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CRIME IN PORT MORESBY

By

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This Thesis contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any University, or which has been previously submitted for any other degree or diploma other than such material the inclusion of which has been approved by the Professorial Board, and to the best of the candidate's knowledge and belief the thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'M.L. Mackellar', written in a cursive style.

M.L. Mackellar.

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M.L. Mackellar

Ela Beach Court House,
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SUMMARY

In 1975 Port Moresby had a serious crime problem. The nature of the crimes committed within the city was generally not serious, for such offences as murder, rape and robbery were rare. What made the problem serious was the vast number of individually trivial offences which collectively produced a case loading so great that the established police and court resources could not cope with it, and while the courts were clogged with trivial cases, the more worrying offences of car theft and house-breaking largely went unsolved. Whilst misdirection of police effort to a considerable extent aggravated the crime problem in Port Moresby, the citizens themselves contributed to it in their own way by failing in many instances to take even the simplest and most basic precautions.

While some residents of the city had repeatedly been victims of crime throughout that year, there were others who had never ever had any offences committed against them, and the probability of becoming a victim of crime was not evenly distributed throughout the city. There were high crime suburbs and low crime suburbs and while some were dangerous to live in, others were safe. Likewise there were high crime times and low crime times, and most offences tended to be committed during weekends.

Neither the declining efficiency in the police force nor the corresponding chaos in the administration of the courts can be attributed to the localisation process. Both police and courts were degenerating under the previous Australian Administration which had introduced legal procedures and processes which even then were inappropriate to the circumstances

of Papua New Guinea. At Independence in 1975, the incoming Independent Government inherited a decayed criminal justice system.

However, although the crime problem is serious, the remedies are simple. All that is necessary is for the police to adopt the simple tactics of beat, blitz, checkpoint, saturation, trojan horse and target and team, and for the residents to take a few simple precautions like keeping their doors locked. All this can be accomplished at no extra cost and can be implemented immediately. Costing nothing, would be a greater simplification of the process and procedures in the existing lower courts, with a corresponding innovation which would require some funding, of the expansion of village courts into all suburbs of Port Moresby. Further innovations which would require funding could be work release programmes for prisoners, weekend jail, community work schemes, probation and parole.

Port Moresby is a small city by world standards. It could easily be converted into a low crime community and a good place in which to live.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

Objective of Research:

The object of this research was to inquire into the general law and order problems of Port Moresby.

The research was concentrated mainly on the size of the overall problem in relation to the capability of the police and the courts to deal with it, and special emphasis was placed on a particularly prevalent offence in Port Moresby housebreaking.

The causes of crime in Port Moresby are as many and as varied as they are in most other cities throughout the world and wherever a defective criminal justice system is a cause of crime it is usually only one of many causes operating simultaneously. However, a full inquiry into all the causes of the law and order problems in Port Moresby was beyond the scope of this research and although mention is made of some of these other causes, these are not explored in any depth in the following pages.

Because most of the problems which are explored in this study are peculiar to Papua New Guinea, it is assumed that the reader already has some background knowledge of this newly independent country, and of the lifestyle and other social conditions of its capital city, Port Moresby.

As these problems are not merely of academic interest but are also the real life problems of residence in Port Moresby, the reader should expect towards the end of this paper a few simple suggestions as to how the level of criminal activity can be reduced and how Port Moresby can be made a safer place in which to live.

Methodology:

The time span for the statistical study was the six month period from April to September inclusive, 1975. The last month of this period was particularly significant as Papua New Guinea became an independent state then, and the time span was deliberately chosen so as to include Independence Day, 16th September 1975 in order to observe the accelerated breakdowns in social control which were expected to follow closely upon the end of Australian administration in Papua New Guinea. As it happened, there were no noticeable changes in the established crime patterns immediately after Independence, and the general trend, two years after Independence appears to be that reported serious crime in Port Moresby is decreasing slowly, for reasons which will be described later.

Port Moresby contains a multitude of habitats, ranging from traditional style villages to international style hotels and from shabby shanty settlements to elegant air-conditioned apartment buildings. Since the 1960's Port Moresby has been a "Papuan" town, although there has been an increase in the percentage of non-Papuan residents, since then (Oram N.D. 1976: 105). By 1975 expatriates, still predominantly Australian, formed about one quarter of the total population which was estimated at the time of this survey to be 100,000. (Papua New Guinea Bureau of Statistics, 1976).* The rest of the city's population consisted of 73% of persons whose ethnic origins lay along the Papuan coast, 13% whose origins were in the New Guinea mainland provinces, 10% Highlanders, and 3% from the New Guinea Islands (see Table 4).

Data for this survey were gathered from documents, interviews and participant observation. The documents used were the depositions of all the cases which passed through the Port Moresby lower courts during the six month period and also all the Crime Reports in the CIB files which related to house-breaking offences reported to the police for the same six month period. All three sources of information overlapped to some extent owing to the peculiar position I occupied during the survey period, and this allowed for data from one source to

* R. Fergie, Statistician (personal communication)

be checked against data from another, and such cross references soon intermeshed to form a substantial information bank.

The research universe of Port Moresby City was my own community. During the time span of this study, I was at all times a potential victim of the kind of offences I was investigating, and I was often able to get first hand corroboration of how certain offences were committed, by simply watching them being committed; by visiting the scenes of the offences afterwards; by sifting through the subsequent Crime Reports later; or even by asking the particular persons involved. And while I was always a potential victim in this situation, I was also at the same time, part of the criminal justice system of Port Moresby, charged with the responsibility of coming to grips with the situation, and as a serving Magistrate of the Boroko District Court, much of the raw data used in this research project passed through my own court room.

At the time of the statistical research, there were two court houses in Port Moresby, and throughout the time span I maintained an office in each. I commuted daily between these court houses hearing cases in one or the other and sometimes in both during the same day. While I was absent in one, research staff kept a running check on what was happening in the other, and court records were constantly being checked against police records in relation to cases brought into the courtrooms of both court houses. The ordinary day to day working relationships which exist between police and Magistrates were for the purpose of this survey strengthened by useful marriage and social connections. My senior research assistant was the wife of an Inspector of Police in the Boroko CIB and another research assistant was the cousin of a notorious gangster. Other research assistants were selected on the basis of not only of what they knew but also of whom they knew and the advantage of these connections was that where official information was deficient in any respect, I could usually fill in the gaps with pieces of information gathered informally.

A considerable amount of informally gathered information came also from persons in and out of the criminal justice system who had known me for some years. Many of the old sergeants now in charge of police sections in Port Moresby had accompanied me as young constables on explorations into the interior of Papua New Guinea years ago when I was then a young Patrol Officer. As we grew old together I had watched their sons graduate first through grade school, then through high school and then through Police Training College. Some made it through Officer Cadet School.

During the same years I had watched another kind of graduation of Defendants; first through Childrens Court, then through District Court and finally into the National Court.

I knew the Senior Police Prosecutor at the Boroko District Court as a school boy in the Trobriand Islands when I was Assistant District Commissioner there and many more young police officers and young criminals in Port Moresby have known me for as long as they can remember. All of them had much to offer this research project and they offered it willingly, by way of informal discussion between old friends.

Similarly, many Papua New Guinean public servants who were junior clerks when I joined the service are now Departmental Heads; and the expatriates who arrived in Port Moresby with me as young Patrol Officers less than ten years after the Pacific War are now scattered throughout different Government Departments and, like me, are now in the twilight of their public service careers. Throughout the intervening quarter of a century some of us served throughout Papua New Guinea and some of us stayed in Port Moresby. But all of us saw Port Moresby grow from a small colonial town to a bustling National Capital; from a quiet low crime community to a nervous high crime community. Those who survived the transition unscathed had much to offer this research project also, particularly in relation to advice on survival technique and a summary of this technique can be found towards the end of this paper.

Other residents of Port Moresby who had not known me over the years but who nevertheless knew of the research project were also helpful by supplying details of their experiences as victims of Port Moresby crime by way of a quick phone call, a hurried exchange of information in the street, or by way of a relaxed conversation at an informal social gathering.

Information obtained from such official and unofficial sources was further checked against information obtained by house to house victim surveys through selected suburban areas of Port Moresby. We aimed at total coverage in the selected areas but this was never achieved due to absences from home when the research team called, bad weather towards the end of the survey, and also because some premises were so heavily protected by wire mesh fences and guard dogs, that the researchers often could not gain entry. Nevertheless we obtained an overall 30% victim survey sample in the selected areas.

Information from the house to house victim survey was hand punched onto sorter cards and processed manually. Housebreaking information was transcribed from the Crime Reports onto worksheets of the kind shown in Appendix B, and processed manually from there, while information from court cases, though transcribed onto a similar work sheet, was machine punched and processed by computer.

For the purposes of plotting where housebreaking and other offences occurred during the time span, the Port Moresby City area was divided into 20 map areas, each roughly of 3.8 k^2 and corresponding with the same divisions used by the Malaria Services. This grid scale was probably not the best system of sub-division we could have used, since grid lines cut through suburban boundaries. But it was the most convenient system because the Malaria Services map is a functional house to house directory of Port Moresby. This Malaria Services grid system is reproduced here as Appendix A.

The grid scale became part of both work sheets, and could be read off against any other item on the work sheets, so that we could tell for example, how many persons were charged with Drunk and Disorderly on Saturday nights at Boroko etc. etc. throughout the time span. The grid scale supplied information on what were high crime areas of Port Moresby as opposed to low crime areas, and other information revealed by the work sheets soon produced other patterns in the crime scene. Of interest among these patterns was the correlation between the type of offence committed, and the ethnic origin of the offender.

When housebreaking data were read off against a calendar scale, month by month throughout the research period, the information soon revealed that there were high crime days and low crime days and recurring patterns of these fluctuations soon emerged.

When the grid scale was read off against the calendar scale, a crime spread index was revealed, indicating changes in the actual ground area in which housebreakers were operating. By this method the activities of housebreakers could be plotted, as they moved from one suburb to another.

Much of the data used in this survey came to light by way of the much maligned "wantok" system. However nebulous this system may be in Western eyes, it is a real life phenomenon in Melanesian society, and can be manipulated successfully for research purposes as for any other social purpose. The "wantok" system short circuits the kind of communication barriers likely to exist because of class or occupational distance, so that members of a discreet "wantok" network can establish their own "hot-line" through which information can be induced to flow in directions otherwise impossible in the formally structured bureaucratic society of Port Moresby officialdom.

It soon became clear as the research project progressed, that one of the reasons why the crime problem exists at all in Port Moresby is that police, victims and other organs of the criminal

justice system are not making full use of such simple social mechanisms as the wantok system as a weapon against crime, and the failure to use even the simplest systems of crime control in Port Moresby supplies a major theme for this thesis.

1. THE PORT MORESBY CRIME SCENE

A. Historical Background

The origins of the current crime wave in Port Moresby lie deep in the origins of the city itself.

There is some doubt as to which Europeans were the first visitors to what is now Port Moresby City, since some authorities claim that Torres and his crew were first, in 1606 (ParsOnson G.S. 1967:156) while Captain John Moresby thought he was when he entered the bay which still bears his name on 21st February, 1873 (Inglis, K.S. & Oram N.D., 1973: 1 & 34).

In any event, foreign settlement did not immediately follow Torres' visit and the history of the city can be said to have dated from Moresby's visit. At that time there were ten Motu and Koita villages within what is now the city's boundary of Port Moresby, (Inglis & Oram 1973: 5) and Motuans then possessed "far flung trading relationships" (p.15) which were later to influence the pattern of indigenous migration into the city.

There is at present as there was in the past, some confusion over what exactly is meant by the name "Port Moresby". As no town was in existence when John Moresby arrived, there is no doubt that he intended "Port Moresby" to be the name of the harbour. The early township was known as "Ela" which is its Motu name, but the town was later officially renamed "Granville" which name is still used on Lands Department maps of the old town area. Early expatriate settlers used the name "Port Moresby" to refer to the town of Granville, and this name was gradually shortened to "Port", an expression still in use some years after the Second World War. By then, this was a convenient way of distinguishing the old town from the new which sprang up during the war along what is now the Hubert Murray Highway. These war-time buildings survived for many years afterwards, becoming progressively and depressingly

more dilapidated and not knowing what to call this architectural legacy spread between the harbour and the airport, expatriate residents, sparing no effort to be original, simply named the various building clusters from the readings of their speedometers. To this day, parts of the city's urban sprawl are still known as *Two Mile Hill, Three Mile, Four Mile, Five Mile, Six Mile and Seven Mile*.

Gradually, the term "Port Moresby" began to apply collectively to the whole of the area within the city boundary and the problem which then arose was how to distinguish the old town of Ela, Granville or Port from the newer suburbs. This problem, still unresolved, continues in this text, wherein the definition of "Port Moresby" or "the City" varies according to the context in which those names are used.

The first expatriates to settle permanently in what is now the city of Port Moresby were the Rev. W.G. Lawes and his family who came in 1874. (Chatterton, P; 1974:4). Thereafter a succession of traders, goldminers and entrepreneurs of doubtful character arrived. Some stayed, some left, and by the time of Sir William McGregors' arrival in 1888, the vestiges of rudimentary colonial administration were already in existence. Public Servants then began to appear in Port Moresby in one guise or another, and to this day Port Moresby is still very much a Public Service city, its importance in this direction having increased considerably after 1949 with the decision by the Australian Government to make the city the administrative capital of the two pre-war Territories of Papua and New Guinea. (Oram, N.D.; 1976:84).

By 1905 the permanent European population of Port Moresby was still only 64, yet the town by that time had gained a reputation for lawlessness. Drunken brawls between the expatriate residents were frequent (Stuart, I; 1973:81) and by 1914 Port Moresby was a "raw frontier town in which

the majority of the residents entertained themselves with uninhibited drinking, brawling and feuding (p.99)" a description which continued to be appropriate in 1975.

By 1920 the expatriate population had risen to about 400 (Chatterton, P;1974:10) and though the town was then still small, expatriate residents gradually began to sow the seeds of what was later to become the current Port Moresby crime wave. Discrimination in the form of harsh labour contracts, curfew, pass and segregation laws, soon transformed Port Moresby into a white man's town and a "distant suburb of the great cities of Australia". (Annual Report of Papua, 1938:5). The "white man's town" developed "a periphery of shanty settlements in which the indigenous migrants began to settle. Segregation was complete, and the expatriate population of Port Moresby lived its narrow insular existence little knowing or caring about the Papuans in whose homeland they had settled". (Chatterton, P;1974:10).

Life in Port Moresby continued in this manner until the outbreak of the Second World War, and apart from the escapades of revelling expatriates, pre-war Port Moresby was generally law abiding, with the "natives" in the true colonial sense, "well under control". There were however, some instances of friction between expatriates and Papuans, particularly with relation to real or imagined fears of attack on expatriate women by Papuan men, and these instances, already well documented by Inglis (Inglis, A;1974) tended to sour whatever little contact there was between the races before the war.

But three years of total war dissolved forever the magic of the old white mystique (Stuart, I;1973:150) and one of the first acts of the post war Administration was to cancel all existing native labour contracts. Crowds of plantation and other workers came to Port Moresby to seek transport back to their villages (p.145) but some never left. Instead, they settled on whatever land they could occupy without

inviting eviction, and they built shanty houses from any leftover wartime materials they could find. Meanwhile, relatives back in the villages, converged on Port Moresby to live with those who had already settled in the city. The urban drift had begun.

"By the mid fifties, discriminatory practices had begun to be abandoned. The first move to give Papuans equal status with Europeans was the relaxing of the regulation requiring that part of native wages be paid in the form of food rations" (Stuart,I; 1973:156).

Then followed the abolition of the curfew, and the desegregation of Port Moresby's busses. Sporting teams became integrated and in November 1962, the last of the discriminatory practices was abolished when Papua New Guineans for the first time were legally allowed to drink. Stuart (p.163) describes what happened after that:

"Some of the fears of those who had opposed native drinking have been realised. Few people can afford to drink, except occasionally, and in strict moderation, without a drastic decline in their standard of living. However there are some who go on long drinking sprees each pay day and spend almost all the fortnight's wages in one evening. The families of those who are married inevitably suffer along with the drinkers themselves under these circumstances. Another unfortunate result of heavy drinking has been the deterioration in the relations between the people and the police. Every weekend there are many arrests for drunkenness, and the drinkers deeply resent what they believe to be unnecessary police interference in their affairs".

But things went from bad to worse. The Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink reported in 1971 (p.15) that "In some urban areas where the principal liquor outlets are large public bars and taverns" (as in Port Moresby)

"the conduct of drinkers has at times become so unruly as to constitute a real threat to the maintenance of public order by a hard pressed police force". By then, the "native situation" in the true colonial sense, was "out of control".

The police, whose main duties in the past had been the enforcement of curfew and other segregation laws, suddenly found themselves confronted with a task for which they had never been trained. Weekends saw them involved in pitched battles in and around the taverns and hotels as they struggled to maintain order among throngs of disorderly drunks. All over Papua New Guinea the situation worsened. Nation wide arrests for drunk and disorderly in 1962-63 totalled 538. By 1970-71 the total was 6516. (Commission's Report, Appendix F; Table 1).

And for those drinkers whose thirsts exceeded their wages, the inevitable happened. They began to steal. Superintendent Giddings of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (personal communication) says: "The police were not geared in the beginning to cope with the problems associated with the lifting of prohibition. It took time for the public to realise this but after the first few tentative breaks, word got around that housebreaking was easy and punishment for it unlikely. Fourteen years ago in Port Moresby housebreaking was rare. If we had five incidents in one month then, we thought we had a crime wave. In 1975 if we had five in one night, we thought we were lucky".

In 1975 for the month of April alone, the number of reported housebreaking incidences in Port Moresby totalled 255.

Appendix "F" of the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink (1971) indicates that nation wide, the total number of reported offences directly and possibly related to liquor rose from 651 in 1962-63 to 16,318 in 1970-71. For Port Moresby, the Report concluded (p.18)

"There is a marked proportionate increase in offences relating to drunkenness which take up a large proportion of the time of the courts. It is a factor directly giving rise to serious crime."

The increase in crime in Port Moresby in recent years was not of course caused by the lifting of prohibition alone. The urban drift for example, made some contributions of its own as we shall see. But the lifting of prohibition did unleash upon Port Moresby an all purpose excuse for the commission of all kinds of offences, where no excuse was previously available. For there is no doubt that whatever the law might say about intoxication not being an excuse (see S.28 of the Papua New Guinea Criminal Code), there appears to be an undercurrent of belief among Papua New Guineans that drunkenness is an excuse. To this day visitors to Boroko District Court can hear defendants when replying to a charge, say something like this:

Yes, the charge is true but I was drunk at the time.

Clearly indicating to the court that leniency is expected for this reason. So entrenched is this belief, that it is now apparent that in order to have a ready made excuse if caught in the act, in some instances, deliberately getting drunk first is a prerequisite to the commission of an offence. For example, a burglar caught in the act of approaching a house (the technical charge of unlawfully adjacent to a dwelling house) would have a task explaining his presence if he were sober, but if he were drunk, he can always claim that he lost his bearings on the way home and blundered into the curtilage of that house by mistake. This excuse might not always work, but it is certainly better than none.

Furthermore, the lifting of prohibition also had an influence on increasing the crime rate simply because people act differently when drunk. "Since alcohol reduces inhibitions" the Commission of Inquiry reported (p.19) "dulls judgement and increases self-confidence, one would expect to find some relationship between crime and alcohol and such statistical information as there is available is consistent with this view."

There is also evidence to show, that when the supply of alcoholic drink is turned off temporarily, the crime rate drops temporarily.

For example, when periodic prohibition is enforced in Port Moresby during long weekends such as Christmas, Easter and Queen's Birthday, the crime rate, across the board for all offences drops some 50% below that of ordinary weekends.

All this is not to suggest a return to the days of total prohibition. But it is to suggest that the crime rate of Port Moresby increased considerably following the lifting of prohibition in 1962.

Now the police in particular and the remainder of the criminal justice system in general might be excused in 1962 for not knowing what was likely to happen following the lifting of prohibition but by 1971 it must have been fairly obvious, since by then it was all clearly documented in the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink. And by 1975 the whole criminal justice system, particularly that part of it in Port Moresby still had not been geared up to cope with the rising crime rate.

In spite of the many years of Australian generosity in foreign aid to Papua New Guinea there never was any excuse for years of bumbling and fumbling by the Australian Administration which contributed to the present crime situation in Port Moresby. The present Independent Government of Papua New Guinea cannot be blamed for what it inherited. Nevertheless in the year of Independence among other hangovers from its colonial past, Papua New Guinea became the possessor of a capital city in the grip of a serious crime wave.

1. THE PORT MORESBY CRIME SCENE

B. The Current Crime Situation

It has been asserted that Port Moresby has a high incidence of crime. Let us examine this assertion more closely. Using most Western measures of crime rates would not seem appropriate since they define serious crime by the incidence of homicide, robbery and rape etc. These selected "serious" crimes do occur in Port Moresby as of course they occur in other cities elsewhere in the world, but their incidence in Port Moresby is extremely low. During the six month survey period for example, only one murder, one rape and one robbery case, occurring within the city limits passed through the lower court system.

Furthermore, Western crime measuring techniques usually concentrate on crime incidence in slum or other crowded city areas (Clinard & Abbot; 1973:139) but measurement in such areas of Port Moresby would give a misleading picture of the city's total crime incidence since these areas of Port Moresby are largely crime free. Koki canoe settlement, as an example, is perhaps the most over-crowded no-covenant residential area in the city, with shanty dwellings and few modern amenities, and all the trappings of the urban slum. Yet our house to house survey through this settlement produced a 96% opinion that this settlement is a safe place to live. 88% of the respondents could not recall a single offence of any kind ever having being committed against them in years of crowded residence there. This crime free condition at Koki has apparently existed for years. Oram (1967) remarked that "life in the settlement was orderly and peaceful (p.15) and that the residents were generally law abiding (p.44). And these remarks would seem to apply equally today.

Other more cursory surveys through other no-covenant areas of Port Moresby produced similar results, indicating that by conventional measuring devices, Port Moresby simply does not have a crime problem. How could it have one, it could be argued, if even the slums are safe to live in ?

Yet, during the six month period from April to September inclusive

in 1975, there were 1211 reported burglaries in this city of only 100,000 people. The rate of burglaries in cities of comparable size in the United States over a twelve month period was 1568 per 100,000 population (FBI Uniform Crime Reports 1974:P.160) which means that over twelve months Port Moresby has nearly double their number.

During the same time span 6411 criminal cases were heard in Port Moresby's lower courts to the accompaniment of a constant public outcry for something to be done about the soaring crime rate. The Nation's leading newspaper the Post Courier carried almost daily references to the crime situation in Port Moresby either by way of its own news items or by way of published letters to the editor, and as early as February 11th that year the Post Courier's editorial warned "CRIME ONE OF PNG'S GRAVEST PROBLEMS." Only three days later, the Commissioner of Police himself was reported to have said that "the crime rate is a national disgrace." (P-C;14/2/75).

If these comments were not intended to refer to the rare incidence of the serious crimes of murder, rape and robbery, then to what sort of crimes were they referring ?

There are two categories of "selected serious crimes" as indexed in the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports which do occur frequently in Port Moresby. These are unlawful use of motor vehicles and burglary. For our purposes, the last mentioned crime can be considered synonymous with "housebreaking" or "breaking and entering" which is the legal terminology used in Papua New Guinea, and all three expressions are used in this paper interchangeably to indicate the same broad category of offence.


It is housebreaking in its various forms however which constitutes the basis of the crime problem in Port Moresby and for this reason much of the material in this paper is devoted extensively to the examination of this one particular category of offence. And although housebreaking is a distinctly separate offence in law, it is in the real life situation in Port Moresby, closely associated with other offences such as stealing, possession of goods unlawfully obtained, unlawfully on premises and even vagrancy all of which are sometimes used as an alternative charge when one or more of the more formal elements of a housebreaking charge is

Fig 1

COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGE OF DAY LOADINGS

Showing

Distribution of Criminal Offences before
the Port Moresby City Lower Courts from
April to September (inclusive) 1975
according to the day of the Week on which
the Offence was Committed



M.L. Mackellar

SUBURBS OF PORT MORESBY AND CRIMINAL OFFENCES COMMITTED THEREIN - APRIL TO SEPTEMBER (Inclusive) 1975
Compiled from records in the Port Moresby and Boroko Court Houses.

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Table 1

OFFENCE ↓	SUBURB →		GEREHU 10	GEREHU 11	UNIVERS 5	ADCOL 12	TOKAR 18	WATGANI 6	CORDON 7	HANUAB 8	KONE 13	CITY 14	HOHOLA 15	HOHOLA 16	BADILI 19	GABUTU 20	GORDON 21	BOROKO 22	KOKO 25	SABANA 25	AIRPORT 25	Elsewhere or Unknown	
	MAP →																						
	2	9																					
Murder							1															8	9
Rape																	1					2	3
G.B.H.																	1					5	6
Assaults		3		3	5	6	2	3	1	4	8	2	18	5			18	9	2	1	264	372	
Obsc Lang.			1	1		1		3	1		1	1	3				1		1		66	85	
Off. Behav.		1		4	2	4		5	3	9	5	4	33	1	13	43	8	8			216	359	
Indecent Man.											1										34	35	
False Report							1	1		2	1				1		22	1	2		24	56	
Other Pers.	1				3		1		1	1				2	1		11	1	1		8	31	
Robbery																1						1	
Stealing				2	6	3	4	1	2	66	7	3	25		13	60	17	1	6	288	504		
Break & Ent.				2	2	9			2	11	2				4	12				66	110		
Un. User					2	2		2	1		2			3	1		8	2	1	85	112		
Animal Trsp.																		1				1	
Un on Premis.	3	3	1	2	5	5		2	3	5	7	6	10		15	13	9	2		27	118		
Proprty Dam.	1	1		2	3	3	2	2	4	2	3	1	11		11	6	2	1	1	81	137		
Other Prop.													3							9	12		
Contempt									1											10	11		
Escape										3		4	1			18				42	68		
Drunk, D&D	3	4	6	19	13	39	16	3	27	139	77	41	136	1	62	276	52	6	15	28	963		
Riot Behav.		2					2			5	5	4	4	4	9	15		9	1	210	270		
Dang. Drive					1	1	1		1	4	1	5			2	1				2	19		
D.U.I.		1	1		4	5	1		2	6	11	14	8		8	28	5			14	108		
Speeding	3			1		2	2			8	2	25	1		4	13	5		1	5	72		
Other Traffic	8	10	4	14	15	45	17	9	26	191	228	267	277	4	102	366	192	31	5	342	2153		
Council Rule	4	6		8	22	13	2		2	43	7	1	28		9	29	26	11	1	40	252		
Other Off.		1		1	5	3	1	1	1	16	4	8	21		14	37	4		3	72	192		
Liquor Lic.	1				2	3					1		1		7	3		1		16	35		
Gun Licenc.															1		4			1	6		
Vagrancy	1	2			3	2			1	5	3	4	7	1	6	4		1	2	110	152		
Gambling			1				1		2				2	4	9	8		5		110	142		
Other V. less															5	2			1	9	17		
Totals:	25	34	14	59	93	147	53	32	81	520	376	390	595	22	320	998	338	83	37	2194	6411		

absent. It is therefore necessary to look between the lines as it were, when examining court records, because the actual offence of housebreaking can be found in many different disguises. Furthermore, the problems of preventing housebreaking as we shall see are often rooted in other seemingly innocent social phenomena such as urban drift, or the ethnic origins of Port Moresby migrants, and the incidence of housebreaking in Port Moresby would in all probability diminish if problems such as unemployment, matrimonial difficulties and a host of other social ailments were cured, independently of the criminal justice system.

Apart from housebreaking however, the Port Moresby crime pattern also shows a seemingly endless array of individually trivial offences. Table 1. in this paper shows us for example, a multitude of minor traffic offences on the one hand, and on the other hand a considerable number of offences associated with the over use of alcohol. Apart from traffic offences, the category of offence most frequently appearing in the court list was Drunk, or Drunk and Disorderly which accounted for 23% of the case loading. When we add to this category other kinds of offences for which drunks are usually arrested obscene language, offensive behaviour, assaults and so on, we have something like a 40% "drunkenness factor" throughout the whole court list. Preoccupation with processing such a large proportion of traffic and "drunkenness factor" cases so exhausts the police effort that their attention is diverted from their other preventive and detective duties with the result that the probability of being caught for other more serious crimes such as housebreaking, diminishes.

Table 1. also suggests that the incidence of offences does not occur at random throughout Port Moresby but is concentrated around the main thoroughfares of Boroko, the City and Badili. These are the centres of entertainment where people go to the movies, restaurants or hotels.

Figure 1. indicates that offences do not occur evenly throughout the week but occur more frequently on Thursdays, Fridays and Saturdays. In fact the percentage of offences committed on Saturdays is twice that committed on Sundays.

Similarly, the incidences of housebreaking are not distributed evenly

throughout time or throughout Port Moresby. They are clustered less noticeably around weekends, and more noticeably around certain suburban areas. For example, the suburban distribution of reported housebreaking offences as shown in Table 2. ranged from only 5 in Hanuabada to as many as 177 in part of Gordon, and the concentration of 481 reported incidences or 40% of the survey total occurring in the high covenant area of Gordon-Boroko-Korobosea would appear to indicate a crime density in those areas of very considerable proportions.

But all this shows that not everyone, everywhere in Port Moresby is equally liable to become a victim of crime. There are high crime times, and high crime places and while some areas are dangerous; others are safe. And even where the incidences of housebreaking are high, looking more closely, we find that in 28% of all reported housebreaking incidences, nothing at all was taken. In 16% of all reported incidences burglars took only food, clothing, money and a few odds and ends like an electric jug which they could conveniently carry away, giving in 44% of all reported cases, a value of goods stolen at less than K100.

What is significant here, is not so much the value of goods taken, as the value of goods not taken, for compared with the loot stolen during the burglary of a large warehouse in a large city in the western world, the actual loss suffered as a result of the average Port Moresby housebreaking incident, pales into insignificance.

What is significant in Port Moresby however, is the sheer number of offences. Now even the best gathered criminal statistics are unreliable as an accurate measure of crime because of the built in "drop out" factor which permeates the whole judicial process. For example, when an offence is reported, the police have to decide whether or not to arrest. If the police do not arrest, the courts cannot convict, and if the courts do not convict, the correctional agencies cannot offer treatment. The amount of crime that comes to official attention is a small fraction of the total volume, and some crimes reported to police result in no action at all. Accordingly, the "drop out" rate in criminal statistics is very high, and the further we move along the judicial cycle from report to arrest to trial to commitment, the higher the number of drop outs. All the evidence indicates that the main error in official records is that they tend to underestimate the number of criminal acts. (Lundberg, 1968:541ff).

BREAK AND ENTER INDEX

Distribution of Break and Enter Offences in Port Moresby City from April to September 1975
by Month and Suburb

Table 2

Maps and Suburbs	April		May		June		July		August		September		TOTAL	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
2. GIREHU	11	5	5	2	1	-	2	1	2	1	-	-	21	2
9. GERIHU	13	6	19	9	17	9	12	6	3	2	1	-	65	6
10. UNIVERSITY	6	3	5	2	6	3	2	1	2	1	2	1	23	2
11. AIXCOL	5	2	12	6	9	5	7	4	10	6	-	-	43	4
5. TOKARARA	10	4	17	8	15	8	2	1	16	9	9	6	69	7
12. WATGANI	14	6	12	6	9	5	13	7	2	1	2	1	52	5
18. GORDON	10	4	20	9	10	5	6	3	10	6	6	4	62	5
6. HANUABADA	2	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	5	-
7. KONEDOBUI	10	4	9	4	12	6	13	7	10	6	4	3	58	5
8. CITY	20	10	17	8	24	12	27	15	24	14	19	15	131	11
13. HOKOLA	20	10	18	8	12	6	5	3	2	1	5	4	62	5
14. HOKOLA	1	-	10	4	2	-	3	2	5	3	12	10	33	3
15. BADILI	16	7	9	4	11	6	11	7	12	7	10	7	69	7
16. GABUTU	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2	1	1	-	5	-
19. GORDON	41	18	28	12	29	15	28	15	18	12	33	25	177	16
20. BOROKO	23	11	25	11	23	12	28	15	31	18	11	8	141	12
21. KOROBOSEA	19	8	16	7	16	8	16	9	14	8	20	14	101	9
22. SABAMA	4	2	-	-	-	-	3	2	3	2	3	2	13	1
25. AIRPORT	2	-	2	-	-	-	4	2	2	1	-	-	10	-
Distributed:	227	100	225	100	197	100	184	100	169	100	138	100	1140	100
Not Distributed:	28	11%	8	3%	8	4%	6	3%	8	4%	13	8%	71	6%
TOTAL	255		233		205		190		177		151		1211	

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For Port Moresby, the "drop out" factor in its criminal statistics was considerably aggravated during the research period by early saturation of the court listings. That is to say, and for reasons which will be explained later, there were times when so many cases were listed for hearing that the existing criminal justice system simply could not handle any more, and the police were asked to stop prosecuting some categories of offences, mainly drunkenness, traffic and vagrancy cases until those cases in the court list then pending had cleared the system, and room was found for more. Thus, it often happened, and particularly on pay nights, that once the criminal justice system had reached saturation point and could cope with no further cases for the time being, criminals were free to roam the streets and to do their particular thing whatever it was, without fear of arrest.

The sum total of this means that the court statistics shown in Table 1 should not be considered to be a definitive list of the total number of crimes committed in Port Moresby during the six month period. They are only a fraction of the total. They do, however, include all the cases of the court list for this period and are useful as an indicator of the kind of crimes most frequently encountered in Port Moresby.

Generally speaking therefore, Port Moresby's crime problem is not the same as that encountered elsewhere in the world. Port Moresby does have organised gangs, as we shall see, but it has no equivalent of the IRA or the Mafia. There are drugs in Port Moresby, but no drug problem. There is gambling and prostitution, but no gambling and prostitution rackets. Port Moresby has no vice kings and no underworld, and although mailbags containing money have sometimes been stolen, Port Moresby has never experienced a bank robbery or a payroll robbery.

The kinds of crime most frequently found in Port Moresby are best summarised in the words of the Prime Minister, Mr. Somare, as "violence, drunkenness and theft" (P-C; 5/3/75) but the occurrence of actual "serious" crime is rare. What is serious in the Port Moresby crime scene is not the nature of the crime but the volume of the crime that vast array of individually

trivial offences which collectively produce, under the existing court procedures, a case loading so big as to be beyond the carrying capacity in 1975 of the then existing law enforcement facilities.

Table 3

CASES HEARD IN THE PORT MORESBY CITY LOWER COURTS
APRIL TO SEPTEMBER (INCLUSIVE) 1975
OFFENCES COMMITTED AND OFFENDER'S ETHNIC ORIGIN

	TOTAL	38	142	628	1902	117	132	220	206	134	449	416	16	70	64	302	20	26	46	21	19	1106	1788	7862	
		National Capital	Western	Gulf	Central	Milne Bay	Northern	South. Hl.	Enga	West. Hig.	Chimbu	East. Hig.	West Sep.	East Sep.	Madang	Morobe	Manus	West New B.	East New B.	New Ire.	Bougainv.	Expats.	Not Known	TOTAL	M.L.Mackellar.
Murder			3		2	1		3																9	
Rape					1																		2	3	
G.B.H.					3						2					1								6	
Assault	2	11	40	77	8	3	28	17	9	57	34	1	6	2	31	1	4	4	2		12	28	372		
Ob.Lang.		3	7	27	1	2	4	1		5	12	2	2	2	5		3	1		1		7	85		
Off.Beh.	1	8	44	89	18	11	16	16	13	29	33	2	8	10	16		2	2	3	3	10	25	359		
Ind.Man.			3	9	1	4	2		3	3	5			3								1	35		
False R.	1	10	5	17		1	9	2	1	1	1	1	1					1			1	4	56		
Other			12	7		4			1	2	1				1						2	1	31		
Robbery				1																			1		
Stealing		21	103	197	8	21	12	15	9	30	38	1	3	8	10	1		4	3	1	7	12	504		
Break & E.		1	40	32	1	4	1		5	6	7		1		7			2		1		2	110		
Un.User		2	32	33		1	6	1	3	4	9	1	1	1	10			1			6	1	112		
An.Tspas.			1																				1		
Un. On P.		3	16	16	3	8	8	11	6	16	13		1	1	9			3	2		1	1	118		
Prop. Dam.		5	26	32	2	5		10	7	14	8	1	2	1	5	1		2	1		3	12	137		
Other		2	1	5			1			1											1	1	12		
C. o C.				3																	1	7	11		
Escape		2	16	23	1	3	2	2	2	8	3	1				3		1			1		68		
Drunk		41	94	150	41	32	74	81	39	108	113	2	22	18	105	1	11	11	4	3	5	8	963		
Riot Beh.	1	15	29	70	6	4	12	23	11	39	37		5	1	5	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	270		
Dang Driv.				6	1					1					1						3	7	19		
D.U.I.	2	1	8	27	3	3	3	1	6	6	8	2	4	3	11	3		3	1		11	2	108		
Speeding	1	1		15											1			1			22	31	72		
O.Traffic.	27	4	47	746	7	5	4	3	2	14	29		7	4	39	8	4	2		1	229	971	2153		
C. Rules.	1		7	54											1			1			33	155	252		
Other.	1	3	15	44	2	3	11	10		25	17		3	2	6			2			19	29	192		
Liquor L.		1	1	7	2	1				1	11				1	8					1	1	35		
Firearms.																					6		6		
Vagrancy		2	21	27		2	13	4	13	46	16	2	1		2			1			1	1	152		
Gambling		1	19	31	3	9	14	8	2	21	17		2		10				1			4	142		
Other				7	1	2	1			1												1	17		
Land			1	3																			4		
Marriage		2	20	63	4	2		1		5	1				1	1	2			1		4	71	178	
Comp.				6																		1	6	13	
Tax & Debt.	1		20	70	3	2	1		2	4	3		1	6	14	2		3	2	8	714	376	1232		
Other:				2																		7	15	24	

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1. THE PORT MORESBY CRIME SCENE

C. Who are the Criminals

As the majority of the offences before the courts are of the "less serious" variety, it follows that those persons who commit most of them correspondingly harbour little or no criminal intent and could hardly be labelled "criminals" in the usual sense of that word.

Nevertheless the data do appear to indicate that certain kinds of offences tend to be committed more by persons of some ethnic origins than by persons of other ethnic origins. This correlation is an important factor in the prevention and detection of crimes since the range of suspects for certain offences is for the most part limited to persons within certain ethnic groupings.

This correlation of ethnic origin and offence committed is indicated to some extent by Table 3. Unfortunately, Table 3 has in addition to the inherent unreliability it shares with other criminal statistics, some built in impediments of its own. One of these is the extraordinarily high distribution of 23% of the total cases into a category indicating that the offender's ethnic origin is unknown. This problem derives from defects in the court records. Very early in the research programme it became evident that there was some correlation between the defendant's ethnic origin and the offence with which he was charged, and such data was extracted whenever the ethnic origin was revealed in the court records. At the time the research was conducted the courts had no obligation to take any notice of this and this accounts for this particular discrepancy in the research data.

The category of "ethnic origin unknown" is particularly noticeable in relation to traffic offences and the reason here is that as most traffic offences are non-arrestable in the first instance the offender's ethnic origin is omitted from the charge sheet in favour of the offender's address in Port Moresby. This is done to facilitate faster service of court process.

Another minor misrepresentation occurs in Table 3 in relation to taxation offences committed by expatriates. The figure shown here of 714 such offences among the expatriate population of Port Moresby would prima facie indicate a high degree of tax evasion. In reality however, those tax offences refer to defendants in the whole of Papua New Guinea, wherever residing. The reason for this is that all income tax returns must by law be filed with the Taxation Commissioner in Port Moresby and any court action arising from evasion of the tax laws is begun in the Port Moresby Court House. The theory is that the offence is committed in Port Moresby, irrespective of where the offender happens to live at the time. Furthermore, in relation to non-expatriate offenders for this category of offence, the ethnic origins of 376 defendants were not known for the same reason given for the traffic cases.

One or two correlations between offence committed and offender's ethnic origin would have been fairly obvious in any case, even without the aid of Table 3. For example, the expatriate ethnic group in Port Moresby has a lifestyle largely directed by the use of motor vehicles. With an accompanying relatively high socio-economic status, this particular ethnic group has in comparison with other ethnic groups in Port Moresby, a disproportionate use of motor vehicles per head of city population. It could therefore be expected that the court statistics might show a high proportion of traffic court appearances by expatriates.

Similarly, the traffic system of Port Moresby is land locked. And the traffic statistics might be expected to show a high proportion of offenders other than expatriates whose ethnic origins lie within the road networks surrounding Port Moresby. In fact, Table 3 shows that in relation to those traffic offences where the ethnic origins of the defendant were known, persons of expatriate and Central Province origin together claimed 75% of the Traffic Court list.

While still on the subject of the road network, it is interesting to note that of those housebreaking cases which passed through the courts during the survey period, 67% of

the defendants had ethnic origins within the only two provinces which form part of the land locked Port Moresby traffic system ... the Central and Gulf Provinces.

A similarly high percentage of defendants from these two ethnic origins is shown in other property offences which came before the courts during the same period. For example, 61% of the persons charged with stealing, and 59% of persons charged with the unlawful use of motor vehicles had ethnic origins in either the Central or the Gulf provinces.

The reasons for this are not too hard to discover either. A marauding band of Highlanders in Lae may be able to drive a stolen car full of burgled goods into the innermost depths of the Chimbu Province never to be found again, long before a temporarily absent owner has reported his loss to the police. Such a manifest could pass un-noticed out of Lae since car loads of Chimbos and their cargoes are frequent sights along the Highlands Highway but not along the Hiritano Highway ... for once out along the Hiritano Highway, there is nowhere for a stolen carload of Chimbu's to go.

There are of course, pockets of Highlanders here and there along the Papuan coast in plantations, construction camps and other similar settlements, and Highlanders generally (from 5 separate provinces) supplied 25% of the defendants in property cases before the Port Moresby courts. But by and large, given the usual ethnic barriers in Melanesia it would be difficult for a Highlander to find sanctuary at most places along the road network which leads out of Port Moresby.

Not so for a coastal Papuan who is on his home ground, more or less, with marriage, trading or traditional ties of friendship and reciprocity to aid him. It is therefore relatively easy for anyone from the Gulf or Central Provinces to hide a stolen vehicle off the Hiritano Highway or the Rigo Road, at least long enough to disperse whatever stolen goods it may contain among friendly households nearby.

Since the majority of migrants in Port Moresby are from the


Gulf and Central Provinces the "ethnic origin of offender" figures may simply mirror this make-up of the urban population. But if 67% of the Break and Enter offences in Port Moresby are committed by persons of Gulf or Central Province origin, then it follows that the wantoks of these persons in Port Moresby will also be predominantly of those origins. These two ethnic origins incidentally supply many members of the rising National elite in Port Moresby, and it follows further that because of the extensiveness of the wantok system, many burglars of Gulf and Central Province origins must have many wantoks who are highly placed in the Public Service, the Police, the Army and in various statutory authorities. This point will be explored later, but in the meantime let us ponder on the possibility that a considerable number of "respectable" residents of Port Moresby may be "receivers" in one form or another of the proceeds of the city's endless stream of housebreakings.

Apart from housebreakings and traffic, the next most prevalent group of offences which affect the quality of life in Port Moresby are those which can collectively be referred to as "street offences". These are the charges which result from arrests for drunk and disorderly, fighting, throwing stones at passing cars, urinating in the streets, obscene language and offensive behaviour of one kind or another. Most of these "street" incidents if taken individually and in isolation are relatively harmless. Most constitute a public nuisance only, although some do cause minor personal injury or minor property damage. Now and again however, street brawls result in the deaths of some of the participants or even innocent passers-by, and a simple punch-up between two drunks can quickly escalate into a major riot causing death, as wantoks of the original two participants join in. A "simple" street offence is therefore viewed in Port Moresby as being "serious" not because the act itself is serious, but because of what it could soon lead to if the police do not quickly intervene.

Here again we find a correlation between the category of offence and the ethnic origin of the offender, with persons with ethnic origins in the Central, Eastern Highlands, Chimbu and Morobe Provinces making frequent appearances in court for "street offences" while persons whose ethnic origins are in the New Guinea Islands

Table 4
ETHNIC ORIGINS OF OFFENDERS

A Comparison of the Percentage of each of the Four Major Categories of Crime Committed by each of the Four Major National Ethnic Groups and Expatriates.



Sources of Information: (1) Ethnic Proportions of Port Moresby's National Population: Urban Survey Dec1973-Jan 1974 by the Rural - Urban Research Group, UPNG & NGRU. (a one in ten sample).

Indicates the ethnic groups percentage of the total National population of Port Moresby. Expats are excluded.

(2) Ethnic Origin of Offenders: Court Records of Cases heard in the Port Moresby City Lower Courts, April to September (inclusive) 1975, where the offenders ethnic origin was known. This was in relation to 5091 cases of a total of 6411 cases in the above 4 major categories of Crime. Not included in the above table are tax and civil cases which together with the above figures give a total case load of 7862 cases heard during this period.

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make fewer appearances.

To some extent this is also a reflection of the ethnic make-up of the city's population, with Central Province origins being a greater source of supply in Port Moresby than New Guinea Islands origins. However, there is no doubt that "People from the Highlands Goilala sub-district, commit offences, especially offences relating to violence, theft and drunkenness, out of all proportion to their numbers." This is what the Commission of Inquiry into Alcoholic Drink concluded (p.18) in 1971, and the same is true today. Table 4 for example measures what percentage of the total crime load in Port Moresby is committed by persons of each of the four major ethnic groupings. The bar graph measures the crime and the horizontal line +++++ measures the population. Where that line on Table 4 appears above the bar graph for an ethnic grouping, it indicates that the percentage of crime committed by persons of that ethnic grouping is below that groupings percentage of the city's National population. This condition holds for all groupings except the Highlands grouping. In fact the figures show that Highlanders are nearly 8 times more prone than coastal Papuans to commit public order offences, 4 times more prone to commit property offences, 6 times more prone to commit offences against the person, but less prone than coastal people to commit traffic offences in Port Moresby.

We can conclude from these figures, that compared with coastal people generally, persons with ethnic origins in the Highlands are more prone to commit offences, but that in Port Moresby, there are fewer Highlanders. In law and order terms, Highlanders in Port Moresby constitute a troublesome minority.

1. THE PORT MORESBY CRIME SCENE

D. The Gangs

The strangest feature of the Port Moresby crime scene is the size of its delinquent community.

Within its population of 100,000 people, the city is said to have over 40 identifiably separate gangs, some of which are said to have as few as 10 members (Young, F.D.;1976) while others have as many as 500 members (Clifford,W.;1976: 16) giving a total gangland population of approximately 3,000 (my estimate) which is 3% of the city's total population and five times the size of the city's police force.

Apart from their numbers, another interesting feature of the gang members is their high degree of integration with the rest of the city's law abiding population, especially that part of the city's population which may be considered to constitute the elite, although Young (personal communication) says "Most of the delinquents' fathers are in constant employment. By Papua New Guinea standards many could be termed "lower middle class".

So high is the degree of integration, that when it comes to defining the social boundaries of the Port Moresby criminal community, the lines of demarcation are often difficult to draw; for many prominent Port Moresby families have among their members living at home some who are still taking part in gang activities. And since so many "law abiding" citizens of Port Moresby benefit in so many different ways from the activities of gang members, it is difficult to say at any one time who has or who has not connections with a gang.

In January 1975 there was published in Administration for Development (the journal of the Administrative College of Papua New Guinea) a fascinating article by a former gang member, (Po'o,T;1975:30) who had successfully made the transition from gang member to senior public servant. There

are many other former gang members who have with similar success done the same; but there are also some younger public servants* who still are gang members and who have not yet completed the transition. Theirs is mostly a part time residual commitment to gang activity, maintained by boredom at nights or during weekends. Old habits and old friendships formed during the days of more active gang participation are hard to sever immediately upon taking up employment and often carry over into the first few years of employment whether in the public service or elsewhere. The result is that some public servants who were active gang members in their earlier years continue to make repeated appearances in court on criminal charges of various kinds long after their total commitment to gang activity has lapsed.**

Generally speaking however, most gang members are youths whose ethnic origin lies along the Papuan coast west of Port Moresby, and Motu is the dominant gang language (Po'o,T;1975:36), although a large majority of gang members were born in Port Moresby and have never seen their "home" village. (Young,F.D;1976) Nevertheless, the size of the gangs and the extensions of the wantok system thereafter ensure that some Port Moresby residents from this region have frequent social contact with active gang members and most residents from this region would at least have sporadic social connection with youths known to be gang members.

Port Moresby's gangland however, should not be viewed as some kind of Mafia fiefdom, because for many young "rascals" gang membership is a passing phrase which lapses when members grow older, marry, or go their own ways for a variety of reasons. Membership of any one gang is not stable. The larger gangs

* The term 'Public Servant' is in this paper intended to refer to all persons whose salary is paid from public money and who are employed under public service conditions, whether under the Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act or otherwise, unless the contrary is expressed.

** This information came from interviews with public servants who appeared before the courts and admitted continued involvement in gang activity.

in Port Moresby says Young, split into sub-groups and never meet as a whole gang. Members drift from one gang to another gang and although not all gang activity is criminal, each gang has a hard core membership of from four to six members who are consistently criminally inclined. Others may join for a few weeks then move on. Certain gangs have acknowledged leaders, but generally there is no hierarchy of command, and influence of some over others generally determines what is done (Young,F.D;1976).

On the topic of gang leadership Po'o says "Gangs in Port Moresby have no set rules for appointing their leaders. People become leaders because of their status; because they are the strongest people in the gangs, because of the famous things they have done in the gang world. Famous things would include breaking and entering, bashing people up, going to jail and other brave deeds" (Po'o,T;1975:35).

Gang involvement in criminal activity might have been going on undetected for years but has only recently increased sufficiently to attract official attention. Parry reports :

The first sign of involvement of gang members in city wide crime was sudden and dramatic when in Easter 1970 police arrested over forty boys and held some of them in the watch house over the holiday period. Those held were second and third time offenders and believed by police to be ringleaders of gangs suspected of committing a large number of break-enters in late 1969 and early 1970 (Parry,G.1;1975:30).

Nevertheless, gang involvement in criminal activity caught on rapidly, aided Po'o says by the goodies and baddies model in movies depicting violence (p.35). And although Port Moresby gangs display little of the Mafia type organisation, they are organised nevertheless. The more notorious Port Moresby gangs; the Raipex; Devils; Joes Mob; and Laddies and about 10 others have held together for some years now and have acquired a kind of Mafia type immunity from the law. This immunity takes the form of what may be described as a "part prosecution".

The "part prosecution" in 1975 was a marriage between gang organisation and police inactivity. Magistrates were often amazed at committal proceedings to hear the evidence unfold of an organised burglary involving first the stealing of a truck to cart the loot away, the posting of lookouts and the division of spoils between the six or eight persons involved. But sitting in court would be one solitary defendant. "Where are all the others?" an inquisitive Magistrate might be constrained to ask. "They cannot be located" was the usual reply.

Sometimes they were located and later charged with participating in the particular burglary. But sometimes there were no further charges in relation to that same incident and Magistrates were left with the distinct impression that a single committal for a housebreaking offence was sufficient to close the police file on it, irrespective of how many gang members had been involved.

There was also the impression that part of the organisation involved in any particular housebreaking incident was the recruitment of a "fall guy" specifically to take the rap if the heat got too close. Sacrificing him with a portion of the loot was usually sufficient to get the case closed. Later, when he came out of jail, he could always be compensated for his heroic deed in taking the rap for his friends. The "rap" incidentally in Port Moresby's courts in 1975 was usually only a few months for a young offender.

Surprisingly none of the housebreaking cases which passed through the lower courts in 1975 included a female defendant. Yet our research staff when probing through the wantok system after a housebreaking incident often came across reference to various girls who had been involved either as decoys or lookouts. The reward of course being whatever feminine articles of clothing or jewelry were included in the loot and for which the youths had no use. Never once were the girls' names mentioned in court, and we were impressed by such honour among thieves.

Girls of course took part in many non-criminal gang activities, and many non-criminal girls had boyfriends who were active gang

members. Together they drifted into a sub-culture of their own. Clifford says :

It seems clear that these gangs are functional in the sociological sense. They developed in response to a social need and they thrive because they continue to fill that need. There is reason to suppose that unemployed, aimless, frustrated and bored young people, unable and perhaps unwilling to find work, slowly drew together for mutual protection ... probably against critics at home, older people who despised their idleness or other working youths who had no time for others less fortunate than themselves. (Clifford,W;1976:16).

Even so, the attitudes towards the gang members displayed by their "respectable" parents, friends and others in their homes, show a considerable degree of ambivalence. For while at times the "respectable" inlaws condemn the depredations of the gang members the same inlaws appear to have no qualms about accepting stolen property into their households as gifts or contributions towards the household maintenance. Of this Po'o (1975:36) says :

In most cases that I know of the parents do not seem to mind about the fact that their sons are rascals. This happens especially in squatter settlements, and in which most families are poor. The children stray off, steal and do all sorts of things. The parents do not seem to mind because they may bring home a little of what they have stolen. This practice has been going on a long time and the parents are used to it and regard it as part of their life. If the children are caught they get the blame but on the other hand they know that the law will deal with them justly.

Of the better off families, Po'o says "they try to control their children but find it very hard" and that "some parents are ashamed if their children are rascals because they regard it as a disgrace to the family" but not such a disgrace, our research team found, as to refuse to accept contributions into the household which have been obtained from dubious sources.

And while such better off families are outwardly vocal about the shortcomings of their gangster offspring, they are also, nevertheless quick to come to their rescue whenever the question of fine or bail or appeal to the National Court arises. And for good reason since the gang members represent the equivalent in Port Moresby of the Western designed family budget subsidy which the Papua New Guinea Government cannot afford to introduce legally, even though such subsidy is obviously needed at times to tide some families over crises of sickness, unemployment, school fees and so on.

In the kind of high living, car oriented, beer swilling lifestyle which the Papua New Guinean elite inherited from their former colonial masters, there was one important element which was not inherited ... the high Australian salaries, to pay for such a lifestyle. Thus, for those who follow this lifestyle in Port Moresby, and who do not have salaries high enough to pay for it or those who have no salaries at all, the difference has to come from somewhere, and it is the gangs who supply it. In this sort of situation as Clinard and Abbot have noted :

Delinquent gang behaviour grows wherever legitimate means to the attainment of success goals such as economic and higher educational opportunities are blocked.

(Clinard & Abbot; 1973:177).

In Port Moresby the legitimate means are blocked simply because there are insufficient places in the second and tertiary institutions of higher education, and insufficient job opportunities even for those fortunate enough to have graduated from such institutions.

In an article entitled 'CRIME - A WAY OF LIFE FOR MANY IN PNG' the Post Courier (2/8/76:3) quoting a paper from the UPNG Educational Research Unit claimed that by the end of 1976 the Standard 6 and Form 1 unemployed, still seeking semi-skilled employment in PNG would reach 19,000. Many of these persons would of course have gravitated to Port Moresby in

search of legitimate work only to have found none. For them, the only hope of achieving their material goals in life lies in a life of crime.

How much worse off then, are those youths who have never had any education at all, and who, motivated by boredom in the village, are attracted to Port Moresby in search of jobs. For them, legitimate means of attaining their goals are even less likely to be available, so they too, may drift into crime.

Lastly, there are those who are in the process of attaining higher educational qualifications, i.e. those who have not yet dropped out of school or university, and who have not yet sought employment. They have not yet become disillusioned about the uselessness of a good education, yet they too drift into crime, because they cannot afford to rent or buy cars for themselves, and jewelry for their girlfriends, and gifts for their parents, or even their own school fees. But if they join a gang they can.

The Port Moresby gang members who pass through the courtrooms display little of the traditional image of the street layabout. Most of them have had some education; many were well educated. Asked which language they preferred to speak in court, they generally chose English, the language of the elite, in which language most of them could converse perfectly.

Outside the courtrooms they have a friendly smile and a wave for the policemen who arrest them and the Magistrates who jail them, and one of the most un-nerving defendants which any Magistrate can face across a Port Moresby courtroom is not the disorderly drunk ... for a few days in the cells will soon dry him out; or the drunken driver ... for he is a danger to the public and ought to be kept off the roads in any case ... the most un-nerving defendant is the eighteen year old kid with ten previous convictions who stands before the court unflinchingly, awaiting his sentence.

When asked if he has anything to say why sentence should not

be passed this defendant indicates politely that he has nothing to say. What is the point of saying anything ... his story is the same as that of the last kid who appeared in court ... good education, no job, no money, nothing to do, nowhere to go; useful but unemployed. Behind the defendant in the public gallery sit his fellow gang members, watching. Their turn will come next; maybe not this month, maybe next month. Some of them have recently been released from jail ... you can tell by their prison hair cuts; all of them display the same fresh faced eagerness for life although for them there is nothing much to be eager about ... Among them sit the defendant's parents and aunts and uncles, grey haired, dry eyed, expressionless. They have been through this procedure before, many times, and there is nothing much they can do to help for they tried before and failed ... And at the far end of the courtroom sobbing quietly to herself in the corner sits the defendant's girl friend ... this is the last time she will see him for many, many months.

Yet in many ways, prison is no hardship for an active gang member. To him it is only one of many places of temporary residence he has in Port Moresby, and one in which he has many friends. For among his fellow inmates he finds many old acquaintances with whom he can talk over past exploits and rehash the circumstances of his arrest and trial, and in accordance with Sutherland's theory of differential association (Sutherland, E.H; 1947:5-7) he is given the opportunity to learn from other gang members who get caught less frequently, how to become a more skilful criminal.

Far from being a deterrent, prison is viewed by most Port Moresby gang members as an occupational hazard. Throughout 1975 many gang members in Port Moresby made frequent re-appearances in court for offences committed while they were out on bail pending the hearing of other offences, or pending the hearing of appeals from earlier convictions. Some were able to skip bail and continue their gang activities for months, untrammelled by warrants issued for their re-arrest, for even in the relatively small city of Port Moresby a gang member can ride out a dragnet search

for him quite easily, for reasons which are explained later.

Is there no solution to the gang problem in Port Moresby? There was in 1975 a temporary solution, which was the prosecution of the beneficiaries of gangster activity; those friends and relatives who harbour gang members and receive their stolen goods.

The prosecution for the offences of being in possession of anything which is suspected of having been stolen or unlawfully obtained * and of being the holder of a house frequented by thieves or persons who have no visible lawful means of support ** would most likely have had the effect of depriving most gang members (those who live with their families) of a sanctuary. They would either have had to curtail their depredations, or move on.

But these laws were never enforced in 1975 because of the embarrassment it could have caused to gang members' families. And the present moves in the National Parliament to repeal the old Papuan Police Offences Act and the Vagrancy Act (said to be Colonial hangovers) and to replace them with a newer Summary Offences Act and a newer but less severe Vagrancy Act will make prevention and detection of gang activities even more difficult for the police.

Even so, no lasting cure can ever be found either in the squad rooms or the courtrooms for the social ills which have generated for years now, the growth of gang activity in Port Moresby.

Gangs will continue to thrive in Port Moresby under the existing and foreseeable laws for as long as there is no dole,

* Section 18, Police Offences Act (1912) (Papua)

** Section 4 (1) Vagrancy Act (1912) (Papua)

no welfare cheques, and no hope for the swelling ranks of the unemployed. The only hope of containing gang activity within toleration limits is by a fairly simple police tactic known as Target and Team. This is explained later.

2. HOUSEBREAKING - A SPECIAL CATEGORY OF CRIME IN PORT MORESBY

Among the most frequently occurring offences in Port Moresby, by far the most disturbing is housebreaking.


It is still possible in Port Moresby, by leading a life of relative seclusion, to avoid contact with disorderly drunks, layabouts, and other lawless elements in the city's population simply by staying at home, particularly on Friday or Saturday nights. But there is no retreat from a burglar because his particular offence is only perpetrated within the confines of his victim's home.

Even though, as we have seen, the average burglar is fairly selective in what he takes and in any case usually does not take much, it is this feeling of no retreat - this invasion of privacy and the accompanying feeling of helplessness and exasperation by the victim which distorts the image of the average burglary out of all proportion to the actual loss or damage suffered.

In addition to this exploded image and in common with the vast array of seemingly endless street offences more frequently clustered around weekends, the main impediment to the effective control of burglary in Port Moresby is the relatively large number of separate housebreaking offences which collectively are so far beyond the containment capability of the existing criminal justice system that proper response, investigation and prosecution of each individual offence is impossible.

There were 1211 separate housebreaking offences reported to the police during the six month survey period. How many housebreaking offences not reported to the police during the same period is anybody's guess, but even if there was only one unreported housebreaking for every case reported to the police, this would give Port Moresby a housebreaking rate of 4844 per year.

Clearly, it would take a police force with a very high



degree of organisation and efficiency to handle a burglary problem of this magnitude, and the Port Moresby police, given their present state of unpreparedness (Clifford, 1976:18) simply do not stand a chance.

All is not lost however, and closer examination of the housebreaking problem in Port Moresby reveals all sorts of interesting patterns which could lead to greater understanding of the situation, and, by extension, a more positive plan to deal with it.

As already stated, everybody, everywhere in Port Moresby is not equally predestined to be a victim of housebreaking. And while many houses in the city were each broken into many times during the survey period, there were others which had never been burgled.

Even in that part of Port Moresby included in the area of Map 19 (Gordon) which had the highest break and enter rate for the city during the survey period (16%), most of the dwellings there had not been broken into during that time and the vast majority of the Port Moresby population as a whole has never experienced a burglary.

This of course is no comfort to those who have. But the evidence so far indicates that while many factors of neighbourhood, residence, time and spatial disposition of dwellings are unfortunately conducive to frequent acts of housebreaking in some parts of Port Moresby, there are other parts of the city where thoughtful manipulation of these environmental factors has successfully precluded burglary to the extent that it never happens there.

The crime of housebreaking, like any other crime, has no single cause, and no single cure, but insofar as it is a societal illness, it can, like any other illness, be diagnosed, isolated, analysed and treated. It might never be cured, but as experience in parts of Port Moresby has shown, it can be contained.

The first clue to the analysis of housebreaking in Port

Moresby can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 5. Together they show that housebreaking incidents in the city are concentrated in time and space.

Referring first to the concentration in time, we notice in Fig. 2 a graph zigzagging across the page in a seemingly unintelligible series of meaningless peaks and troughs. Looking more closely however, we notice that the greater number of offences reported for that month were said to have occurred during weekends, especially during the private sector pay weekends.


Fig. 2 discloses another interesting concentration of housebreakings and that is in relation to the day of the week. For whereas the daily average of reported housebreakings for Tuesdays was 5.8, the daily average for Thursdays was 11.5. This was the highest of the daily averages, and the reason that housebreakings in Port Moresby occurred most frequently on Thursdays, is that Thursday is pay day. Housebreakers who volunteered information to the research team about their burglary habits confirmed that pickings as a rule are fairly slim on Mondays, and are at their best on Thursdays, and that the custom of spending most of the pay packet within a few days of payment dictates to a large extent the daily frequencies for housebreaking activity.

Not disclosed in Fig. 2 but revealed elsewhere in the data was an even more interesting concentration of time into the daylight hours. It could have reasonably been supposed that most of the housebreakings would occur under the cover of darkness and of course many do. But there was such a surprising amount of stealing from houses committed in broad daylight, that the question was put to some of our burglar informants. The reason they gave was the essence of simplicity: Because of the fear of burglars, most houses worth burgling in Port Moresby are securely locked up at night, often with burglar alarms set. Most houses can be broken into nevertheless, but the noise of tearing wire and ringing alarms and barking dogs and so

Fig 2

BREAK AND ENTER INDEX

Chronological Distribution of Reported Break and Enter
Offences for Port Moresby for April, 1975.



Compiled by Research Staff

in the Boroko
District Court, from data
supplied by Boroko C.I.B.

M.L.Mackellar.

N	%	% of	days
98	38	26.6	Private pay weekend
60	24	26.6	Admin pay weekend
97	38	46.8	Other days
255	100	100	TOTAL

BREAK AND ENTER INDEX

Distribution of Reported Break and Enter Offences in Port Moresby City
by day and Suburb for April 1975.

Date:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	Suburb	Map and
Day :	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	T	F	S	S	M	T	W	Total	Suburb.
Table 5	1				4	1		1				1			1						2					1					11	2. Gerehu
					3					3	1			1	1						1	1			1	1	1				13	9. Gerehu
								1				2	1		1					1											6	10. UPNG
				1	2		1																			1					5	11. Adcol.
					1	2						1										1	3			1		2			10	5. Tokarara
	2		1	1	1		1								1	1	1			1		1			1	1		1	1		14	12. Waigani
	1								1		2			1						1						3		1			10	18. Gordon
									1				1																		2	6. Hanuabada
	1		1		1	1													1				1	1	1		1	1			10	7. Konedobu
		2	5		1			1	1	1	1					1				3				1		1			1	1	20	8. City
			1	1		3					2		1	3		2		1		1	2		2			1					20	13. Hohola
											2		1		1	3	2			2	1										16	15. Badili
		1	1			3					2																				6	16. Gabutu
	1	3	4	1		2	1	3	2	3	1	2	1	2			3	1	1	2		1	1		1	1		2	1		41	19. Gordon
	2		1	3				1	1	1	2					1	3		1		2			2		1			1	1	23	20. Boroko
		1	3		1	1						1		1	1		1	1		2				2	1				1	2	19	21. Korobosea
									2									1		1											4	22. Sabama
								1					1																		2	25. Airport
		2									1				1	1	3	5	9	1				2	1		2				28	UNKNOWN
	8	7	19	7	14	13	3	7	9	8	12	9	5	10	5	11	14	13	4	14	8	3	12	5	4	13	5	3	6	5	255	TOTALS

Compiled by Research Staff
in the Boroko District Court, from data
supplied by Boroko C.I.B.

M.L.Mackellar.

on, often alerts a light sleeping family. It is far easier to break into a house in daytime and although there is no cover of darkness there are other and better advantages. To begin with it is hotter in the daytime so the windows or shutters which are normally closed and locked at night, might be found open in the daytime, left that way for ventilation purposes during the absence of the householder. No one wants to come home to a house as hot as an oven.

Furthermore, daytime often means that doors which would have been locked at night will be left open in full view of passers-by not only for ventilation purposes but also to allow young children to come and go at will. For although children can be locked in at night when it is their bed time, they can hardly be locked in during the day, when it is their play time.

All this is known to housebreakers, who merely have to sit at some vantage point to wait for an opportunity to pounce. This opportunity often comes when the housewife is in the laundry which in most Port Moresby houses is either underneath the house or at the rear of it, and out of sight of the front door. With the washing machine whirring away drowning any noises in the lounge room, and children and pets playing happily outside the laundry, the housebreaker simply walks through the open front door and without having to actually "break" anything, scoops up whatever loose change happens to be lying around the lounge, perhaps a watch or a transistor radio on the coffee table, takes whatever food may be sitting on the kitchen shelf, or in the refrigerator, and leaves before the washing machine stops whirring. The "housebreaker" doesn't get much on occasions like this, but then if he is hungry and unemployed, and without any unemployment benefits (there are none in Papua New Guinea) he does not complain. He simply takes what he can in the short time available and walks out of the house through the same open door he came in. Of all the reported "house-

breaking" in Port Moresby during the six month survey period, 13% occurred as a result of the housebreakers entering by way of open windows, open doors, or other openings, without having to "break" anything to get in.


There is of course a danger for the housebreaker who employs this method of entry that he may be caught in the act by some person in the house whom he did not know was there. But this is a rare event as the offenders are careful to observe the comings and goings into the selected house so as to pounce at the right time. Now and again our informants told us, they were surprised when approaching the house, by the housewife or more likely, her dog. When questioned as to his intentions, the would be housebreaker simply says "Mi laik wok" in the most practised and innocent manner. As he could hardly be arrested for making an "innocent" inquiry for work in broad daylight, the worst that can happen to him is to be told sharply to move on. Which he does, until he finds another house further down the street with no surveillance, and an open door.

Even if he is seen leaving the premises with stolen goods in his hand the chances of apprehension are remote, particularly if the person finding the housebreaker is alone, female and expatriate. For most of the housebreakers in Port Moresby are young, fit, and fleet of foot, and in many cases that is about the only description police get when they arrive at the scene sometimes hours after the event to make enquiries. A Papua New Guinean householder can usually make an educated guess as to the offender's ethnic origin, even with only a hurried glimpse of him, but to most expatriates, a National housebreaker running down the road looks like any other National running down the road and proper identification from expatriate witnesses or victims is almost impossible. The probability of a housebreaker being actually caught and brought to court is remote even when he is operating in broad daylight, provided that he confines his activities to certain suburban areas of Port Moresby.

Fig 3

BREAK AND ENTER INDEX

*Incidence of Reported Break and Enter
Offences in two adjoining Suburbs of Port
Moresby City -- April to September, 1975.*




Map No:	April	May	June	July	Aug.	Sept	Suburb Total
Map 19	41	28	29	28	18	33	177 Gordon
Map 20	23	25	23	28	31	11	141 Boroko
Total:	64	53	52	56	49	51	318 TOTAL

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Fig 4
Break and Enter Index

Comparative Percentages of Total Reported
Break and Enter Offences from April to
September 1975 by Month and Suburb.



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An example of the low arrest rate of burglars can be seen from the figures. Table 1 shows that during the six month survey period there were 110 cases of Break and Enter terminated in the Courts. To this could be added the figure of 118 cases of unlawfully on premises which is an alternate charge often used when circumstances preclude the sustaining of the more serious burglary and associated charges. This gives us a total of 228 arrests for housebreaking offences generally.

But during the same period, there were according to Table 2 a total of 1211 reported burglaries. As housebreakers rarely operate alone, it can be assumed that there were on the average at least three persons involved in each break.

Given that each of the burglars active during the survey period was probably involved in many separate burglaries, there is still no doubt that there is a large contingent of burglars regularly plying their trade in the city with little fear of arrest or harassment from the police or other authorities.

Referring next to the concentration of housebreaking activities in space, Table 5 shows that during April 1975 some suburbs experienced more housebreaking activity than others. Map 19, (Gordon) for example had the highest reported incidence of housebreaking that month with 41 separately reported cases, while Map 16 (Gambutu) had none at all. And the longest period that Map 19 went without a reported burglary that month was two successive days.

Table 5 shows quite clearly the geographical distribution of reported housebreaking offences for April 1975 which was to continue more or less according to this pattern throughout the whole of the six month survey period. The pattern varied occasionally, as Figure 3 shows, for while reported burglaries decreased in one suburban area they often increased in an adjacent

suburban area, as though some housebreaking gangs were following a predetermined plan of working out different areas in turn rather than selecting at random which houses were to be burgled.

Figure 4 however shows that what remained constant throughout the whole six month survey period was the obvious concentration of housebreaking activity in the Gordon area. Figure 4 is a Comparative Percentage Bar Graph, one bar for each month of the survey period divided into percentiles. The length of the bar remains the same irrespective of the number of burglaries reported each month, and what is distributed along each bar is not the number of burglaries reported, but the percentage of the reported burglaries which each map area received for each month. It is therefore not a measure of numbers but a measure of concentration of housebreaking activity. It shows for example, that although the total number of reported burglaries decreased throughout the survey period, the actual share which the adjoining suburbs of Map 19 (Gordon) and Map 20 (Boroko) received, increased during the same period. In fact, even though the last month of the survey period attracted the least number of reported burglaries, by this time one third of all such reported instances occurred within the areas of Maps 19 and 20. In other words, while numbers went down, burglar activity had by then become less scattered throughout the city as a whole and more concentrated in the Gordon/Boroko area.

Why is housebreaking more prevalent in Gordon than in other suburbs? Well, let us compare Map 19 (Gordon) with another map area which has a low incidence of reported burglaries. Take for example Map 6, Hanuabada.

On the one hand, the houses of Hanuabada are built close together, some only a few yards apart, and are arranged in descent group order where everyone knows his neighbour. The interiors of the houses are over-

crowded, with on the average more than ten persons per house, and the population is permanent in the sense that people who are born there, will live there and die there. Household residential sites have been passed from generation to generation through the same clan lines and the present residents have community spirit and social solidarity.

The population of Hanuabada is almost wholly indigenous and almost wholly pure Motuan. Formerly sea people, most of their present day dwellings are either built over or on the periphery of the sea, and access to the main residential area from other parts of the city is generally restricted to the by ways off Boe Vagi Road (the circuit thoroughfare to Waigani). Hanuabadan residential space therefore has a high degree of defensibility. This does not mean that the buildings themselves are break proof; it means that in the normal course of events, it would be so difficult for an intruder to get into one without being seen, that there is virtually a complete defence against intruders and therefore a low incidence of housebreaking.


On the other hand, and on the other side of Port Moresby city lies the Map 19 area of Gordon. It is an attractive suburban oasis in the midst of surrounding light scrub and grassland. Laid out in the best traditions of suburban Australia, Gordon boasts rows of pleasant blocks of flats, and airy tropical style dwellings each on its measured and numbered allotment of land, spaced sufficiently apart to avoid contact between neighbours, many of whom do not even know the others' names. The interiors of the Gordon houses are spacious, most houses being occupied by a single nuclear family, and some of the flats only by a single person living alone. The population of Gordon is not permanent; it is transient in the sense that for the vast majority of the people who live there, it is not home. Home for them is somewhere else ... either in a town somewhere in England or Australia, or in a village elsewhere in Papua New Guinea. Gordon is a place where people might

live happily for many years; but not for a lifetime.

The mostly expatriate population in the higher covenant area of Gordon is interspersed with National families of mixed ethnic origin, and in lower covenant areas the mostly National population is interspersed with expatriate families. Very few of the National families are from the Moresby Sub/Province due to a Housing Commission ruling which precludes the allocation of already scarce dwellings to persons who already have indigenous housing rights within the Sub-Province. The net result of this practice is of course that most residents in Gordon, including National residents, are 'foreign' to Port Moresby, and although English is widely understood throughout the suburb, there is no single mother tongue in Gordon which is common to all residents, and no ethnic solidarity or community spirit to match the social homogeneity of Hanuabada.

Access to the residential areas of Map 19 is unrestricted by foot from the surrounding grasslands and also from the Electricity Commission's power line reserve which runs roughly north and south through that part of Map 19 circumscribed by Henao Drive, dissecting that part into two distinct residential areas. These two residential areas are in turn separated from the other major residential area of Map 19 around Kanage Street, by the Hubert Murray Highway and a ridge of undeveloped grassland designated as Sections 540, 1004 and 832 on the street directory

Though officially not subdivided into residential blocks, these sections nevertheless contain a scattering of shanties, strung along the ridge and overlooking the better quality dwellings in the 'official' residential areas below. (See Photo 1). The possibility of constant surveillance by residents in the shanties is a constant source of annoyance to householders in the 'official' residential areas



Shanty Settlement overlooking High Covenant Harbor.
--- a Constant source of Annoyance.



High Covenant Housing Overlooking a Shanty Settlement.

below who were not slow to suggest where the proceeds of nearby housebreakings had gone. There were frequent reports of suspects sighted in the distance running from the direction of recently burgled houses, through the grasslands towards the ridge top settlements, never to be apprehended or recognised again.

Similarly, although containing no shanties, the Electricity Commission's Reserve is also a good place from which houses and activities in the Henao Drive area can be observed, and there are other areas of light scrub and grasslands interspersed throughout the various residential sections of Map 19 which serve the same purpose, making that part of Port Moresby city an easy place to plunder from vantage points unseen.

Opposite in most respects therefore, Hanuabada and Gordon could be placed at opposite ends of a House-breaking frequency continuum if we were to devise one, with the other suburbs of Port Moresby taking their places according to the degree in which they resembled the two suburbs at the extremes.

There is no doubt that the higher the degree of mono-ethnicity in any given suburban area coupled with the higher the density of housing and population concentration, the lower will be the incidence of housebreaking.


Other factors of course contribute in their various ways. The surveillance factor and the easy access factor are both found in other suburban areas of Port Moresby where high frequency of house-breaking is reported, but the mere close proximity of a shanty settlement to a high covenant area is not in itself a contributing factor. For example, in Photo2, the high covenant area in Pruth Street (Map 15) which has a low burglary incidence adjoins

a typical Port Moresby suburban shanty settlement. The difference here of course is that the surveillance factor operates in reverse. For while the shanty dwellers cannot see what housebreaking opportunities are available in the high covenant dwellings above them, the Pruth Street dwellers look down over the shanty settlement with no incentive to steal from it.

Also allied with the easy access factor for suburban areas, is the easy access factor for individual dwellings. This is a city wide phenomenon, and is not found exclusively in the suburbs with higher housebreaking frequencies. It is however a factor which does contribute to an increase in housebreaking incidences in suburbs which otherwise would have had their fair share anyway, for reasons already suggested.

Photo 3 indicates quite clearly, one particular method to survive the housebreaking plague in Port Moresby ... simply build against it. This is not the only method of survival as we shall see, but it is necessary if the operative factors of that particular housing site are present - that is to say if the site is constantly under surveillance from a nearby shanty settlement - if there is unrestricted access to and from the site, if there are places of contiguous sanctuary, and if for reasons of unfriendly or frequently absent neighbours, the curtilage of the dwelling is for one reason or another indefensible.

The dwelling depicted in this photograph may not be every one's idea of home-sweet-home. But the brick walls, barred windows, chain mesh fence and guard dog can in the normal course of events guarantee the security of the premises from burglary. Although effective, this method is fairly expensive by Port Moresby standards and very few persons could afford this luxury. Even in the high covenant suburbs such homes are rare, and no Government owned dwellings have ever been built to this or similar design and



Brick Walls, Barred Windows, Wire Fence and Guard Dog
--- Necessary Protection in Some Parts of Port Moresby.

probably never will. The photo is shown here merely to illustrate to what lengths it may be necessary to go, given the necessary attendant factors, to secure a dwelling from intruders.

In the past however, neither the Government nor most private house owners were able to devote such resources to make dwellings break proof, with the result that most dwellings in Port Moresby definitely are not. A lot of the fault for insecure housing lies in housing design and cannot be wholly blamed upon the perennial shortage of funds. One might wonder for example what the housing might look like in Port Moresby if Papua New Guinea had been a former French or British or Spanish colony. Walled gardens of the type seen in Southern Europe could easily have been constructed in Port Moresby from coral and stone and mud. And Port Moresby's limited rainfall would have been ideal for adobe constructions. Many enterprising Patrol Officers in the early days when left to their own resources often constructed substantial buildings cheaply from local materials. One such officer twenty nine years ago built the jail at Esa'ala in the Milne Bay Province from an adobe compound made from kunai and mud. It is still standing, still in use.

Had Papua New Guinea therefore had a different colonial heritage, it might have inherited a different standard of housing design. Instead, it had an Australian colonial heritage, and along with many other unpleasant features of this Australian heritage, Papua New Guinea inherited and is now stuck with, literally thousands of houses of outback, Queensland, turn-of-the-century design.

Constructed largely of materials easily transportable to some outback cattle station in Australia, made in Australia, for a design intended to allow maximum ventilation in a crime free small town country

community, the majority of houses in Port Moresby today are in many ways unsuited to the modern living conditions of the Nation's capital. They are hard to maintain, hard to service with such utility facilities as water, electricity and sewage, and are strung out in clusters miles apart so that a greater mileage of road network is necessary to link them together than the size of the city's population would otherwise warrant. Worst of all, for the purposes of this present study, most of Port Moresby's houses are easily burgled.

As an example of how easy it is to get into the average high covenant dwelling in Port Moresby, look at Photo 4. This is one of the standard designs of Government housing, known as the 'M' type. It has a roof of corrugated iron sheeting; its walls are made of fibro cement sheeting with windows of louver blades; it has a wooden floor and the interior walls are made of masonite sheeting. The frame of the house is made of timber, and the whole structure stands on concrete piles, high enough to park a car underneath, or to make other use of the area beneath the house for example as a playing area for children, or as a drying area for the household laundry during the rainy season.

The elevation of this building above the ground on which it is built is about the only endearing feature of this dwelling design. Elevation in addition to allowing for improved ventilation is to some extent a deterrent to burglars who might otherwise have to scale concrete piles to get in via the side windows were it not for an absurdly positioned set of louvers near the front door. The door area could not have been better designed for burglars, not even by the burglars themselves, and some expatriate wits have suggested that these dwellings were never intended to be break proof, but were designed in the days before housebreaking was prevalent to facilitate easy entry for those absent minded householders returning home late at night from the R.S.L. to find that they had locked their keys inside the



Typical Older Style Port Moresby Residence with Chain Wire Nailed to the Outside of the Window Frames.

house. There have been other, more innocent occasions in the past when the housewife downstairs in the laundry suddenly found herself locked out of her own home when the wind blew the door shut and the simple Yale or other locking mechanism precluded entry without a key. Where was the key? Inside on the kitchen table. So how did the housewife get in? she simply went around to the window nearest the front door, (see Photo 4) slid open the louvres from the outside, or maybe they already were open for daytime ventilation, and put her arm through the open space between two louver blades and unlatched the door from the inside. It was all very simple. Any housewife could do it. So could any burglar.

In fact burglars do it frequently. It is the most frequent method of entry, and of all the housebreakings reported in Port Moresby during the six month survey period, 56% of the entries were made in this manner.

In the case of simple louvered windows, not a single housebreaking tool is necessary. Where the windowed space is covered with fly wire to keep out tropical insects, a little more force is necessary, but still no tools are required, other than a nail file or a long thumb nail. And once an opening is made in the wire, the whole sheet will tear off easily. Where dead locks have been installed, to prevent opening the door from the outside without a key, entry is still possible through the window. The removal of two louver blades will admit a child; three, an adult. Considerate burglars who use this method stack the louver blades neatly beneath the window so that the householder can replace them afterwards, without cost.

Photo 4 shows the louvered windows in this particular dwelling to be covered with chain wire mesh. This is a recent addition to most buildings in Port Moresby, and is now a standard modification of the original design. Intended to prevent entry by way of the louvered windows in the manner described, the chain mesh hardly

proved to be any deterrent at all. The reason: Although the mesh is made of particularly hard steel wire which is impossible to break without tools of some kind, like bolt cutters, heavy duty pliers etc, the mesh is attached to the house by means of ordinary fencing staples nailed to the wooden window frames from the outside.

As this wire mesh is only nailed on, it can very easily be un-nailed off, in some cases by pulling very hard. Mostly however, a simple tool of some kind is needed to effect an entry when this kind of mesh is found on the window frames, but even so, with the use of a hammer, a pair of pliers, a tyre lever or a pocket knife, one burglar alone can get in in less than fifteen minutes.

The act of removing the wire mesh however, is for for most housebreakers in Port Moresby, the greatest amount of force they are prepared to use to get into a building, for any entry requiring a greater degree of force than this takes a little longer, it needs a little more effort, and can make enough noise to alert householders or neighbours, or even the neighbourhood dogs whose combined chorus is often sufficient inducement to would be housebreakers to move on.

There have been instances where burglars have employed considerable force to effect an entry, by using such tools as axes or sledge hammers to smash in doors and walls ... most of which as in the house depicted in Photo 4 are only made of fibro or plywood sheeting anyhow, and on one or two isolated occasions vehicles have been driven into brick walls to create an entrance. But by and large, all other factors being constant, the greater amount of force needed to effect an entry, the less likely there will be a burglary, and of

all the instances of housebreaking reported for the six month survey period only 10% involved the forcing of door latches, 6% the smashing of a door off its hinges, 5% the smashing open of windows, and 10% involved other kinds of forced entry, through walls, floors, ceilings, etc. The remaining 69% as already stated, involved entries with minimal force or through already open doors and windows where no force was used at all.

There are many reasons why burglars dislike using a lot of force, and not least among these reasons appears to be the low escalation of the conflict profile between the burglars and their victims, which seems to generate, on the part of the housebreakers, a desire not to bite too severely the hand that feeds them, and on the part of the victims, a high tolerance of limited theft. Quite often, in response to questions involving the failure to report certain instances of housebreaking to the police, the research team received answers like this : "Well, if he was so hungry that he had to break into my house only to steal last Friday's half stale loaf of bread, he is welcome to it. I wouldn't report a man for that." And there is no doubt that considerable restraint is exercised by most burglars to take only what they need, and to leave the rest behind.

Now and again Port Moresby experiences some really macabre burglaries, where houses are cleared of everything moveable including furnishings and fittings, and where fixtures which cannot be taken are destroyed. In such cases burglars often defecate on the floors, deface the walls with paint or excreta, and often go to extraordinary lengths to leave the inside of the dwelling house in a mess, even if this requires the shredding of bed linen and clothes. But such instances, fortunately, are rare, and the research team was unable to explain them.

Generally speaking, in relation to the considerable choice of goods available in the average Port Moresby dwelling to the average Port Moresby burglar once he has gained entry, very little is taken. In 28% of the reported cases burglars found nothing they liked and left without taking anything. 44% of all reported housebreakings involved the taking of goods and money valued at less than K100, and where goods of greater value were taken, an even greater value was left behind. Quite often very expensive stereogram sets are taken while other equally expensive household items are left behind. Sometimes jewelry is taken and nothing else, sometimes clothing is taken but only of a particular size, with all other sizes left behind, and sometimes food is taken, but not all the food. In one particular instance, burglars took some cold left over food from the refrigerator, ate it on the premises, then washed the plates and cutlery they had used, leaving these neatly stacked in the sink before leaving. In another instance, a housewife returning home late from shopping, left the front door open in her haste to rescue the roast burning in the oven. In her flight to the kitchen she left her hand bag hanging by its strap from a chair in the lounge. Spotting this from the road outside, a swift footed housebreaker ran through the open front door, seized the wallet from the hand bag and fled. The wallet contained K40 which was never seen again. But the thoughtful thief realising that the wallet also contained documents of considerable value to the housewife although of no value to him, posted the wallet back to her minus the K40 but otherwise intact.

Instances similar to this and there were many of them, seem to suggest that in addition to the sub-culture of hard core gangster burglars in Port Moresby, whose housebreaking activities are not discouraged by their kin, and who have little regard for the feelings or property of their victims, there is another independently operating universe

a "soft core" of "honest" burglars whose only motivation is hunger, and whose sympathy for their victims constrains them to take only what they need.

With unemployment in Port Moresby, aggravated by the inevitable and increasing urban drift, and a high wage structure which by law prevents employers from legally employing persons at less than the lawful minimum urban wage even when both parties agree on a lesser wage, there is no doubt that the soft core burglars receive a good deal of sympathy in return from the better off sections of Port Moresby society. Nevertheless, the only Government sponsored assistance available to a burglar whose only motivation was hunger, is prison, where he will be fed. Unfortunately when he gets to prison he meets other burglars there and in accordance with Sutherland's (1947) theory of differential association he soon learns to become a better burglar, and finds his ultimate vocation as a professional criminal. There is at the moment in Port Moresby unfortunately no cure for this; in the sense that there is nothing that the ordinary householder can do to stop it.

There are however, some very simple precautions which the ordinary householder in Port Moresby can take to lessen the probability of being burgled.

Considering the prevailing conditions of unemployment, urban drift, lack of unemployment benefits, insecure design of housing, and the horrifying gap between the rich and poor in Port Moresby, what is more amazing than the high incidence of housebreaking is the even higher incidence of immunity from housebreaking.

For how is it that even in the suburbs of highest housebreaking incidence, there are houses of typically inadequate design which have never been burgled?

The answer to this intriguing question lies in the application of what in criminology is known as Newman's Defensible Space Concept described by Grenough (1974) thus :

Newman's Defensible Space concept is the combination of principles from two different disciplines - architecture and behavioral science. In application, it involves using real or symbolic barriers to make it evident that a certain space is not for intruders, then developing a natural round-the-clock surveillance system of neighbours to monitor that space so that intruders will in fact not intrude. According to this theory, potential criminal intruders, if they must do their thing, will do it elsewhere, Defensible Space deals directly with preventing a crime from occurring in the first place and does not rely primarily on the criminal justice system for its effectiveness.

And whether they knew about it or not, most residents of Port Moresby who have become immune from housebreaking have apparently been applying this concept for years. For in response to questions concerning this immunity, residents who had never been burgled gave as their opinion the following typical replies. Firstly, in the lower covenant areas :

1. The house contained members of more than one nuclear family. If one family went out together, the other residents generally stayed home. The house was therefore rarely vacant, and even in the middle of the night, there was usually someone awake, either feeding a baby, going to the toilet, rummaging for food and so on.
2. Good neighbour relationships had developed between residents of adjacent houses even if they weren't wantoks. They helped each

other in minor community projects such as unclogging a common drainage ditch, pooling transport, parties for the children etc., and each could rely on the others to keep an eye on his interests.

3. Where houses were crowded close together, everyone knew who lived where and intruders could be spotted immediately. Hordes of children pestered any visitor who could hardly do anything without being seen.

4. Where adjoining or adjacent houses contained persons of the same ethnic origin, any person of a different ethnic origin automatically attracted interest when entering the general area and would be courting disaster to attempt any foul play. In such a social climate, a hue and cry is easily raised.

Not used to the same kind of lifestyle, residents of the higher covenant areas who had also never been burgled nevertheless had their own reasons why this was so.

These included :

1. The presence of a recognisable boundary. Not necessarily an expensive unscaleable prison style barrier ... just an ordinary inexpensive wire fence, or hedgerow of hibiscus, wood roses, or cratons etc. ... anything that will indicate to passers-by where public property ends and private property begins. The existence of such a boundary automatically burdens an intruder with the obligation of explaining his presence when found inside.

2. The presence of a dog. This need not be an established breed of guard dog. Any flea-bitten mongrel will do. For the dog soon learns who is an acceptable visitor to the house and who is not, and his instinct induces him to defend his lair, even if only by barking.

3. Reciprocal arrangements between neighbours not to vacate houses at the same time, i.e. at weekends, and for each to keep an eye on the other's house during each other's absence.

4. Keeping the front door locked when working out the back and vice versa when working in the garden at the front, and by always locking the house securely whenever leaving it.

5. Where servants quarters are supplied with the house, keeping them occupied at all times, even if no servant is employed.

Some of these reasons would seem to be too obvious to warrant a mention here if it were not for the fact that in most instances of housebreaking, few, and sometimes none of these simple precautions had been taken.

Proof of the pudding however, still appears to be in the eating. For as the housebreaking figures show, the actual number of reported burglaries decreased month by month throughout the survey period.

Intrigued by this phenomenon, we asked our housebreaking informants why this was happening and we received independently of the householder respondents the same sort of answers. That is to say, that housebreaking was becoming more and more difficult, not because of any increase in the efficiency of the criminal justice system, but because people who had not taken precautions against burglars before were at last beginning to take them, in the manner already described.

By far the greatest deterrent to housebreaking, both householder and burglar informants agreed, was not so much the increase in electronic alarms, or chain wire or other physical impediments to illegal entry, but the presence of persons in servants quarters.

Old style high covenant dwellings which the pre-Independence

Government constructed for its expatriate public servants were equipped with spartan but functional servants quarters. In 1966 however in an effort to reduce building costs, the colonial government introduced a new housing design which did not include servants quarters. Instead, tenants were issued with an electric washing machine. This was somewhat of a comedown to expatriate wives who had grown used to having servants around the house and in the more remote outstations the problem was overcome by attaching servants quarters to the new design, funded from the Minor New Works or building maintenance appropriations or by siphoning off funds from other projects. This kind of manipulation was not available to Port Moresby residents however, and soon whole streets in the newer suburbs of Gordon, Tokarara and Gerehu were built of houses without servants quarters.

Although this might have been good economy at the time, the ultimate effect on the security of these newer houses in these areas was disastrous. Rows of houses, temporarily vacant during their tenants absence at work became ripe plunder for Port Moresby burglars. But even in the older suburban areas of Port Moresby where houses did have servants quarters attached to them there was a trend it seems, over the last few years for residents in the high covenant areas to discontinue employing house staff. Foremost among the reasons for this trend was the rapidly rising urban minimum wage which although not directly applicable to domestic staff, nevertheless had the effect of siphoning off persons in former domestic service into better paying jobs. To attract them back, higher domestic wages had to be offered, and these wages were often beyond the capacity of most householders to pay, particularly National householders. And so began the era of the vanishing domestic.

This was accompanied by the era of the vacant servants' quarters, and all over Port Moresby these buildings were gradually being put to other uses, as laundries, workshops, tool sheds, play pens, and junk rooms. But as the number

of vacant servants quarters increased, so also did the housebreaking rate in Port Moresby. Thoughtful householders then began to see the connection, and while still unable to employ domestics at the going wages, made other arrangements for filling the quarters. There always has been a housing shortage in Port Moresby, and although the servants might have gone elsewhere there were plenty of applicants for their empty quarters, from persons in other employment who were unable to find adequate housing. The sort of arrangement now gaining currency in Port Moresby is for a family not employed by the householder to occupy the servants quarters in return for continuous surveillance of the allotment both families occupy, with perhaps a bit of gardening thrown in for good measure.

Families occupying good standard servants quarters have too much to lose by being careless in their surveillance duties and go to such pains to ensure the security of their householder's premises that burglaries have never occurred where such arrangements have been made. Strangely enough this sort of surveillance costs neither family anything, since it can be conducted by children or wives or visiting wantoks who at the time might have nothing else to do anyway. It is a direct application of the Defensible Space concept ... and would be burglars know the danger so they leave these places alone. "Servants quarters occupied by arrangement" is not the only defence against housebreaking in Port Moresby, but it is the best ... both householders and burglars agree on this.

There was another reason given by our burglar informants for the reduction in the number of housebreakings which had nothing to do with household security, and this involved the termination of payment for goods by cheque in all large stores in Port Moresby. This eventuated following an agreement in 1975 between major retailers in the city as a result of the increasing number of cheques received into supermarkets and which were subsequently not met on presentation to the banks. A large number of these cheques were from



Adequate Protection --- Boundary Fence, Dog, and
Servants Quarters " Occupied by Arrangement."

departing expatriates whose bank accounts had closed before the cheques had been presented. Others were from Nationals as a result of careless, misunderstood or fraudulent operation of cheque accounts. But the decision to take only cash as payment for goods bought in Port Moresby was a wind fall for the city's delinquent fraternity. It meant that shoppers must now be accompanied into the supermarkets by relatively large amounts of money, because they could no longer pay by cheque.

The result of this agreement was a rash of bag snatching and pickpocketing, in and around the supermarkets, ... and a corresponding reduction in housebreaking. For would be burglars no longer have to break into houses to steal food, or money to buy food or other essentials. At the present time they can buy what they want "honestly" in the shops like everyone else, with the money they receive in bagsnatching excursions.

But, despite the reduction in the number of burglaries in Port Moresby during the six month period, the saga of housebreaking continues nevertheless to plague the nation's capital, and one gnawing but delicate question which still needs to be answered is ... where does the loot go ?

As there are no "thieves markets" in Port Moresby of the kinds Clinard (1973:38) describes for other developing countries this question becomes even more intriguing.

The answer has already been hinted at in an effort to cushion the shock for it has long been apparent that most burgled goods are simply recycled back into the Port Moresby community via the households of the burglars and their friends. The Chairman of the Law Reform Commission who had conducted an independent inquiry into housebreaking conceded that "a large proportion of crimes against property are committed by youngsters whose parents now live permanently in the towns (P-C 8/3/76)

Now it could be supposed that money, food and drink stolen during housebreaking excursions could be consumed by the burglars alone, away from their homes and without the knowledge of their families. But what about household electrical items such as electric jugs, toasters, frypans, transistor wirlesses or other household items such as cutlery, crockery, towels, bed linen and a hundred other items designed primarily for use in the home which also disappear from burgled houses in 14% of the reported cases?

Entry of such goods into the homes of burglars and their friends must surely be suspect, particularly when those bringing these items are known to have no job or other visible lawful means of getting them. Yet, it appears that such goods are (readily) accepted by the recipient householders without many qualms, particularly when given by an able bodied family member who has recently been remiss in his share of supporting the household. It could hardly be supposed that when such goods are offered as obligatory contributions to the household they would be greeted with a barrage of accusations and recriminations concerning their origins, and when householders who had received such gifts were questioned about them, they gave answers something like this :

Well, we don't know where he got it from but if he stole it he probably wouldn't tell us anyway, and if we asked him he would probably say one of his friends gave it to him. Perhaps we should take it to the police but how would they know where it came from? One jug looks like any other jug and who is to know if the police kept it and used it as their own. We could never afford to buy a jug like this, but we can certainly use it, so now that it is here, it might just as well stay here. How could it ever get back to its rightful owner anyway?

Considering the number of housebreakers plying their trade in Port Moresby, and the number of residences burgled during the six month survey period, it could be assumed

that at least 600 separate households in Port Moresby were indirect beneficiaries of the housebreaking activities in this manner during this period.

But the story of the beneficiaries does not end there. For although the ownership of most of the smaller household items so far referred to would in the normal course of events be untraceable in any case, this is not the situation in relation to the larger and more expensive items of household furniture and equipment such as Hi-Fi stereogram sets, refrigerators, washing machines, rotisseries, electric typewriters and other goods within this sort of price range, some of which appear in the lists of goods taken in 56% of all the reported house-breaking instances. For most of these items are under warranty when newly purchased, are insured against theft or damage and ownership could be traced via supplying agents or insurance company records and manufacturers serial numbers.

The manner in which such expensive burgled items are recycled through Port Moresby society is an interesting tale on its own. One informer, a gang leader, told us :

Take an expensive Hi-Fi rig for example, the sort which has separate units of turntable, tape deck and wireless, with four external speakers, worth about K1,000. There is no point in giving this rig to somebody who lives in a settlement which has no electricity, or to someone who lives in a small low rent home where it would take up too much room and get in everyone's way. The sort of person we would give this to would have to be educated enough to know how to use it and would have to live in a big house ... the same sort of house we took it from. Living in a big house would mean he is paying big rent, which means that he must be on a good salary, which means he must have a good job either in the Government or in private business.

These people are in responsible positions and they have to pay school fees for their children and run a car and so on. Their expenses are high and they are expected to have a good home with things which they can't afford to buy. They have to do a lot of entertaining at home and friends and family make many demands on them. They are glad of gifts like this.

When asked if the persons to whom he gave such expensive equipment accepted it, knowing it to have been stolen, our informant said :

Well, they don't ask "Where did you steal it from?" or anything as direct as that, and I don't tell them in that sort of direct way. I just say that I have a spare Hi-Fi set which they can use if they like, and they say that they would like to use it. If they ever thought about it they would know that as I don't have a job, I must have stolen it, or stolen the money to buy it, or got it in some other unusual way. You know that. So must they.

And when asked how he benefited by "giving" such things away our informant said :

Well, I don't need the money, so there is no point in selling these things, and the people I give them to could not afford to buy them anyway. Sometimes if I am short of money I can go to these people and they will give me some. But if they haven't got enough I can always break into a house and take some money or whatever else I want. What I really need in Moresby though is a place to hide in when the police are after me, and that is how I benefit. The people I give things to will let me stay in their houses. If they

report me, no more presents for them. The sort of people I stay with are so important that the police would never think of looking for me there. You'd be surprised at how many houses of important people I can hide in.

"How many houses?" I asked.

"About fifty" he said, and he is only one of the many professional housebreakers now operating in Port Moresby.

Young (personal communication) says that some professional burglars like this informant were even known among their circle of beneficiaries, to take advance orders on certain items of equipment, so that when they cleaned out a house in the course of a burglary, they knew where the refrigerator should be delivered, and who had asked for a Hi-Fi set, and who could best use the washing machine, and which of their girl friends had asked for a wristlet watch and so on.

And at this point it may be appropriate to consider who takes what and from whom. Early in the research project we endeavoured to compile a Who takes what from whom index, but although there were adequate data on the location of buildings, types of buildings and the ethnic origins of householders who had been burgled, and although there were lists of what had been taken in each burglary reported to the police during the survey period, there was no corresponding information about who had burgled each particular house. If there had been of course, then we would have expected a correspondingly high clear up rate with police only having to locate known offenders.

In fact, the police in most instances of housebreaking had no clue who the culprits were and most instances of housebreaking reported during the survey period remained unsolved at the end of the period.

By probing through the wantok system however, and by interviewing some known burglars, the research team was able to unearth some information concerning who takes what from whom.

From the very beginning, and before information began to trickle in, it was assumed that there was a definite racial connotation to Port Moresby's housebreaking epidemic with expatriate householders being the only victims. However, it very soon became clear that although the expatriate section of Port Moresby's population suffered the most burglaries, this ethnic group was by no means the only one to be burgled. Our burglar informant expressed surprise at the suggestion that they might have been deliberately selecting expatriates as victims, and insisted that so long as householders were not their wantoks, the ethnic origins of victims was not a factor taken into consideration.

The prime considerations, the burglars said, was the probability that the particular building contained the items intended to be stolen, and the probability that the burglars would be undisturbed during the act, and not discovered afterwards. If there was the slightest possibility of discovery, either during or after the event, we were told, then burglars simply went elsewhere and tried another house.

However, our informants said, although expatriates were not deliberately selected as victims, most expatriates in Port Moresby had a lifestyle which indicated that most of what the burglars wanted could be found in the homes of expatriates. But as there are many Papua New Guinea Nationals, particularly those of the rising urban elite, whose lifestyle resembles that of the expatriates, the residences of these Nationals attracted the attention of burglars in the same way. The main attraction to a building therefore was not the ethnic origin of the householder, but the lifestyle of the household^r, and it so happens in Port Moresby that most residents with this

attractive lifestyle are expatriates.

Although the ethnic origin of the victim did not of itself determine what was to be stolen from him, the ethnic origin of the burglar often indicated what he would take. It is not here suggested that persons of particular ethnic origins only steal particular goods to the exclusion of all others. But it happened in 1975 that there was a rough correlation between the ethnic origin of burglars and the kinds of things they stole.

Roughly, the breakup was this : Highlanders generally only took food, drink, loose money and assorted odds and ends found in the kitchen and bedrooms to a value usually less than K100 while coastal Papuan burglars took the Hi-Fi sets, the refrigerators, furnishings, jewelry, and the larger and more expensive items.

The reasons for this breakup are that a large proportion of the Highlands population in Port Moresby is unemployed. "Involuntarily" unemployed that is, in the manner described by Wright and others (Wright,M. et al;1975) and in the absence of unemployment benefits in Port Moresby, some Highlanders within this category of unemployment have no option but to steal in order to eat.

True, these persons in all probability have wantoks on whom they can rely for support during the first few weeks of unemployment, but the wantoks themselves are generally in the lower income earning bracket, and sooner or later the welcome tends to wear thin, with a corresponding expectation that the unemployed will manage to contribute to household maintenance somehow. With unemployment among the Chimbu population of Port Moresby for example, running as high as 36% (Wright,M; et al:1975:21) the temptation to steal must indeed be strong.

However, although the urge to steal may be strong, the needs of the unemployed Highlanders would appear to be relatively few, and coupled with an absence of outlets

for disposal of expensive household items, and a life-style which in any case generally did not include a use for these items, Highlanders generally tended to steal only what they could carry away by foot, items for immediate consumption, and in many cases only items to fill their immediate needs. Such instances of break and enter often invoked the sympathy of the householders and many instances involving the selective theft of food only, were never reported to the police for this reason.

At the other end of our imaginery Who takes what scale however, are the gangs. Membership as we have seen, consisted mostly of persons whose ethnic origins lay along the Papuan coast. The gangs were well organised, well practised, and mobile. When they had no cars of their own, they stole whatever kind of vehicle was necessary to carry away their loot. They stole office safes, which they carried along the Hiritano Highway or the Rigo Road to be broken open undiscovered, and they stole large quantities of food and alcohol, and in some instances they completely removed all contents and all furnishings from the houses they burgled, leaving only bare floors and walls. These instances, fortunately, were rare, but they did serve to indicate that the gangs had no disposal problems with their loot. Non-electrical furnishings and fittings could be passed off to willing relatives and friends anywhere along the road network in and out of Port Moresby, and sophisticated electrical equipment was always in demand in the households of elite wantoks within the city, in return for sanctuary, as we have seen.

Whatever the ethnic origins of the burglars or their victims may have been in 1975, and whatever was taken during the incredible number of burglaries that year in Port Moresby, there is no doubt that among the reasons for the ineffective control of housebreaking activity in the city that year was that so many people benefited from it.

3. INADEQUACIES IN THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF SOCIAL CONTROL

A. The Police

There is no doubt that the traditional police methods in some fields of law enforcement in Port Moresby have definitely been a failure.

But before launching into adverse criticism of the Port Moresby police, it is as well to see the introduced police methods in their proper perspective.

The methods currently in use by Port Moresby police are largely those copied from Australia and introduced by the pre-Independence Australian Administration along with other vestiges of a criminal justice system moulded roughly on the same model.

This model, or at least the introduced counterpart of it, is gradually being changed in Papua New Guinea, and already we have seen in other branches of the criminal justice system such innovations as Land Dispute Settlement Tribunals, and Village Courts which have no counterpart in Australia.

But it is well to remember that the Australian police model was not inherited in isolation, but together with a multitude of other models which have no counterpart in traditional Papua New Guinean society either, and with which no application of traditional Papua New Guinean customary law could cope.

To observe how well the introduced police methods work in relation to other introduced models, let us look briefly into the fields of firearms and traffic control.

Neither firearms nor motor traffic had any place in traditional society. Both are items of the imported culture which arrived with the imported control laws, designed to be enforced by an imported type of police

force.

Under the existing imported laws, the police decide, at least in the first instance, who will be licensed to drive what sort of vehicles and which vehicles will be allowed on the roads. Similarly, the police decide what sort of firearms will be licensed and who will use them, and the enforcement of all laws relating to firearms and traffic is the responsibility of the police.

To whatever extent therefore that the use or misuse of firearms or motor vehicles ever got out of control, a corresponding degree of fault would lie with the police, since they, and no other organisations or institutions are directly responsible for the application of a sensible firearms and traffic control policy.

A meaningful test of police efficiency in these fields then, could be made simply by looking at the real life situation, and taking firearms first, we find that there was only one reported case of armed robbery for the whole of the six month survey period and only very few instances where housebreakers or other criminals were found armed with firearms. One sad incident involved the shooting of a police dog which had discovered some burglars one night, and there were a few instances when otherwise unarmed burglars found firearms in the course of ordinary housebreaking activities and stole these firearms together with their other loot. There was also a daring incident on 3rd April 1975 when a gang of young hoodlums broke into the Port Moresby District Office and stole a safe, that instead of money, contained all the Patrol Officers' revolvers. The entire gang was arrested and all the firearms were recovered within three days. But throughout the survey period there was not a single bank robbery or payroll holdup, and hijacking of vehicles or aeroplanes by armed bandits is totally unknown in Port Moresby. Whatever faults the Port Moresby police may have, in other directions, they can definitely be said to have the fire-arm situation well under control.

Similarly in the field of traffic control, the police have shown considerable ability in enforcing the traffic code as the court records show, for during the six month survey period no fewer than 2464 traffic prosecutions were launched by the police, and there would have been more but for the fact that the Magistrates asked the police not to increase the rate of prosecutions simply because the existing court machinery could not carry any additional weight of case loading.

On 1st April 1976, exactly one year after the survey period began, changes in the criminal justice system in Papua New Guinea designed to allow for on-the-spot Infringement Notices and pre-court payment of penalties for minor traffic matters came into operation. This meant that action by police against violators of the traffic code could be increased without any corresponding increase in the case loading in the courts.

The share of the case loading which was previously taken up by the prosecution of minor traffic violations in 1975 was on and after April 1975 absorbed by an increase in the prosecution of minor street offences such as drunk and disorderly, riotous behaviour, assaults and offensive behaviour of one kind or another, with the result that the case loading is still at saturation point. The courts have to cope with between 100 and 200 arrests each weekend.

What was limiting the arrest rate in 1975 and prosecution of traffic offences then, was not inefficiency in the police force, but case clogging in the courts. It took a change in the termination procedures for traffic offences (on-the-spot traffic tickets) to ease this clogging, but no sooner had this happened, than the police promptly clogged the courts again, this time with prosecutions for street offences.

What all this points to is that in relation to the type of law enforcement duties for which the police have a

good deal of initial control, and for which their methods of operation were originally designed, Port Moresby police are extremely efficient. However, the imported system under which Port Moresby police were trained, was never designed to cope with unemployment, urban drift, school dropouts, culture clash and the wantok system which together are the causes of the main law and order problems in Port Moresby.

As the police do not dictate employment policy, have no control over internal migration or the curricula of the national education system, were never trained to deal with a multi-ethnic society and did not invent the wantok system, they can hardly be blamed for whatever failings in the law enforcement system resulted from such factors beyond their immediate control.

Nevertheless, there is no excuse for laziness, drunkenness and stupidity in the ranks; for diligence, sobriety, and some simple common sense would overcome many police deficiencies which are habitually attributed to lack of training or rapid localisation, and most police failings which came to light during the course of this survey appeared not to result from any lack of training but from a management deficiency ... what Clifford (1976:36) calls "a middle management gap."

Thus, many police prosecutions failed not because of any lack of real evidence, but because somebody forgot to tell the police witnesses to come to court, or the witnesses were told but forgot to come, or they remembered to come but came on the wrong day.

And the reasons given in many instances for not reporting crimes often related to bad experiences people had with the police when reporting previous crimes. Many informants complained of the absurd habit of the police despatchers of requiring the minutest details of the complainant before sending help, even in the most dire emergencies. Such details as the age, sex and occupation of the complainant

could always have been obtained later. And even when the police arrived, distressed victims were often asked the name of their assailant. When they couldn't give it they were often told that prosecution would be impossible since if the police were not told the name of the suspect they would not know who to arrest.

Some of the response delays are almost legendary. One such reported in the Post Courier on 30/12/75 (p.3) reads :

One witness, Mr. Morris Brown, a District Officer who lives at Boroko told the court that in October this year he rang the police and asked them to remove some drunks from his lawn. There was a twelve hour and forty minutes lapse between when the police were called and when the police came, Mr. Brown said. When the police arrived, they came to take fingerprints.

Actually, the Fingerprint training at Boroko Police Station is very good, and the evidence its officers have given in court has always been convincing. But in many cases where a simple fingerprint search would have solved the crime, the Fingerprint Section was never alerted, or was alerted but never came ... and so on. Many victims of housebreaking offences arriving home to discover they had been burgled in the usual manner (removal of glass louveres) often found sets of fingerprints on the louver blades which were given to the police never to be seen again; remembering where all the exhibits are is not a forte of the C.I.B.

Sometimes they remember where they are but get them mixed up. In one murder case a police witness was describing how he found the weapon (a knife) and how his investigations proceeded from there. Led by the prosecutor, he went into great details about the knife. The Defendant was excused for interrupting the court to point out that the knife he had used had a white

handle not a black handle, and that the police might have brought along an exhibit from another case, by mistake. There followed a hurried adjournment while the police sorted out their exhibits, and the court resumed some hours later with the same witness giving the same evidence but this time in relation to a white handled knife.*

Some of the bungled cases could almost be mistaken for episodes from the "Keystone Cops" series. One night in Port Moresby some passers-by on the pavement heard strange noises in the upper floor of the building nearby; ... a series of bumps interspersed with dragging sounds ... almost as though some burglars were dragging and lifting a safe, end over end towards a window, through which it could be hurled to the ground below and taken away somewhere to be opened ... sure enough, crash through the window came the safe, and landed in a nearby alleyway. Hastily, the passers-by organised themselves to trap the burglars coming out of the building to collect the safe, while someone ran up to the nearby police station to alert the Constabulary. Police arrived on the scene to find the burglars in the custody of the passers-by, and taking over with great gusto, they marched the burglars away ... but when the case came to court, there were no eye witnesses, because the police had forgotten to take names and addresses from the passers-by. **

And some of the escape stories deserve mention. Usually, escape is made from the precincts of the court house, for when fifty or sixty arrestees are being debussed from prison vans into the court rooms surrounded by wailing relatives, nervous witnesses and curious onlookers, it is easy enough for one or two prisoners to slip unnoticed

* Hans Nero v Manela Kabos : National Capital District
Court Case No. 430/1975

** Anthony Mulipachery v Maureen Okihairo : National Capital
District Court
Case No. 58/1975

into the crowd and disappear. Sometimes there is a daring run for freedom, straight down the street, for a barefooted prisoner in the lead has a decided advantage over a uniformed policeman behind, clumping along in his number ten boots.

But sometimes escape is engineered in the face of a gullible police guard. One quick witted escapee at the court house noticed that the mens toilet was occupied. The situation being desperate, he urged his police guard to allow him to use the ladies toilet. Normally, the guard accompanied the prisoner to the toilet, but on this occasion the prisoner said, it wouldn't do for an unsuspecting lady to blunder into her toilet and find two men there so it would be best for the guard to post himself outside, to ward off the ladies. This the guard duly did. Time passed, but the ladies didn't and some became fairly vocal at the misuse of their toilet and eventually the guard was constrained to knock on the door to enquire into his prisoner's situation. The door of course was locked from the inside and emitted no answer. Suspecting something at last, the guard called for assistance and other police went around the back of the building to investigate the window. The glass louvre blades had been removed and neatly stacked on the floor and there was no prisoner.

This incident was briefly recorded in the case listing for the Douglas Street Court House on 23rd September, 1975, where against the escapees name is the entry "Defendant escaped."

Some escapes require a little more ingenuity. One one occasion because police had recently been criticised by a judge for bringing their prisoners to court late, they were at considerable pains to be on time. Unfortunately, the key to one of the cells had been temporarily mislaid, and rather than waste time looking for it and risk another rebuke from the bench, police urged one prisoner also awaiting his appearance in court for picking locks, to pick the cell lock and get the other prisoners out. He

obliged, and all prisoners, including the lock picker made it to court on time. On the way back from court however, the lockpicker returned the favour. He picked the lock on the prison van door, and when the van stopped at an intersection the prisoners opened the door and disappeared into the crowd. Arriving back at the police station, the police crew were surprised to find no prisoners in their van.

There are multitudes of similar stories all of which could possibly be laughed off as indicators of the defects present in any large organisation. Old soldiers tell similar stories of similar instances which occur in even the most hallowed of regiments. But some stories about the Port Moresby police are not funny any more, particularly those which relate to drunkenness and brawling in the ranks, assaults by off duty police upon innocent members of the public, and the general disorderly behaviour of some off duty policemen. There were frequent complaints of this by National residents who live near Gordons Police Barracks, particularly in relation to the molesting of women in the Gordon Market area, and drunken brawls involving off duty policemen which are frequent in and around the barracks.

On 23rd October 1975 some off duty policemen took part in a riot at the Port Moresby Teachers College and two weeks later an off duty commissioned police officer was killed in a running street brawl outside the Islander Hotel, between police and citizens. During the six month survey period, the courts recommended to the Commissioner of Police the dismissal of five members of the Force who had been convicted of various offences during that time.

But the situation got a lot worse after that. On 9th December 1975 the Commissioner of Police announced that of his 600 men in Moresby 65 had been suspended so far during that year (P-C 9/12/75), and in the six months following the survey period, no fewer than 55 policemen convicted of offences before the courts were recommended by the courts for further disciplinary action.

This chronic situation is one of the causes contributing to the current state of lawlessness in Port Moresby since the police cannot hope to combat crime effectively until they first put their own house in order.

The situation however, is not completely hopeless, and credit must be given where it is due. For despite the inefficiency, and indiscipline which marred the image of the Port Moresby police in 1975, not a single case of police corruption was discovered during the survey period. It may well be that some policemen may have favoured those of their prisoners who were wantoks, and policemen operating alone may have been influenced in the exercise of their discretion to arrest by blood or kin ties with their prospective prisoners, but the wide spread corruption of the kind found among New York Police (Mass,P:1973) is unknown in Port Moresby.

The court listing any week of the year will testify to this and Magistrates are often surprised when entering their court rooms to see among the defendants awaiting their turn to be arraigned in the dock, a member of parliament; now and again a cabinet minister; a commissioned police officer; a departmental head; a Minister's Secretary; a very senior public servant; and on one or two occasions, a brother Magistrate.

Apparently the Port Moresby police are not frightened to prosecute anyone, including brother policemen and not even members of the Prime Minister's personal staff are immune from arrest and the due process of law. This of course, is as it should be, and what is indicated by the recurring presence in the dock of persons of high social status is that the quashing of prosecutions before they get to court by "fixing" the police must be considered to be such a rare occurrence in Port Moresby, that if it occurs at all, it does not amount to a serious defect in the criminal justice system. Of all the accusations which can legitimately be levelled at the police then, corruption is not one.

It could also be mentioned that a prosecution rate of 12822 per year for Port Moresby is not a bad effort for a police force which is "undereducated, underpaid, inexperienced and immature" (Clifford 1976:36) particularly when that rate is limited by the carrying capacity of the courts.

And in spite of their sorry rate for inefficiency, the Port Moresby Police have demonstrated a remarkable ability to present cases quickly to the courts once the arrests have been effected. Fig. 5 for example is a clearance index for June 1975. It shows that in relation to a total of 886 criminal prosecutions for offences other than minor traffic cases which were terminated in the courts during June 1975, 475 such cases were in relation to offences which had been committed that same month. That is to say, an arrested person stands a better than 50/50 chance of being arrested, prosecuted and having his case heard and determined within one month of his having committed the offence, and there are not many countries in the world which can match this sort of clearance rate.


The effectiveness of this rate can be seen more clearly in the figures for the last few days of the month, which show that of those persons who committed offences during the last Saturday and Sunday of June 1975, the 28th and 29th, 25 had their cases terminated by 30th June. In fact one lucky defendant who committed his offence on 30th June had his case heard and determined in court the same day he committed the offence.

Since there are obviously some functions which the Port Moresby police perform quite efficiently, the question which might well be asked at this stage is "what is wrong with the Port Moresby police?"

CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION OF REPORTED CRIMINAL OFFENCES

(Other than Minor Traffic Offences)

Committed in June 1975 in Port Moresby City and Terminated in Court During the same Month



Compiled by Research Staff from the Registers of the Boroko and National Capital Court Houses, Port Moresby City.

M.L.Mackellar.

It seems that there is nothing much wrong with their training. There are too many successful prosecutions and too many clever arrests to be attributed to mere chance. And from the weight of their work load it is obvious that there must be some sober and conscientious hard working members of the force in all ranks and in most sections, and the force generally has demonstrated a foundation of honesty and diligence and a wealth of manpower and material from which a really efficient organisation could be built.

There is also no doubt there are a great number of drunks, drones and other undesirables in the ranks, but these could easily be weeded out. And since these personnel already contribute very little by way of meaningful work effort, they would not be missed and their absence would mean a considerable saving to the community in terms of salaries, housing, and other costs they currently incur.

Once the drunks and drones have gone however, the problem which will still confront the police force in Port Moresby is that resulting from a monumental misdirection of effort caused by Clifford's "middle management gap."

This "gap" occurs between the ranks of constable and inspector among men whose rank is sergeant (3 grades) and who have the initial responsibility of making decisions on the spot, in the streets and taverns and also in private houses when attending breaches of the peace or calls for police assistance. Mistakes during the moment of initial police contact both with criminals and with complainants can usually amount to failures in investigations and prosecutions which in turn contribute to the law and order problem generally.

Mismanagement during this initial contact results not from a lack of training, but from a lack of experience on the job. For example: Any sergeant in charge of a Sector Patrol Squad which comes across a mob of hoodlums smashing the windows of parked cars knows that several offences are being committed and that the police have a duty to arrest. But how does one arrest a bunch of rock throwing hoddiums? The police training manuals do not explain how, and no amount of classroom theory can duplicate the real life situation in the streets. Nothing but practical on-the-job experience can suffice in this sort of situation, and this is what is lacking in the middle ranks of the police.

What is needed to fill this hiatus, is a few crusty old sergeants from Darlinghurst to show the younger and relatively inexperienced Port Moresby sergeants what to do.

"The science of arrest is an important segment of the course on general penology" says Solzhenitsyn (1974:7) who goes on to explain some of the techniques used by the KGB :

Arrests are classified according to various criteria: night time and daytime; at home, at work, during a journey; first time arrests and repeats; individual and group arrests. Arrests are distinguished by the degree of surprise required and the amount of resistance expected.

And, according to Solzhenitsyn (1974:13) arrest can be conducted in such a subtle way that the arrested person might be unaware of what is happening until it is too late for him to resist.

Of course no one wants to see a Papua New Guinean equivalent of the KGB. But subtle arrest is practiced by all efficient police forces throughout the world and is an ordinary example of man management at the

middle levels of a police force and which the Port Moresby police currently lack. It constitutes part of the "middle management gap" of the Port Moresby police.

This gap can easily be filled, but until it is filled, the Port Moresby police will always be operationally inefficient.

B. The Courts

The woeful situation of the Port Moresby police in 1975 was surpassed by a far more woeful situation in the courts.

Much of the problem related to the disproportionate amount of court time spent in the hearing of trivial offences and the legacy of ponderous court procedures inherited from the previous colonial Administration which were, and still are, unsuited to Papua New Guinea conditions.

Port Moresby in 1975 had two court houses. The one in Douglas Street, City (Map 8) and the other in Turumu Street Boroko (Map 20). As a general rule, the split up of cases between these two widely separated court houses was roughly this : all civil cases, committals, children's courts, taxation matters, questions of native custom involving marriage, divorce, adoption and so on and generally all matters requiring some degree of finesse were channelled through the Douglas Street court house. Offences arising out of traffic incidents, shop lifting, street brawls, gambling, vagrancy, drunken behaviour and street offences generally, passed through the Boroko court house.

The Boroko court house had more than twice the case loading of the other court house, and that loading was carried mostly by only four Magistrates, with one or two visiting Magistrates called in from time to time whenever the case loading got completely beyond the normal magisterial strength, and while the Magistrates at the Douglas Street court house might take weeks to hear a single court case, the Magistrates at Boroko were each expected to get through up to twenty cases per day. They had to, to keep up with the case loading. The monthly range of most cases passing

through the Boroko court house was from 840 in May, to 1048 in July, and in that month one Magistrate at Boroko heard exactly 500 traffic cases.

How does a Magistrate handle such a large case load? There were 22 working days in July, which gives an average of 22.7 cases per court day. This sort of loading day in, day out, every day of the month would be difficult enough for any Magistrate to handle, particularly as about 10% of the cases involve not guilty pleas which require full hearings. What makes this loading worse, however is that traffic offences like all other offences tend to be committed in patterns of peaks and slumps, so that there are high and low times for traffic offences as for all other offences. The chronological distribution of traffic offences tends to mirror the distribution for ordinary street offences and plots out more or less like the distribution depicted in Figure 5.

Since the majority of traffic offences are committed on Fridays and Saturdays, and because of the rapid clearance rate by the police prosecutors of matters awaiting court hearings, the traffic courts on Mondays may have to get through from 40 to 50 cases. The Magistrate assigned to hear traffic courts cannot call for help from other Magistrates since they are fully occupied with a similar loading of street offence cases, which might involve between 80 and 100 people arrested during the preceding weekend. Only three Magistrates can sit simultaneously at the Boroko court house because there are only three court rooms, so the deployment of Magistrates is usually one for traffic matters and the other two for criminal matters.

To make matters even worse, on days with long court listings, the hearing of cases does not start earlier but later. This is because, with more defendants and witnesses to sort out and more papers to shuffle, the prosecution process takes longer to organise. Once it gets rolling, very little time is then available

to spend on each case. Usually, whatever the size of the listing, each day, it all has to be squeezed into a hearing time of no more than five hours. Fifty cases in five hours allows for only six minutes per case. But if one case drags on for more than six minutes, less time is available for each of the remaining cases. These cannot be adjourned to another day, since all other days will be equally as busy, even if they don't have an equal number of cases. Parkinson's Law works both ways at Boroko, for while on some days court hearings are allowed to expand to fill the time available, on other days they may have to contract to fit into the same sized time slot. There is no point in trying to even out the daily loadings, since the time taken on Mondays to sift through all the cases to decide which should be heard on which of the following days, could be better spent in disposing of the cases in the first instance. There is no such thing as a vacant court day, and the shifting of cases from one day to another merely had the effect of cutting down the time available for the hearing of the other cases yet to be brought on that other day. There is simply nowhere for the cases to go. Whatever case comes into court on a Monday has to be dealt with on the spot, and given late starts, adjournments for one reason or another, and the intermittent and unavoidable interruptions common in all busy court houses, it quite frequently happens that the only time available for the hearing of the average case in court is three minutes.

In this situation of three minute justice, the Boroko court house is a legal machine, constantly operating at maximum capacity, programmed to crank out court decisions like sausages, Mondays to Fridays, every week of the year.

We know what the public's opinion of the police is ... we didn't dare ask what their opinion of the courts was, and in any case the Magistrates are the first to admit

that the law rides roughshod over most defendants, and that very few get anything approximating a fair hearing. Those who do are the very few who can afford lawyers to defend them. And the longer the lawyer takes to plead his client's case, the less time there is available for the hearing of the remaining cases of those who cannot afford lawyers.

Alarmed at the kind of justice which was being dispensed from the Boroko court house as a result of this overloading, both Magistrates and the Police in a joint approach to the Law Reform Commission in August 1975 suggested that Village Courts be introduced into the suburbs of Port Moresby as an interim arrangement under existing Village Court legislation pending the eventual take-over of most of the less serious cases by the kind of lower courts envisaged by Clifford (1976:26).

Eventually, Village Courts were established in the traditional village areas of Hanuabada and Tatana and Baruni, but the Law Reform Commission was not impressed with the idea of extending the Village Court system into the remainder of Port Moresby, not even into the settlement or the lower covenant suburbs and these areas still remain within the initial jurisdiction of the Local Courts and District Courts of Douglas Street and Boroko.

The Law Reform Commission did however give its blessing to one major innovation to the old colonial style lower court system and this was the introduction of on-the-spot Traffic Infringement Notices for minor traffic offences.

This innovation is now well entrenched in most western countries and had long been contemplated in Papua New Guinea. A previous on-the-spot traffic ticket system in Papua New Guinea had failed because it had got entangled in its own red tape, and was abandoned. As a result a considerable amount of police effort was then devoted to the issue of summons, bail and arrest.

warrants and to the enforcement of minor fines, while the courts pondered (generally at three minute intervals) on the heinous derelictions of an endless array of defendants who passed through the traffic courts on such charges as parking in the wrong place or carrying the wrong licence or having a licence plate obscured by mud and so on, and while police were concentrating on these duties and the courts were clogged with such trivia, the break and enter rate in Port Moresby ranged from 151 to 255 instances per month. There was a clear misdirection of effort which happily was resolved when the new and much more simplified and efficient on-the-spot traffic system came into operation in 1976. This new system allowed the traffic police to continue their depredations upon delinquent motorists without clogging the courts with trivial traffic matters.

As we have seen however, the police soon took up the slack in the court list with an increase in the arrest rate for street offences, with the result that although there was a change of emphasis in courts, the case loading at the Boroko court house remained the same.

In the Douglas Street court house meanwhile, the situation was no better. For although the Magistrates there do not hear as many cases as their brothers at Boroko, the individual cases last much longer, owing to the burdensome and largely inappropriate procedures involved in committing people for trial to the National Court because in accordance with Sections 72 and 101 of the District Court Act, each individual committal proceeding has to be recorded verbatim and the statement of each witness read back to him in the presence and hearing of the defendant. All the evidence is typed out in quintuplicate, the original going to the trial Judge, with one copy each for the Defence and Prosecution lawyers. The fourth copy remains in the District Court for record purposes.

Even the simplest committal proceeding takes at least

one day's hearing to complete. Cases involving more than one defendant may take several days to complete and cases which are defended by lawyers might take several weeks. The whole process from arrest to committal for trial and then to sentence or acquittal in the National Court takes many months. The case involving the breaking and entering of the Port Moresby District Office where the Patrol Officers pistols were stolen occurred three days after the survey period started. The culprits were arrested three days later, and their first appearance in court was 9th April 1975, But it was exactly one year later, in April 1976 before these offenders were sentenced in the National Court at Waigani.

In the normal course of events however, unless bail has been granted when the charge is first laid, a defendant going through the committal process is required to remain in custody for only three months awaiting the termination of his committal proceedings and thereafter he may be required to wait another two months in custody for his case to be tried in the National Court.

Such delayed court action can hardly be calculated to inspire confidence in the judicial process, or in those persons who are charged with the duties of reforming it. And the situation is much worse when seen in the light of what may be described as the jurisdictional muddle of trivial indictable offences. For every offender involved in all the 1211 breaking and entering incidences recorded during this survey is liable if caught, to be dragged through this time consuming and largely senseless committal process irrespective of the value of the goods stolen. That is to say, even if only one loaf of bread is taken during a housebreaking excursion by a hungry vagrant, the only redress according to the existing law is via this ponderous committal process. And as the sample has already shown, goods less than K100 in value were taken in 44%

of all reported cases.

It is now fairly obvious that some form of simplified procedure is necessary for simple criminal cases of whatever category, because the way things are at the moment, even if the police became super efficient and began to arrest more of the marauding burglars now at large, the courts would not be able to handle the increased case loading. Police inefficiency as far as the courts are concerned, is a blessing in disguise.

Of course much of the delay in getting committals heard and much of the case congestion in the Boroko court house in 1975 might not have occurred if more Magistrates and more court rooms had been available that year. More Magistrates could have been made available had there been more court rooms for them to work in, so the essence of this part of the problem can be reduced to an acute shortage of court room space, which came about gradually over the years. Although court room space had increased somewhat since the lifting of prohibition, it had not increased at the same rate that arrests had increased.

The saga of how this problem was solved in 1976 is almost unbelievable except for those readers with a background knowledge of Papua New Guinea's pre-Independence officialdom. What happened, briefly, is this : When court room space in Port Moresby was rapidly approaching maximum carrying capacity in 1973, the City Magistrates planning for the future, requested additional space. Magistrates then were part of the Law Department and in the course of normal public service procedure, all such requests had to pass through that Department's administrative estimates system. The problem here was that the collective genius of all the lawyers in the Law Department was deficient when asked to cope with administrative problems of this nature with the result that whatever letters were written and whatever plans were made for future court space were shunted from one

desk to another, filed out of sequence, were progressively mislaid, misread and misdirected until finally in 1975 the sheer weight of the case loading simply over ran the city's court room capacity.

Fortunately, the Constitution at Independence in 1975 successfully divorced the Magistrates from the Law Department but the newly created Magisterial Services Commission did not get into full swing until 1976. When it did, the newly appointed Chief Magistrate asked one of his Magistrates (a former Patrol Officer) to unravel the red tape and get another court house operating. There swiftly followed some quick co-operation between other former Patrol Officers. One, now in the Treasury Department funded the project in July; another now on the Board of Management of a Vocational School organised the construction in August, and on the 1st September 1976 a new court house came into operation at Ela Beach. The kiaps' days might well be numbered, but they can still get the job done.

Adding only two more court rooms to the Lower Court system, the Ela Beach court house nevertheless in 1976 did much to ease the case congestion which would otherwise have continued after 1975.

Another defect in the criminal justice system in Port Moresby which has its origins in the courts is the growing phenomenon of the lenient sentence. This has generated considerable criticism from time to time, and on 9/12/75 the Commissioner of Police is reported (in the Post Courier) to have said (p.3) :

Magistrates were partly to blame for Papua New Guinea's worsening crime situation. Courts had frustrated policemen by being lenient with criminals. The present leniency which courts adopt today contributes to the worsening crime situation that we have in Papua New Guinea.

Since severe penalties have by themselves never completely deterred crime in the past, it is doubtful that they ever will in Port Moresby in the future. But insofar as more severe penalties tend to be a greater deterrent than less severe penalties do, then there appears to be some truth in what the Police Commissioner was saying. At least he was correct in pointing to "the present leniency which the courts adopt today."

Now it is difficult under any circumstances to test the severity of court sentences relative to each other, relative to each defendant, and for one kind of offence as against any other kind of offence. But assuming that a fine is less severe than a prison sentence, it is possible to make a very rough comparison via the ratio of fines to imprisonment over two separate but equal time spans, for the same category of offences.

The category of offence referred to in this survey as Offences against Property embraces activities which are sometimes associated with the major problem of house-breaking and includes such summary offences as stealing, being unlawfully on premises, receiving stolen property and so on which are often used as alternative charges to avoid the cumbersome procedures for "break and enter" indictments. Similarly, the unlawful use of motor vehicles is often part of a housebreaking excursion, and damage to buildings the most frequent form of entry. These may be inaccurately termed as summary housebreaking offences and are generally heard and determined in the Magistrates' courts.

The registers in the Boroko District Court show that of 51 convictions for this category of offence in September 1974, 46 defendants went to jail and only 5 were fined. On the other hand, there were in the same court house in April 1975, 56 convictions for this category of offence which resulted in 31 defendants going to jail and 25 being released on payment of fines.

That is to say, the percentage of persons convicted of offences against property in September 1974 and who went to jail was 90%. For April 1975 it was 55%.

Comparisons between other months in 1974 and 1975 show more or less the same margin of difference, so that assuming the degree of seriousness of property offences brought into court generally not to have altered during these years, then it can be said that compared with 1974, there was in 1975 a reduced probability of being sent to jail following conviction for an offence against property. In other words, penalties became more lenient.

Some, by Western standards were absurdly lenient. There were many instances in 1975 of some defendants being fined less than the amount that they stole, so that they made a profit, and many persons convicted of unlawfully using motor vehicles found it cheaper to steal a car than to hire one.

One reason for this was that as an increasing number of property offences are committed by youngsters, courts are reluctant to impose harsh penalties, particularly on first offenders. With no system of reform school, the only available punishment alternative to a prison sentence is a fine; one which the offender can afford to pay.

And associated with the leniency of penalty is an even more perplexing problem in the Port Moresby courts and that is the disparity of penalty for the same category of offence. It frequently happened that many persons charged with the same offence, but brought before different Magistrates received vastly different penalties. It quite often happened that while some persons who had been involved in a street brawl were sent to jail by one Magistrate, other

persons who had been involved to the same extent in the same brawl were at the same time being fined by a different Magistrate in the adjoining court room.

It seems that the ethnic origin of the Magistrate has a lot to do with the sort of sentence he gives, so that a Magistrate from an area where a particular offence is a problem will tend to sentence differently for that offence than a Magistrate from an area where that particular offence is not such a problem. Individual Magistrates quirks in relation to sentence policy are present even among Magistrates of the same ethnic origin as in Australia, and by extension, into the Papua New Guinea context, this problem is magnified in the same proportion.

National Magistrates generally tend to impose lighter sentences upon their fellow Nationals than their expatriate predecessors did, and what has happened since 1974 is that with an increasingly localised bench, the greater number of court cases now being heard by National Magistrates is reflecting a change in court sentences.

As National Magistrates cannot shed their ethnic origins any more than expatriate Magistrates could, the only answer to the problem of sentence leniency or disparity appears for Parliament to legislate minimum penalties. This has already been done in relation to Customs offences and some Traffic offences (see Sect. 7 (1A) Motor Traffic Act as amended) and it could easily be done for every other offence.

Quite clearly, something ought to be done to equate penalties with the facts of the case, not the ethnic origin of the Magistrate.

C. The Correctional Services

Of the three major organs of the criminal justice system of Port Moresby, the correctional services appear to be the most efficient.

Since the size of the prison population is at all times governed, not by the size of the prison or by the size of its budget, but by the arresting policy of the police combined with the sentencing policy of different Magistrates, the correctional service has to contend with the whims and fancies of both police and magistrates and may be said to be at the receiving end of the whole judicial process.

While the police have a discretion as whether they will arrest or not, and the courts have a discretion as to whether they will imprison or not; the correctional service has no discretion as to what to do with the prisoners it is given. All prisoners have to be accommodated, fed, clothed, guarded, and put to work, irrespective of the state of the prison budget or the supervisory capacity of its staff. And while the police can simply stop arresting when their cells are full, and the court can stop hearing cases once their case list is full; the prisons cannot refuse to accept more prisoners simply because the jails are full; everyone has to move over to make room for the newest inmates, and prison officers have to make the best use of whatever resources are immediately available, without at the same time having any control over the number of prisoners admitted into their institution.

Even in the most capable hands therefore, prison management is a logistical nightmare, and the management of the Bomana Corrective Institution outside Port Moresby is no exception. Yet there

are few complaints by prisoners; few escapes; and no embarrassing incidents involving drunken street brawls between prison staff and the citizenry of the kind frequently seen between off duty police and citizens.

Whatever disciplinary or organisational problems the prison service may have, they are, like the prisoners, locked away from public view and settled by the internal management processes within the service. Correctional officers make very few appearances in court either as defendants or in any other capacity, and the general view is that the organisation does what it is told to do with quiet efficiency.

But although the management of the correctional system is efficient, there are many faults in the system itself. That is to say, design faults for which no blame attaches to the prison officers. There is no probation or parole service for example, and as neither could be fitted into the present correctional infrastructure, there is no point in discussing them here.

But there are other services which could easily be fitted into the existing correctional infrastructure and at considerable cost savings to the Government.

To begin with there is no system of "Half-way House" - a relatively benign branch of the correctional system wherein persons who have committed offence without criminal intent and are considered safe security risks could perform useful community duties with a minimum of supervision and without having to mix with and be influenced by hardened criminals.

There is no system of weekend jail. Many inmates of Bomana got there because of some minor offence for which a small prison sentence was awarded. Because such a sentence included days on which the offenders

would otherwise be at work in their place of employment, such offenders are in danger of losing their jobs, and dismissal from their jobs only compounds their situation further, with innocent families and dependants being the greater sufferers. The figures show that 66% of the offences for which drunks are normally arrested occur during weekends, and it has long been established behaviour in Port Moresby for many persons who are otherwise law abiding during the working week to run wild during weekends.

Prison sentences designed to keep such persons out of trouble during weekends and at the same time allowing such persons to pursue their normal occupations during the week, would be of service to such persons and the community generally and would ensure that the innocent families of such persons do not suffer.

Similarly, there is no release-to-work system operating in Port Moresby which would allow persons imprisoned for passing valueless cheques or property offences of one kind or another to keep their ordinary jobs for the purpose of paying off their deficiencies or damage or whatever it was which got them into jail in the first place.

Such innovations could easily be worked into the existing prison infrastructure, using the existing correctional officers at no extra expense to the correctional services. In fact, the cost per unit prisoner would decrease and the government would get a far cheaper and even more efficient correctional service, and the potential benefits to the Port Moresby community as a whole are obvious.

4. REMEDIES

A. The Need for Law Reform

Part 6 of Schedule 2 of the Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New Guinea establishes the Law Reform Commission which has the duty -

to report to the Parliament and to the National Executive on the development, and on the adaptation to the circumstances of the country, of the underlying law, and of the appropriateness of the rules and principles of the underlying law to the circumstances of the country from time to time.

The "underlying law" is elsewhere in the Constitution by a series of cross references defined as a mixture of home grown law and imported law in proportions suited to the circumstances of the country.

Part 3 of Schedule 2 also imposes a duty upon the courts to consider any hiatus between the law and the circumstances as these are discovered from time to time and the general view of the Constitution in matters of law appears to be to endeavour to allow the law to change in step with changes in the circumstances of the country; a very necessary and sensible arrangement, considering the frequency and extent of the changes envisaged to enable Papua New Guinea to catch up with the rest of the developed world.

The courts however are still bound by "test case" procedure, which means that although Judges and Magistrates may know of a particularly worrying hiatus between the law and the circumstances, they have to wait beside the trap until a particular case falls into it, before making any pronouncement about how

the gap will be filled in the future.

The Law Reform Commission on the other hand does not have to wait, and having seen the gap in advance, may recommend changes in the law to fill it in advance, thus allowing for a smooth transition from one set of circumstances to another. In addition, the Government does not have to wait for either the courts or the Commission but can of its volition and at any time prepare legislation for whatever changes in the law it deems necessary.

Some changes, like those relating to on-the-spot traffic tickets involve sub-ordinate legislation and the executive can effect these changes within three weeks without prior debate in Parliament. "Changes by act of Parliament" however take a lot longer, having to wait their turn at the next or subsequent sittings of Parliament to be read or debated on the floor of the House.

As neither Cabinet nor Parliament can discuss everything at the same time, an order of priority determines which matters will be discussed in which order, and before Independence in 1975 any matter relating to changes in the criminal justice system tended to get shunted further down the list to make way for discussions on the Constitution. After Independence and well into 1976 Cabinet and Parliament were both preoccupied in launching Papua New Guinea into the world with a flurry of treaties and other international arrangements which are the necessary appendages to the birth of any nation.

In this climate of post Independence euphoria therefore, any proposals to alter the existing criminal justice system which had bungled along in its own way for three quarters of a century already, were not viewed with any urgency; and this was the situation at the time of this survey.

Even the Law Reform Commission saw no urgency in the situation, and proposals by Magistrates and police for the establishment of village courts throughout Port Moresby in an effort to simplify the processing of the vast multitude of less serious offences were viewed askance as the Commission prepared itself for deep meditation over the question of adultery. And while the crime rate soared in Port Moresby and robbers plundered trucks along the Highlands Highway, the Law Reform Commission toured the Provinces seeking peoples' views on whether adultery should be a civil offence or a criminal offence, or perhaps no offence at all.

Apart from the new on-the-spot traffic tickets the only significant contribution the Law Reform Commission made in 1975 to the law and order problems of Port Moresby was the production of a proposed new act of Parliament designed to consolidate and amend the antiquated Police Offences and Vagrancy Acts, by an up to date and all inclusive Summary Offences Act. However, one novel feature of this Act is the absence of the former offence of "insufficient means of support".

As most professional burglars are unemployed, this provision was often used by police either as a holding charge during housebreaking investigations, or as an alternative charge when it was considered inappropriate to wade through ponderous committal process on breaking and entering charges.

The Law Reform Commission's innovation now gives burglars greater freedom than they ever enjoyed before, and imposes new restrictions on the already inefficiently operating police investigative services. The reasons for the proposed removal of this offence from the statute book were given by the Chairman of the Law Reform Commission in a letter to the Post Courier on 8/3/76 :

The particular offence of being without lawful visible means of support has been on our law books for 50 years. This law has not, in its enforcement achieved what people would claim it would achieve, namely prevention of the urban drift

.... There are ways to reduce the crime rate, but the continuation of laws which have been shown to be harsh and ineffective and the introduction of pass laws are not amongst them.

Elsewhere in the letter the Chairman alluded to "basic standards of human decency and personal liberties" presumably of burglars, to be considered when making laws, and of fears that persons genuinely out of work would be arrested and jailed indiscriminately, if vagrancy were allowed to remain an offence.

It appeared however, that the idea of indiscriminate dragnet arrests of unemployed residents of Port Moresby is a myth. Certainly, it did not happen during the period of this survey when only 152 persons appeared before the courts on this charge, which amounted to only 2% of the total number of criminal cases before the courts during those six months.

Furthermore, the offence is not of being unemployed, but of being without lawful visible means of support, and as it has frequently been pointed out by the courts as for example in the case of Kaspar Kumo v Raka Killian* each case is judged on its own merits, following an investigation into the particular persons means of support. If these are not suspect, no offence is committed.

In this particular case, the Appeal Judge, confirming an earlier pronouncement on the law said :

* National Court Appeal Case No. 19 of 1976 (N.G.)

The fact that a man has not got a job is a matter which has to be considered. So is the fact that he has no money or very little money and so is the fact that he is being helped by kindly wantoks who house and feed him. But these matters whether taken in conjunction or taken singly are not conclusive.

So the mere fact that a person was living with his wantoks did not necessarily mean that he was without lawful means of support; he may be a welcome guest, or, he may be an idler who sponges on his relatives and who moves from one house to another eating other peoples' rice and doing no work. Likewise, the mere fact that a man has not got a job does not necessarily mean that he is without lawful means of support; he may have tried to get work but couldn't; on the other hand he may have been in a place for three months and not tried to get work.

Each case must depend on its own particular circumstances and care should be taken in every case to ascertain that the true circumstances are disclosed before a conviction is recorded.

Though not retained in the new Summary Offences Act, Parliament did see fit to pass a new Vagrancy Act in which the old offence of having no lawful visible means of support is retained. In the new Act however, no penalty attaches to this offence in the first instance. Instead, courts can only order vagrants to move on or to return home and a penalty then attaches when such an order is disobeyed. The danger of course is that once released from custody with his move on order, a burglar as we have already seen, can find easy sanctuary in Port Moresby from which he can continue his criminal activity with ease.

The greatest need for law reform however, lies not in deciding what should or should not be an offence but in deciding what to do with the offender, once the offence, whatever it is, has been committed.

Present indications are, that case loading in the courts is likely to increase beyond the carrying capacity of the court system, given the existing procedures and court room facilities, and it is necessary to streamline the system or increase the court room capacity in order to cope with this increase in case loading.

In April 1976 the new Sector Patrol system of police coverage came into operation in Port Moresby and its immediate effect was to double the arrest rate for drunks and other street offenders, so that while in April 1975 the courts could expect to receive between 80 to 100 arrests as a result of weekend police activity, in April 1976 the Monday loading rose to between 100 to 200 arrests.

It should be remembered that this loading is produced by a police force which is "undereducated, underpaid, inexperienced and immature" (Clifford, 1976:36). Once the force improves its educational and pay standards and its members become more experienced and mature, we can expect an even higher arrest rate.

To add to the problem, the newly established Ela Beach Court House together with other buildings on Ela Beach is expected to be removed in the not too distant future to make way for a planned recreational area there. When this happens, the lower courts are expected to move into a new court complex to be built at the Waigani Administrative Centre. This new complex is expected to house all the lower courts in Port Moresby in one building, but alas, the design calls for only ten court rooms (the number now available in Port Moresby) and does not overcome the problem of moving hordes of prisoners back and forth from the cells in the Boroko Police Station. In any case, by 1980 when the new court complex will be ready, 10 court rooms will be

insufficient to cope with the even greater arrest rate expected from projected population increase in the city and the expected increase in the efficiency of the Police Force by then.

What all this points to is that our lower court system was never designed to cope with case loadings of the magnitude Port Moresby experiences now, or the even greater magnitude it is likely to experience in the future. The only effective answer is to overhaul the system completely, or redesign it to allow it to deal with large numbers of offenders in batches, and to do away with, once and for all, the ponderous and time consuming court procedure which to the average defendant is in any case, largely unintelligible.

Lawyers may understand the reasons for our noble British court process, but the average defendant, picked up during the average street brawl in Port Moresby does not. Furthermore, he is not interested in the "wherefores" and the "therefores" of mid-Victorian English in which the charge is framed ... for all he wants to know is how to get out of his predicament.

If this can be done with a K10 fine or three days in custody, then the matter for him, is solved, and since nobody can remember how the average drunken brawl began, it is pointless for the courts to waste time hearing about it, and the question of guilt or innocence becomes meaningless.

Also meaningless in the present circumstances is any difference between conviction and dismissal of particular court cases. The reason for this was soon revealed at the beginning of the survey when it became obvious that quantification of decisions was unreal in view of the large number of cases which were listed as "struck out". When questioned about such a large number of "struck out" cases, Magistrates gave an answer something like this :

Well, take a Drunk and Disorderly case for

example. You can tell by the bruises and scratches on the defendant's face and his generally hung over appearance that he must have been involved in something. But he was probably too drunk at the time to remember what happened, so he pleads not guilty. At his first appearance the police have a few sketchy details which could lead to a conviction but the procedure on a not guilty plea means that the Court has to hear witnesses. With 30 odd cases to get through that same morning, there is no time to hear witnesses then and in all probability the police would take some time to locate them, given the hasty and largely arbitrary process involved in the sort of dragnet arrests which got this particular defendant into court in the first place. So a date is set for the hearing of this charge. Because of the crowded court list, this particular case is listed for hearing simultaneously with five or six others, by the same Magistrate, and the defendant is released on K15 bail. Fortunately, he does not bother to reappear at the hearing, which is just as well, since the police find that they cannot locate the witnesses, and in any case we don't have time to hear the case even if the witnesses and the defendant are all present. So the case is struck out and the bail is forfeited for no appearance. This K15 which the defendant so forfeits, is about what the fine would have been had he been convicted.

By April, 1976, 28% of drunk and disorderly cases were "struck out" in this manner, and while the courts were

wasting their time performing pantomimes like this, other far more serious cases cannot be heard.

Even if the Law Reform Commission is still preoccupied with adultery it seems timely for the Government of its own volition to introduce reforms designed to relieve the pressure of minor street offences on the lower courts and at the same time regulate the punishment of such offences by some quick and simple method.

One suggestion for this is to follow the process recently introduced for the punishment of minor traffic offences by the introduction of standard penalties and to allow voluntary payment of these penalties without the necessity of a court appearance. That is to say, what is now paid as "bail" becomes a fine in the first instance, payable upon release from arrest. The normal safeguards of election of court process and appeal to superior courts could remain as they do for on-the-spot traffic fines, but the vast majority of minor street offenders could be dealt with without the formality of a time wasting and a largely fictional court hearing.

With the majority of minor street offences then out of the way Parliament could then concentrate on speeding up the hearing of Indictable Offences those "serious" charges which pass through the District Court by committal process eventually to terminate, some months later, in the National Court.

The Judges have for some years now (Personal communication by Sir Sidney Frost, Chief Judge of Papua New Guinea) recommended that greater power be given to the more senior Magistrates to dispose of, at summary trial, most of the less serious indictable offences. We are not speaking here of "less serious" murders, rape or robbery, but of the less serious breaking and entering offences which take up most of the National Court's time and which involve simple entry through windows etc. and the taking of goods to the value of less than K200.

As stated earlier. committal proceedings for these offences in the District Court only turn over at the rate of no more than one per day. By summary hearing, at least ten such cases could be processed each day, by a single Magistrate, and 20 or so using two Magistrates, but until such innovations are made in the entrenched and largely archaic committal process, there is no point in the police increasing their arrest of burglars, because Port Moresby simply does not have a court structure capable of handling an increased committal case loading.

But with increased jurisdiction for the District Courts to process the "less serious" indictable offences the way would then be open to decide what to do about the "more serious" indictable offences requiring more detailed deliberation and determination by a Judge assisted by counsel. For such offences committed in remote parts of Papua New Guinea, it still makes sense for some kind of committal process to precede the National Court trial. This is because counsel at the trial who live and normally work in Port Moresby have no access to the kind of evidence which will be used at the trial other than that contained in the committal depositions. Telephone and other communication from the National Capital to remote places in Papua New Guinea is sporadic and unreliable at the best of times, and both parties to the trial could be at a disadvantage without the assistance of some kind of preliminary hearing out in the provinces.

The situation is entirely different when serious indictable offences are committed within the National Capital District, for it is here that the Public Prosecutor's office and the Public Solicitor's office have their headquarters, and it is here that most of the Law Department's Legal Officers are permanently stationed. Access to whatever evidence is likely to be used in a trial is already freely available to the Prosecution, by way of a simple telephone call to the Boroko C.I.B. or a perusal of police statements

and exhibits in the C.I.B. office.

If similar access were available to the Defence, there would seem to be no reason for any kind of preliminary hearing at all for serious indictable offences committed within Port Moresby, yet two court rooms, two Magistrates and attendant depositions typists and sundry court staff are permanently employed in the senseless clerical exercise of getting cases before the National Court for trial. Mostly, in committal proceedings, there are no Defence lawyers and the prosecution is conducted by the police. But Port Moresby now and again witnesses the time consuming and very expensive preliminary hearings where Public Prosecutors and Defence Counsel, all legally qualified, face an unqualified Magistrate to ask if there is sufficient evidence to put the defendant on trial. In situations such as this, if the collective wisdom of the Public Prosecutor's office has already decided, what point is there in asking the Magistrate ?

It seems that the time has come to put an end to this, and a simple amendment to the Criminal Code would allow cases originating in the National Capital District to be brought directly into the National Court without the necessity of any kind of preliminary hearing at all. This reform would then release at no extra cost to the Government, more staff and court room facilities for the hearing of the "less serious" but nevertheless very persistent summary cases awaiting termination in the District Courts. Reforms of this nature are simple to implement, and are of utmost importance if the criminal justice system is to gear itself to cope with the increased case loading expected in the not too distant future.

Also in need of an overhaul is that part of the criminal justice system which is responsible for dealing with the problem of the criminal public servant.

Being the nation's capital city, Port Moresby shares

along with other national capitals, the common phenomenon of a relatively large public service population, and the census figures for 1971 (Fergie, R; 1974:14) indicate that of the Port Moresby workforce, 38% is employed by the Government either directly under the Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act, or indirectly by Statutory Authorities like the NBC and the Electricity Commission, or by other semi-governmental agencies of one kind or another.

As this percentage of the workforce is itself a cross section of the Port Moresby socio-economic strata, including all occupations from sweeper to Departmental Head, it can hardly be supposed that all criminal offences in Port Moresby are committed only by persons in private employment. It is therefore possible that some public servants contributed to the statistics which formed the basis of this survey. Exactly how many did, we shall never know; for although court records for 1975 did show how many policemen came before the courts on criminal charges, there is no similar record for public servants.

The reason for this is that the Police Force (Interim Arrangements) Act decrees at Section 49 that a court which convicts any member of the Police Force shall make a recommendation to the police commissioner, for or against further departmental action to be taken against the defendant, in addition to whatever penalty the court imposes. That is to say, the court must recommend one way or the other, even if it recommends that no further disciplinary action be taken.

This is a useful device for bringing to the notice of the Commissioner of Police which of his men have criminal records, and it is aided by the fact that the police prosecutors know their own police defendants, even if only via the ordinary departmental mechanisms. It is therefore very difficult for a policeman to be arraigned before the courts without

the prosecution and hence the court knowing that he is a policeman.

But there is no similar mechanism in the public services. There is no requirement for a court to make recommendations about additional disciplinary action even if it knows which of its defendants are public servants, and there is no readily available method by which police can check that a defendant is or is not a public servant if that defendant chooses not to disclose his occupation, or gives details of a fictitious occupation.

In the case of departmental heads, or other prominent public servants, word soon gets around via the grapevine or the press, but the vast majority of public servants in the middle and lower echelons can harbour in the grey anonymity of their calling without their criminal records ever coming to the notice of their employing authority. Of course the Public Service Board and its equivalent in the other services can take its own disciplinary action if it knows of any criminal offences committed by its servants, but in the absence of any requirement for the courts and the Public Service Board to communicate directly in this matter there is no automatic method by which the Public Service Board (and the other employing authorities) can know on a day to day basis, which public servants are appearing on which charges before which courts in Port Moresby.

So defective is the system that some public servants who do go to jail, remain for some time on the government payroll, since there is no effective method for getting them off it. We knew of four public servants who went to jail during the survey period who were never taken off the payroll. They were on full pay all the time they were in jail and they walked back to their jobs afterwards as though nothing had happened. How many more did the same we will never know. "I was sick" or "My mother died"

is usually a good enough explanation in these circumstances. Public servants whose salaries are paid into their cheque accounts are in little danger of having their pay stopped when in jail since they do not have to be present to be paid. Those who are paid fortnightly in cash and who are not present to be paid stand the risk of having their salaries repaid into the Treasury, but this danger can be overcome simply by appointing an agent to collect the pay during the term of imprisonment. Even without such arrangements, the average public servant can safely serve up to 12 days in jail between fortnightly paydays without any deductions for his absence.

The term of payment while in jail is often preceded in the Public Service by an additional bonus called "suspension under full pay". Under Section 94 of the Act the Public Service Board has laid down that officers charged with criminal offences shall be suspended on full pay pending the outcome of the court case. This seems reasonable enough if the delay between charge and outcome were only a few days. But in the case of Indictable Offences as we have seen, the time span from charge to conviction may take many months, even a year, and all the while the public servant on charge is receiving full pay and doing no work. During 1975 three public servants that we know of were suspended on full pay for more than six months while awaiting trial.

Although Section 94 of the Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act allows for convicted public servants to be dismissed, the rigmarole this involves is enough to deter most supervisory officers from taking such action. But even when such action is planned, it is often thwarted by the use of false names.

This cunning ploy is facilitated by the Papua New Guinea custom of having no surname. The general rule is that

a man has several names of his own which he can use interchangeably, and quite legitimately. And for a reserve supply, he can always use any of his father's names as well.

Thus a man may be named AVASA by his father MOALE. He may have been baptised THOMAS by which name he was known in the Missions school where he was educated, and his father may have been baptised BENJAMIN. He might have signed on in the public service as THOMAS MOALE which is the name shown on his High School Certificate, but his driver's licence may be in the name of BENJAMIN, Thomas, and his friends will call him AVASA.

When arrested by police for any offence, he might give the name AVASA BENJAMIN and is processed through the court by that name. But if the Public Service Board ever hears over the grape vine that its servant THOMAS MOALE went to jail, representatives of the Board may call at the Boroko Court House for details of conviction for the purpose of processing dismissal papers. Alas, there is no criminal record for a person of that name.

Now it could eventually be proved that THOMAS MOALE, Clerk Class 3 at Waigani Government building is also AVASA BENJAMIN, Prisoner No. 14637 at Bomana Corrective Institution* but the red tape and the other impediments involved are generally enough to discourage even the most thorough investigators from the Public Service Board. The worst that can happen to THOMAS MOALE therefore is to be asked to submit a leave application, when he returns from his absence in jail. Even so, there are many ways around this. He can for example submit a leave application as required, explaining his absence as "personal reasons", in which case he would probably be granted in retrospect leave without

* The names used in this example are entirely fictitious.

pay for the time he was away. But by far the most suitable solution for him is to simply agree to submit a leave application, then never submit one. For, after about five attempts to extract a leave application from him, the average supervisor will simply give up trying, and the matter is soon forgotten.

How many public servants appeared before the courts during the survey period, to be paid while in jail and never to be dismissed thereafter cannot be ascertained from the existing records. But there were indications that this sort of thing was happening all the time. Most of these indications came upon us quite by accident by passing familiar faces in the corridors of Government Offices; by research staff inadvertently unearthing details of a public service occupation, during an inquiry into a defendant's other history details and so on; and sometimes details of public service employment were given to us involuntarily by wives or relatives of convicted public servants. For every week during the course of the survey period the Boroko Court House staff usually received two or three requests for sentence details from persons searching for husbands, brothers or other relatives said to have been sentenced by the Court, but under false or alternative names. Pressed to further identify the missing defendant, relatives would say something like this :

He is a clerk in the Government building at Waigani. He and some of his friends had a party last Saturday and there was a fight and people got hurt and the police came and took them all away. He was in court yesterday but the courtroom was too crowded and we couldn't get in to hear what happened. But when the police van drove away afterwards we saw his face in the window and he waved at us through the bars. Is there any chance we can pay his fine or bail him out ?

"Sorry", the clerks would say after much research, "there is nobody listed in our records by that name".

If his own relatives and our own court staff could not find his conviction details, there is little likelihood that his employing authority could either. Hence, whoever he was and whatever he did, there would be no mention of his having committed this particular offence on his public service file. No conviction details; and very likely no dismissal.

It should be quite clearly pointed out at this stage that all we can say is that there are only indications of a constant trickle of public servants through the courts. The exact number known to us is very small. But the point to be made here is that there are definite defects in the public service employment system which quite clearly preclude the public employment authorities from knowing which of their employees have criminal records.

People can change their names, but they cannot change their finger prints and a simple identity card for public servants, with fingerprint classification and photograph thereon would soon overcome most of the defects in the system. But if nothing is done soon, then there is a danger that in the normal course of public service promotion which is fairly rapid in Papua New Guinea due to the localisation process, persons proved to have been dishonest in the past will soon occupy positions of great importance in the public service. It might have interested the Public Services Commission for example, to have known in 1976 that the Port Moresby assistant manager of a certain Statutory Authority had the following criminal record :

<u>Date:</u>	<u>Offence:</u>	<u>Penalty:</u>
3/3/72	Behave in Offensive Manner	K10 fine
7/3/74	Passing Valueless Cheques	2 months jail
22/3/74	Passing Valueless Cheques	3 months jail
22/3/74	Passing Valueless Cheques	Convicted only
28/3/74	Stealing	2 months jail
12/8/74	Passing Valueless Cheques	K30 fine
12/8/74	Passing Valueless Cheques	K15 fine
24/3/76	Drunk and Disorderly	One week jail

The continued employment of convicted public servants is one problem; but the continued employment of criminal public servants who were never even charged is an even greater threat to continued stability and efficiency in the public service.

The first annual report of the Public Prosecutor, tabled in Parliament in 1976 (P-C;6/9/76) stated that theft and fraud within the public service is on the increase and misappropriations to his knowledge amounted to approximately two million kina per year. He claimed that there was little financial control in most government departments, and that detection and investigation of minor theft and frauds within the public service is unlikely.

Our research experience supports this view, and for examples we did not even have to look beyond our own court houses. In 1975 there was a deficit of K268 at the Boroko Court House, being fine or bail money received but not accounted for. We reported that to the Area Finance Officer twice but nothing was done about it. In 1976 one Magistrate and two clerks in the Ela Beach Court House helped themselves to the contents of the office safe. But as they only took K15 between them nothing was done about that either. Treasury officials tell of even greater amounts each totalling thousands of kina which disappear through the mail from Port Moresby never to be investigated, even though there is an accounting procedure which can trace the movement of such cash from one handler to another via the registered mail system.

The Auditor General's report for the year ending 10/6/76 said that discrepancies totalling K43 million had accumulated in the Port Moresby Area Finance Office during that period. (P-C;29/11/76). This report discloses that there were duplications of names on

the payrolls, unauthorised overpayments, and defaults, irregularities and misappropriations totalling thousands of kina in some departments.

Our research supports this view, and there is no doubt that the Government has a large "Ghost force" on its payroll in Port Moresby. That is to say, it pays more people than it has working for it. The Fraud Squad caught one of these in 1975, a man who had been dismissed from the Public Health Department but who had continued to collect his pay for six months afterwards. Asked why he did it, he said he thought it was "back pay". And we discovered several persons who were on two salaries, having transferred from one department to another, and still being paid by both. When questioned about this, they said they thought it was Higher Duties Allowance.

If we could discover such discrepancies in the normal course of a research programme they must have been glaringly obvious to those senior departmental officers responsible for internal audit and other accountability functions. The impression gained from such of these officers as the research team interviewed indicates that there is a deliberate policy of covering up some thefts and frauds within the public service on the grounds of better a dishonest public service than none at all, the collective inference clearly being that if all senior or middle range public servants were prosecuted for their acts of fraud and theft, there would be very few left to run the country efficiently.

This is by far an hysterical view of the situation, for while it is doubtless that there are some public servants in high positions who are dishonest and given to acts of fraud and theft; there are many others who are not. The Manpower Planning Unit estimates that the end of 1977 will see 2317 high school leavers without wage employment. In 1980 there will be 3707 and in 1984,

17,679. There are therefore literally hundreds of well educated honest young people inside and outside of the public service who are ready to step in and take over each of the positions of those who could be found responsible for the many frauds and thefts within the public service if something were done about it. The Auditor General advocated a "more virile consideration to disciplinary action" and clearly something ought to be done to rid the public service of its criminal element.

But before this weeding out process can begin there needs to be some streamlining of the security checking and disciplinary processes within the services. This can only be done by appropriate changes to the Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act and the other acts of Parliament associated with employment in the various statutory authorities.

Papua New Guinea cannot survive without an efficient and honest Public Service and in all matters designed to keep the service free from the depredations of criminals there is a definite need for law reform.

Also in need of some reform is the delicate subject surrounding the right to be represented in court by counsel. This has been a perplexing matter in Papua New Guinea ever since localisation began, and was generated by the slower localisation of defence counsel. The problem may disappear in time, but until it does, it needs some careful examination to prevent criminals from escaping justice in the meantime simply by the clever manipulation of the established court room process, by experienced expatriate defence lawyers.

Clifford (1976:21) reports "the police maintain and not without some justification that a basic error in the administration of Papua New Guinea has been to

import the Australian system of law which the people neither understand nor appreciate. They are disturbed by the extent to which their own relatively uneducated and legally unskilled police prosecutors are confronted with legally trained and experienced advocates ...

To the police this not only permits injustice where an offence may be dismissed because of a police fault in prosecuting the case (my emphasis) : it reduces the police authority by showing the true offenders that the police are not properly supported by the authorities."

Many cases are dismissed because of a police fault in prosecuting, as Clifford states. But a lot of cases defended by foreign lawyers are also dismissed through no police fault in prosecuting, but through what might be described as "cultural disparity in the court room."

This situation arises when a foreign lawyer defends a case in which all other persons involved, including the Magistrate, are Papua New Guineans. For in relation to all other persons present in the court room, the expatriate defence counsel is usually older and more confident; he would have had about ten years more court room experience than either the prosecutor or the Magistrate, both of whom may not have had even one year's court room experience. In addition, the defence counsel has a university education, is obviously well read, and has probably acquired over the years a polished cocktail circuit accent in English which is of course, his mother tongue.

With all the nuances of this language at his disposal, the expatriate defence counsel is at a considerable advantage, and there is no doubt in this sort of situation as to who has the edge over whom in court room debate or the examination of witnesses. When both the Magistrate and the police prosecutor are limited by their brand of high school English learned as a foreign language, the probability of their missing

a point here and there or of becoming socially out of depth vis-a-vis the defence counsel is always present.

Whatever the law might say about who presides over the hearing of these court cases, the simple sociological fact is that the urbane manner and the eloquence of the expatriate defence counsel soon makes him the focus of court room attention, and his presence soon begins to dominate that of all other persons then assembled.

In such situations, the young Local Court Magistrate quickly becomes culturally out-manoeuvred in his own court room, and the witnesses hopelessly confused by the defence counsel's skilful use of multi-syllabled words, double negatives, discourse in the subjunctive mood or lapses into the ablative absolute.

It then does not take too much argument to convince the Magistrate that there must be a reasonable doubt in his mind that the offence, whatever it was, was ever committed ... so the defendant is acquitted.

Such cases in 1975 were therefore not determined on their actual legal merits, but on the relative cultural advantage skilfully exploited by clever defence counsel.

Quite often the shift in court room control during these cases was so pointed that as soon as an expatriate defence counsel entered the court room, the outcome of the case was predetermined.

It sometimes happened in the lower courts in 1975 that a defended case was prosecuted by expatriate counsel from the State Prosecutors office who were, professionally speaking, the peers of the expatriate defence counsel and this made for a more balanced contest. These instances

however were rare due to a shortage of State lawyers and in most defended matters it was a case of a young unqualified policeman having to pit his talents against those of a highly trained expatriate defence lawyer. In McCallum's case (mentioned later) a very young prosecuting constable had to face not one expatriate defence lawyer, but two, one of whom was the Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Papua New Guinea. Our present law in relation to practice and procedures in the District and Local Courts considers this to have been a fair contest.

However, the architects of the Village Courts Act obviously had this problem in mind because any person can appear for a defendant in a Village Court, except a lawyer (S.42). And while expatriate lawyers will probably never be banned from appearing in the other lower courts, except perhaps to prevent them from competing with National lawyers as soon as there enough of these, there are some simple devices which could be incorporated into the laws relating to the lower courts, to remedy mis-trials of the kind described.

To begin with, the system of appeals from the Lower Courts has long been due for review. The present system of appeal from the Local Court direct to the National Court is time consuming and burdensome, especially as most appeals seem to involve simple mistakes by junior Magistrates which could easily be corrected by a senior Magistrate without bothering the National Court at all, except of course if a party was not satisfied with the second Magistrate's decision. Appeal from the Local Court to the District Court in the first instance has long been advocated by all Magistrates, and now that each Province has a senior Magistrate, it would seem logical for that Magistrate to review all appeals from the Courts in his Province before passing the matter on to the National Court.

Provided that both parties to the Magistrates court had equal rights of appeal so that if the defence can appeal against conviction then the prosecution can also appeal against dismissal, then the problem of ethnic disparity in the court room could be resolved by rehearing by another Magistrate, with judgements set aside in cases where at the original hearing it could be shown that either witnesses or the Magistrate or both, were bamboozled by the polysyllabic eloquence of the expatriate defence counsel.

Strangely enough, although Parliament which in its wisdom passed the "no lawyers" prohibition for the Village Courts, knows of this perplexing problem, both Magistrates and police in a joint submission to the Law Reform Commission were unable to convince its Australian trained lawyers that such a problem exists at all. Even in the National Court before which the matter of "ethnic disparity" was raised during an appeal (McCallum v Buibui*) the court ruled that reference to such a situation by the Magistrate was "not helpful."

The philosophical view of the National Magistrates to the refusal of the higher judicial authorities to even consider that such a situation might exist in the lower courts is that in this land of the wantok system, the lower courts are confronted by the worst kind of wantokism in the country that which exists between "brothers-in-law." **

Only appropriate reforms by Parliament can cure this malaise.

Though law reform is a necessary prerequisite to help overcome the law and order problems in Port Moresby,

* National Court Appeal Case No. 121 of 1975 (P)

** A pun, frequently used to describe the fraternity of lawyers

the reforms that are most needed are not those which entail the creation or abolition of offences, but those which can streamline and simplify the procedures for hearing or otherwise determining matters once the offences have been committed. It is therefore the procedures of courts and other terminating mechanisms which need to be reformed, not the laws.

One of the greatest problems facing the criminal justice system in Port Moresby therefore is what to do with the offender once he has been caught. The antiquated and clumsy imported lower court system which was designed for another society in a bygone era is no longer workable in Port Moresby. What is needed now is a reform in the settlement mechanism to allow for the rapid disposal of large numbers of relatively minor cases at little cost to the community. Simplified court or other hearings are a necessity in the coming years, and so are simple correctional facilities such as probation, parole, weekend jail, and community benefit work parties. How to deal with a multitude of simple offences, quickly, fairly, and cheaply, is the most urgent task of law reformers.

B. The Need for Administrative Reorganisation

However pressing the need for law reform may be, the simple truth of the law and order situation of Port Moresby is that much of the city's crime problem could be solved by a cheap and commonsense reorganisation of the existing resources which are already available in the National Capital, without the necessity of changing any laws at all.

To begin with, most visitors to Port Moresby who either hear of or who experience at first hand some of our more pressing law and order problems are completely mystified at the absence of even the simplest form of police coverage ... the policeman on the beat. This absence is even more surprising for visitors from other parts of Melanesia who have already experienced the inspiring and colourful sight of a Fijian policeman on the beat in downtown Suva or the stolid police foot patrols through the heart of Honiara, in the Solomon Islands.

Despite the introduction of motorised police patrols throughout the world, most police forces still retain the constable on beat for reasons which one police text book explains :

The full time of an officer may be required to prevent and dispose of incidents that call for police service when a large number of them occur in a relatively small area (i.e. for Port Moresby, the areas indicated in Fig. 6) . Conditions that justify a foot patrol under such circumstances are found in areas containing a large number of amusement resorts where the concentration of people requires continuous police attention. (Wilson, 1963:242)

Although Port Moresby is a sprawling scattered city, it has its own version of "amusement resorts where the concentration of people requires continuous police attention" and these of course are those areas of shops, hotels and markets where the Port Moresby people generally congregate during business hours and weekends. Despite the geographical size of Port Moresby, the areas where people so congregate, and where most of the street offences occur, are small, easily identifiable and are shown on Fig. 7.

But despite assurances from the police in December 1975 (P-C 10/12/75) that foot patrols would be introduced into Port Moresby, these were not evident by the middle of 1976. Meanwhile, a dramatic drop in the crime rate in Suva in January 1976 was attributed to increased foot patrols by the Royal Fiji Police in that city (P-C 27/2/76).

What did happen in Port Moresby in March 1976 however was the introduction of an extremely ambitious mobile patrol system using a fleet of brand new patrol vehicles specially designed for this purpose. These vehicles consist of a cabin with two rows of seats which can accommodate six policemen comfortably, and a cell at the rear which can hold as many prisoners. These vehicles are radio controlled, can be stationed anywhere in the city to operate like miniature police stations, and are now a familiar sight on Port Moresby's streets.

With the inauguration of this new mobile system of police coverage, Port Moresby's police embarked upon a crime clean-up programme with a vengeance. Before the new system was introduced, the case loading at Boroko court house in the first few months of 1976 was hovering around 75 appearances per day. The first Monday which followed the introduction of this new system saw 179 cases before the Boroko courts, and each succeeding Monday has seen a similar loading.


Fig 6

THE HIGH CRIME AREAS
OF PORT MORESBY CITY

Comparative Percentages for the Six Month
Period April to September (inclusive)
1975

Location
of Criminal Offences
Heard in the Port Moresby
City Lower Courts
Number of Offences: 4217

Location
of Break and Enter
Offences Reported
to the Police
Number of Offences: 1140



20 15 10 5 :percentage scale: 5 10 15 20 %

Suburban areas having less than 5% of the reported crime for Port Moresby City in either Index are not shown above, and by comparison may be considered to be areas of low crime incidence. These areas are: Map2 Gerehu; Map 11 Adcol; Map 7 Konedobu; Map 22 Sabana; Map 10 University; Map 6 Hanuabada; Map 16 Gabutu and Map 25 Airport.

ACCURACY OF DATA: As Break and Enter offences are committed in relation to buildings, the location of such offences is available in the official records. In relation to many other offences in the General Index however court records detail offence locations only when this happens to be part of the charge. For this reason, the General Index percentages distributed above are only in relation to 4217 such charges: 66% of the total cases heard during the six month period.

Meanwhile, there were 106 breaking and entering offences reported to the police during April 1976; a drop of 58% from that reported for April the previous year.

Though police line efficiency appears to have increased during the year, there is still much room for improvement, for there still has been no attack on the areas of contiguous sanctuary which surround the high crime areas and where the terrain or vegetation prevents the entry of motorised patrols. People in the high crime areas still complain that once a patrol vehicle has passed by, housebreakers and other criminals are free to pop out of the grass like rabbits to continue their depredations until the next patrol comes along.

Even when hotly pursued, criminals are still assured of sanctuary if they can reach the grasslands before the police catch them, for there is no pursuit beyond the boundaries of the built up areas. The new patrol system, for all its successes, is stuck to the streets like tar.

It is fairly obvious therefore that in spite of adequate government expenditure on and good organisation of the new mobile patrol system, the law and order problems of Port Moresby will never be under proper control until at least some of the city's 600 policemen get out of their cars and get onto their feet.

Port Moresby is so scattered and strung out and badly planned that complete foot patrol coverage by police is obviously out of the question. But then such patrols are not needed everywhere in the city all the time, and the argument which used to be advanced in the past that the climate precluded such a form of police coverage, is no longer convincing, given the good foot patrol systems of Honiara and Suva in similar climates.

What is still needed in Port Moresby, and has always been needed here since the current crime problem began, is a system of foot patrols in those areas where "the concentration of people requires continuous police attention", and which are indicated in Fig. 7.

Foot patrols can easily be organised for most of these areas out of the existing police stations at Boroko, Port Moresby, Koki and Hohola. Elsewhere in these areas and beyond convenient walking distance from those police stations a patrol vehicle could be stationed at a convenient intersection, with its crew foot patrolling that immediate vicinity. All this could be achieved with the existing resources now available to the police department at no extra cost.

Police coverage of the grasslands between suburbs and within some suburban areas may require a little more forethought, but is by no means impossible. In these areas a criminal can sit in the grass ten feet away from a policeman and never be seen. He can hide there from a man ... but not from a dog. It does not take much organisation to put a police dog into any suspicious areas of contiguous sanctuary to flush out anyone who happens to be lurking there.

Coverage deeper into the grasslands and into the scattered settlement areas beyond the street network of Port Moresby could be achieved by kiap type foot patrols or by mounted police patrols. Bush patrols have been the backstay of the Papuan Administration for the last seventy five years and there is no reason why these patrols should stop now, even within the National Capital District.

And for those who think that Mounted Police belong only to the horse and buggy era here is an extract from one recent police science text book :

... today the mounted officer is equipped with mobile transistorised two way radios enabling him to communicate with his headquarters and other officers in the field to send and receive messages, information and instructions. Although horse patrol would appear to be a thing of the past, it has a definite place in our modern day police patrol system. (Eldefonso et al, 1974:224)

Even bicycles could be used. Nothing could be simpler than a bicycle patrol. The same text book continues :

A bicycle is quiet and of course can be ridden into areas where no automobile can travel. It is of great aid when the element of surprise is important and is valuable in conducting patrol of high crime rate areas, in many cases making possible the apprehension of suspects in the act of committing a crime. The police officer operating a bicycle and equipped with a transistorised radio is afforded the opportunity of covering a larger area in a shorter period of time with less physical fatigue than his brother officer on foot (p.225).

When people know that the police are likely to appear anywhere at any time in Port Moresby, there are considerable limitations as to who can conceal what and who can or cannot venture forth to plunder. The mere presence of the police does not of course preclude crime, but the constant uncertainty of not knowing where the police are likely to appear next puts criminals into a far more unenviable position than their present situation which is that in the normal course of events they will remain undisturbed by police within settlements, the areas of contiguous sanctuary and in the so called "no go" areas.

Much has been said in the past of the "no go" areas within the National Capital ... those areas where police simply won't go. And for good reason, since on many occasions in the past when entering Hanuabada, Tatana or Baruni to investigate a matter, police vehicles had been stoned, and policemen attacked. The tendency is therefore for police not to go into these areas even when called and as a result, many houses within these "no go" areas have become sanctuaries for car stealers, burglars, shoplifters and other criminals.

For as long as these "no go" areas remain free from police intervention, crime must be expected to continue at its present high level. The point is however, that there is no legitimate reason why any area in Port Moresby should be a "no go" area to the police and with a little bit of subtle reorganisation, these "no go" areas could be converted to "go".

This would have been a little difficult to achieve in the not too distant past when most of the attacks on police occurred, simply because the police rarely went to these places except to look for suspects, and the ordinary bonds of kinship and the wantok system, very strong in these mono-ethnic suburbs automatically reacted against the police, as was to be expected.

But since the introduction of Village Courts into these suburbs police now have a "legitimate" excuse for entering them, simply to pay friendly calls upon their counterparts ... the Village Court Peace Officers. There are many ways in which the regular police can help the peace officers, for example in conveying prisoners to the Corrective Institution, and co-ordinating peace officer activities over the police radio network. This is not to suggest that the regular police should act in such a way as to give the impression that the peace officers are an appendage to the Royal Papua New

Guinea Constabulary, but the presently complicated mechanism involved for a peace officer in Hanuabada to contact a peace officer in Tatana could be short circuited via the radios in two regular police vehicles patrolling separately in these two areas.

Strangely enough, some visits to the Boroko Court House by Village Court officials are for the purpose of complaining about the lack of any directions in the Act providing for co-operation between the regular police and the peace officers. The Village Courts are linked to the regular lower courts via the transfer, supervision and appeals provisions ... but there is no similar link up with the police. This is not to say that there cannot be any co-operation with the police. This option is just left open and it should be taken up by the police immediately to strengthen both police and peace officer control of law enforcement in the National Capital District as a whole. Regular police visits to the peace officers would soon dissolve the "no go" barriers. Begun tentatively at first, by fleeting visits during the day time when most of the work force of these monoethnic suburbs is absent, the duration of police presence could be gradually increased until police presence in these areas is taken for granted, without cause for alarm or reason for attack. As soon as this situation is achieved, car thieves, burglars and other parasites returning to roost in these areas could soon be spotted and intercepted. It was limited access to these areas which was one reason given for their immunity from other criminals and with regular police straddling these accesses, much of Port Moresby's crime would simply disappear.

But whether inside or outside the "no go" areas, the absence of any substantial use of foot, horse or bicycle patrolling was in 1975 not the only form of elementary police method which was not used. Even the simplest police tactics, basic to law enforcement

all over the world, the Port Moresby police seem never to have heard of.

Some of these tactics are :

Blitz:

Most police forces and the Port Moresby police are here included, have their law enforcement sections divided into specialist squads, each detailed to deal with a separate category of offenders. Thus, the Port Moresby police have a Motor Squad, a Fraud Squad, a Breaking Squad, a Licencing Squad and so on.

Our figures show however that while offences generally tend to be committed more often during weekends, the frequency of each category of offence does not automatically rise or fall in parallel with the others. For example, on Saturday nights, the frequency of commission of street offences is high due to the weekend holiday, extended licensing hours, festive mood and so on, while the frequency of passing valueless cheques and other frauds is low or non-existent, because banks and company offices are closed. So while the drunk squad is being overworked on Saturday nights, the fraud squad is idle. Housebreaking for example occurs more often on private pay weekends than on Government pay weekends, and twice as many houses get broken into on Thursdays than on Tuesdays.

The tendency therefore is, for one Squad to be overworked while another is underworked, and while officers in one squad may be unable to cope with a peak situation, others at the same time are off duty or idle.

The technique of "blitz" involves the concentration of all available manpower of the force, of whatever particular squad, upon the particular offence most prevalent at the time. Where specialist knowledge of one kind or another is required because of the nature of the offence, or the complications of arrest, and that knowledge is not normally possessed by policemen of other squads, those squads

which would otherwise be underemployed at the time can nevertheless supply the logistical or other ancillary back up support for the squad in whose province the most prevalent offence at the time then falls.

Superiority at the proper time and place is essential in war. It is equally indispensable in police administration says one police science textbook (Leonard, 1964:14). The form of tactic aimed at gaining police superiority at the proper place is called "Saturation".

Saturation:

While "Blitz" is a police response to the concentration of certain offences in time, saturation is the appropriate response to concentration of certain offences in space.

The new Sector Patrol system of Port Moresby's police which came into operation in 1976 is to some extent a manifestation of saturation technique and has improved police coverage considerably in the areas where it was most needed. But in 1975 any meaningful application of this system was virtually non-existent in Port Moresby. What happened then was that with the exception of a few roving patrols like CIB and Traffic, most other police were deployed around the police stations whence they waited for calls for their services. When a call came, they would go out and look for the place the offence was alleged to have occurred at, and then attend to it sometimes, Some squads had to cover the whole city at the same time, and were based miles away from those areas known to have high occurrences of particular offences. Much time was lost getting to the scene, and in peak crime times police often arrived very late. Sometimes, as we have seen, they did not get there until the following day, when all hope of a fresh pursuit was lost.

Our figures show us which crimes are more prevalent in which suburbs, and that some suburbs have very few calls

for police attention most of the time. It is therefore possible to predict with some degree of accuracy, what calls for police assistance will come from which part of the city at what time. In this sort of situation, it does not make much sense for the police to wait at Boroko police station for all the calls they know will come from Gordon, knowing that the units despatched to attend the calls will arrive too late. The appropriate technique in this situation, is to saturate Gordon with policemen before the calls start.

As peak crime time varies, so also does peak crime place, and to be effective, saturation technique has to be properly managed to avoid saturating the wrong area at the wrong time. If this happens the police are no better off than they were before and might just as well be waiting back in Boroko Police Station.

Fig. 3 for example shows us a switchover in housebreaking concentrations between Boroko and Gordon. In one month, there was an equal number of reported burglaries from these two areas, and in some other months, the difference between the number of reported burglaries did not vary greatly between these two suburbs. However, there were months when the difference in reported housebreakings between these two suburbs was so considerable that it must have been obvious during those times where the burglars were concentrating their activities. It is times like these that saturation technique can be used very effectively, to the advantage of the police.

These simple techniques are easy to organise, and cheap to operate and can be implemented without any changes in the existing laws. They don't cost anything, since the same number of policemen and the same vehicular fleet and other facilities are used but in different formations. The only variation is in the deployment of the existing police resources into different combinations of space and time.

There are many more useful techniques which the Port Moresby police could use if they were a little more ambitious but these require additional funding. Cheap at the price, nevertheless are the following :

The Trojan Horse:

The problem with saturation technique is that although it prevents crime because so many police are in the particular area, it does not catch many criminals. Its main effect is to keep criminals moving elsewhere. It can sweep the streets of drunks, and keep clever criminals like burglars and shoplifters at bay but it does not always keep them out of circulation.

This is most effectively done by catching them in the act from a mobile point of concealment. The "horse" in the Trojan Horse technique is a van of some kind, fitted out inside to contain a number of policemen comfortably, but disguised on the outside to look like anything other than a police van. For this purpose the police have to either borrow or otherwise acquire a retired pie van, milk cart, bakers van, furniture removal van or some other similar vehicle.

From peep holes, one way windows or other vantage points in the van which is parked in a high crime area at a high crime time, half a dozen police simply watch the activities of pickpockets, shoplifters, housebreakers or whatever. When they spot one in action, they spring from concealment, seize him, and put him into the van. It can be done so quickly that other shoplifters operating in the same area are unaware of the arrest, and continue their depredations until they too are spotted and caught.

The same "horse" can be used on many occasions in different parts of the city before it becomes too well known, but sooner or later it becomes necessary to alter its description. For a while this can be done by repainting it, or plastering it with

advertisements and other more bizarre camouflage, but eventually a different vehicle has to be used. The best way to do this is by some arrangement with a used car dealer who recycles his used vans through the technique in return for a fee. In this manner the "horse" keeps changing its colour and description and maintains its anonymity most of its working time.

"Check Point Charlie"


Incidents of housebreaking which involve the removal of heavy furnishing or equipment also involve the movement of motor vehicles. Some housebreaking acts often incorporate the theft of a vehicle for removal purposes and if the police are quick enough to stop the vehicle before it is abandoned, they catch more than two birds with one stone as it were. Vehicles are also used in the commission of offences other than burglary of course for example the transportation of stolen goods, contraband and alcohol or drugs for illegal sale.

With vehicles travelling all over the city all the time, some being abandoned anywhere between Port Moresby and Rigo or Port Moresby and Bereina, it would seem to be a hopeless task for the police to drive around aimlessly wondering which vehicles are involved in which crimes. But if the police stay put in the right places, the vehicles will come to them.

Port Moresby is not a clearly defined housing continuum, like most other cities in most parts of the world. It does not have a grid system of streets and avenues like New York. It has no city centre, and does not conform to the usual city plan as defined by Harris and Ullman (1945).

Port Moresby city is a collection of small isolatable settlements connected physically only by a narrow ribbon road network. It has no Metro, no trolley bus service, no monorail or any kind of suburban railway system, and the only advantage of the city's ill-conceived

Fig 7



Amusement resorts of Port Moresby where the concentration of people requires continuous police attention.

(Marked thus:



plan is that from a law enforcement point of view, it makes most of the citizens most of the time dependent upon motor vehicle transport, of one kind or another.

People in Port Moresby can walk from one part of the city to another if they want to, but the city is so strung out, and its climate so hot in the day time, and its streets so dark at night that the only convenient way of getting around is by motor vehicle. This makes most travellers, most of the time in Port Moresby, subject to the Motor Traffic Act which allows for police to stop and examine vehicles at any time. (Regs. 100 & 113, Motor Traffic Act).

A few well positioned road blocks can at any time momentarily physically isolate one part of Port Moresby from the others (see Fig. 7) and if permanent police check points were established at various places in the city all stolen cars and heavy burgled loot would be liable to police interception.

This may appear to be advocating something too close to a "police state". However Port Moresby's traffic police have been stopping cars for years during the daytime at mobile check points throughout the city, and nobody has yet complained. The offences of driving under the influence of liquor (DUI in the figures), dangerous driving and speeding, all come to the notice of the police by the particular manner in which a particular vehicle is driven at a particular time, or else as a result of an accident which police attend, or upon complaint by another irate driver.

But nobody rings up the police to complain that his neighbour's car registration has expired or that he is driving around on the wrong licence. These and other minor traffic infringements, and there were 2153 such cases before the courts during the

survey period, the police have to find out for themselves, by actually stopping the vehicles for routine checks at mobile check points along the streets.

It happened quite often in 1975 and quite by accident, that a vehicle stopped for routine check in this manner was found to be stolen, or to contain persons otherwise wanted by the police. Everyone, including the police were surprised when this happened, since the vehicles were not stopped in the first instance for this purpose.

Routine checks of vehicles continued into 1976 and from April to July* of that year, 1364 cases came before the courts of persons stopped for minor traffic infringements. And the number of vehicles stopped for routine check but whose drivers never came into court because the police found nothing wrong at the time, is anybody's guess.

This shows that Port Moresby's citizens have got used to being stopped and checked by traffic police and submit to these checks without complaint. The police could exploit this tolerance to its fullest extent, by using the checkpoint technique to deliberately detain suspicious looking vehicles, on the pretext of a licence check-up, or for searching for some minor defect in the vehicle, at critical places around Port Moresby and at critical times, when offences which incorporate the use of vehicles are most prevalent.

The area of Map 8 in the figures, the Tuaguba peninsula where the oldest buildings still stand, has the third highest rate of reported break and enters in Port Moresby. Together with the adjoining area of Map 7, this part of the city forms a convenient sector for checkpoint isolation; ... for a car load of burgled goods can

* April, 129; May, 347; June, 396; July, 492

leave this sector by two roads only ... Boe Vagi Road and Le Hunt Road. These roads at places are only 30 feet wide, and if the vehicle has not passed through such narrow exit confines then it has not left the sector. That narrows the search area considerably.

Similarly, there is only one road exit from Gerehu; two from Tokarara; three from Waigani, and only six road exits exist from the whole of Port Moresby city.

If police checkpoints became fixed instead of mobile, positioned at narrow exit points in selected city areas instead of at random along the streets, and staffed permanently instead of temporarily, then with the use of fewer policemen selected crimes in Port Moresby could be more successfully isolated.

Finally, the most ambitious administrative reorganisation which the Port Moresby police could employ, though one which requires very little effort, and very little investment by way of funds or manpower resources is the technique known as the Target and the Team.

The Target and the Team:

Changeover to this technique presupposes that the law enforcement arm of the police force is already organised into squads designed to investigate certain categories of offences as already described. But although police may be organised this way, the criminals are not. That is to say, although police might specialise in investigating crimes, criminals do not always specialise in committing them.

Thus, we might get a situation in Port Moresby like this : At 9 p.m. one night, a pickpocket takes a wallet from an unsuspecting victim during the interval time at the Papuan Theatre. Before the interval ends the victim becomes aware of his loss and reports it immediately to police on duty at the Musgrave Street police station opposite the theatre. Investigations

are still continuing without a suspect having been found one hour later when a car is stolen from outside the Ela Beach RSL Club. Club officials call the Boroko Police Station where units of the Motor Squad are prompted into action. While they are interviewing the car owner at the RSL, a house is broken into in Gordon and neighbours alert the Boroko Police Station again. This time, units of the Breaking Squad go to Gordon to attend the house-breaking scene and while this is happening, the getaway car in its haste to avoid pursuit hits and runs down a pedestrian at Boroko. While the Traffic Squad are interviewing witnesses there, the Sector Patrols are alerted to look for the offending hit and run vehicle as soon as the description has been ascertained from the witnesses at Boroko.

Each of the five squads investigating these matters that night, are, at least in the first instance unaware that they are all looking for the same car load of youths involved in all four incidents, and even if the gang is caught by units of one squad the probability of their facing all four charges is remote, since there is no single co-ordinating cross ply to link one offence with the others.

Even if during the investigation of one offence, evidence is discovered of the others, this evidence tends to get lost in the change over of shifts between policemen and in the paper shuffle between one squad room and another. Unless all culprits are caught together, there is no co-ordinating mechanism to link one with the others, and quite often the police deem the case "closed" as soon as one culprit is caught. If the offenders are all caught separately, they are usually interviewed separately by different detectives on different shifts, sometimes from different squads, and at different times.

In this sort of situation, all hope of a co-ordinated presentation of the sum total of the gang's activities to a court is lost. The offenders are usually charged

separately, at different times, often before different courts, and the penalties received, if any, are usually different. In fact some members of the gang may be convicted of one offence by one Magistrate while other members of the gang are acquitted of the same offence by another Magistrate, even though all members were equally involved. If the error is discovered later, recriminations of one kind or another usually follow, with police blaming the Magistrates for being "weak" and the Magistrates blaming the police for muddling the evidence. The criminals meanwhile, particularly those who escaped prosecution entirely could be forgiven if they came to the conclusion that despite myths and legends to the contrary, crime does pay after all.

The problem of course lies in the basis of the current law and enforcement strategy of the Port Moresby police which is reactive commitment of resources towards offence oriented crime. In other words, what happens now is that the police wait for an offence to be committed, then go out and investigate it. In 1975 they didn't always get there, and in 1976 additional resources were supplied to the police designed to get them there faster ... but always after the event.

Target and Team tactics on the other hand involve a proactive commitment of resources towards organisational oriented crime. This does not require additional resources; it just means that the existing resources are committed differently, without any necessity to change the law, and are directed not towards solving individual crimes committed by individuals after the crimes have occurred, but towards watching the organised activities of gangs to prevent the crimes from ever occurring in the first instance, and to meet organised crime with organised prosecution of crime (Smith D.C. & Salerno R.F. (1970) 101).

Now the police cannot be expected to watch every group of youths everywhere, all the time, but as a major

proportion of the major property crimes in Port Moresby are committed by gangs whose members are already well known to the police, the police can watch most of Port Moresby's major criminals most of the time.

Thus, each major gang becomes a "Target" for police surveillance, by a "Team" of policemen drawn from different squads, and instead of sitting in the police stations waiting for a call to attend the scene of a crime, each "Team" goes out looking for its target gang, to see what the gang is doing. Each team follows the activities of its target and when finding its gang committing offences, arrests, interrogates and prosecutes each member involved, in each court the cases are brought, before each Magistrate then sitting, so that each organised crime is met with an organised, co-ordinated and rationalised police investigation and prosecution. With one gang in jail, the "Team" then moves on to another "Target" and so on, with all the gangs in Port Moresby liable to come under the intensive scrutiny of the police teams at any time.

With a little manipulation of the wantok system to which each gang member along with every other Papua New Guinean belongs, the Target and Team tactic could reduce Port Moresby's crime situation considerably. All that is needed is for the police to do a little more watching and a little less waiting.

Mismanagement of resources within the Police Department in 1975 was however matched, in proportion, by an even greater degree of mismanagement of Port Moresby's lower court system.

In 1975, Port Moresby's District and Local Courts operated from two separate court houses, the one at Douglas Street (Map 8) City, and the other one at Turumu Street (Map 20) Boroko. They were only four miles apart, but considering the lack of co-ordination and co-operation between them, they might just as well have been on different planets.

There were times during that year when the Boroko Magistrates were snowed under with work, churning out court decisions at the rate of one every three minutes and having extra court sittings at night and during weekends while the Magistrates in the Douglas Street court house, had nothing to do. Even when they did have plenty to do, they were not always there to do it, and frequently police arrived with witnesses and exhibits for a listed hearing, only to find that there were no Magistrates available. Where had they all gone ? Nobody knew.

While at Boroko Court House, the criminal records were in a remarkably tidy state considering the volume of paper flowing in and the size of the storage space available there, the records of civil cases in the Douglas Street Court House were in chaos. Magistrates there were hearing courts in their own offices, sometimes behind closed doors marked "Court in Session - Do Not Disturb" in complete denial of the basic principle of open court, and the majority of decisions reached by Magistrates as mediation were never recorded. They are not included in the statistics for the six month survey period because research staff could not find them.

And whilst justice could be said to have been lacking at Boroko Court House in 1975 from the necessary haste in which judgements were handed out ... necessary that is, to keep up with the case loading, justice was also lacking in the Douglas Street courthouse but for the opposite reason : cases which could have been finalised quickly often took months to terminate.

What is remarkable about this state of affairs is that it was not a product of localisation but quite the reverse: The system got out of kilter

previously while under the control of expatriate Magistrates and expatriate executive staff then in the Law Department, and although the senior Magistrates at both court houses in 1975 were Papua New Guineans, administration of Port Moresby's lower courts was already in an advanced stage of disintegration when they inherited it.

Happily, Independence cured the basic ills of the lower court administration of Port Moresby, since the Constitution provides for a Chief Magistrate to fill a co-ordinating and an administrative role which was lacking previously. Magistrates have ceased to be their leaderless selves, and are now properly organised into a graded and structured service. All Magistrates in Port Moresby for administrative purposes now come under the control of a senior Magistrate, and the management of both court houses is integrated with instant staff transfers from one to the other now available to fill unexpected case loadings or for other administrative reasons. The problem of insufficient court room space still remains however, as a continuing defect in an otherwise improved lower court administration.

As the lower court administration in Port Moresby degenerated over the past few years under expatriate control, so also did the administration of the Police Force, and the disorganised state of police management already described was inherited in a similar manner by the present Papua New Guinean police officers who now occupy the higher positions in the Force.

There was much talk in 1975 about the departing expatriate police "experts" whose expired contracts of service were not renewed. But in retrospect, it seems we are better off without some of them, since it is highly doubtful if many of those who have since departed ever had the appropriate expertise in the first instance. If they had, how was it that the

police became so disorganised ?

The same could be said for those expatriate Magistrates and lawyers who maintained in the past, and some still do, a mid-Victorian pedantry in the courtroom which is unsuited to the circumstances of the country.

English might be the official language of Papua New Guinea, but it is still very much the language of a foreign culture, and much of that language and much of that culture will continue to remain unsuited to Papua New Guinean conditions for some time to come.

The end of the long tunnel appears to be in sight however, and with the appropriate blend of expatriate technology and Melanesian experience the effective reorganisation of both the police and the lower courts in Port Moresby is now well under way.

5. Remedies Outside the Criminal Justice System

The many and varied causes of crime are not all curable by an efficient police force or a simplified court procedure, and no amount of reforms within the defective elements of the police or the court system can cure the underlying syndrome of Port Moresby's social woes whose common denominator is "booze and boredom."

An efficient drunk squad can clear the streets of drunks, and harsher penalties can keep the drunks out of circulation for a while; but neither can stop people from drinking too much, or stealing alcohol when there is no money to buy it ... nor stealing food when whatever money was available has already been spent on beer ... nor stealing clothes for the children so that they can look decent in school because the family income has already been dissipated at the hotels ... and so on.

40% of the crime in Port Moresby was in 1975 either directly or indirectly attributable to the abuse or the over use of alcohol, and the Liquor Licensing Commission is well aware of this. In 1975 the Commission became "proactive" in Port Moresby in various experimental ploys aimed at reducing the amount of liquor induced crimes and the attendant social problems thereof, and so far some of these experiments appear to have been successful. At least there was a drop in the sales of alcoholic drinks for the first six months of 1976 compared with the same period in 1975*. Much of this effort was achieved with the cooperation of the breweries by way of voluntary advertising restraint, and by

* Figures released by the Liquor Licensing Commission in 1976 for P.N.G. generally indicate a slight per capita decrease in the consumption of alcohol.

one or two research programmes and anti-drink advertising schemes financed by the breweries.

Government policy for the last few years has been to recognise that absolute prohibition would be impossible to enforce and would most likely generate more problems than it was intended to solve, but that selective prohibition can be used sometimes to great effect. Implementation of this policy results in either partial or total bans on the sale or consumption of liquor at licensed premises during long weekends or during prolonged festive occasions like Christmas and Easter.

And when selective prohibition has been combined with spectacular sporting, cultural or other large scale social events in Port Moresby recently, the temporary drop in crimes at these times has been startling.

The Independence celebrations in September 1975 which consisted of a week long series of spectacular and moving ceremonies with much pomp and circumstance and many foreign dignitaries to look at and a week long ban on liquor sales was the only occasion within living memory when, for a few hours, the cell block at the Boroko Police Station was empty.

Christmas 1975 and the Queens Birthday weekend of 1976, both accompanied by large scale sporting fixtures and selective liquor bans produced the lowest loading in recent years of cases before the courts for the first working day following a weekend, and though the sample of prohibition weekends is still small, these experiments have worked effectively so far.

One experiment which appears not to have worked effectively however was that connected with restricted liquor trading on Thursdays, a device begun by the Liquor Licensing Commission in 1975 to encourage husbands to take home the paypacket undisturbed by

excursions into hotels on the way.

In 1976 a survey conducted by the University of Papua New Guinea, prompted by the Liquor Commission and funded by a brewery, indicated that the experiment of restricted liquor sales on Thursdays had failed because :

- (i) 40% of husbands were not paid on Thursdays;
- (ii) In some families the drink and money problem is not confined to Thursdays;
- (iii) There was no total ban of liquor sales on Thursdays; and
- (iv) Black market sales continued the supply of liquor after hotels had closed.

(Awuko, J. et al: 1976)

These findings are consistent with Port Moresby's crime figures which indicate that liquor induced crimes although high on Thursdays, do not peak until Saturdays, and that restricted sales, to be more effective, might best be imposed on Saturdays, if at all.

The Thursday restrictions however were intended only as an experiment in the first instance, and were intended to be altered if later found to be ineffective. In all probability the Liquor Licensing Commission will continue to juggle trading hours around until the optimum mixture of drinking satisfaction and reduced incidence of liquor induced crime is found. Though a satisfactory solution is not yet in sight, the Liquor Licensing Commission at least deserves some credit for trying, and it is apparent that a solution to Port Moresby's crime problem in general depends a lot on the solution of its drinking problem in particular.

Another remedy to Port Moresby's crime problem which

also lies outside the orbit of the criminal justice system could be found in changes in the allocation policy of the National Housing Commission. In the past it was government policy in Port Moresby to prevent the growth of ethnic suburbs, by deliberate allocation of adjacent dwellings or dwelling sites to applicants of different ethnic origin. This was designed to prevent "Little Goilalas" or "Little Chimbus" from springing up in the suburbs. This policy of course did not operate where houses and house sites were not available for allocation, and the result was that "Little Goilalas" and "Little Chimbus" did develop in squatter settlements and on land over which the allocation of houses and sites was not controlled. In any case, as has been shown earlier in this thesis with the incidence of crime in suburban Port Moresby inversely proportional to the degree of monethnicity in any particular suburb, the continued and forced integration in controlled residential areas might be a mistake.

Elsewhere in the world, segregated suburbs have tended to encourage ethnic prejudices, and such prejudices are already apparent in Port Moresby. (Latukefu, R.A.:1972) but even so, this rarely leads to trouble. Certainly in the past, there have been ethnic based riots sparked off by football matches and even less volatile incidents in Port Moresby, but nothing like this has happened since 1974, and so far it has not yet been definitely shown that suburban segregation contributed to these riots in the past ... they may have happened whatever the ethnic residential pattern might then have been.

It is natural for people to want to live among their own kind. The Motuans in Port Moresby like living in Hanuabada, the wanigelas in Koki, the Kiwai in Horse Camp and so on. These areas are rich in the culture of the ethnic origin of their inhabitants, and very little crime is committed in them.

On the other hand, the mixed ethnic suburbs created by the Housing Commission are a hotchpotch of families each isolated from their neighbours, struggling to overcome entrenched social barriers, and traditional fears and suspicions. It would therefore seem sound administration for the Housing Commission to reverse its present policy and allow applicants to nestle among persons of their own ethnic origin.

One of the main barriers to the creation of Village Courts in the suburbs of Port Moresby was the problem of what custom was to be enforced in multi-ethnic suburbs. Village Courts are already in existence in some of the monoethnic suburbs and more Village Courts could follow if more suburbs became monoethnic. The creation of more monoethnic suburbs should be considered as a future weapon against crime, at least house by house crime such as burglary.

Another housing problem, though one which is not connected to Housing Commission policy, involves police efficiency and morale. Though the police community in Port Moresby, that is to say the 600 serving members of the Police Force, their wives, children and other dependents, make up only 2% of the city's population, they are among the worst housed. Certainly they are the worst housed of any government department or instrumentality. Clifford (1976:17) remarks that the police force "used to have parity with the army in pay and conditions of service, but it had gradually lost ground so that the ordinary constable is now in a much worse position than the soldier". Anyone doubting this statement should compare Gordon Barracks with Murray Barracks.

Gordon Barracks, the main residential area for serving policemen in Port Moresby is built of materials which are inferior, though common in Port Moresby, is overcrowded in terms of buildings to land, and persons to buildings; frequently three and four constables are

required to share a room designed originally for one. There is a wet canteen at Gordon Barracks but it is inadequate in size and amenities for the number of persons it is expected to serve, though in tone with the other general lack of amenities at Gordon. The police have no playing fields of their own and no other adequate sporting or recreation facilities, and it is no wonder that off duty policemen seek solace in the nearest liquor dispenser, the large and spacious public bar of the Islander Hotel.

Meanwhile, Murray Barracks, situated on both sides of Wards Road beginning at the Taurama intersection has spacious two storied single soldiers barracks, neatly laid out married quarters, well appointed mess buildings, spacious playing fields and a good swimming pool. The Sergeant's Mess can put on a good dance, and in many other ways Murray Barracks offers a relatively high standard of amenities to the troops, and it is a good place to live.

What really aggravates this disparity in service conditions is that while the police are constantly being badgered to improve their efficiency, suffer constant assaults and indignities by drunks and other criminals particularly at weekends, and generally have a hard time with inadequate equipment in keeping crime under control, the army meanwhile with far better resources and amenities at its disposal is underemployed.

The Naval and Air components of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force do serve a useful peace time purpose. The Naval vessels double as a Coast Guard and the Air Force planes deliver government supplies and construction equipment to remote airstrips of Papua New Guinea where commercial aircraft do not fly. But the only peace time task confronting the army is that of justifying its own existence.

Papua New Guinea's soldiers have not fired a single shot in defence of their country for over thirty years. No serving troops have had any combat experience, and even if they had, they could not win a war on their own simply because the original concept of the PIR was as a tropical appendage to the Australian Army. Since Independence however, troops of the Papua New Guinea Defence Force now have nothing to append to, or for that matter no appendage of their own to lead into battle, since Papua New Guinea does not have an extensive citizen reserve force found in other smaller countries like Switzerland or Israel (Allon, Y; 1970:232). Its only meaningful role seems to be "civic action" which is in reality a duplication of the services already supplied by the Public Works Department, Area Authorities and other constructional organisations, but which nevertheless it does very well.

For wartime defence purposes it would seem that Papua New Guinea would be far better advised to rely upon defence treaties with Australia, New Zealand and the United States, and as part of those treaty arrangements to contribute within the limits of its own budget a small, specialised commando unit designed to cope with those problems of modern defence which may be peculiar to Papua New Guinea.

Though it would make sense for Papua New Guinea to retain also some kind of disciplined force for use in volcanic, cyclonic or other natural disasters, or as a back-up to police in time of widespread violence or insurrection, such a force need not necessarily be of the present size of the Papua New Guinea Army, and there would appear to be no reason for the Defence Force to continue to occupy Murray Barracks which straddles the nation's busiest traffic intersection.

It makes a lot of sense however, for the police, especially the traffic police to set up a headquarters

here, and with the police accommodation and morale in Port Moresby already in desperate straits, it would seem that more meaningful use of the whole Murray Barracks complex could be best attained by giving it to the police.

There would be no need for a traumatic mass dismissal of troops from the Army, or regimental upheavals of great magnitude in the Defence Force. But a drop in recruitment targets accompanied by the usual wastage of personnel by resignation, retirement or dismissal; the phasing out of a primary war role of the Army in favour of a civil emergency role and the programmed relocation of the reduced troop strength from Murray Barracks to other establishments of the Defence Force in Papua New Guinea would gradually phase the army out and the police in to better quarters and facilities in Murray Barracks.

Such a move would cost little and achieve much and would so increase morale and efficiency in the Police Force as to result in a major improvement in the law and order situation in Port Moresby.

Throughout Port Moresby generally, and particularly in those suburban areas where burglary is endemic, the Government, in an effort to supplement whatever overhauls it is planning in the criminal justice system to face up to the crime problem, could encourage residents to take self help measures of their own.

Taking those householders who have managed to survive the crime wave as an example, the Government could take the initiative via the press and radio to advise residents on the sort of simple precautions against crime which have already proved to be effective. One recommendation it could make for example might be for all householders within a convenient housing cluster to pool K1 per week each for retaining a night watchman to guard the housing cluster during

high crime times. For according to defensible space theory (Grenough; 1974 : 431) the mere fact that householders in a particular residential area have taken some collective action against criminals will for reasons already described induce potential criminal intruders, if they must do their thing, to do it elsewhere.

Another example of self help against crime could be a roster of householders living more or less adjacent to each other, designed to ensure that at least one member of one household within the particular cluster of dwellings is present at all times to watch for any intruders.

The individual householders of Port Moresby do not have access to the crime reports and therefore cannot in the normal course of events predict when and where attempts will be made to plunder their property. But the Government has access to this information via the CIB records and is in a position to predict when and where particular crimes are likely to occur in Port Moresby, and can advise residents of the particular areas accordingly. The Government for example, could make public daily tallies of criminal offences and advise the public of the areas in Port Moresby where criminals are currently active. The NBC already broadcasts daily statistics from the Weather Bureau; there is no reason why it should not broadcast statistics from the Criminal Investigation Bureau.

Forewarned is forearmed; Crime tallies broadcast daily over the radio and published daily in the press would keep Port Moresby residents alert to what sort of offences are currently committed and where, and would destroy the currently popular laissez faire attitude that to become a victim of crime is the inevitable consequence of living in Port Moresby.

Such of course is not the case, as we have seen, and many persons have lived for years in Port Moresby without a single offence having been committed against them. The reason: They took the proper precautions. As with all other freedoms, the price of freedom from crime is eternal vigilance. If residents of the city only took even the most basic precautions, much of Port Moresby's incidence of housebreaking would just disappear.

Finally, some action must be taken to deal with the unemployment problem. Unemployment in 1977 is everywhere, even in the advanced nations like the United States and Australia, so Papua New Guinea is not alone with this problem. However, vis-a-vis these nations, Papua New Guinea is alone in the problem of what to do about it in the first instance, particularly in the towns and major cities like Port Moresby. Unemployed in New York and Sydney can obtain unemployment relief. Unemployed in Port Moresby cannot, for there is no such system in Papua New Guinea. Unemployed in New York or Sydney do not have to steal to eat, but unemployed in Port Moresby sometimes do have to. Once the welcome of the wantok system has run out, there are very few avenues left through which food and other essentials can be obtained other than by theft.

Property crimes must be expected to continue in Port Moresby for as long as there remains no system for dealing with the hungry unemployed. Urban drift is inevitable, but urban hunger is not. There are huge areas of grasslands in and around Port Moresby which could be farmed by the unemployed if they were given a chance. There is in and around Port Moresby an abundance of unused and arable land, and an abundance of unemployed labour. Compulsory acquisition of land coupled with some form of National Youth Service might kill two birds with the one stone and at least partly solve this perplexing situation.

While the causes of the current crim wave in Port Moresby are many and varied, so also are the cures. Many of the cures however lie totally outside the criminal justice system, and a little more effort by those who are in a position to help could return Port Moresby to its former low crime condition and make this nation's capital city a safer place in which to live.

6. Measures of Crime Prevention

There are twenty three ways in which crime can be reduced in Port Moresby. Not all of these methods have to be implemented immediately, but unless some are implemented soon there can be no hope for a reduction in crime in Port Moresby within the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the more of these methods are implemented, the safer everyone in Port Moresby will be.

Some of the ways to beat crime in Port Moresby are so obvious that it would almost seem pointless to mention them here, were it not for the fact that even the simplest and most obvious methods of protection against crime have in many instances in the recent past not been implemented.

Most of the more effective crime prevention methods cost nothing; some cost little; most can be introduced under the existing laws of Papua New Guinea, without any alterations in the existing policy of the Government. Generally these methods involve only a better distribution or use of resources already available to householder and Government alike.

Ranked in order of simplicity, the first ten methods are directed at the average householder, and the remainder at the Papua New Guinea Government :

1. Keep your doors locked:

If you have more than one entrance to your house, keep them all locked whenever you leave the house, even if only visiting neighbours. Leave the doors locked even if you are still on the premises, unless you are working or playing within sight of the door. If you are working or sitting out at the back, then lock the front door. If you are

working in the garden at the front, lock the back door. In 13% of all "housebreakings" in Port Moresby in 1975, burglars gained entry simply by walking through open doors.

2. Get to Know your Neighbour:

Many residents in Port Moresby like any other city residents in the world, do not know who lives next door, yet your neighbour is one of the best deterrents against housebreaking. If you have houses on each side of you and across the street as well, get to know everyone who lives in them. If you live in a block of flats, get to know everyone else who lives in the same block. You don't have to throw a party for this purpose; just walk in and tell them who you are and ask them to keep an eye on your house whenever they happen to be around when you are away. You don't have to introduce all your friends to all your neighbours; your neighbours soon get to know who are regular visitors to your house and are in a good position to alert the police if someone unknown to them is seen lurking around your house in your absence. Remember they don't want to get broken into either, so they will look after your house while you are away, if you will look after their house when they are away.

3. Don't all go away at the same time:

Following on from the last suggestion, it does not take much organisation to ensure that you and your neighbours are not all absent from your area at the same time. It is a bit difficult during working hours, but then there are usually wives or children or visitors at home in one of the adjoining houses or flats at any one time. During weekends, everyone does not want to rush off to Ela Beach all at the same time. Some want to go shopping first; others want to go shopping afterwards ... some have to go to football practice; some play squash or whatever;

but never all at the same time. A simple roster system ensuring that there is always at least one of you around at any one time is one of the best defences against becoming a victim of crime.

4. Erect a Boundary Fence:

This does not have to look like the Berlin Wall. It can be a chicken wire fence, a hedge, a ditch, or a row of bricks or rocks along the ground, so long as it looks obvious to anyone passing by, where the area open to the public ends and where your private allotment begins. This automatically puts the onus upon any intruder to explain why he is inside your boundary. For this reason, any boundary is better than none.

5. Keep a Dog:

Any flea bitten mongrel will do. He does not have to be savage, in fact it is probably better that he is not, otherwise he might savage some of your friends by mistake. But the average dog soon gets to know who ought to be around your place and who ought not and his bark is enough to encourage adventurous vagabonds to move on. If your neighbour's dog expresses a liking to sleep on your veranda ... don't chase him away; he will protect that lair also, so encourage him to stay.

6. Keep your Servants Quarters Occupied at all Times:

Many residents in Port Moresby have servants quarters attached to their house but either do not need servants, do not want them, or cannot afford to employ them. This is no reason to keep your servants quarters empty. Housing is short in Moresby and there are thousands of inadequately housed people in Port Moresby who would be willing to live in your servants

quarters. One of the best deterrents against crime in Moresby is an arrangement between the householder and the occupants of the servants quarters whereby the householder allows the occupants free tenancy of the servants quarters in return for continuous surveillance of the allotment, with a bit of gardening thrown in for good measure. If you have the choice of living in a house with or without servants quarters, always take the house with servants quarters, whether you want servants or not. The presence of persons in the servants quarters is one of your best defences.

7. Make sure your windows or other openings are secure:

Bars are better than chain wire security, but chain wire is better than nothing. The design of most houses in Port Moresby incorporates louvered windows. Nothing could be more inviting to burglars, unless the window frames are adequately secured against unlawful entry. In 56% of all the reported incidences of housebreaking during 1975, entry was made by removing or breaking louver blades in window frames which had either inadequate coverage of security wire or bars or no security at all. If you must have louver blades in your house, make sure nobody can get through them.

8. Leave Security Lights on at Night:

You don't need search lights, klieg lights, spot lights or lime lights, but you do need a few 40w. globes either outside the frame of your house, or at least directed to shine outside. If there are no special fittings for outside lights on your house, buy a few leads and plug them into power points. If your house is on stilts or otherwise raised from the ground, make sure the underneath part is adequately lit at night. Remember, your

neighbours, the occupants of your servants quarters, or passing police patrols cannot be expected to spot prowlers quickly at night unless you help a little with a few lights.

9. Always report any crime committed against you:

The number of people who do not report offences committed against them would amaze you. Yet it is for your own protection that you let the police know if your house has been burgled or if there has been any recent attempt to do so. Failure to report such incidences will only encourage gangsters to return. Next time they might do the job properly, on you, or your wife.

10. Know your Address:

Don't laugh at this one, but you would be surprised at the number of people in Port Moresby who cannot say exactly where they live. Port Moresby does not have a street numbering system, but buildings are adequately identified by Section and Lot numbers, and the city for police purposes is divided into Sectors. Police cannot respond to a call quickly if they are given directions something like this:

"I'm in a house in Chinsura Street ... or maybe its Queenscliffe Street ... anyway its up near the YWCA. You know the YWCA?"

"Yes lady, we know the YWCA but where is your house from there?"

"It's up the other end."

"Other end of what, lady?"

"The other end of the street."

"Which street?"

And so it goes on and on with the complainant becoming more and more exasperated at the "stupidity" of the police for not coming quickly. Your house has a Section Number and a Lot Number like everyone else's house in Port Moresby so learn what it is, and stick it onto your telephone so that when calling the police you

don't forget it when momentarily under stress. Also, mark your house clearly with a sign which says 'SEC 3 : LOT 26' or whatever, so that the police can find it quickly. Remember, the police can't help you properly unless you help them a little.

It must be stressed however that not all these methods are effective all the time. Some are more effective than others, but to take no precautions at all, all the time, is only inviting trouble. Any precaution is better than none, and the less you take, the more likely it is that you will become a victim of crime in Port Moresby.

But remember that while some people in Port Moresby have had their houses burgled frequently, some even at six weekly intervals in 1975; there are other people who have lived in Port Moresby for years and years and have never had a single offence of any kind committed against them. Learn from them.

Whilst householders in Port Moresby can take steps of their own to assist in the general reduction of crime within the city, they cannot alone take all the steps necessary to achieve this purpose. Much of the necessary effort aimed at reducing the volume of crime in Port Moresby can only be taken by the Government, or by the appropriate semi-governmental agencies.

Nevertheless, most of the steps required to be taken by the Government involve only a few Cabinet decisions, extensions of policies already in existence, a reshuffle of personnel into more productive and meaningful activities, and at the very most, some minor changes in the law. None of the steps required by Government need any additional funding, and although some of these recommendations may also appear a little obvious, they are included here for the same reasons already expressed in relation to recommendations to householders. That is,

the obvious has not always been implemented in the past

Bearing in mind that it cannot be blamed for what it inherited at independence, the following suggestions are directed at the present Government of Papua New Guinea:

1. Move the Police Force from a Reactive Posture to a Proactive Posture:

This can be done by the introduction of such basic police tactics as beat, blitz, saturation, Check Point, Trojan Horse, and Target and Team.

2. Improve Police Morale:

Improvements to housing and other basic necessities which maintain morale in a disciplined force would be achieved if the Murray Barracks complex were handed over to the police and the troops were moved to other Defence establishments elsewhere in Papua New Guinea. This could be done gradually by normal wastage in the Defence Force via retirements, dismissals reduced recruiting targets, etc.

3. Simplify the Procedure in the Lower Courts:

The first requirement is to get rid of the Committal Process. It could be retained in some simplified form in the Provinces, but even in simplified form, Committal Process within the city of Port Moresby serves no useful purpose at all. Proceedings for Indictable Offences within the city should commence by ex-officio information direct in the National Court.

Another requirement is to ban expatriate lawyers from the Local Courts. Defendants always have a right to elect a District Court hearing where any lawyer could appear. The intention of simple offence procedure in the lower courts was to keep simple matters simple. Any attempts by lawyers

to make mountains out of molehills in the Lower Courts simply clogs the case loading and delays every other Defendant's hearing. The proper place for eloquence, pondering and pedantry is the National Court, where the appeal process can take any matter from the Lower Courts, in any case.

4. Simplify the Appeal Process:

Much court room time is lost in the preparation of appeals from the court of a junior Magistrate, when the matter could have been rectified by a senior Magistrate if he had had the jurisdiction. The present system of appeal from the Local Courts direct to the National Court should be replaced by channelling the appeal through the District Court in the first instance. Unsatisfied appellants could still be allowed to appeal further if they wished.

5. Standardise Minimum Penalties:

The present system of allowing each Magistrate to decide each penalty in each case before him without reference to any other similar case before any other Magistrate has led to absurd variations of penalty. The present system also makes no allowance for fears of payback or other reprisals upon Magistrates, or variations in penalty caused by ethnic quirks. Standard minimum penalties already exist in the Customs Act and also in the Motor Traffic Act. Every Act should have a standardised minimum penalty.

6. Vary the Kinds of Imprisonment which Courts can Impose:

Frequently, the fining or the sending of a man to jail only aggravates the situation which brought him to court in the first instance. Yet the present laws allow for no other penalty except a conditional release which is generally meaningless. Other countries in the world have such penal innovations as weekend jail, release to work, parole, probation and community work. We need these refinements in Port Moresby.

7. Increase the Jurisdiction of the Lower Courts:

In 44% of all reported instances of housebreaking in 1975, the value of goods taken was less than K100. Yet according to the existing laws, trial of such offences is a time consuming, expensive and ponderous process via committal proceedings in the District Court to determination in the National Court. Getting rid of the committal process would still leave the National Court the case loading of less serious matters which might better be terminated in the lower courts. Jurisdiction for District Courts to hear and determine these and similar matters would speed up the case clearance rates in Port Moresby, and ensure that those burglars who are caught are dealt with quickly before they can commit any more offences.

8. Expand the Village Court's Area of Jurisdiction:

Village Courts have proved successful in the ethnic suburbs of Port Moresby. It only takes one page in the Government Gazette to expand the jurisdiction of the Village Court process to every suburb in Port Moresby. Using the existing court houses and court staff as a base, much of the loading on the existing courts would vanish through the more simple processes of the Village Courts, if such courts were established throughout the city. This would allow quick disposal of cases which people think are simple but which the present law thinks is complicated. Village Court coverage throughout Port Moresby would vastly improve the criminal justice process.

9. Encourage Mono-Ethnic Settlement:

Multi-racial and multi-ethnic suburbs may sound noble, but the Port Moresby experience has shown them to be less safe to live in than mono-ethnic suburbs. The Housing Commission could improve the the safety of the Port Moresby citizenry by the simple process of "first choice" to certain ethnics

in certain suburbs. For example a Motuan gets first choice over applicants of other racial or ethnic origin to a vacancy near Hanua bada. A Kerema gets first choice for a vacancy at Hohola, and so on.

10. Broadcast Daily Crime Statistics:

The N.B.C. already broadcasts daily service bulletins in the form of weather reports, stocks and shares prices, and fluctuations in the coffee and copra markets. It would seem no great hardship to include daily crime reports as well.

It has already been shown that everyone everywhere in Port Moresby is not equally liable to be a victim of crime. There are high times and high crime places within the city, and the venue of criminal activity changes from one suburb to another from time to time. It would be helpful for Port Moresby citizens to know where criminal activity is being concentrated from time to time so that more than adequate precautions can be taken at householder level. Periodic alerts in the suburbs, corresponding with criminal activity concentrations would make criminal activity more difficult for the criminals and keep them constantly on the run.

As far as the N.B.C. is concerned it would only take a single daily telephone call to Boroko C.I.B. to inquire what criminal activity was reported the previous night. Simple to operate, easy to broadcast, this service would do much to help householders help the police and generally assist in the reduction of crime within the city.

11. Get Rid of the Criminal Public Servants:

It seems pointless pursuing a policy to reduce crime in Port Moresby if some of those senior public servants who are in a position to implement such policy are themselves involved in criminal activity.

And whilst the Police Commissioner is not reluctant to shed any of his men convicted of crimes, the Public Service Board obviously is. The practice of ignoring or playing down the criminal activity of certain public servants should cease, and if Departmental Heads or the Public Service Board are reluctant to discipline their staff properly, then the law should do it for them.

Two simple amendments to the Public Service (Interim Arrangements) Act could require -

- (i) All public servants to be fingerprinted and carry identity cards; and
- (ii) Mandatory dismissal from the public service for certain offences such as fraud, misappropriation of public funds, stealing, and drunk and disorderly whilst on duty.

12. Patrol the No-Go Areas:

Get the public used to seeing the police everywhere within the city boundaries; in Hanuabada and other ethnic suburbs, and in the grasslands and other areas of contiguous sanctuary. Use mounted patrols, dog patrols, and old fashioned foot patrols wherever vehicles cannot go or visibility is limited. The probability of a police presence everywhere is a far greater deterrent to crime than the uncertainty of police absence somewhere.

And finally,

13. Do Something about the Unemployed:

This problem will not go away by simply ignoring it. It will get worse year by year, and the sooner something is done about it the better, for in the absence of any lawful form of unemployment benefits the sad truth is that some people in Port Moresby have to steal to eat.

CONCLUSION

The most important finding of this research project was that the patterns of criminal activity which emerged during the research showed that there were high crime times and low crime times and high crime places and low crime places and that everybody everywhere in Port Moresby was not equally likely to become a victim of crime. And whilst some people had become the victims of crime many times over during the course of this research, there were others who had never had offences committed against them in years.

The ordinary street offences of assault, riot, drunk and disorderly etc. tended to concentrate around the places of popular resort; the shopping centres and drink outlets of Boroko, Badili and Hohola, whilst housebreaking offences were concentrated around the high covenant housing areas of Gordon, Boroko and the old city of Granville. In both cases, concentration in time was at weekends, although less noticeably for housebreaking offences.

Some houses were broken into many times in succession during the time span of this project, some at roughly six weekly intervals. Other houses on the other hand had never, ever been burgled, and it was clear from the data available to us that although location and design of a house and the particular materials from which it is built has a lot to do with the probability of it being burgled, the real deterrent to housebreaking in Port Moresby is not location or design or building material but people - having someone around most of the time.

Although it cannot be denied that Port Moresby in 1975 was in the grip of a crime wave, there were still some suburban areas during that year which were completely safe and free from crime. If it were rumoured at that

time that crime was everywhere and that everyone anywhere in Port Moresby was equally likely to become a victim, then such rumours were misleading.

Another important research finding was the significant co-relation between type of offence committed and the ethnic origin of the offender, and although it may be national policy to play down ethnic differences to foster nation building and to prevent regional fragmentation, there is still a definite need from the law enforcement point of view to differentiate between offenders by categories of ethnic origin, for it has been shown by this research project that the ethnic makeup of Port Moresby's population determines to some extent what sort of crime can be expected in the city. Port Moresby's crime control planners of the future therefore, must be alert to any changes in the city's ethnic makeup, because any changes in the ethnic pattern of the city's population will generate corresponding changes in the city's crime pattern.

Another important finding was the unsuitability of the introduced system of lower court practices and procedures which are unable to relate to the circumstances of the city's present crime pattern. Experienced foreign lawyers bamboozling inexperienced national Magistrates, foreign judges insensitive to the circumstances of lower court cases during appeals, the absurdity of the committal process and the frightening aspects of case saturation, incredible delays on the one hand and three minute justice on the other, must give any government cause for alarm. It is very important therefore, to the continued maintenance of law and order in Port Moresby that lower court practice and procedure be overhauled as soon as possible and made more appropriate to the circumstances of Papua New Guinea.

Finally, there needs to be some reorganisation of police activity in the city. The modern tactics of beat, blitz,


check point, saturation, Trojan horse and target and team must be introduced quickly to allow the police to meet with confidence the crime control problems of the future. These tactics require little training, no further funding and are well within the existing resources of the Police Department. A little reorganisation of Port Moresby's police will go a long way towards solving the crime problems of this city.

Most of the documentary evidence for this research came from court case records and police crime reports. While these documents contained a wealth of information, research was sometimes hampered by some inadvertent defects in these records. Traffic court records for example pinpointed the location of the offences sufficiently for our purposes but frequently omitted the offenders' ethnic origins. On the other hand, court records for street offences detailed the offenders' ethnic origins, but frequently omitted the exact location of the offence. Very few court records revealed the ethnic origins of the victims. It would have been interesting to know for example whether the incidences of violence committed by the troublesome Highlands minority were perpetrated against other Highlanders or against coastal Papuans. We were unable to tell accurately one way or the other from the available data and for future research projects it would be helpful if court registers and police charge sheets disclosed more precise details of the ethnic origins of both offender and victim and more precise details of the actual location of the offence. Police crime reports on the other hand contained a mass of meticulously gathered information and although this research project concentrated only on the reports of housebreaking offences, there remains in the files of Boroko C.I.B. a vast store of information relating to all other categories of reported offences. These could be very useful in future research projects. The only tragedy with the police records in 1975 was that they were simply filed away and never used by the police for plotting existing crime patterns or for predicting future criminal

activity. But since the information is already there, it is recommended that the findings of our research project be made into a basis for the annual review of criminal activity in Port Moresby, to be updated year by year, using a one month sample of crime reports, across the board for all offences. Costing less than K1000 per year this annual review would be of considerable benefit to crime control planners of the future.

Our research project uncovered the crime scene in Port Moresby in 1975. But that is now history. What is of greater interest now is what the crime situation is likely to be in years to come, and this can best be estimated by annual review sample.

This research project was the first of its kind in Port Moresby and it came not before time. It would be a pity however if it were allowed to die on the vine, for it has already opened up vistas of future research into the relationship between ethnic origins of offenders and victims, and the crime pattern of a plural society in the developing world.



APPENDIX B

1			2			3			4			5			6			7			8			9			10		
1	National Capital	Papuan Coast	40	Food	3	69	Map 2 Gerehu	SUBURB OF MORESBY WHERE OFFENCE OCCURRED	11	Day of the week that offence was committed	12	Court Termination (if any)																	
2	Western		41	Alcohol		70	Map 9 Gerehu																						
3	Gulf		42	Clothing		71	Map 10 Uni																						
4	Central		43	Battery electrical		72	Map 11 Adcol																						
5	Milne Bay		44	Light electrical		73	Map 5 Tokarara																						
6	Northern		45	Heavy electrical		74	Map 12 Waigani																						
7	Southern High.	HIGHLANDS	46	Motor veh. & parts	75	Map 18 Gordon																							
8	Enga		47	Firearms	76	Map 6 Manuabada																							
9	West. Highland		48	Furniture H/hold	77	Map 7 Konedobu																							
10	Chimbu		49	Furniture, office	78	Map 8 City																							
11	East Highlands		50	Bank books, cheqs.	79	Map 13 Hohola																							
12	West Sepik		New Guinea Mainland	51	Other documents	80	Map 14 Hohola																						
13	East Sepik	52		Jewelry	81	Map 15 Badili																							
14	Madang	53		Money	82	Map 16 Gabutu																							
15	Morobe	54		Anything else	83	Map 19 Gordon																							
16	Manus	55		Nothing taken	84	Map 20 Boroko																							
17	West New Brit.	New Guinea Islands		56	Selective theft	85	Map 21 Korobos																						
18	East New Brit.		57	Grab theft	86	Map 22 Sabana																							
19	New Ireland		58	Total removal	87	Map 25 Airport																							
20	Bougainville		59	Householder present	88	Elsewhere																							
21	Expats		60	Householder absent	89	Monday	Day of the week that offence was committed	11																					
22	Not Known		61	Vehicle used	90	Tuesday																							
23	Open window	Entry without force	62	Vehicle not used	91	Wednesday																							
24	Open Door		63	First break	92	Thursday																							
25	Other opening	Entry by fraud	64	Subseq. break	93	Friday	12																						
26	Trick		65	Gang Job	94	Saturday																							
27	Inside job	Entry with small force	66	Individual job	95	Sunday	Court Termination (if any)																						
28	Louvre opened		67	Day break	96	Fined																							
29	Wire cut	Entry with medium force	68	Night break	97	Imprisoned	12																						
30	Door latch sprung		69	Other	98	Dismissed																							
31	Other small force	Entry with great force	METHOD			99	Committed																						
32	Window smashed		00	Other																									
33	Door smashed	Entry with violence																											
34	Wall smashed																												
35	Other medium force																												
36	ENTRY WITH GREAT FORCE (use of heavy vehicles) (tools & equipment etc)																												
37	Persons threatened																												
38	Persons injured																												
39	Persons killed																												

If the break was not reported to the police, give householder's reason for not reporting:

LOCATION: SECTION:.....LOT.....

SUBURB:.....

If the offence terminated in court, Give the Corresponding General Index NO:.....

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