See code sheet) Number of firearms  
First Firearm  
Second Firearm  
Third Firearm  
Fourth Firearm
- 29 If gun shots fired by whom 1. Attacker 2. Victim 3. Police 4. Other 5.No shots  
fired
- 30 Description of property stolen 1. Cash 2. Cash and personal belongings 3. Articles  
for sale 4. Cash and articles for sale 5. Personal belongings only 6. Drugs and  
cash 8. Nothing 9. Other (specify details)
- 31 Value of property stolen (specify amount)
- 32 Value of property recovered (specify amount)
- 33 Special precautions mentioned in data  
Alarm silent  
Alarm loud  
Camera  
Scorpion  
Bait money  
Bullet proof glass  
Variations in time delivery/pick-up money  
Variations in route delivery/pick-up money  
Armed guards  
Armed victims  
Other (specify details)
- 34 Precaution impact 1. Successful 2. Unsuccessful 3. Not mentioned
- 35 Means of escape mentioned in data 1. Car 2. Motor bike 3. Foot 4. Public trans-  
port 5. None mentioned 6. Other (specify details)
- 36 If car used to escape number of cars known to be used
- 37 If stolen car/transport 1. From victim 2. From other 3. Not known
- 38 Were stolen number plates used? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know
- 39 SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENCE/OFFENDER/VICTIM NOT COVERED IN QUESTIONNAIRE  
(SEE CODE SHEET)

CHECKING PURPOSES ONLY

Arresting officer/s

Where stationed

Names of all known offenders

Date of arrest



APPENDIX 2

VICTORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT - ARMED ROBBERY SQUAD - REPORT OF ARMED ROBBERY

Name and address of persons on premises

Type of premises

Date                      Time                      Day of week                      Weather conditions

Description of property stolen (include guns stolen if applicable)

No of persons involved (specify numbers of males and females in each category)

Staff                      Customers                      Others                      Offenders

Brief details of events - answer yes or no in each category

Masked

Gloved

Influence by drink

Shots fired

Used violence

Persons injured

If yes to injuries describe in full

Description of offenders

(State in following order: Sex, Nationality, Age, Height, Build, Posture, Hair, Complexion, Eyes, Features, Speech, Accent, Any name referred by, Clothing, Masking, Scars, Tattoos, Peculiarities, Weapons.)

If forced entry gained - how effected                      First words used by offenders/s

Was offender seen (answer yes or no in each category and give details below)

Before robbery

After robbery

Unmasked

Observing

Changing vehicles

Is it apparent that offender had 'inside' information - if yes give details

Did following police department attend at the scene

Forensic Science Laboratory

Fingerprints

Photographer

Identi-Kit

Local C.I.B.

Crime Cars

Is there any: Fingerprints, Scientific Evidence, Exhibits, Property recovered, Identification, Suspect. (If yes - give details - including location of exhibits).

Give details of any other offence believed committed by offender

Give brief resume and any other details not previously mentioned

Names of all police officers from all departments attending scene

Armed Robbery Squad. Forensic Science Laboratory Photographer Fingerprints Local CIB.



Description of the robbery

What directions were given to the victim by the offender  
(For example, "Lie on the floor" "Don't press any buttons" etc.)

Subsequent expressions

If victims bound, gagged, etc. - describe in full

Who handled money or property stolen during robbery

Description of container used to remove property - state source

Duration of robbery

Where was victim when offender left

Describe any unusual circumstances  
(For example, staff locked in strongroom)

Precautions - answer yes or no in each category

Alarm

Bullet resistant glass

Camera

Scorpion

Bait money

Other device (specify)

Staff resistance

Other resistance (specify)

For every yes answer in above question give details

(For example, indicate if alarm activated, camera triggered,"scorpion"taken)

Means of escape

If stolen vehicle used give following details:

Registration Number	When stolen	Where recovered
Serial Number	Where stolen	By whom
Make	How stolen	Distance from scene
Model		
Year		
Colour		
Special features		

Describe any special circumstances in use of stolen vehicles  
(For example, stolen plates attached - Plates altered - Held up passing motorist)

If stolen vehicles not used - give other form of transportation

Route of escape - if known

N.B. ALL SECTIONS MUST BE COMPLETED FULLY.



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