The Effects of Three Experimental Prison Environments on the Behavior of Non-Convict Volunteer Subjects

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

Abstract

In order to examine the effects of possible changes in the social organization of prisons, a comparison was made of three experimental prison regimes, using 60 non-convict volunteer subjects. A baseline regime was modelled closely on existing medium-high security prisons. The two other regimes differed in the degree of individuality and participation accorded the prisoners. In an independent groups design with one replication, each group (six prisoners and four officers) spent four days in the experimental prison. The three regimes differed significantly in general atmosphere, and the character of the relations that developed between officers and prisoners. The results were interpreted as further evidence that hostile affrontive relations in prisons are a function of the social organization of prisons rather than the personal characteristics of the participants.

Traditionally, prisons have been seen as places of punishment by confinement, but most present-day prison departments are called Departments of Correction. The change of name implies that the main concern of prisons is now the rehabilitation of convicted prisoners. Nevertheless, most prisons are still overwhelmingly concerned with the custody of inmates, and the maintenance of security is the over-riding aim. The relations between officers and prisoners in such institutions tend to be characterized by a smouldering hostility which occasionally erupts in violent confrontation. Such a climate offers little scope for the development of rehabilitation programs of any consequence.

The experiment to be described was designed to study the effects of possible changes in the social organization of prisons. The specific question to which our research was addressed was this: What sorts of conditions must be provided in prisons in order to generate a system of human relationships consistent with change from a custodial to a correctional orientation?

Reference to diverse sources suggested a number of potentially important conditions, but we regarded the following as the most critical:

1. Firstly, the dignity and individuality of inmates must be respected. In practice this means not only that inmates must be provided with physical conditions consistent with prevailing community

standards, but they must be free from arbitrary control and harassment. More particularly it means that inmates must be referred to and addressed by name on a reciprocal basis.

2. Secondly, inmates must be given the opportunity to progress towards increasing self-control over their life circumstances up to the point of release. In practice this means that inmates must have a participatory role from the start and must be able to expand their areas of decision making, subject to an agreed set of rules and the general constraints of imprisonment.

In order to examine the significance of the above conditions, a comparison was made of three experimental prison environments, using non-convicts as subjects. The research strategy called for the establishment of a baseline condition, or regime, against which the effects of varying the degree of individuality and participation accorded prisoners in two other regimes, could be measured. Our investigation extends the pioneering work of Zimbardo and his associates in the Stanford Prison Study (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Zimbardo, Haney, Banks, & Jaffe, 1973).

Method and Procedure

Standard Custodial Regime. The baseline experimental prison environment was called the Standard Custodial regime, and was modelled on medium/high security prisons in Australia. The training given the officers was an abridged version of an Australian prison officer training programme, and stressed the importance of keeping

the prisoners securely in custody. The prison officers addressed the prisoners by their numbers, but the prisoners called the officers Sir, or Mr. So and So.

Individualized Custodial. The second prison environment was called the Individualized Custodial regime. It was identical to the Standard Custodial regime, with the exception that the training of the officers emphasized the need to maintain security in a manner that would allow inmates to retain their self-respect. In particular, the individuality of the prisoners was to be respected, and both officers and prisoners were to be addressed and referred to as Mr. So and So, unless a reciprocal agreement on the use of first names was reached.

Participatory. The third prison environment was referred to as the Participatory regime. Here the emphasis was on the encouragement of constructive and responsible behavior, rather than mere custodial care. The training of the officers stressed the need to get to know the prisoners and to draw them into decision making in relation to rules of conduct and programs of activity. As in the Individualized Custodial regime, prisoners and officers addressed each other as Mr. unless agreement was reached on the use of first names.

Subjects. The subjects for the experiment were selected from respondents to newspaper advertisements calling for subjects to take part in a study of imprisonment. Subjects were paid $15 each per day,

and were selected from non-student male volunteers who were (i) normally in full-time employment, (ii) aged 18-45 years, (iii) without direct personal experience of prisons or prison administration, and (iv) psychologically stable, as judged by psychological test performance. Sixty volunteers were selected and allocated by a process to the role of prisoner or prison officer. The subjects included several teachers, labourers and computer programmers, a steward on an interstate train, a barman, a book company representative and a Commonwealth policeman.

Prison. The prison was established in a large basement laboratory in the School of Psychology, with six individual cells (3m. x 1.8m.) built around three sides of a general activity area containing a meal and work table, a meal servery and sink, and a duty officer's desk. The cells were equipped with genuine prison furniture loaned by the Department of Corrective Services. Toilet facilities could be reached by an enclosed corridor, and meals were obtained from a campus residential college on the assumption that they would provide a reasonable facsimile of prison fare.

Clothing. Prisoners wore standard prison uniforms, and officers in the two Custodial conditions were issued with full standard uniform. Participatory Condition officers were required to provide their own slacks, shirt and tie.

Review Panel. A Review Panel, consisting of independent professional observers was set up to monitor the experiment. The function of the panel was to decide on the removal of any subject or the

termination of the experiment as a whole, if the welfare of participants was believed to be in jeopardy.

Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent and Supervisor. The senior author acted as Superintendent and was responsible for the conduct of the prison. A research student (W. Adams) performed the role of Deputy Superintendent, and a research student (Mithiran) acted as Supervisor of the prison program and recording director.

Recording. The investigation was monitored by remotely controlled video cameras and a separate sound recording system. One video recorder sampled 1½ minutes in every 10, and another was used to record incidents of interest.

Establishment of the Regimes. The instructions and training given the officers, and the training manual issued to the officers, provided the principal means of establishing the required differences between the three prison regimes. The nature of the contact between the officers and the prison administration (as represented by Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent and Supervisor) was consistent with the training of the officers in the different regimes. Such contact was kept to the absolute minimum, and most of the communication took the form of written requests and instructions.

Principal Measures. In establishing the effects of the three prison regimes, main interest centered on the general atmosphere of the prison, and in particular, the character of the personal relations that developed between the prisoners and officers. We were also

interested in the degree of stress experienced by the subjects. Measures were taken of the amount and quality of the work performed, and the number and character of the formal complaints and requests made by officers and prisoners. Other measures included the time spent on such activities as formal searches and inspections. In addition, the subjective responses and evaluations of the participants were sought from a debriefing session and the administration of questionnaires at various stages of the investigation.

Experimental Design. In accordance with the replicated, independent groups design, the subjects, 36 prisoners and 24 officers, were randomly allocated to six groups, each with six prisoners and four prison officers. Two of the six groups underwent the Standard Custodial condition, two groups experienced the Individualized Custodial regime, and two the Participatory condition. Each group of prisoners was imprisoned for four days with an unsystematic order of group participation.

Officer Training. Because the nature of the instructions and training given the subjects who became prison officers provided the principal means of establishing the differences between the three regimes, considerable care was devoted to the officer training sessions. On the evening prior to their entry into the experiment, subjects allocated to the role of prison officer participated in a two hour lecture/discussion period based on an appropriate training manual. All training sessions were conducted by the same prison psychologist.

Reception and Induction. Prior to induction, subjects underwent a medical examination and signed a consent form which emphasized their right to withdraw from the experiment at any time.

Induction followed standard procedures, including a search following removal of all clothing, listing and storing of belongings, fingerprinting, photographing, and issue of prison clothing and toilet gear. Subjects assigned to the role of prison officer were earlier issued with their uniforms and were present at the induction. Following induction, prisoner subjects were marched to the prison and handed into the care of the duty officers.

General Organization of the Prison Day. The daily routines were identical for the three regimes, and followed standard practice in medium security prisons as far as practicable.

6.30 a.m.	First Whistle
6.45 a.m.	Toilet
7.00 a.m.	Muster and Exercise
7.30 a.m.	Breakfast
8.00 a.m.	Cleaning Cells
8.30 a.m.	Work Muster
10.15 a.m.	Morning Tea
10.30 a.m.	Work
11.00 a.m.	Superintendent's Inspection
12.00 p.m.	Return to work
12.15 p.m.	Muster and Toilet
12.45 p.m.	Lunch and Leisure

1.30 p.m.	Work Muster
3.00 p.m.	Afternoon Tea
3.15 p.m.	Work
4.00 p.m.	Showers
	Leisure
5.00 p.m.	Tea
6.00 p.m.	Leisure
8.00 p.m.	Lock up
10.00 p.m.	Lights out

Work Required. Work activities took three forms: assembly of real electronic components, a type of macrame, and the assembly of large envelopes to hold conference materials.

Prison Rules. The prison rules were simple. They required prisoners to remain in designated areas, to keep their cells clean and tidy, to accept the direction of Prison Officers, and to address Prison Officers as instructed. The rules also specifically prohibited any harassment or abuse of persons, damage to prison property, or the bringing of any non-issue items into the prison. Prison officers were required to furnish reports of all incidents and punishments. Prisoners were permitted to make complaints and requests through the officers. Other than being acquainted with the prison rules, the prisoners received no instructions.

Debriefing. At 1 p.m. on the fourth day the simulation was brought to an end. Participants filled in questionnaires concerning their experience before beginning a 1½-2 hour informal debriefing period

during which alcoholic drinks were served.

Control of Demand Characteristics. The chief means of controlling for "demand characteristics" was Annexure "A" of the Consent and Release Form. Annexure "A" stated that, although the experimenters considered the possibility extremely remote, some psychologists believed that permanent psychological harm could result from participation in experiments such as ours. Our "awesome consent form" (Orne, 1962), and our careful screening of participants for psychological and physical disorders, suggested rather strongly that we were interested primarily in the reactions of subjects to imprisonment rather than the character of the social interaction that developed between the subjects. Post-experimental debriefing sessions made it clear that most of our subjects in fact believed that our main interest centered on stress reactions. Additionally, our subjects were people likely to be less interested than students in producing "a good experimental result."

Results

The results of the experiment can be presented most readily by raising a number of questions. The first question to be answered is this: "Were the simulated prison environments 'real' in the sense that they produced meaningful behavior, and a high degree of personal 'involvement' among the participants"?

There were many lines of evidence which attested to the extraordinary power of the experimental situation, and the extent of

the involvement of the subjects. The compelling nature of the situation was made quite obvious by the changes in the subjects' behavior when the induction began. The earlier signs of levity vanished almost instantly, and it was clear that most of the prisoner subjects, as they admitted later, found the induction "heavy." A common reaction at the debriefings, was, "What have we let ourselves in for"?

As the experiment proceeded, it became apparent that the subjects were capable of operating simultaneously as prisoners, or officers, and as experimental subjects. Occasionally the role of experimental subject would come to the fore, but usually the participants would quickly revert to being prisoners or officers.

The following exchange between an officer and a prisoner in one of the Standard Custodial groups illustrates the way in which the subjects responded to the situation that confronted them without losing sight of the fact that they were subjects in an experiment. (The doors of the cells were solid wood except for a small aperture (210mm. x 100mm.) at about eye height, through which the prisoner could look out onto the general activity area. A prisoner locked in his cell is peering through the aperture.)

Officer: Get your head in.

Prisoner: Why?

Officer: Because I'm an officer and you're a prisoner and I'm telling you - that's why!

Prisoner: It's an open window and I've got a right to look out.

Officer: In a real prison there wouldn't be an open window, and as such you wouldn't have the right to look out. Now get your head in!

Prisoner: Well, it isn't a real prison is it, and I'll look out when I want to - mate!

Officer: You're on report.

Prisoner: Big deal.

Officer. (putting his face close up to the prisoner's): You've got four more days in here sonny, four more days, remember?

Perhaps the most striking illustration of the control the simulation exerted over the subjects was provided by the behavior of one of the prison officers, as described in the Superintendent's report.

"On the final night of one of the Standard Custodial simulations, there were clear signs of discontent on the part of the two prison officers on duty. We could hear them whispering and complaining to each other about their poor pay, the lack of support from the Superintendent, and the baiting of the prisoners. We believed there was a real danger that the officers in question would not come back the next day, and so we decided to give them a pre-debriefing session. We duly called them into the control room and had a few beers with them. We told them all about the experiment, played them back tapes of themselves, and generally had a relaxing time.

We were soon all on first name terms, and after about an hour we told the officers that, as far as they were concerned the

experiment was over, but we'd like them to come back the next day and go through the motions of completing the experiment because, for the prisoners, the experiment was still on. They agreed to do this, and before they left we told them that we would terminate the simulation at about 1 p.m. and have a few more beers with them during a debriefing discussion.

Next morning when I went in to carry out the usual inspection, I expected the officers would wink at me or give some other sign. Not a bit of it, and I soon realized that the officers were right back into their roles. Just how much they had again become "prison officers" was demonstrated when one of them told me that a prisoner wanted to talk to me. I took the officer into an adjacent room to ask what it was all about. The two of us were quite alone, but to my amazement the officer continued to stand to attention and to call me 'Sir' in a most deferential manner. It was just as if the events of the previous evening had never taken place."

Another example of how strongly the situation gripped the participants was provided by the prisoner who demanded to see the Superintendent "under prison conditions" just as the experiment was about to terminate on the fourth day. The prisoner wanted to criticize our running of the prison, and he was afraid that if the experiment ended, he would be deprived of the opportunity of complaining as a prisoner rather than as an experimental subject.

Looking back, it is clear to us now that we consistently underestimated the control the situation exerted over our subjects' behavior. We found it difficult not to think of the simulation as somehow fragile. In fact it was robust, powerful and compelling.

Further illustrations of the involvement of the subjects will become apparent as we look at various facets of the experiment.

The second question we can ask is this: Was the Standard Custodial regime convincing, i.e. did the general atmosphere resemble that of a real prison, and did the usual sorts of officer-prisoner behaviors develop?

Experienced prison psychologists and administrators, as well as ex-prisoners who acted as observers, were unanimous in declaring the general atmosphere of the Standard Custodial groups to be strikingly like the real thing. In addition, specific behaviors that are characteristic of medium/high security prisons emerged in the Standard Custodial groups. To take a particular example, the searching behaviors that developed were highly characteristic of real life searches. On one occasion prisoners stole a matchbook, and the prison officers searched the prison for several hours until they found every last remnant of the matches. Their searching behavior seemed to be maintained by the reinforcement of finding a match about every half hour.

A third question of interest is: Were the intended differences in the Individualized and Participatory regimes achieved?

The prison officers did precisely what was asked of them in establishing and maintaining the three different regimes, and only on a few occasions was it necessary for the Superintendent to intervene. On two occasions the Superintendent instructed the Standard Custodial officers to "ease up and stop reacting to the prisoners' baiting tactics," and, on another occasion, he admonished the subjects in a Participatory group when they became slack.

The fourth question is: In what ways did the climate and specific behaviors differ in the three regimes?

There were striking differences between the three types of regime in the general atmosphere and in the quality of the prison officer/prisoner relationships that developed.

In the Participatory groups there were very few overt expressions of hostility between prison officers and prisoners, despite the stress experienced by some of the participants. After an initial period of wariness and suspicion, the general atmosphere was characterized by mutual tolerance and co-operation. The few problems that arose were solved within the group without calling in outside authority. The unity that developed in the Participatory groups was illustrated when the prison psychologist entered the prison unannounced, and his intrusion was resented by both prisoners and officers.

It was clear that, for some subjects at least, the prison came to be regarded, and indeed was referred to, as their "commune"--their "living quarters." Authority for them was something which existed outside the group and resided in the Superintendent and his assistants.

In the Standard Custodial groups there was a constant undercurrent of hostility in the relations between prisoners and prison officers. In one group, in particular, there were many hostile exchanges and examples of harassment. The hostile interaction between prison officers and prisoners in the Standard Custodial groups was by no means one-sided. There were only limited means of exerting control available to the officers, and they were constantly needled by some of the prisoners. Indeed, a few of the prisoners spent most of their time working out ways to outsmart, belittle and frustrate the officers.

One prisoner in a Standard Custodial group attempted to escape by climbing out through the manhole in the lavatory while the prison officer was waiting outside. After the escape incident, the prison officer, who had narrowly missed being hit by a piece of concrete placed over the manhole by the prisoner, was somewhat demoralized. Observing that the officer had lost his composure, one of the prisoners seized the opportunity to make a verbal attack on him.

The Individualized Custodial regimes developed a formal paternalistic atmosphere. The officers exerted authority which was

accepted by the prisoners with little overt hostility. There was little attempt by the officers to get on a first name basis with the prisoners, and if some form of address was used, it was nearly always Mr. Most often, however, the officers avoided using any form of address and maintained a clear social distance between themselves and the prisoners. Very few incidents of interest occurred, and, in general, the Individualized Custodial groups were characterized by a certain routine flatness.

Two independent graduate raters were required to make blind categorizations of the type of control exerted by prison officers in 15 officer/prisoner interaction segments selected at random from the time sampling audio recordings of each group. Each of the interactions was transcribed, and, after deletion of identifying data, was allocated by the raters to one of three categories: Co-operative Control (seeks agreement to act); Paternalistic Control (requests action with clear social distance); Authoritarian Control (commands action). Inter-rater reliability, as measured by the index of predictive association, was modest (λ_B=0.56), and the combined ratings gave percentages in each category as follows: Standard Custodial Regimes: Co-operative, 0%; Paternalistic, 5%; Authoritarian, 95%. Individualized Custodial Regimes: Co-operative, 3%; Paternalistic, 55%; Authoritarian, 42%. Participatory Regimes: Co-operative, 48%; Paternalistic, 52%; Authoritarian, 0%.

The two independent raters also rated 30 randomly sampled, transcribed officer/prisoner interactions from each of the six groups on degree of expressed hostility. For both the initial and repeat groups, 20 interaction segments from each of the three regimes were randomly mixed, and the rater was required to place the segments in 11 ordered categories ranging from very low hostility (1) to very high hostility (11), with no more than six and no less than four segments in each category. Inter-rater reliability was satisfactory (r=0.80), and the mean ratings for the three regimes were: Standard Custodial, 9.2; Individualized Custodial, 5.4; and Participatory, 4.1.

The differences between the groups were brought out very clearly by the count of the number of incident reports made by the officers. The Standard Custodial officers submitted 28 reports of incidents, such as insubordination, failure to carry out orders, and theft. On the other hand, the Individualized Custodial and Participatory groups each submitted only two reports of incidents. One Standard Custodial group submitted a formal complaint about an officer.

The groups also differed sharply in the ways they conducted a search that was ordered on the third evening. The Superintendent sent a written instruction to the officers to conduct a thorough search of the prison on the grounds that he had reason to believe some form of contraband had been brought into the prison. The

Standard Custodial groups spent an average of 45 minutes on the search. The Individualized Custodial groups averaged 10 minutes, and the Participatory groups five minutes.

In some respects the differences between the groups were small. For example, the amount and quality of the work performed were broadly similar across all groups. All prisoners shared the same physical conditions. All were confined to the same limited space and experienced the same repetitious daily routines. According to the participants, these conditions combined to produce a background state of boredom. At a behavioral level there was a reduction in verbal interaction over the four days in all groups.

The fifth question to be asked is: To what degree did the second group of each situation repeat the behavior that was observed in the first group?

The resemblance between the initial and repeat groups was very close in all three regimes. The general character of the first Standard Custodial group was repeated in the second group. The number of incidents was greater in the repeat group, and there was a good deal more open hostility, but the general atmosphere was very similar.

The two Individualized Custodial groups were also similar in character. One group was somewhat more authoritarian than the other, but there was little hostility in either group. Furthermore, both groups had the same unremarkable quality about them, such

where I did not have quite the same degree of unquestioned authority." Although the Standard Custodial officers involved "backed off" when told to do so by the Superintendent, they made it quite clear in the debriefings that they strongly resented the way in which the Superintendent "sided with the prisoners and failed to back them up."

Discussion

In comparing our results with those of the Stanford Prison Study, it is necessary to bear in mind some important procedural differences between the two experiments. The main differences are set out in Table 1. In summary, the participants in the U.N.S.W. experiment

Insert Table 1 about here

were subjected to much tighter behavioral constraints than the participants in the Stanford Study, and the U.N.S.W. simulation (Standard Custodial) was literal rather than symbolic or functional.

As might be expected from the procedural differences, the behavior of our Standard Custodial subjects was less extreme than the behavior of the Stanford subjects. In view of the procedural disparities, however, the specific similarities in behavior observed in the two studies (see Table 1) are quite striking.

It is clear that our Standard Custodial Regime induced ordinary people with little knowledge and no experience of prisons, to behave in much the same way as prisoners and officers in real prisons. On the other hand, changes in the experimental prison regime produced dramatic changes in the relations between officer and prisoner subjects. In other words, both our officers and our

prisoners responded to the explicit and implicit definition of the situation provided by their superiors (i.e. those with power over them). There seems good reason to believe that the behavior of real guards and real prisoners is similarly determined.

Our results thus support the major conclusion of Zimbardo et al that hostile affrontive relations in prisons result primarily from the nature of the prison regime, rather than the personal characteristics of inmates and officers. We are aware, of course, that we have not fully disposed of the arguments of those who are sceptical of the validity of simulations (e.g. Banuazizi & Movahedi, 1975). It would appear that the validity of a simulation can be firmly established only if the investigator:

(a) provides a baseline simulation designed to reflect essential, objectively defined structural characteristics of a real life situation;

(b) determines the behavioral effects of changes from the baseline condition which are deemed to be of psychological significance;

(c) demonstrates that the same changes produce similar effects in the corresponding real life situation.

In our own study we have moved to the second step, and the crucial third step remains to be taken. We are confident, nevertheless, that the effects observed in our Individualized Custodial and Participatory regimes would also occur in real prisons. In other words, we believe that a change towards participatory regimes would result in a significant improvement in the social

climate of prisons. It should be emphasized, however, that to suggest such a change by no means implies that we must become soft on criminals. Indeed, the establishment of participatory regimes in prisons would be perfectly compatible with insistence on punishment for criminal behavior. We simply wish to make the point that if constructive behavioral change is required in criminals (or other persons in total institutions for that matter), those persons must not be degraded, humiliated or de-individualized. Given that the individual's dignity as a person is respected in the ways we have outlined, it is quite consistent with the goal of constructive behavioral change to make the most stringent demands on that person's behavior, and to subject him to significant material deprivation. It is crucial, however, that the deprivations and demands be seen as deriving not from the arbitrary whims of particular individuals, but from a rational and agreed set of behavioral rules.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that the establishment of participatory regimes in prisons would require supportive institutional changes of a quite fundamental character. Furthermore, such regimes would provide no more than a necessary starting point for the development of correctional programs which may or may not be successful. The required changes are unlikely to occur unless prison officers become at least semi-professionals

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who are trained as correctional officers rather than custodians. Participation as prisoners in experimental prison regimes might well form part of the required training.

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Table 1

Comparison of U.N.S.W. and Stanford Prison Studies

Conduct of Investigation

Stanford	U.N.S.W.
One group, exploratory study	6 groups, 3 conditions with replication
Paid volunteer subjects	Paid volunteer "representative" subjects
No training of guards	Training of guards with training manual
Symbolic, functional simulation (smocks, stocking caps, chains on ankles for prisoners, reflective sunglasses, bully sticks for guards)	In baseline (Standard Custodial) group, literal representation of prison (standard uniforms, officer training, daily activities, rules), no weapons for guards
Consent of subjects "to be harassed and have civil rights curtailed." Physical abuse prohibited.	Harassment and physical abuse prohibited. Demand characteristics minimized by "awesome Consent Form" and use of non-student subjects.
Arrest procedure, suggesting possibility of change in rules	No arrest procedure. No question of change in rules.
Communication between Superintendent and guards not specified	Communication between Superintendent and guards rigidly controlled
Duration 6 days	Duration 4 days (each of 6 groups)

Results

Stanford	U.N.S.W. Standard Custodial
Pathological reactions:-	Constant undercurrent of hostility
Extreme sadistic harassment by guards.	between officers and prisoners.
Negative, hostile, affrontive relations between officers and prisoners.	Some hostile exchanges and examples of arbitrary control and harassment.
Gross emotional reactions in prisoners (depression, crying, rage, and acute anxiety).	Attempts by prisoners to outsmart, belittle and frustrate guards.
Reality transformation.	Many reports of insubordination.
	Very lengthy searches.
	No reality transformation.
	Participants simultaneously prisoners (or officers) and experimental subjects.

Stanford and U.N.S.W. Standard Custodial

Meals treated as "privileges."

Prison authorities regarded by officers as siding with prisoners.

Offers by guards to work overtime without pay.

Inappropriate carry-over of role behaviors.

Behavior under surveillance consistent with behavior when believed unobserved.

Most hostile guards spontaneously assumed leadership roles.

U.N.S.W. Individualized Custodial	U.N.S.W. Participatory
Paternalistic atmosphere.	After initial period of suspiciousness,
Officer-prisoner relations distant	gen al atmosphere of tolerance and
and formal. Form of address	co-operation.
(if any) usually Mr.	Form of address, first names on
Authority of officers accepted.	reciprocal basis.
Little overt hostility.	Virtually no overt hostility.
Very f w incidents or reports.	Prison regarded as "living quarters",
Search s thorough but rapid.	"commune." Authority existed
	outside group.
	The few conflicts resolved within
	group.
	Perfunctory searches.
	Some tendency to slackness in
	relation to cleaning and routines.